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This thesis examines the political activism of Croatians in Australia between 1947 
and 1989.  It is clear that the history of opprobrium that this political activism has 
attracted – sometimes seen as extremist and violent – is unfounded. To 
understand this activism, this thesis argues that there are three aspects which 
mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant ‘Other’ and thus 
determine Australian responses to Croatian political activism.  
First, push and pull factors act as catalysts for migration, and determine the 
composition and characteristics of the community that develops in Australia. 
Without understanding these push and pull factors, the migrant ‘Other’ in 
Australia cannot be contextualised, explained, nor understood. 
Second, the concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly constructed 
identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions, determine how the 
migrant ‘Other’ is perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. It embodies 
what I call the ‘expectations of oughts’ – of what Australia ought to be, of how 
Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how they 
ought to behave.  
Third, domestic, transnational, and international contexts arbitrate the first two 
aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are created and 
understood. These paradigms shape the responses of legal, political, and media 
authorities to particular migrant groups, who occupy varying spaces and levels of 
the ‘Other’.  
In the case of Australian responses to Croatian activism in the post-war period, 
there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which responses can be grouped, 
1949-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989. Despite the differences across periods, 
Australian responses can be distilled to a single but flawed belief – that Croatians 
were a problematic community. This ‘problem’ was attributable to their radical, 
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The sign on the building Hrvatsko Poslanstvo - Croatian Embassy, 
together with the [Croat] emblem and the tricolour [the flag], 
better than any radio or television advertisement, or volumes of 
thick books, makes the point to everyone that that which 
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On 29 November 1977 the first Croatian embassy in Australia opened in 
Canberra. Ceremony proceedings were as expected for such an occasion. The 
Charge d’Affaires, Mario Dešpoja, welcomed the 200-strong crowd, community 
leaders from across Australia spoke about the significance of the occasion, a flag 
was raised, and an anthem played. At the end of the formalities, the doors of the 
embassy were symbolically thrown open to the Croatian people.2 This seemingly 
unremarkable ceremony in the nation’s capital, however, was both the catalyst 
for an almost two-year diplomatic nightmare for the Australian Government and 
the subject of national and international attention. For this was an embassy 
without a state - the territory of Croatia then one of the six republics of 
Yugoslavia, and the people of Croatia Yugoslav citizens.  
The ‘Embassy’ proclaimed itself a ‘trumpet of Croatian independence in these 
regions distant from Croatia,’3 and its strength lay in its symbolism. The 
organisers of the ‘Embassy’ deliberately exploited the political language of 
diplomacy in order to challenge the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state, rejecting 
the claim that the Yugoslav Government represented Croatia, Croatians, or their 
interests, whether in Australia, Yugoslavia, or elsewhere. The Yugoslav 
Government, through its Ambassador Aleksandar Šokorac, was quick to 
condemn the ‘Embassy’ as ‘a very grave political provocation against the integrity 
and sovereignty of Yugoslavia.’4 The Australian Government was equally 
concerned with it, but lacked legal recourse; this was, after all, the first embassy 
of its kind to be seen in Australia, and perhaps the world.  
On 24 August 1978 the Diplomatic and Consular Missions Act 1978 received 
Royal Assent, and after another year of legal vacillation, the ‘Embassy’ was forced 
                                                          
1 Speech delivered at Mother’s Day Luncheon in Wollongong, as found in: 
‘News from the Croatian Embassy’, Spremnost, 23 May 1978, 6. 
2‘First ‘embassy’ for Croats’, Canberra Times, 30 November 1977, 11. 
National Archives of Australia, Canberra (hereafter NAA): A1838, 1490/5/51/1, PART 1, ‘Official          
opening of Croatian Embassy’. 
3I. Čizmić, ‘Hrvatska Ambasada U Canberri 1977,-1979’, in V. Kukavica (ed.), Hrvatski Iseljenićki Zbornik 
(Zagreb, Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 2006), 189. 
Original quote: ‘Glavni smisao otvaranja Hrvatske ambasade, prema zamisli osnivača, bio je da 'bude  
trubač hrvatske državotvorne misli u ovim dalekim krajevima od Hrvatske.' 
4 B. Juddery, ‘Removal of Croatian ‘Embassy’ demanded’, Canberra Times, 10 December 1977, 3. 
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to close its doors on 25 October 1979. Though the ‘Embassy’ became the central 
point from where Croatian political activism in Australia unfolded during its 
operation, it was neither the first to gain national exposure, nor did its closure 
signify the end of the community’s activism. Rather, the ‘Embassy’ was simply 
one episode (albeit a significant and colourful one) in the political activism that 
defined the Croatian community. That there was no independent Croatian state 
between 1945-1991 gave a distinct flavour to its Australian community and 
impetus to their actions. Croatians were most present in the Australian public 
sphere when advocating for an independent Croatian state, or for a Croatian 
identity distinct from a Yugoslav one, either through protest and demonstration, 
in the petitioning of the Australian Government, or in its staunch dedication to 
preserving Croatian culture and language. During the 1960s and 1970s, allegations 
of political violence and terrorism pushed the community into the national 
spotlight, and marked Croatians with a reputation for extremism that still haunts 
many.  
This activism became the defining characteristic of Australia’s post-war 
Croatian community. However, perceptions of this activism - and of the Croatian 
community in general - have not evolved too far from the ‘folksy’ image of 
migrants in Australia. Croatians are often reduced to the familiar migrant 
markers of speaking a harsh language, eating strange foods, working the blue 
collar jobs of the construction and manufacturing industries, and most 
importantly, playing the football that has contributed so much to Australia’s 
sporting life. The stereotype of the ‘Balkan Brute’ still taints perceptions of the 
community, particularly in its association with football violence, the supposed 
ethnic hatred of Serbs, or the hushed accusations of being ‘too political’, even if 
very little is known about the activism itself. In casting a light on this unfamiliar 
history, there is more to gain than just a better understanding of the history of 
Croatians in Australia. To the trained eye, the legal, political, and cultural 
legacies that shaped the history of Croatian political activism in Australia are 
palpable in the present. The imperative to understand the relationship of 
Australia with its migrant ‘Other’, whether past, present, or future, will only 
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increase as unprecedented levels of global migration, technological 
interconnectedness, and the looming spectre of global terrorism exert their 
influence on our present.   
 
THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is concerned with the various ways Australian political, legal and 
media authorities have responded to Croatian political activism from 1947-1989. 
It argues that there are three aspects which mediate the relationship between 
Australia and its migrant ‘Other’. The first are the push and pull factors which act 
as catalysts for migration. These factors determine the composition and 
characteristics of the community which develops in Australia, and in turn the 
activities and causes around which they organise. The second aspect is the 
concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly constructed identity, imbued 
with a set of expectations and provisions upon which migrants are perceived, 
understood, and ultimately judged. Finally, domestic and international contexts 
arbitrate the first two aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are 
created and understood.   
In the case of Australian responses to Croatian political activism in the post-
war period, there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which these responses 
can be grouped – 1947-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989. Within each period, both 
the actions of Croatians and their Australian responses were tempered by a 
complex interaction of contexts from Australia, Croatia, and the wider 
international political environment. Despite the differences across periods, 
Australian responses can be distilled to a single but flawed belief – that Croatians 
were a problematic community. This ‘problem’ was attributable to their radical, 
and in the eyes of some Australians, irrational political agenda. The origin of this 
belief is found in the expectation that migrants would become apolitical upon 
their settlement in Australia. Ironically, Croatians are perceived as problematic 
precisely because they take their citizenship as ‘Good Australians’ seriously – they 
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do not just buy the rhetoric, but enact it through their political activism. Thus, 
this history can be read as the tension between the objectives of authorities to 
create the Good Australian Migrant, and those who, in the eyes of these 
authorities, do not, cannot, or will not conform.  
This thesis addresses these issues with the following structure. Chapter One 
takes a longitudinal approach to the history of Croatian migration to Australia, 
both chronologically from the first arrivals in the 1800s to the present, and 
geographically from the reasons for leaving Croatia to the choice of Australia as 
the destination, in order to map the contexts which work to define Croatian 
political activism in the post-war period.  These push and pull factors of 
migration act as catalysts to migration and determine the composition and 
characteristics of the Croatian community which develops in Australia. These 
factors motivate certain individuals to leave their country of origin in the first 
instance, and to choose to settle in Australia in the second. This in turn 
influences how these migrants organise upon settlement, and the activities and 
causes around which they organise. Changes in the push and pull factors of 
migration will influence different individuals to emigrate as motivations change, 
and in turn change the composition and characteristics of the community and 
their political activism.  
Chapter Two introduces the concept of the Good Australian Migrant. This 
figure is a post-war construction, introduced by the Australian Government after 
1945 to make mass immigration acceptable to an insular and unreceptive society. 
The three broad functions of the Immigration Department – selection and entry, 
settlement, and citizenship – ascribed certain characteristics and expectations to 
migrants which demarcated the social space migrants were to occupy. Though 
some of these have evolved as historical, political, social, and cultural changes 
have exerted their influence, these expectations still form the foundations upon 
which migrants are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. The Good 
Australian Migrant is therefore a highly constructed identity, imbued with a set 
of expectations and provisions which mediate the relationship between Australia 
and the migrant Other.  As such, it embodies what I call the ‘expectations of 
6 
 
oughts’ – of what Australia ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and 
of who migrants ought to be and how they ought to behave.  
Chapter Three centres on the first post-war period of Croatian political 
activism, 1947-1971. Like other post-war migrants, the first wave of Croatian 
migrants established welfare and social organisations in order to respond to the 
issues raised by migration and settlement in a new country operating under an 
assimilation policy. However, these organisations also embodied political 
undertones which sought to establish a Croatian identity as separate from a 
Yugoslav one and advocated for an independent Croatian state.  This was 
problematic in the eyes of Australian authorities for two reasons - first it 
contravened the assimilationist expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, and 
second, replaced it with a political agenda that was problematic. Despite these 
contraventions, Australian responses were tempered by Cold War politics, and 
thus afforded the community latitude in its activism. The 1960s brought with it 
wider social, political and cultural changes, as well as a second wave of Croatian 
migrants, which disrupted these paradigms. 
Chapter Four explores the period of 1972-1979, during which Croatian 
political activism was conflated with allegations of Croatian/Ustasha terrorism. 
The election of Gough Whitlam and his government ushered in a new political 
paradigm, a large feature of which was the disavowal of the Cold War myopia 
that had defined the preceding 23 years of conservative government rule. It was 
no longer leftist activism and communism which threatened Australia’s national 
security, but right-wing extremists who had been able to operate under the cover 
of their anti-communism. Croatians were the foremost example of such a group, 
attested by the unprecedented raid on the headquarters of the Australian 
Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) by the Federal Attorney-General 
Lionel Murphy on 16 March 1973 and its aftermath. At the same time, the 
introduction of multiculturalism by the Whitlam Government, and later 
supported by Malcom Fraser’s Government, opened up a legitimate space for 
Croatian activism. This led to the establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ in 1977, 
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which sought to redress the terrorist conflation with which the Whitlam 
Government had branded the community and its activism.  
Chapter Five covers the final period of 1980-1990, during which Croatian 
political activism finds legitimacy. This is due to three main developments that 
shift the paradigms once more and cause Croatian independence to become 
politically acceptable, and in some corners, even desirable. First, the 
reconfiguration of Croatian activism within the paradigms of multiculturalism 
allowed it to sit better within the Good Australian Migrant framework, while the 
rise of second-generation Croatians and the arrival of a third wave of Croatian 
migrants reinforced these changes. Second, Asian immigration caused a 
disruption in immigration paradigms, challenging the general consensus on 
multiculturalism as a successful or desired policy. Third, the death of the 
President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the general demise of communism 
worldwide, meant that Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic importance in the 
international political environment. This not only legitimised Croatian 
nationalism and activism, but led to its encouragement by the very same 
governments that had been ambivalent (and sometimes vehemently opposed) to 
Croatian activism in the previous three decades. 
This thesis is concerned with establishing a new paradigm through which 
this history can be approached. It is less concerned with filling the gaps in the 
literature as it is in expanding the boundaries of it. It seeks to build a foundation 
from which further research can be extended that moves understandings away 
from descriptive and confrontational histories to one of critical interrogation that 
integrate the contexts that define it. It avoids focus on the minutiae of Croatian 
political activism in Australia itself, but rather focuses on Australian responses to 
them in order to lay the contextual groundwork for such a project. This history is 
far more complicated than the varying narratives of good prevailing over evil, or 
of the successes and failures of integration, found in both Australian and Croatian 
accounts of the post-war community. 
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In doing so this thesis will present Croatian political activism not as an 
anomaly or peculiar trait inherent or exclusive to Croatians, but as the actions of 
a group of Australian citizens engaging with the body politic about an issue of 
perceived importance, but whose status as an ‘Other’ guides the reception of 
their contributions. Neither the activism of Croatians nor Australian responses to 
them occurred in a vacuum; both Croatians and Australians were situated in 
domestic, transnational, and international contexts which informed their 
understandings and shaped their actions and reactions. Moreover, Croatians were 
not only the subjects of policy and public debate, but sought to shape them as 
citizens contributing to a national conversation, articulating explanations and 
justifications of their actions and of the world around them.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on Croatian political activism in Australia is a paradox – while 
it is tempting to simply ask ‘what literature?’, the bibliography for this thesis 
attests to the disparate avenues of research this activism has been, and can be, 
associated with. Though the most significant characteristic of the Croatian 
community has been its political activism, there has been little critical or 
academic research that explicitly addresses it. Where accounts do exist, they are 
largely without continuity, lacking comparative study of the activism over time, 
across geography, against the activism of other migrant communities, or in 
regards to Australian responses to it.  Thus, Croatian political activism is often 
reduced to isolated case studies, usually as bit-parts to a wider story, and 
presented descriptively, with little attention to context. This approach shapes the 
activism as homogenous and stagnant, changing little over time and rarely 
presented as a contested activism.  
That which has been written has largely been in isolation of the other; works 
by non-Croatians have focused on English-language sources and perceptions, 
while those by Croatians have focused on Croatian-language sources and 
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perceptions. These competing histories talk at each other, rather than with each 
other. Thus, what is presented is often without nuance, where sources are 
selective and taken at face value, complex issues glossed over in a paragraph or 
two, and the ‘other side’ dismissed without any real dialogue or analysis. An 
example of this can be found in Fabijan Lovoković’s Hrvatske Zajednice u 
Australiji: Nastojanja i Postignuća, a substantial work presented as a 'true 
representation'5 of the history of the post-war Croatian community. Lovoković 
attempts to integrate English-language sources, such as newspaper articles and 
quotations from Federal Hansard, to create a compendium of dates, facts and 
figures that trace the development of the post-war community. Though 
expansive, it is not an academic work, and as Budak outlines, has many implicit 
and explicit shortcomings including its lack of structure, narrative, and cohesion, 
and the misrepresentation, and in some cases omission, of information.6  
From an Australian perspective, Croatian political activism is almost entirely 
defined by the allegations of Croatian/Ustasha terrorism and right-wing 
extremism of the 1960-70s. This means that all Croatian political activism is often 
dismissed as extremist and right-wing in nature, coded as irrational and morally 
reprehensible. This is facilitated by an explicit ‘top-down’ approach to the role of 
Croatian organisations and their leaders within the community, with a focus on 
alleged links to Ustashism, rather than a ‘bottom-up’ approach which considers 
the different reasons why individuals grouped within and around these 
organisations, and their varied interpretations of Croatian identity, nationhood, 
and rhetoric.   
Croatian political activism in Australia is therefore framed within a narrative 
of the adjustment of the Croatian community to Australian society, that is, its 
‘Australianisation’, with Australian authorities the driving force of this narrative. 
The Australian Government is positioned as the subjugator of Croatian 
                                                          
5 F. Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji (Kingsgrove: Središnji Odbor Hrvatskih Društava Australije, 
2010), xviii. 
6 L. Budak, ‘Review of F. Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji, Nastojanja I Postignuća [Croatian 




extremism and terrorism, its legal, judicial, and law-enforcement agencies 
stamping out the ideological legacies from ‘over there’, in favour of the civilised 
values of Australian society. This narrative rests heavily on the well-worn 
Western discourse that Todorova has termed ‘Balkanism’ – the geographical, 
historical, political, and sociological construction of the Balkans as a pejorative 
symbol, imbued with negative connotations against which a positive image of 
Europeanness has been built.7 Balkanist discourse creates a dichotomy between 
the civilized, wealthy, organised, and sophisticated world of the European, with 
the uncivilised, primitive, crude, and cruel world of the ‘Balkan Brute’. Therefore 
at the heart of these narratives lies the transformation of Croatian ‘Balkan Brutes’ 
into Good Australian Migrants.  
This Balkanist narrative is explicitly linked with the history of Left and Right 
politics in Australia, and often arises in literature dealing with Murphy’s ‘raid’ on 
ASIO. Allegations of Croatian terrorism are treated as just another example of the 
difference between the conservatism of Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies and 
consecutive Coalition governments and the progressive, post-Cold War era 
Whitlam and the Labor (Australian Labor Party –ALP) Government represented: 
where the Liberals persecuted innocent Australians because of their ideologies, 
Labor persecuted those who posed a real threat to the security of Australia – 
                                                          
7 M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Although all owe an intellectual debt to Edward Said’s Orientalism, scholars of Balkanism vary in their 
interpretation of the relationship between Balkanism and Orientalism. Some, like Todorova, argue that 
while Orientalism relates to the differences between ‘imputed types’ (i.e. the ‘Occident’ and the 
‘Orient’), Balkanism relates to the differences within one type (i.e. Europe). Others, however, argue that 
Balkanism is one of the variations of Orientalism, which Bakić-Hayden terms ‘nesting Orientalisms’.  
See: D. Bjelić and O. Savić (eds.), Balkan as Metaphor: Between globalization and fragmentation 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). 
K. Fleming, ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography’, American Historical Review, 105(4), 
2000, 1218-1233. 
M. Bakić-Hayden and R. Hayden, ‘Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in 
Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics’, Slavic Review, 51(1), 1992, 1-15. 
M. Bakić-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, Slavic Review, 54(4), 1995,  
917-31. 
P. Patterson, ‘On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, and Italian 
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right-wing Croatian terrorists.8 This narrative is yet to be challenged, and is best 
exemplified by the fact that to this day, the evidence for this view is often taken 
almost verbatim from Murphy’s Ministerial Statement on Croatian terrorism.9 
The most recent contribution to the field - Blaxland’s volumes of ASIO’s official 
history, The Protest Years and the Secret Cold War - does little to challenge the 
implicit assumptions of the literature, even with unprecedented access to ASIO 
files documenting the most problematic years of Croatian political activism.  
Instead, Blaxland repeats many of the tropes already identified as shaping the 
well-worn narrative of Croatian political activism in Australia. It is defined as 
extremist, irrational, and morally bereft, borne of the ethnic hatred idiosyncratic 
of the 'Balkan Brutes' that comprised Yugoslavia, and the result of a 'deep-seated 
resentment felt by Croat migrants towards the Serb-dominated state of 
Yugoslavia.'10 Croatian political activism is reduced to nothing more than the 
Croatian pursuit of 'righting the perceived wrongs done to them.'11 Again, there is 
an explicit top-down approach, concentrating on alleged links to Ustashism, 
where the actions of the few are coded as representative of the many, with almost 
no contextual engagement, particularly with Croatian history or sources. As 
might be expected of an official history, the greatest attention is given to the 
internal machinations of ASIO in dealing with the ‘Croat problem’. Like his 
predecessors, Blaxland frames the perceived successes and failures of managing 
Croatian extremism within the Left-Right political paradigm of the 1960s and 
1970s, rather than questioning the implicit assumptions on which this paradigm 
is based. Thus it seems that the discourse of the ‘Australianisation’ of Balkan 
                                                          
8 For a detailed investigation into the history of the raid on ASIO and its implications for the Croatian 
community, see: K. Kalfic, ‘Knock Knock. Who’s there? Lionel. Lionel Who?: The Attorney-General’s Raid 
on ASIO, 1973’ (BA Honours Dissertation, University of Wollongong, 2011). 
9 Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No. S.13, 1973, 528-547 (See: Appendix 1B). 
The most striking example can be found in David McKnight’s 1994 Australian Spies and their Secrets, in 
which his chapter on Croatian terrorism is openly declared to be almost entirely based on the Ministerial 
Statement and its tabled documents.  
See: D. McKnight, ‘Reaping the Whirlwind’ in Australian Spies and their Secrets, 171-181 
This is despite the many challenges raised both then and now questioning the veracity of the statement, 
including Senator Ivor Greenwood’s Statement-in-Reply on 4 April 1973.  
Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No.S.14, 1973, 798-807 (See: Appendix 1C). 
10 J. Blaxland, The Protest Years: The Official History of ASIO 1963-1975, Vol.II (Crows Nest: Allen & 




Brutes (or lack thereof) not only informed Australian responses to Croatian 
political activism, but also continues to inform historical understanding of it. 
Croatian-Australian literature has largely been written in response to such 
allegations, either explaining or defending the actions of the community, or in 
substantiating counter-allegations that these were incidents orchestrated by the 
secret service of Yugoslavia (commonly referred to as the UDBa - Uprava Državne 
Bezbednosti), acting as agents provocateur in order to discredit Croatian political 
activism.12 However, unlike other countries where Croatian terrorism was alleged, 
such as Germany, Sweden and Bosnia-Herzegovina, allegations of Yugoslav UDBa 
activity in Australia have remained unexplored.13 Rather, Australian-Croatian 
literature tends to focus on the Croatian experience of migration and the 
establishment, maintenance and contribution of the community to Australian 
society. Some are triumphant, such as Drago Šaravanja’s The Snowy and 
Croatians, some historical, such as Ilija Šutalo’s Croatians in Australia: pioneers, 
settlers and their descendants, some encyclopaedic, such as the entries found in 
both editions of James Jupps' The Australian people: an encyclopaedia of the 
nation, its people and their origins, and others memoirs, such as Mate Alač’s Into 
the World.14 
This literature is often celebratory, and acts either as a validation of the 
Croatian identity and culture, or as a symbolic ‘middle finger’ to the forces that 
brought Croatians here. That there was no independent Croatian state from 1945-
1995 gave a distinct flavour to the community, which often manifested in the 
preservation and promotion of a Croatian identity separate from that of being 
Yugoslav. Australian-Croatian literature has reflected this, asserting the 
                                                          
12 See: D. Darby, Why Croatia? (Cheltenham: Douglas Darby, 197-?). 
L. Shaw, Trial by Slander: a background to the Independent State of Croatia, and an account of the Anti-
Croatian Campaign in Australia (Canberra: Harp Books, 1973). 
13 See: B. Vukušić, Tajni rat UDBE protiv Hrvatskoga Iseljeništva (Zagreb: Klub Hrvatskih Povratnika iz 
Iseljeništva, 2001) 
M.J. Marković, Udbini Sinovi (Ljubuški:Press Holding, 2004). 
14 J. Jupp (ed.), The Australian People: an encyclopedia of the nation, its people and their origins, 2nd 
Edition [1st edition, 1988] (Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
D. Šaravanja, The Snowy and Croatians (Sydney: D. Šaravanja, 1999). 
I. Šutalo, Croatians in Australia (Kent Town: Wakefield Press, 2004). 
M. Alač, Into the World (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1992). 
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‘Croatianness’ of the community and framing it as a diaspora of Croatia first, and 
as an Australian community second, if at all. However, these histories also follow 
the general pattern of migrant histories in Australia by positioning the 
achievements of the community within the accepted scripts and imagery of post-
war migrant contribution to Australian society. In doing so, Australian-Croatian 
literature attempts to bring Croatians in from the cold of their reputation as 
extremists and terrorists by emphasising their economic contributions through 
work, their sporting contributions through football, and their cultural 
contributions through their language, customs, and traditions. 
Australian-Croatian histories, like many migrant histories, give a social, 
cultural, and emotional face to the experience of migration, and the private and 
public struggles of building a ‘new life’. Although these histories have created, 
and continue to create, important understandings of what the migrant 
experience means to migrants and Australians alike, this paradigm has also 
proven problematic and limiting, contributing to the creation of (lower case) 
migrant histories which more often than not, sit outside the (upper case) 
‘History’ of Australia. Whether upper- or lower-case, each history can be 
recounted, described, and explained largely outside of the other, save for a few 
important points of agreed intersection, such as the post-war Displaced Persons 
(DP) Scheme or Whitlam’s introduction of multiculturalism. As a result, 
Australian-Croatian histories are characterised by a relative absence of 
engagement with Australian history, and Australian history characterised by a 
relative absence of engagement with Croatian history. 
 As a consequence, Croatians in Australia have largely been written ‘about’ by 
others, often as the footnotes, highlights, or catalysts to ‘real’ Australian history 
migrants so often are. When one type of history mentions the other at these 
agreed intersections, it is namely to add contextual colour. For example, 
Murphy’s ASIO raid is positioned in Australian historical accounts within the 
battle of the political Left and Right, the allegation of Croatian terrorism just 
another example of the difference between them. Australian-Croatian histories, 
on the other hand, pass the Raid over as yet another obstacle the community has 
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faced in its struggle for political and cultural recognition, perpetrated by a 
zealous leftist politician, characterised either as a naïve and gullible Australac 
duped by the Yugoslav Government, or as a malevolent communist-supporting 
henchman. In each case, the other side is simply dismissed, without any real 
consideration as to why exactly the Raid happened at that particular time and 
place, why it was Murphy who carried it out, nor why Croatians and their 
activism featured in the incident.  
Aside from the lack of dialogue between Australian and Croatian literature 
and the integration of English- and Croatian-language sources, there has also 
been a significant lack of engagement with the subject from academic historians, 
who have had almost nothing to say about the Croatian community, let alone 
Croatian political activism. In fact, a large amount of the scant academic 
literature that does exist is found outside the discipline altogether, and is usually 
centred on sociological research into identity, nationalism and diaspora relations, 
such as Val Colic-Peisker’s Migration, class and transnational identities: Croatians 
in Australia and America, and Zlatko Skrbiš’ Long Distance Nationalism: 
Diasporas, homelands and identities.15 There has been little historical study 
exploring the influence of international political relations and contexts had on 
perceptions of the Croatian community and its advocacy of Croatian 
independence. Particularly, no attention has been paid to how Cold War 
considerations dictated the political desirability of an independent Croatia as 
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(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008). 




This replicates the general pattern of studies of European migration to 
Australia identified by Bosworth and Wilton, whereby researchers have only been 
interested in the history of migrants upon their arrival to Australia, doing  
very little to ask how much of a migrant’s politics or culture came from a past 
which still exists for the migrant, how much the migrant still exists outside 
Australia, how much a migrant retains or even re-invents a nationality from the 
country of origin.16  
Conversely, migrants themselves have not been eager to submit their experiences 
to historical analysis due to a perception of Australia as a naïve, uneducated and 
uncultured host country unable or unwilling to understand the nuances and 
intricacies of European history; a sardonic twist on the Balkanist discourse that 
has shaped Australian perceptions and responses. This silence is further 
complicated by the fact that the Europe from which post-war migrants came 
from was a field of fierce and bloody ideological battles, with the Yugoslav 
territories one of the most marked examples of it. As such, Bosworth and Wilton 
argue that some post-war migrants, including Croatians, had a vested interest in 
keeping their pre-Australian lives ‘hidden’. While some had malevolent reasons 
to deny their activities during this period, the experiences of others were so 
terrible they were glad of the opportunity to escape to the furthest end of the 
earth and simply forget.17  
Finally, where histories have been written by migrants, ‘there is major 
evidence of a presence of hierarchies and biases which have been carried from 
Europe to Australia.’18 Only the story of the ‘right’ type of migrant is recorded at 
the expense of others, serving to both reinforce and legitimise the hierarchy of 
one over the other. The legacies of these silences reverberate in Australian-
Croatian histories, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive, longitudinal 
analysis of Croatian migration to Australia which  encompasses  both 
chronological and geographic contexts in Australia and Croatia, and in the 
invisibility of Croatians who fall outside of the post-war definition of the 
                                                          
16 R. Bosworth and J. Wilton, ‘A Lost History? The Study of European Migration to Australia’, Australian 
Journal of Politics & History, 27(2), 1981, 223–24. 
17 ibid., 229–30. 
18 ibid., 225. 
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‘community’, such as non-Catholic Croatians, those from the political left 
(including Croatian Yugoslavs),  non-Croatian ethnic minorities, and arguably, 
Croatian women.  
This thesis argues that in order to break this cycle of histories which talk at 
each other rather than with each other, historians need to put the Australian 
back into Australian-Croatian history, developing new avenues of historical 
inquiry which build on and expand the ways in which Australian-Croatian history 
is understood, and which address the community’s intersection with Australia’s 
imagined nation and the longitudinal rhythms of Australian history. This thesis, 
therefore, seeks to bridge this gap by contextualising post-war Croatian political 
activism. Put simply, neither the activism of Croatians nor Australian responses 
to them occurred in a vacuum. Both Croatian migrants and Australian hosts were 
situated within complex domestic, transnational, and international contexts that 
informed their understandings and shaped their actions and reactions. It is 
precisely here that the paradox of the literature concerning Croatian political 
activism in Australia is created.  
Where an abundance of academic literature rests, and with which Australian-
Croatian literature has seldom intersected, is in the broader issues and contexts 
which shaped the unique experience of  Croatians in Australia, such as those of 
Australia’s history and experiences with immigration, foreign policy, national 
identity, and the construction of the ‘Other’ in Australian society. Although these 
works do not reference Croatian political activism directly, they provide 
theoretical and comparative tools with which the history of Croatian political 
activism in Australia can be approached and analysed. For example, the works of 
James Jupp, Andrew Jakubowicz and Stephen Castles on immigration and 
ethnicity, Richard White, Mark McKenna, David Carter and Marilyn Lake on 
Australian identity and nationhood, and Henry Reynolds, Heather Goodall, Tom 
Griffiths, Anna Haebich, and Peter Read in the field of Australian Indigenous 
history, all frame the socio-political context of Australia that Croatians were 
perceived and evaluated within, and against which their activism was understood 
by Australian authorities. Similarly, the work of Ghassan Hage on Arab-
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Australians, and Hsu-Ming Teo and Nancy Viviani on Vietnamese-Australians 
deal with communities that, like the Croatian community, have been stigmatised 
by their political activism and status as diasporas of international conflict. In fact, 
it was the political activism of Croatians that bequeathed the Vietnamese 
community the ‘pungent epithet for Vietnamese refugees: Yellow Croats; in one 
phrase, the sum of all these fears.’19  
While there is a relatively small body of literature which explicitly addresses 
Croatian political activism in the post-war period, there is a vast array of primary 
material that has remained unexplored or underutilised. The foremost example of 
this is the large quantity of ASIO, Commonwealth and State Police reports, 
governmental department files and reports (largely from the Immigration 
Department and Department of Foreign Affairs), and the personal papers of 
various politicians who through their appointments or constituents had a vested 
interest in monitoring Croatian activism, found in the National Archives of 
Australia in Canberra and in corresponding State Archives. As Croatian 
organisations often attracted the attention of Australian legal and political 
authorities from their very foundation, these archival sources are useful in tracing 
the development of Croatian activism, particularly of that associated with 
organisations and persons of interest to the authorities. Furthermore, often 
included in these files are ephemera related to Croatian activism that would 
otherwise be difficult to locate. The sheer quantity of these archival materials20 
means that a great number of research trajectories could and should be pursued 
that were not possible within the scope of this thesis, but which would shed 
important information on many of the issues discussed. As an example, a 
comparative study of the reports from ASIO and the Commonwealth Police Force 
would provide important answers to the question of whether ASIO’s estimation 
                                                          
19 N. Viviani. The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia (Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 1984), 56.  
20 For example, series A432 originating from the Attorney-General’s Department includes two items 
which are over 180 pages in length apiece, detailing various reports on Croatians and Yugoslavs for the 
month of November 1972 alone. See: 
NAA: A432, 1972/7051 PART 1, 
NAA: A432, 1972/7051 PART 2 
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of Croatian activism was influenced by the politics of Menzies and his Cold War 
myopia as has been alleged. 
  Despite the wealth of information contained in this primary material, there 
are significant limitations which hamper the research of academic historians, and 
perhaps help to explain why this topic has received limited attention. The 
foremost of these limitations is the issue of access. Many of these files have yet to 
be examined for release, and requesting access can become a protracted process 
as many of them, particularly those from ASIO which are not subject to the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982, require special permissions from various 
Commonwealth agencies or are not subject to the usual conditions as outlined by 
the Archives Act 1983.21 As a result, some requests for access have been rejected,22 
and even when access is granted, it is usually with exceptions. These barriers to 
access have resulted in the fragmentation of information, and though this is not 
unique to the case of Croatian political activism, it does nonetheless pose a 
significant impediment to historical research. This is further compounded by the 
absence of, or difficulty in, contextualising this primary material. Primary sources 
‘in the archives’ are rarely the objective and balanced documents they present 
themselves to be, and need to be contextualised in order to be critically analysed. 
Particularly in the case of an organisation like ASIO, where often the origin of a 
report is redacted, it can be difficult to discern the contexts, preconceptions, and 
intentions through which the information contained within these sources has 
been presented. It is therefore recognised that these sources present only partial 
accounts that are difficult to contextualise, and that there exists material relevant 
to the thesis, but to which access is denied.  
Nonetheless, for the purpose of this thesis these archival documents were 
useful in two ways – in elucidating some important minutiae of Croatian 
                                                          
21 For example, requests to have files examined that I placed in March 2013 have been only been 
released as recently as August 2017, well after this thesis was submitted for examination, and even then 
some information has been deemed withheld.   
22 For example, see: 
NAA: A1838, 73/1/3/13 PART 31 
NAA: A1838, 73/1/3 PART 10 
NAA: A1838, 1500/1/24/4 PART 1 
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activism, such as the dates, names, and details of particular events or people of 
interest, and in tracing general trends, both in the changing attitudes of 
Australian authorities and the changing nature of Croatian activism. In fact, it is 
after a wide reading of these documents that two central arguments of the thesis 
were first hypothesised – that there were three distinct paradigm shifts around 
which the responses of Australian authorities could be grouped, and that 
Croatian activism adapted to these paradigm shifts at least in rhetoric, if not in 
nature.   
Federal parliamentary debates (Hansard) have also been utilised to trace 
these general trends. The decision to focus on Federal, rather than State, Hansard 
was guided by the scope and limitations of the thesis. The Federal Parliament, 
with representatives from every State and Territory, could reflect the general 
response of Australian authorities to Croatian activism. The digitisation of 
Federal Hansard also presented a great opportunity to compile diagnostic 
information about political responses to Croatian activism, such as how many 
times the issue was raised in any given year, who was raising the issue, and in 
creating a snapshot of how this debate was shaped from 1949-1989, This proved 
to be particularly useful in tracking the change in debate from the 1960s to the 
early 1970s, and in discerning which aspects of Croatian activism caught national 
attention. Nonetheless, it is recognised that just like archival primary material, 
these sources present a partial account of parliamentary responses to Croatian 
activism. A comparative analysis of State and Territory parliamentary debates 
would tease out the regional differences in responses to Croatian activism, as well 
as provide a more nuanced explanation as to where, when, how, and why 
Croatian activism became a matter of concern to some members of Parliament 
and perhaps not others.  
Newspaper articles were used to monitor media responses to both Croatian 
activism and the responses of Australia’s legal and political authorities to this 
activism. Newspapers and their journalists reflected the ‘pulse’ of the debate, as 
they were situated in the nexus between the general population and the political 
and legal elite. Like Hansard, newspaper articles were chosen with the scope and 
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limitations of the thesis in mind. First, the three main daily newspapers of 
Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne (the Sydney Morning Herald, Canberra Times, 
and the Age respectively) were chosen as the main sources of primary material 
because these cities were the greatest sites of Croatian political activism during 
the periods researched. Second, these newspapers were chosen as they were in 
high circulation in these cities, and therefore a likely source of news media for 
the majority of inhabitants. Finally, the ease of access and analysis to these 
newspapers through their digitisation allowed for diagnostic analyses that would 
become too cumbersome to complete with non-digitised newspapers.  
 There are many limitations to this approach. In choosing to focus on 
newspapers, other media responses, such as television and radio, have simply 
been omitted. Newspapers, however, were the only constant media source 
throughout the periods researched, were readily accessible to many, and were 
considered a trusted source of information. By confining the geographic location 
of these newspapers to Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne, analysis becomes East-
Australian-centric, and omits any regional differences or perspectives on Croatian 
political activism – it could very well be that the rest of Australia was not as 
concerned with Croatians and their activism as these cities were. Finally, the 
choice of the three newspapers targeted is problematic in and of itself as all three 
newspapers are owned by Fairfax Media – Sydney Morning Herald from 1841, The 
Canberra Times from 1964, and The Age from 1972. This means that, at least from 
1972, all three newspapers would have been under the influence of the same 
publisher, which has important implications for the editorial direction of the 
newspapers and their perspectives on Croatian activism. Again, like archival 
material and parliamentary debates, the contextual considerations of these 
articles, the journalists who wrote them, and the newspapers that published 
them, could and should be investigated through comparative studies with other 
newspapers, journalists, and media sources in order to provide a more nuanced 
explanation of media responses to Croatian activism. 
The absence of oral interviews in this thesis was a deliberate decision rather 
than an oversight, and one reached with difficulty. The most pressing reason for 
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this decision was scope – plugging the gaps in the literature, as it were, will be an 
undertaking far larger than the scope of this thesis, and one I quickly realised in 
the early months of my research when I was attempting to do just that. Thus, to 
interview every person, or only key figures, or even a fair sample of them, 
relevant to the 50-year period would not have been feasible, particularly because 
this thesis was not intended to be an oral history project. More importantly, 
however, it would not have challenged or resolved the issues identified in the 
literature review.  Most of the key figures from the period (taken to mean those 
in positions of power, leadership, or authority) have already made their thoughts 
known elsewhere, and though they may bring a new fact or unknown perspective 
to the history, the general narratives of their responses would, I believe, remain 
the same and thus perpetuate the fractures already present in the literature. ‘ 
The lack of primary sources originating from the Croatian community, and 
the dearth of historical research into this means that the overwhelming majority 
of the ‘bottom-up’ history Croatian political activism needs remains behind 
private doors, uncollected and diminishing with the passage of time and deaths 
of older community members. Where these sources (both primary and 
secondary) have been found, however, I have used my language capabilities to 
address the lack of integration between English- and Croatian-language sources 
identified in the literature review. Where applicable, quotations have been 
personally translated, with the original Croatian form provided in the footnotes. 
Croatian script has been used where applicable; however, quotes and anglicised 
terms have been left in their English formats (e.g. Ustaša, Ustasha and 
Ustashism). However, these too suffer from the same limitations outlined above 
for both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources, such as the newspaper 
Spremnost and the ephemera found within archival files, are only partial accounts 
that provide limited snapshots of how only some Croatians viewed their activism. 
Secondary sources, such as the body of Australian-Croatian literature relied on to 
help construct Croatian organisational life, are also partial accounts often written 
in order to justify the Croatian community in the Australian public sphere, and 
need to be contextualised with this in mind. Though these primary and 
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secondary sources have been useful in determining some minutiae of Croatian 
activism and in tracing general trends, the absence of comparative academic 
research has made it difficult to contextualise their content.  
As one of the first (if not the first) doctoral theses to examine Croatian 
political activism in Australia, this thesis attempts to develop a generalised 
representation of Australian responses in the period of 1947-1989. It therefore 
perpetuates some of the issues identified in the literature review in the name of 
scope.  The Croatian ‘community’ is used as short-hand for the customary post-
war definition as those who organised around overtly Croatian organisations that 
were of the ‘proper’ political inclination, and in particular those associated with 
the Catholic Church, folkloric, and football organisations. As such, non-Catholic 
Croatians, those from the political left (including Croatian Yugoslavs) and non-
Croatian ethnic minorities from Croatia are overlooked, while the male-centric 
history of this community, particularly in its leadership, has served to obscure the 
histories of women within the community and in regards to its political activism. 
Furthermore, this thesis does not distinguish between the different communities 
across Australia, and focuses predominantly on those communities in New South 
Wales, Canberra, and Victoria. Though problematic, these parameters were both 
how the community defined itself and how the public sphere defined the 
community, and therefore defines the ‘Croatian community’ Australian 
authorities were responding to in this period. This thesis is but a beginning; it is 







CHAPTER 1:  







Migration movements are total social phenomena, in the 
sense that most structures of social reproduction and of 
human agency play a role in them: economic, demographic, 
social, familial, individual, and psychological factors all come 









In the introduction to her book, The Sting of Change: Sicilians in Sicily and 
Australia, anthropologist Constance Cronin remarked that those 
who emphasize the group and the culture have by and large failed to realize that 
cultures or societies do not immigrate and they do not acculturate. Individuals 
or, at most, families immigrate – taking with them their values, beliefs, and a few 
material possessions. Their societal institutions do not follow with them, and 
although individuals may attempt to establish some of their pre-emigration 
institutions, circumstances force the alteration of these institutions and 
eventually the values which relate to them.2 
She argued that those who study migration must always bear in mind that 
migrants do not bring with them entire political, religious or economic systems, 
but rather, ‘they brought only themselves and their ideas.’3 These ideas, Bosworth 
and Wilton argue, are best described as ‘partially formed and sustained versions 
of the institutions and traditions of their old world’ which are then ‘further 
adapted in the new environment.’4 This chapter demonstrates that the past does 
not desert the migrant when they emigrate, but rather resonates in their new 
environments. Croatian political activism in Australia was rooted in elements and 
ideas from the old world clashing with and adapting to their new environment in 
Australia. Sometimes these partially formed and sustained ideas from the old 
world find semblances in their new environment, and sometimes they jar, forcing 
these ideas to adapt and change.  
The history of Croatians in Australia often begins with Australia’s post-World 
War II (WWII) immigration program. Croatians were one of the many groups of 
Federal Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell’s ‘New Australians’ who helped 
create multicultural Australia. While it is true that this post-war period was the 
most significant in the expansion of the community, it is not so readily known 
that Croatian settlement in Australia dates back to the early 1800s. Given this 
long history, it is somewhat surprising to find that there is no comprehensive or 
seminal work which documents it, both chronologically from the first arrivals in 
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the 1800s and geographically from the reasons for leaving Croatia to the choice of 
Australia as the destination.5 
The challenge of historically documenting Croatian migration and settlement 
may in part explain the reason for this absence, as it is only from 1996 that 
Australian officials began recording Croatians as a separate group. Instead, they 
were recorded as citizens of the empire or state that the territories of Croatia fell 
under. Prior to World War I (WWI), Croatians were variably recorded as 
Austrians, Austro-Hungarians, Italians, or according to their regional origins, 
such as Dalmatians. Archival sources from this period are further complicated by 
the scarcity of naval documents and passenger lists, the Anglicisation and 
misspelling of names on existing records, the purposeful fabrication of names, 
dates, and places of birth, and the illiteracy and inability of Croatian settlers to 
speak English.6 In the interwar years, Croatians were recorded as ‘South Slavs’ or 
‘Jugoslavs’. With the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
at the end of WWII, ‘Yugoslav’ became the official nationality of Croatians until 
its dissolution in the 1990s.  
Even when available, however, interpreting census data can be problematic. 
For example, as at the 2011 Census, there were approximately 126,267 individuals 
of Croatian ancestry living in Australia, of which 38,316 were born in Croatia.7 
This seemingly simple statistic of the number of Croatian-born, however, had to 
be constructed - there are actually 48,828 Australians who were born in Croatia, 
but only 38,316 of them identify as being Croatian. This leaves 10,512 individuals 
                                                          
5 For example, Tkalčević covers the history of Croatians in Australia from the early 1800s, but is more 
descriptive than analytical, and does not give much consideration to the wider historical contexts, both 
in Croatia and Australia, which influenced the community and its actions. The academic contributions in 
Jupp’s The Australian People also cover the entire period of Croatian migration, but each entry is self-
contained. Šutalo has completed the most detailed investigation of early Croatian migration, but his 
section on post-war migration only includes an overview of the period.  
See: Jupp, The Australian People [1st Edition], 335-346 
Jupp, The Australian People [2nd Edition], 235-251 
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia 
M. Tkalčević, Povijest Hrvata U Australiji (Melbourne: Cross Colour Printing, 1999) 
6 Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 1–7; Tkalčević, Povijest Hrvata U Australiji, 13. 
7 The following statistics have been constructed using the ABS Census TableBuilder and data from the 






who were born in Croatia but do not think of themselves as Croatian. Conversely, 
12,393 individuals were neither born in Australia nor Croatia, and of these 4,850 
were born in the former territories of Yugoslavia.  
That the census is self-declaring further complicates this question of 
inclusion and exclusion in that only those who identify as being of Croatian 
ancestry will be recorded - there may be more that are of Croatian ancestry but 
do not self-identify as such. Of those who declare Croatian ancestry, there is no 
indication how much of this ancestry is borne out in their identity - some may 
only carry a Croatian surname, while others may be extremely active in Croatian 
organisational life, speak Croatian fluently and travel to Croatia frequently. It is 
clear that at least 34,426 individuals of those included in the figure of 126,267 are 
of mixed ancestries, listing Croatian as their second ancestry group, and 
suggesting that they may identify with their first ancestry group more closely. 
These issues highlight that the Croatian community - though often cited - is 
difficult to define, and can mean whatever the historian needs it to mean; from 
anyone with a tenuous link to Croatia, to only those that are actively involved in 
the narrowly defined ‘real’ Croatian community, such as overtly Croatian 
organisations that are of the ‘proper’ political inclination, or members of a 
Croatian Catholic church community.8  
Like most migrant histories, the experience of migration itself (the journey 
and the establishment of a ‘new life’), and the experience of the community once 
settled (the history of the community) have been the focus of Croatian-Australian 
histories. Scant attention, however, has been paid to two other important aspects; 
the push factors of migration, the reasons for leaving Croatia in the first instance, 
and the pull factors of migration, the reasons for settling in Australia in the 
second. Jupp reminds us of a third, and in the case of Australia, extremely 
influential element influencing migration patterns - ‘the role of the state in 
                                                          
8 For further discussion on the unreliability of census data in researching Croatians in Australia, see: 
B. Škvorc, ‘Nekoliko napomena o broju Hrvata, Hrvatskom Jeziku, školama i Hrvatskim medijima u 
Australiji’, Društvena Istraživanja, 7(1-2), 1998, 189-206. 
R. Mesarić-Žabčić and D. Mlinarić, ‘Some Reflections on the Research Project of the Institute for 






turning the tap on or off and in favouring and encouraging some classes of 
immigrant over others.’9 Although the logical relation between these three 
aspects is tacitly acknowledged, the historiography of Croatian migration tends 
to treat each in a vacuum, as though the experience of one has very minimal, if 
any, effect on the others.  
This overlooks the fundamental influence these factors of migration have on 
the composition of a community, in that the push factors of migration motivated 
certain Croatians to emigrate, which in turn influenced how they organised, and 
the ideas, causes, and activities around which they organised. Without 
understanding the push factors of Croatian emigration, and therefore the 
characteristics of the Croatians emigrating, the Croatian community becomes a 
homogenous group of people that simply ‘exist’ in Australia. This obscures the 
context of the community’s unique development in Australia and overlooks 
important influences on the trajectory and actions of these people, which 
differentiated them from other migrant groups.  
Likewise, that their destination was Australia was not purely fortuitous. Just 
as there were reasons for when and why particular Croatians emigrated, there 
were also reasons for when and why these particular groups came to Australia 
rather than anywhere else in the world. Without understanding the role of the 
Australian state within this, the host country can be reduced to an arbitrary 
migration destination, with very minimal influence in the composition, 
organisation, and actions of migrant communities, which, at least in the case of 
Croatians in Australia, is simply not true. Like push factors, these pull factors 
influenced how and why Croatians in Australia organised themselves, which in 
turn differentiated the Australian diaspora from other Croatian diaspora’s 
throughout the world.  
This approach to Australian-Croatian history has served to obscure both the 
development of the Croatian community and the fact that the political activism 
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of the post-war community was not as novel or unique as the literature suggests. 
Rather, Croatians in Australia have consistently engaged in political activism 
since the turn of the 20th century, with the activism of the post-war community 
but one of the many forms it has taken. Whether because of the issues with 
documenting Croatians in Australia, the simple loss of history that comes as 
different stories gain prominence in collective memory, or a more wilful 
forgetting, the omission of this historical analysis limits our ability to recognise 
and explain influences on the political activism of the post-war community, as 
well as Australian responses to them. 
This chapter attempts to unravel this comprehensive history in order to 
better understand the longitudinal trajectory of Croatian migration to Australia. 
In doing so, it will contextualise the political activism of the post-WWII period in 
an unprecedented way by expanding the history of the community 
chronologically and geographically beyond the limitations of earlier works. 
Section 1.1 will look at the less well-known period of Croatian migration to 
Australia prior to World War I. Though this emigration was small, Croatia’s 
experience under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Croatian National 
Revival it produced significantly shaped ideas about Croatian identity and 
nationhood that would influence the pre-WWI and inter-war communities in 
Australia, and Croatian activism in the post-war period. Section 1.2 covers WWI 
and the inter-war period. The internment of Croatians in camps across Australia 
during WWI, and the experience of migration and settlement at the height of the 
White Australia Policy served to organise and politicise the community in 
somewhat surprising ways. That Croatia found itself under another two 
constitutional monarchies in the inter-war period, and the experience of three 
failed states in less than 50 years resulted in different and disparate visions for 
Croatian statehood and its future. 
Section 1.3 explores WWII and its aftermath both in Croatia and Australia. 
Not only was this period the direct cause of the first wave of post-war Croatian 
migration, but understanding the experience of Croatia during WWII is crucial to 





reverberates throughout the community today. The experience of WWII also 
profoundly reoriented Australia’s relationship to the world and with immigration. 
Without this reorientation and the post-war immigration program it generated, 
the Croatian community in Australia would not have developed at the rate and 
size that it did, nor would it have attracted the unparalleled diversity of intake 
that created the multicultural Australia of today. Finally, Section 1.4 provides an 
abridged account of the four waves of post-war Croatian migration that coincide 
with the timeframe explored in the remainder of the thesis. By covering this very 
broad and at times seemingly extraneous ground, this chapter will provide the 
foundations needed to reimagine the historical narrative of Croatian political 
activism in the post-war period. After all, in the same way we look to the past to 
understand the present, it is difficult to understand the immediate past without 






1.1. CROATIAN EMIGRATION PRIOR TO WWI 
Croatian migrants experienced Australia at its various stages of social 
development, from Federation, development of outback industries and urban 
sprawls, world wars, the great Depression, racism, changes in migration and the 
application of multicultural ideas.10 
 
Just who was the first Croatian to arrive and when varies across sources. 
However, all seem to agree that Croatian migration to the Australian colonies 
originates somewhere in the early 1800s.11 By the 1880s, Croatian barques were a 
regular sight in Australian ports, and as Šutalo argues, their repeat arrivals 
suggest that Australia was a regular trade destination for Croatian sea 
merchants.12 Croatian crewmen occasionally deserted these ships and settled in 
Australia permanently, while for others, a number of shipwrecks forced Croatians 
to settle in Australia, at least temporarily.13 By 1890, over 850 Croatians had lived 
in Australia, and were almost exclusively single men of peasant origin from the 
                                                          
10 W. Lalich, ‘Migration Generated Expansion of European Influence and the Role of Croatian Diaspora’, 
in E. Smith (ed.), Europe's Expansions and Contractions: Proceedings of the XVIIth Biennial Conference of 
the Australasian Association of Europen Historians (Adelaide, July 2009)(Unley: Australian Humanities 
Press, 2010),  152. 
11 Tkalčević argues that the first traceable Croatian, A Cumberlitch (Čuberlić or Candrlić), arrived in 1800, 
though there are indications that attest to even earlier arrivals.  Šutalo and Stenning argue that the first 
arrival for whom we have documentary evidence is Stefano Posić, a convict of Croatian descent, charged 
with larceny in England and transported to Australia in 1813 under the name of Stephano Haskitt, which 
he later changed to John Stanton. See: 
M. Stenning, Croatian and Slav Pioneers: New South Wales. 1800s-1940's (Glebe: Fast Books, 1996), 2–3. 
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 15.   
Tkalčević, Povijest Hrvata U Australiji, 13 
12 Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 114. 
13 The most famous of these was the shipwreck Stefano, which struck the Ningaloo Reef south of Point 
Cloates, Western Australia on 26 October 1875, of which 3 survivors ended up living with and learning 
the language, customs, and ceremonies of an Aboriginal tribe - amongst the first Europeans recorded to 
have done so.  Two of these, Miho Bacić (Baccich) and Ivan Jurić (Jurich) eventually returned to Croatia 
and recorded their recollections. The original manuscript of these recollections was published by 
Gustave Rathe, descendent of Miho Baccich in 1992, while the hand-written duplicate copy can be 
found in the National Museum of Rijeka in Croatia. See:  
G. Rathe, The Wreck of the Barque Stefano off the North West Cape of Australia in 1875 (New York: 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1992).  
N. Smoje, ‘Shipwrecked on the North-West Coast: The Ordeal of the Survivors of the Stefano’, Journal of 
the Royal Western Australian Historical Society, 8(2), 1978, 35-47.  
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 114–15. 





coastal regions of Dalmatia.14 Despite their relatively small number, the 
contribution of these early Croatians to the development of Australia was 
significant. They worked in the gold fields of Western Australia and Victoria, as 
seamen and fishermen, established hotels, wineries and farms, and were among 
the first of Australia’s entrepreneurs, establishing multiple business ventures and 
trades, as well as making significant contributions to society, culture, and 
industry.15 
These pioneer Croatian migrants, as Šutalo names them, were the product of 
a particular context. In Croatia, the lead up to the 1800s had been turbulent, with 
gains and losses of territory, changes in administrative control, and the 
disbanding and reinstating of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor). Centuries of 
oppressive and exploitative rule by the Austro-Hungarians in Northern Croatia, 
and by the Venetian Republic, France, and Austria along the Dalmatian coast, 
stunted economic development as each empire sought to consolidate their 
political and economic power through their territorial acquisitions. The advent of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1868 and the reunification of northern Croatia 
with Dalmatia did not bring any assistance or relief. Rather, the Empire 
deliberately encouraged Croatian emigration by exacerbating the conditions of 
economic deterioration. This exacerbation was also intended to keep the 
peasantry politically powerless, while preventing industry competition with 
others in the Empire.16  
                                                          
14 Very few Croatian women migrated at this time, and those that did were overwhelmingly wives 
accompanying their husbands. Single Croatian women did not begin migrating to Australia in larger 
numbers until the 1890s with the establishment of chain migration patterns, and it is only in the mid-
1890s that we see marriages between Croatian-born men and women occurring. See:  
Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 61–90. 
15 ibid., 91-186 
16 B. Banović, ‘Push and Pull Factors in the Emigration from Croatia to Australia from the End of the 19th 
Century to Present Times’, Migracijske i Etničke Teme, 6(1), 1990, 9. 
For more information, see: 
B. Banović, ‘Emigracijska politika Austro-Ugarske i iseljavanje iz Hrvatske u razdoblju 1867–1914’, 
Migracijske i Etničke Teme, 3(3-4), 1987, 313-323 







This process was further encouraged by the introduction of assisted 
migration which encouraged non-Slav’s to move to the region. The monarchy 
hoped that economic underdevelopment and the dual process of Croatian 
emigration and non-Slav immigration would help legitimise and secure the 
sovereignty and authority of the monarchy in this politically unstable territory of 
the Empire. Although the policies operated identically across both northern 
Croatia and the Dalmatian coast, the significantly poorer economic conditions in 
the coastal and island regions resulted in higher numbers of emigration. Without 
fertile land for subsistence agriculture to fall back on, Banovic estimates that 
more than 100, 000 Dalmatians emigrated in the period prior to WWI, 
constituting an exodus of almost 20% of the total population of the region.17  
These push factors of Croatian emigration affected a particular Croatian – the 
peasant of Dalmatia - and explains why the overwhelming majority of Croatian 
migrants to Australia during this period were from this region. Croatian 
historians describe this type of emigration as ‘s trbuhom za kruhom’ – literally 
‘with stomach after bread’ - these Dalmatians were pushed out in the search for 
subsistence. This particularly affected the single male peasant. Faced with little 
prospect of employment to support oneself, let alone a wife or family, he left to 
create his fortune elsewhere.18 This also accounts for the relative invisibility of 
Croatians throughout the colonies prior to the 1890s. As peasants, many were 
illiterate and uneducated, did not speak English, and were not wealthy enough to 
afford the expensive passage to Australia. They were, however, experienced 
fishermen or seamen and thus worked their passage to Australia. This method of 
migration found their names anglicised, misspelled, or incorrectly recorded, and 
in some cases, purposefully fabricated.19 Further contributing to this invisibility 
was the imperative of marriage and procreation. Exacerbated by a lack of existing 
                                                          
17 Banović, ‘Push and Pull Factors’, 10. 
18For a detailed analysis of various causes of Croatian emigration in this period, see: ‘Overseas 
Emigration from the Balkans until 1914’ in Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 37–92. 
19 Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 1–7. 





family structures, Croatian males simply integrated into the lives of their 
Australian wives.20   
Unlike the Croatians who would come after them, these settler migrants were 
not highly organised or visible as a community in Australian society. That is not 
to say, however, that they did not share a sense of community based on their 
Croatian identity. As Šutalo explains,  
[Croatians] worked and ran businesses together, socialised and lived together - 
and maintained ties with other Croatian settlers in Australia. There is written 
evidence that over 54% of Croatian settlers had connections with other Croatian 
settlers in Victoria… They were each other's marriage witnesses, attendees at 
funerals and godparents to each other's children. They sometimes travelled great 
distances to be a marriage witness or to be present at a funeral of a Croatian 
friend.21 
Similarly, though their activism was not highly visible, these early Croatians were 
involved, at least individually if not collectively, in Australian public and political 
life. This involvement was closely tied to the employment of early Croatian 
migrants, particularly on Australian goldfields and in mining districts. Others still 
supported various political causes through wider community ties.22 
At the turn of the century, patterns of chain migration began to form. 
Croatian migration was aimed first at Western Australia, and from there 
Croatians either settled or migrated eastward. In 1890, the first ‘mass’ migration 
of Croatians took place from the town of Račišće on the island of Korčula.23 They 
settled in Boulder-Kalgoorlie in Western Australia, whose goldfields soon became 
home to the largest community of Croatians in Australia.  An abrupt 
deterioration of economic conditions in Dalmatia heralded the onset of these 
mass migrations, and accounted for the larger number of Croatian arrivals to 
Australia from the 1890s, particularly with the collapse of the winemaking and 
                                                          
20 Šutalo, Croatians in Australia, 61–62. 
21 ibid., 61. 
22 For example, Šutalo documents at least three prominent Croatians, Thomas Pavletich, Mattio 
Orlovich, and Archbishop of Adelaide Matthew Beovich as supporting the ‘Irish cause’ in Australia, 
influenced by their ties to the Catholic Church. See: ibid., 71–81. 
23 Approximately 60% were single men and 30% married men who had left their wives in Croatia, 
mirroring those that had migrated before them.  The remaining 10% of male migrants, however, were 
accompanied by their wives. See: C.A. Price, Southern Europeans in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford 





shipbuilding industries that had provided some level of economic subsistence in 
the region.24 
The economic disenfranchisement of Croatia under Austro-Hungarian rule 
was amplified by the Empire’s so-called ‘Magyarisation’ policy, which threatened 
to erase Croatian identity by enforcing the use of the Hungarian language and 
resisting the unification of Croatian territories.25 In response to this, a group of 
young Croatian writers, under the leadership of Ljudevit Gaj, established the 
Illyrian movement in Zagreb in the early 1830s. This was a cultural and political 
movement aimed at addressing the position of Croatia within the Empire, its 
principle goal the establishment of a standard Croatian language as a counter to 
Magyarisation. This linguistic pursuit sat alongside the development of a 
Croatian cultural identity and history of nationhood, often referred to as the 
Croatian National Revival (Hrvatski Narodni Preporod).  
Based on the theory that South-Slavs were descendants of ancient Illyrians, 
the movement also advocated a pan-South-Slavism based on linguistic and 
cultural grounds. The breadth of the movement, however, resulted in the 
development of two main strains which would shape the next 150 years in the 
region; a Croatian nationalist movement aimed at the unification and 
independence of the Croatian people, and a Yugoslav movement, aimed at the 
integration of all South-Slavs.26 In the 20th Century, both would use figures and 
ideas from the Illyrian movement to justify their causes.27 The Croatian-
Hungarian Agreement of 1868 (commonly referred to as the Nagodba) reinforced 
these cultural developments by granting Croatians autonomy over internal affairs 
in the ‘Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia’. This prompted a boom in the institutional 
                                                          
24 I. Goldstein, Croatia: a History (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 97. 
25 G. Vermes, ‘South Slav Aspirations and Magyar Nationalism in the Dual Monarchy’ in I. Banac, J. 
Ackerman, and R. Szporluk (eds.), Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich (Boulder: 
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26 For a discussion on the reasons for this division, and comparisons between Ante Starcevic and Josip 
Juraj Strossmayer, see: Tanner, Croatia; A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, London: Yale University 
Press, 1997), 94–107. 
27 For more information on the Illyrian Movement and its development, see: 
E. Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1975).  
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development of Croatia, including the renaming of the Matica Ilirska to Matica 
Hrvatska, (now one of the oldest Croatian cultural institutions still in operation), 
the re-establishment of the University of Zagreb in 1874, and the construction of 
the Croatian National Theatre in 1895.  
This period of cultural and national development led to the migration of 
Croatians with a framework of ideas and language that expressed a Croatian 
national identity not available to those that migrated earlier in the century. This 
is best encapsulated in the lamentations of Pavle Vidas, a Croatian traveller who 
lived in Australia from 1889-1894, and whose diary is one of the precious few 
written sources detailing the lives of Croatian pioneers. He notes, 
Upon our arrival in Sydney, my friend from Hreljin and myself, met a Croat from 
Primuda in Croatia who had a Hotel in Sydney. We told him that we were from 
Croatia and he responded that we were Austrians as there was no country called 
Croatia. Žali Bože, he didn’t even know where Croatia is, but is a Croatian like us! 
At the time, at his hotel were several other Croats who also agreed with him and 
stated that there was no Croatian ethnicity. When we heard such stupidities, my 
friend and myself, although without money and no other place to go, decided to 
leave the Hotel rather than waste our time with those ignorant idiots.28 
Exposed to the Illyrian movement, the Croatian National Revival, and the 
development of a Croatian national identity, Vidas was appalled to find Croatians 
in Australia unaware of their cultural and ethnic heritages, either uneducated or 
unwilling to express their nationality. Though the tension between ‘real’ 
Croatians and those whose allegiances lie elsewhere was a defining characteristic 
of the post-war community, this exchange demonstrates that the negotiation of 
Croatian identity, closely tied with the political activism of the community, was 
not a new phenomenon nor unique to the post-war period. 
Although Croatians were more visible in Australia from the 1890s simply 
because they were more numerous, they also began organising as a distinct 
community. Like Vidas, the influence of the Illyrian movement can be found in 
the organisation of these migrants not only as Croatians, but as ‘South-Slavs’, 
incorporating the pan-Slavist ideals of the movement. This is best demonstrated 
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in the establishment of the first identifiably Croatian organisation, the Croatian-
Slavonic Society of Boulder-Kalgoorlie in 1912. It seems that at least at this 
juncture in time, a Croatian identity and pan-Slavist ideals were not the mutually 
exclusive pursuits they became after WWII.  It is not difficult to imagine that as 
an overwhelming minority in the face of such distance and isolation, organising 
with people from a similar geographic area with similar cultures and languages, 
under the banner of South-Slav may have had its own advantages, not least 
because it was reinforced by Australian authorities who did not differentiate 
between them. 
Australia was not by any means the preferred destination for Croatian 
emigration before WWI. As Banović points out, the emigration of at least half a 
million Croatians from 1868 up until WWI constituted approximately 35% of the 
total emigration from the Austro-Hungarian Empire for this period. Of this, 
approximately 5% came to Australia - the overwhelming majority migrated to the 
United States.29 This can be attributed to the pull factors (or lack thereof) of 
migration which determined Australia’s desirability as a migration destination. 
Despite the exodus of people from Europe into new settler societies that 
characterised the 19th Century, Australia was largely bypassed by these migrants 
on the move. 
The most significant reason for Australia’s marginalisation in the great 
migrations of the nineteenth century was the most obvious – the tyranny of 
distance.30 Australia also had too small of an economy and population to produce 
the opportunities afforded by North America, and was blemished by the stigma 
associated with its convict population. These barriers to migration also held true 
for Croatian emigration. Australia was too distant and too expensive a 
destination, and not only was it easier to migrate to the United States, but 
employment opportunities were better and easier to come by for the new migrant 
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in the United States, where wealth was faster and easier to accumulate in its 
industrial-mining industries as compared to Australia’s agricultural industry.31  
Despite these barriers, Banović argues that Australia still remained an 
attractive migration destination for Croatians - a sparse population that lent itself 
to growth opportunities, an abundance of free agricultural land for farming, a 
relatively developed livestock industry (most notably in sheep husbandry), rich 
deposits in gold and opal for mining, and a relatively unrestricted immigration 
policy. Western Australia was especially attractive to early Croatian migrants, as 
it had similar conditions and industries to those in Dalmatia. The proximity to 
the ocean and fishing industries was reminiscent of the rhythms of coastal life in 
Dalmatia, while the climate and soil were similarly suited to winemaking. Finally, 
as chain migration patterns were established towards the end of the century, 
some Croatians migrated to Australia with the assistance of family and friends 
who could, at the very least, secure temporary accommodation, assist in finding 
employment, and help alleviate and navigate the social and cultural anxieties of 
migration.32   
Due to the distance and expense involved, Australia’s relationship to 
immigration in the 1800s was unburdened with the question of large numbers of 
unassisted or unwanted arrivals, as was the case in the United States, and those 
who reached Australia were able to be controlled, subjugated, or ostracised as 
needed. The introduction of assisted passages to British subjects not only allowed 
the colonial governments to decide when and how migrants came to Australia, 
but also which migrants came. These conditions developed a long tradition of 
determining the selection of incoming people, and thus gave Australia the ability 
to, in effect, design its population. It comes as no surprise then, that one of the 
first acts of Federal Parliament, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, addressed 
the role of immigration in the new federation. Though this Act was the central 
piece of legislation which ushered in what would become known as the White 
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Australia Policy, it was also only one in a series of acts, amendments, and 
programmes which would develop over the years of White Australia’s existence.33  
The social logic of the White Australia Policy was steeped in rationales of 
race determinism and mass nationalism which posited humans on a sliding scale 
of whiteness. Proponents argued that racial homogeneity was essential to 
national unity, prosperity, and the establishment of a democratic society, and 
that non-Europeans, as a culturally and biologically different race, were incapable 
of identifying with, or subscribing to, the values of white British Australia. This 
social logic found economic expression in the prevention of entry of cheap goods 
and cheap labour into Australia. It was argued that the manufacture of goods by 
British Australians, coupled with government assistance in the development of 
industries would keep living standards high by providing employment. The 
prevention of ‘coloured’ labour would keep wages fair and reasonable by 
preventing their entry into industrial relations as ‘cheap’ labour, and had the 
added bonus of keeping the race homogenous, which was thought necessary for 
the peaceful regulation of industrial relations. 
This social and economic logic was buttressed by Australia’s geopolitical 
reality and the profound anxieties caused by it. The tyranny of distance which 
determined Australia’s peripheral status in the great migrations of the nineteenth 
century also found expression as a fear of invasion. Perceived as an isolated 
outpost of Western civilisation, Australia’s distance from Britain, coupled with 
the sheer size of the Australian continent comparative to its very small 
population, created a perception that Australia was liable to be overrun at any 
given moment by those ‘lesser’ races surrounding it.34 This anxiety was 
                                                          
33 As Markus explains, the policy ‘was concerned with racial purity in the widest sense,’ and can be 
broadly categorised into three facets. The first is that with which the policy is most readily associated, 
the control of population movement and the exclusion of non-European migration to Australia. The 
second included measures to reduce the number of non-Europeans already in Australia, and finally, it 
also aimed to segregate and ultimately eliminate the Indigenous population for the sake of racial 
homogeneity.  
See: A. Markus, ‘Of Continuities and Discontinuities: Reflections on a Century of Australian Immigration 
Control’ in J. Jayasuriya, D. Walker, and J. Gothard (eds.), Legacies of White Australia: race, culture, and 
nation (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 176. 





particularly pronounced due to Australia’s uncomfortable proximity to the 
‘awakening’ Asian continent, whose Chinese, Japanese, and Indian populations 
were on the move in comparable numbers to those from the West. The 
experience of Chinese immigration during the gold rushes of the 1850s only 
served to reiterate the legitimacy of these anxieties, and for 60-odd years after its 
introduction in 1901, the White Australia Policy enjoyed bipartisan and 
overwhelming public support. As Kelly points out, this longevity and near 
universal support was ‘testimony to the powerful economic and social logic 
implicit in the policy.’35 
 
                                                          





1.2. CROATIAN EMIGRATION IN THE INTERWAR 
YEARS 
Australia limited entry not only to British subjects from Asia, but also to southern 
Europeans, who were regarded as being not quite ‘white’.36 
 
WWI served to strengthen Australia’s ties with the British Empire and 
reinforced the White Australian vision of the future; that for reasons of national 
unity and security, Australia should be predominantly British, that non-
Europeans should be denied entry, and that the indigenous population must 
remain segregated from white British society. The issue of cheap labour was 
exacerbated by wartime conditions, and led to the internment of various ethnic 
groups deemed ‘enemy aliens’. Alongside others then considered ‘Slavs’, 
approximately 740 Croatians were interned first in camps on Rottnest Island and 
Torrens Island in Western Australia, and upon their closures in 1915, transported 
across the country to the Holsworthy Internment Camp at Liverpool in New 
South Wales. Ostensibly interned because of their official status as Austro-
Hungarian citizens, Fischer argues that the real reason for the internment of 
Croatians was ‘a campaign by mine workers unions over the question of ‘enemy 
labour’ in the goldfields of Boulder-Kalgoorlie where [Croatians] were a sizeable 
minority in the workforce.’37 While some were released at the end of the war, 
most of the Croatian internees were deported from Australia in September 1919, 
as citizens of the then non-existent Austro-Hungarian Empire.38    
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This internment and subsequent deportation occurred despite the fact that 
many Croatians were outspoken in their opposition of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Its rule over Croatia was considered culturally and economically 
oppressive by the community in Australia, and had directly or indirectly caused 
their migration in the first place. The first Croatian political organisation can be 
dated to as early as 1910, with the establishment of a Peasant Party in Broken Hill 
that produced its own small publication, Peasant News.39 By WWI, it is clear that 
Croatians were active in their denunciation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
Croatian-Slavonic Society in Boulder-Kalgoorlie openly and actively collected 
funds for the allied war effort and encouraged men to enlist,40 while in North 
Queensland, Croatians were encouraged to renounce their Austrian citizenship 
and instead declare themselves Serbo-Croat or Croat.41 Such was the activism of 
the Boulder-Kalgoorlie community that in December 1915, the Boulder Police 
Station and the Kalgoorlie Miner reported that tensions between those 
advocating for or against the Austro-Hungarian Empire threatened to escalate in 
violence and spill into the streets.42  
Interestingly, this political activism did not include a vision of Croatian 
unification and the establishment of a Croatian state. Rather, as Tkalčević 
explains, while some advocated to remain within the Empire (presumably under 
better conditions), Croatian political activism mostly advocated either a pan-
Slavist ideal of the unification of one people, or the utilitarian unification of the 
different ‘South-Slavs’ against common threats.43 Nevertheless, the anti-Austro-
Hungarian position of Croatians was ‘clearly recognised by the Australian 
Government which actively tried to recruit volunteers from among Slav 
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migrants,'44 and a Croatian contingent of the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF) 
was created for the front in Salonika. The servicemen in the AIF contingent, 
however, met a similar fate to their internee counterparts:  
After the war some tried to get assisted passage back to Australia, [and] despite 
being trained by Australians and travelling to Europe to fight for Australia, they 
were not allowed to return on the navy ships with other Australians.45  
Their deportation and the failed repatriation of AIF servicemen reverberated 
throughout the community, the legacy of which would inform the interwar 
period.  
In the aftermath of WWI, the introduction of immigration restrictions and 
quotas in the United States redirected some of the immigration out of southern 
Europe to Australia. A significant proportion of these Southern Europeans were 
Croatian, and as conditions in Croatia deteriorated, a significant growth in 
Croatian migration to Australia might have been anticipated. The Australian 
Government, however, moved to restrict this immigration. The influx of 
Croatians and other southern Europeans after the war was perceived as a threat 
to employment prospects and conditions, and the wartime preoccupation of 
labour re-emerged as the social, cultural, political, and economic nexus of the 
White Australia Policy in the interwar period. In 1924 and 1925, the Australian 
Government introduced quotas on those deemed problematic to Australia’s 
Working Man’s Paradise.46 This included Southern Europeans, who were 
perceived as ‘not quite ‘white’,47 and a potential source of cheap labour which 
could undercut the employment prospects of British Australians. 
Though these measures significantly restricted the entry of Croatians in the 
interwar period, there was nonetheless a relative growth in Croatian migration. It 
was also a period of significant expansion in community, social, sporting and 
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cultural activity, with over 22 Croatian clubs formed.48 As Banović argues, this 
was because the pre-war economic pull factors of Australia also held during the 
interwar years, and were even augmented by a number of additional reasons. 
Australia’s accelerated urbanisation and industrialisation, the increased exchange 
of information about Australia as a migration destination through chain and 
return migration patterns, and the movement of Croatians already in Australia 
into better paid employment, resulted in a better ability of those already in 
Australia to help cover the costs of travel and initial settlement of new migrants, 
and thus convince family and friends to migrate.49 The most influential of pull 
factors according to Banović, however, was the relative standards of living 
between both countries. When considering the comparative differences in real 
wages, living standards and earning potential between countries, Australia 
boasted the highest standard of living during the interwar years, surpassing that 
of both the United States and Canada.50 
Following WWI, Croatia found itself under another monarchy - the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Justified by the argument that the three were equal 
'tribes' of a single, 'tri-named' nation, the Kingdom ostensibly fulfilled the pan-
Slavist ideals of the Illyrian movement.51 For Croatians, however, the reality 
resembled more their subordination and grievances under the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire than the promised equality with its South-Slav neighbours. The fear of 
Magyarisation under Austro-Hungarian rule was replaced with a fear of 
Serbianisation under the new monarchy. The issue of language reappeared, as 
Serbian and the Cyrillic script became the lingua franca of the central 
government.52 Disputes over education, the centralisation of government, the 
reduction in the powers of the Croatian Ban, and the dissolution of the Sabor yet 
again, were all reminiscent of issues under Austro-Hungarian rule. Under the 
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guise of agrarian reform, the government dispossessed Croat institutions of lands 
which had been granted to them in perpetuity by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, while shutting down a number of departments at the University of 
Zagreb, and somewhat bizarrely, transporting large quantities of books from 
Croatia to Belgrade under the pretence that they were no longer needed in 
Croatia. The monopoly of Serbians in governmental positions contributed to the 
rising discontent, with Croatian republicans and communists finding themselves 
barricading against the creeping monarchism of the Serbian Karadjordjević 
dynasty. This was all underlined by a series of disputes, outrages, and 
assassinations over the procedures of government and voting that dominated 
politics for most of the 1920s.53  
 Stjepan Radić, founder of the Croatian Peasant Party in 1904 (Hrvatska 
Seljacka Stranka –HSS) was a leading figure in Croatia under Austro-Hungarian 
rule and became a key politician within the new Kingdom. He campaigned under 
a platform of opposition to the Kingdom itself politically, and Serb hegemony 
culturally. Credited with turning the Croatian peasantry into a viable political 
force, Radić and his party enjoyed overwhelming support throughout Croatia, in 
spite of the considerable challenges imposed by the central government.54 On 20 
June 1928 these political tensions came to a head when Puniša Račić, leader of the 
People’s Radical Party of Serbia (Narodna radikalna stranka – NRS), pulled out a 
revolver and shot at five HSS representatives on the floor of the Parliament. Two 
died instantly, and two were wounded but later recovered. Radić was the fifth 
casualty, seriously wounded in the stomach.  
The assassination attempt triggered a political crisis from which the Kingdom 
never recovered. Less than an hour after news reached Zagreb, approximately 
19,000 people gathered on the main square demanding the Sabor be reinstated in 
order to separate Croatia from the Kingdom. As Radić succumbed to his injuries 
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on 8 August 1928, the prevailing sentiment was that the attack on the leaders of 
the HSS was an attack on the Croatian people. Radić’s funeral on 12 August 
attracted crowds in the hundreds of thousands, and ‘resembled more the funeral 
of a great monarch than of a one-time republican politician.’55 The death of Radić 
‘turned into a political manifestation of massive proportions,’56 with the triune 
Kingdom losing whatever legitimacy it may have held with the Croatian people. 
Rather than allowing Croatia to separate, on 6 January 1929, King Aleksander I 
Karadjordjević annulled the constitution, dissolved parliament, banned all 
political parties, introduced harsh censorship of the press, and named a new 
Government under a system of royal dictatorship. On 3 October 1929, this royal 
dictatorship became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia served to further convince Croatians of their 
political, economic, and cultural dispossession at the hands of Serb nationalism. 
From April 1929, influential opposition leaders were arrested and imprisoned, 
bands of ‘terrorists’, composed mostly of the police, were organised in order to 
subdue dissidents, and a suite of legal reforms were introduced in an attempt to 
reduce expenditure, corruption and regional differences.57 However, as Bellamy 
outlines, 
Most critically for the historical statehood narrative, [the King] abolished the 
former constituent entities (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and 
Serbia) and introduced nine regional Banovine, which bore the names of rivers. 
The name Croatia was removed from official use for the first time since it was 
established in the medieval Triune Kingdom. To rub salt into the wounds, 
Croatia and Dalmatia were again split into two entities.58 
Therefore the Croatian migrating during the interwar years was not dissimilar to 
those pre-WWI; both were citizens under constitutional monarchies not of their 
own choosing, both consisted of predominantly male peasants pushed out due to 
economic reasons, and both saw their cultural identities threatened by a 
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pervasive and persistent ‘Other’. The failure of yet another constitutional 
monarchy - the third in less than 50 years - would have engendered some shared 
anti-monarchic sentiments between the pre-war and inter-war migrants, 
particularly when constitutional monarchies were the indirect cause of both 
migrations.  
Inter-war Croatian migration to Australia was also one marked by transience. 
Between 1924-44, over half of those who came to Australia eventually returned to 
Croatia, while during the Great Depression, more Croatians departed than 
arrived.59 Part of this can be attributed to the policy of emigration pursued by the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia which Hranilović describes as ‘round-about emigration’; 
ideally workers would migrate in search of employment, earn their wealth 
abroad, and return to the Kingdom when the nest-egg was large enough.60 This 
transience meant that information about conditions in Croatia under the 
unstable politics of the Kingdom made its way to Australia, while information 
about Australia and its Working Man’s Paradise made its way back to Croatia.61 It 
also meant that Croatians who migrated in this period would have had a minimal 
influence on the composition and character of the community as a whole simply 
because they did not have the opportunity to establish themselves within the 
Australian milieu as did their pre-WWI counterparts. 
The interwar years were characterised by a newfound public visibility of the 
community, driven in part by an increase in their political activism. International 
socialism was common to the political language of both Australia and Croatia. In 
Australia, its ideals were considered possible answers to the economic, social, and 
political problems facing the working class, including access to work, 
employment conditions, and unionisation.62 Poor working conditions in 
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Australia, coupled with this rise of socialist and communist ideals within the 
mass unions of industries Croatians were employed in, contributed to the 
increased visibility of Croatian political activism, and soon found Croatians 
participating alongside other Southern European and Australian workers. This 
was made possible because these movements were able to overcome the ethnic 
divisions that separated Southern Europeans from British Australia. Local 
Australians and immigrants (of the working class at least) were able to find 
common ground in shared employment experience, and a common language in 
the ideals of international socialism or communism.63  
This political activism was centralised in 1928 with the establishment of the 
Borbeni Radnički Pokret (Militant Workers Movement) in Broken Hill. The Pokret 
was a left-wing organisation that supported the international socialist movement, 
and in 1931 began publishing the first Croatian-language newspaper in Australia, 
Borba (Struggle). At its 1932 National Conference it was decided that the 
organisation relocate to Sydney and be renamed the Savez Jugoslavenskih 
iseljenika u Australiji (Association of Yugoslav Immigrants in Australia - Savez). 
This was done to better reflect the membership and political orientation of the 
organisation, which embraced not just Croatians, but all South Slavs. Borba was 
renamed Napredak (Progress) in 1936, and became the official newspaper of the 
organisation.64  
The Savez initiated a number of political actions in support of the 
international socialist movement, often co-ordinating with local labour and trade 
union movements in industrial actions across Australia. The most notable of 
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these included strikes in the mines at Broken Hill,65 on the wood-lines of Western 
Australia,66 and in the cane-cutters strikes in Queensland.67 Savez members were 
active in trade unions, with some rising to prominent positions.68 Such was the 
political activism of the Savez that from January 1937, the Commonwealth 
Investigation Branch (CIB) began surveillance of its members.69 The leftist 
political sentiment found within the pages of Napredak was also of interest to 
authorities, and from 1940-1942 the Australian Government banned Napredak 
from circulation. 
With over 30 branches throughout Australia by the beginning of WWII, 
Lalich argues that the Savez was an organisation of such size and scope that it is 
difficult to find parallels both within and outside Croatia.70 Aside from 
participation in local industrial actions and newspaper publication, the Savez 
concerned itself with a wide range of activities, including Croatian-language 
instruction, the formation of drama societies and tamburica orchestras, and the 
establishment of sporting and other recreational clubs. Unlike previous Croatian 
organisations in Australia, the Savez was also actively concerned with 
developments in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, disseminating information and 
providing support for union and trade movements as well as communist-led 
organisations within the Kingdom, and in fundraising for various causes.71  
Though the arrival destination of Croatian migration started to move 
gradually from Western to Eastern Australia, the community in Boulder-
Kalgoorlie retained its importance in the interwar period. It is no surprise that 
the interwar frustrations of poor working conditions, the rising racialisation of 
labour forces, and inherent disputes in industrial relations which characterised 
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the 1930s, culminated in what was reported as a ‘Night of Unbridled Rioting.’72 
The growing resentment and suspicion of the sizeable non-British mining 
populations turned the accidental death of a British-Australian during a brawl 
into a demand for all mine-owners to dismiss southern European miners and 
employees. The ensuing rioting resulted in three deaths, including that of 
Croatian Josip Katić, the looting and destruction of southern European shops, 
hotels and clubs, including the hall of the Croatian-Slavonic Society, and the 
torching of more than 50 homes in the residential area populated by southern 
Europeans. Such was the violence, local forces were unable to control the rioters, 
advising migrants to flee and take refuge in the surrounding bush until the arrival 
of reinforcements from Perth some three days later. Though subsequent judicial 
inquiries exonerated the southern Europeans, and even resulted in official 
compensation and charitable drives, the anxiety and insecurity the riot bred 
slowly created an exodus of the southern Europeans to Perth and its surrounding 
farms and vineyards, and the decline of Boulder-Kalgoorlie as the epicentre of 
Croatian migration.73  
In Croatia, international socialism was touted as the answer to the problems 
of constitutional monarchy and capitalism, and a communist Yugoslav state the 
only real political expression of pan-South-Slav unity. The Croatian peasantry, 
under the influence of Radić, had become politicised in the interwar years, and 
politics in the aftermath of Radić’s assassination trended towards extremism, 
with the emergence of both left and right wing political movements as answers to 
the problems of constitutional monarchies - a situation not dissimilar to political 
developments throughout the rest of Europe. Coupled with the fact that the 
Yugoslav Communist Party had a strong following in Dalmatia prior to its 
suppression, this meant that those emigrating during the interwar years were 
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more likely to be sympathetic to communist ideals, or to be apolitical.74 As Price 
explains,  
more politically conscious peasants and labourers tended to stay in Europe in 
order to take part in political activities; the less politically conscious were 
inclined to leave their native land and settle overseas.75  
Some were politicised upon arrival in Australia, ‘shocked by the hostility to 
immigrants, especially in the industrial areas where unemployment was high.’76 
For others, there was not much choice; more than 90% of Croatians in Australia 
were organised around the Savez during the interwar years, and the few 
monarchists who existed were completely ostracised.77 That communism was 
already a feature of Australian political life and the Croatian community, while 
far-right movements such as fascism were less so, obscured any non-communist 
Croatians that may have migrated during the interwar years.  
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1.3. WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Violence occurred in many directions. Religious, ethnic, social and political 
motives for persecution overlapped, both nationally and locally. Boundaries 
between victims and perpetrators were often blurred; collective violence  
was interactive, procedural and permanently changing. 78  
 
The interwar years politicised the people of Yugoslavia, particularly 
Croatians, and resulted in competing visions for Croatian statehood and the 
future it should take. WWII and the unconditional surrender of the Royal 
Yugoslav Army on 17 April 1941 plunged the territory of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia into a ruthless war between rival forces. This had devastating 
consequences throughout the entire region, and cast a long and dark shadow on 
the post-war community – one that still reverberates in the present day. The 
struggle for Croatia was concentrated between the Croatian Ustaša, Serbian 
Četnik, and Yugoslav Partisan forces. However, a number of ancillary forces, 
militias, and groups were also involved, all of whom collaborated with and fought 
against each other in the name of the various ideals and aims they represented.79 
Both the Ustaša and the Četniks were nationalist-oriented movements 
concerned with the emancipation and independence of their people. Led by Dr 
Ante Pavelić, the Ustaša was a movement that advocated ‘with all means 
possible – including armed uprising – to liberate Croatia from alien rule and 
establish a completely free and independent state over the whole of its national 
and historic territory.’80 The Četniks were led by Draža Mihailović, and 
comprised of Serbian royalists whose aim was to ‘realize a vision of an ethnically 
homogenous greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short 
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run, by a policy of collaboration with Axis forces.’81 The Yugoslav Partisans, on 
the other hand, were an anti-Axis and anti-nationalist force led by Josip Broz 
Tito who advocated for a fully realised ‘Yugoslav’ society organised under a 
communist state, in which all the various groups in the Yugoslav region would 
become equal via a social revolution. By the end of the war, Tito’s Partisans 
would reign victorious, but not before over 1 million victims across the territory 
of Yugoslavia had perished.82  
 
1.3.1. THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA 
Pavelić first achieved national prominence in 1927 as a deputy of the 
Trumbić-Pavelić bloc, a hard-line Croat nationalist party, and though it did not 
enjoy widespread support, the bloc was popular in Zagreb. A day after King 
Aleksander suspended parliamentary government in 1929, Pavelić set up the 
Ustaša - Hrvatski Oslobodilački Pokret (Croatian Liberation Movement) in 
Zagreb.83 Pavelić and his followers were quickly forced into exile in order to 
escape imprisonment by the royal dictatorship of King Aleksander, and in 
November 1929 the courts in Belgrade sentenced Pavelić to death for publicly 
advocating the overthrow of the state. As Tanner explains, this helped to 
legitimise Pavelić as a national leader in the poisoned political atmosphere of 
Croatia in the aftermath of Radic’s death and the dissolution of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - ‘Pavelić’s sentence contrasted markedly with that of 
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[Puniša] Račić, who was sentenced to only twenty years, in spite of killing three 
deputies in the parliament.’84 
While in exile, the Ustaša engaged in a series of operations which frustrated 
Belgrade authorities, reaching their zenith in 1934 with the assassination of King 
Aleksander on a state visit to Marseilles, France.  This further cemented Pavelić’s 
reputation and that of the Ustaša as synonymous with the struggle for Croatian 
independence. The assassination, however, also led to the internment of Pavelić 
and his associates by Italy’s Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, driving the 
movement underground where it silently continued to organise and recruit 
members in Zagreb by Pavelić’s right-hand man Slavko Kvaternik, and in cities as 
disparate and distant as Vienna, Pittsburgh and Buenos Aires.85 
Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, the Ustaša 
seized the opportunity to realise its dream. On 8 April, a number of Ustaša 
supporters revolted against their officers in the Yugoslav army and proclaimed 
Croatia’s independence in Bjelovar. On 10 April, Kvaternik proclaimed the 
establishment of the Independent State of Croatia - Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 
(NDH) on Zagreb Radio, declaring Pavelić its Poglavnik (leader) with the backing 
of both Italian and German authorities. For the Italians, Pavelić was ‘their man’ 
through his association with Mussolini and his residence in Italy. Fearing that the 
German invasion would get in the way of their plans for Dalmatia, the Italians 
tried to ensure Pavelić’s leadership as soon as Mussolini had been informed of 
German plans to invade.86 For the Germans, the leader of the HSS, Vladko Maček, 
had been their preferred leader, as they were impressed by his widespread 
popularity, control of military, and credibility in dealing with the Yugoslav 
government in the years preceding 1941. In late March, German agents in Zagreb 
had contacted Maček and offered him governance of an independent Croatia, 
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however Maček refused to collaborate with the Germans.87 Thus, with seemingly 
no other viable candidate, Pavelić and his Ustaša came to power by default.  
Even with the Ustaša in power, the NDH was not exactly the independent 
state Croatians had yearned for. Ustaša power was restricted and the territories 
divided into German and Italian occupation zones. In the German zone however, 
German presence was minimal after political and economic interests had been 
secured, and the Ustaša was free to implement its vision for the state. The regime 
portrayed itself as the next iteration of Croatian nationalism, laying false claim to 
the legacies of key figures in Croatia’s past to legitimise their leadership.88 Armed 
with a political programme prepared during their exile, and with Pavelić 
governing via decree rather than parliamentary process, the Ustaša introduced a 
suite of racial and discriminatory laws that brought the brutality of the regime 
quickly to the fore. The regime called for the eradication of Serbs, Jews and the 
Roma, as well as Croats and Muslims found guilty of 'un-Croatian behaviour’, i.e. 
any non-Ustaša Croatians who expressed alternative political opinions.89 There 
was an expectation by the regime that it was not enough to simply be Croatian, 
but that 
In the Ustasha state, created by the Poglavnik and his Ustashas, people must 
think like Ustashas, speak like Ustashas, and – most important of all – act like 
Ustasha.90  
Thus, to have been anything other than an Ustaša in the territory of the NDH was 
to put oneself at risk of persecution and death.91  
Though Pavelić and his regime enjoyed the limited support of the Croatian 
people initially, it was short-lived and as early as the end of 1941 dissatisfaction 
with the regime was rife, due to both the brutality of the regime and to the 
annexation of almost the entire Croatian coastline (where 90% of the population 
was Croatian) to Italy through the Rome Agreement of 18 May 1941. Support for 
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the Ustaša was strongest amongst the less educated classes and the poor regions 
of the Dinaric Alps, and from Croatians throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina who 
were happy to have been territorially incorporated into the NDH. These regions 
also bore the brunt of the mass violence of WWII, where ‘Ustaša violence became 
radicalized, justified or even provoked by counter violence committed by the 
Četniks or the Partisans and was affected by events that were beyond the Ustaša 
leadership’s control.’92  
That the regime fashioned itself as a natural expression of the desire for a 
sovereign Croatian state resulted in an overlap of nationalist sentiment between 
the regime and the people. Due to the disproportionate power and influence 
granted to the Ustaša by German authorities, it has been argued that the regime 
was suffered by the people in exchange for the longed-for independent state; a 
warped sense of quid pro quo. While Bellamy suggests that this argument may be 
more reflective of Croatian historical revisionism in the 1990s,93  historians appear 
to make a distinction between support for the Ustaša and support for a sovereign 
Croatian state, arguing that while most Croatians supported the state, only a 
minority supported the Ustasa regime itself.94 Croatians were for the most part 
still faithful to the HSS, or more sympathetic to the communists than the Ustaša. 
For members of the HSS, the instruction by Maček to co-operate with the new 
government via radio on the day of the NDH’s establishment had been 
instrumental in ensuring the support of the Ustaša in the early days of the 
regime.95 Maček’s ‘ambiguous proclamation,’ Ramet argues, ‘played a role in 
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encouraging almost all village mayors to cooperate with the new regime.’96 It 
seems that, at least for those who were decidedly anti-communist, there was little 
else to choose.  
The demarcation between regime and state also manifested itself in the 
organisation of the armed forces, itself an amalgamation of three disparate, and 
often competing, forces – the Croatian Home Guard (Domobrani); the Ustaša 
Militia; and the Croatian Gendarmerie (Hrvatsko Oružništvo). The Domobrani 
were the official army, navy, and air force of the state, and comprised of both 
volunteers and conscripts, including officers who had served in the armies of 
Austria-Hungary or the interwar Kingdoms.97 The militia, on the other hand was 
the party army of the regime and enjoyed the privilege of its post.  It was mostly 
populated with volunteers who were members of the movement, its officers not 
professionally trained but faithful and loyal to the regime and its Poglavnik. As 
Tomasevich explains,  
Ideologically, a wide gulf existed between the militia and the army. The army was 
not politically indoctrinated, while the militia was indoctrinated in Ustasha 
ideology and was dedicated to the defense of the Ustasha regime and its leader.98  
This ideological rift left the two forces vying against each other for both 
legitimacy and resources. The regime discriminated against the army in favour of 
the militia, and both were deeply mistrustful of the other, at times in direct 
conflict and at others endeavouring to subsume the other within its own 
structures.99 The Croatian Gendarmerie, on the other hand, was somewhat 
different in nature to both the army and the militia and consisted of professional 
officers, and was at first a special attachment to the army, but transferred to the 
militia in June 1942 - a move greatly resented within the Gendarmerie.100 Further 
complicating the issue was that ‘Croats served not only in the Croatian armed 
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forces, but also, on the basis of various agreements, in purely German units, in 
mixed German-Croatian units, and even in an Italian-Croatian legion.’101   
This confusion of rival factions, formation, disbandment, and reformation 
under different authorities, was exacerbated by a general lack of resources, 
cohesion, and allegiance to any one particular cause, force, or leader. 
Unsurprisingly, this led to a high number of desertions from the NDH to the 
Partisans, particularly from the Domobrani who were not only the least 
supportive of the regime, but also bore the brunt of both Ustaša discrimination 
and German exploitation. By the time of the unification of the Domobrani and 
the militia under the formal control of the Ustaša and Pavelić in late 1944, those 
that were left within the ranks of both forces were the uncompromising faithful, 
unwavering in their support for either the Ustasha or a non-communist 
independent Croatian state.  
Wary of the impending victory of Tito and his Partisans and what this might 
mean for them, anti-communist forces on Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian sides, 
including Muslims, fled the country with a large number of civilians. By mid-
May 1945, these troops and their dependents had crossed into Austria and 
surrendered to the British, convinced their shared anti-communist sentiments 
would keep them safe from Tito and any reprisals he may enact. This fear proved 
to be not unfounded - for Tito, these individuals represented an imminent and 
egregious threat to his legitimacy and the establishment of his communist state. 
However, as Ramet explains, ‘for reasons which continue to be the subject of 
controversy, the British disarmed them and sent these refugees back to 
Yugoslavia, turning them over to the Partisans.’102 Tito’s Partisans proceeded to 
massacre these refugees at Bleiburg, Kočevski Rog, and other places along the 
death marches that became known as the ‘Way of the Cross,’ with some 
survivors walking up to 1,000km to the end destination.103  
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1.3.2. TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA 
In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the rise of non-communist, anti-fascist 
parties were perceived as a threat to the legitimacy of the new state, and ‘in order 
to establish their organizational monopoly… the communists had to smash the 
incipient pluralism; to accomplish this, they were prepared to use the 
instruments at their disposal, including extralegal ones.’104 Thus, in Tito’s 
Yugoslavia, to have been anything other than a communist Partisan during the 
war was to put yourself at risk of persecution and death, and there was no one 
Tito saw as more of a threat to his power than the Ustaša;  
Tito for his part wanted to annihilate as many of the Ustashe[sic] as possible. 
Now that control over the whole of Yugoslavia was within his grasp, he was 
determined not to allow the NDH to recoup its strength in exile, or filter back 
into the country as an anti-Communist fifth element.105 
To achieve this, Tito followed the same strategies as other communist leaders 
throughout East Central Europe to pacify opposition: the liquidation of 
opponents, including prominent individuals, as well as civilian anti-communists; 
trials against ‘uncooperative’ prelates; the deposition of heads of rival regimes; 
defamation and de-legitimation of non-communist politicians; banishment of 
kings and royal families; strict censorship of the press; and the destruction of 
political pluralism and parliamentary life.106  
Leaving Yugoslavia, either to escape persecution, out of protest, or simply in 
the search of economic opportunity, was not a straightforward solution. As part 
of his process of legitimisation and power consolidation, Tito effectively closed 
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the borders of the Yugoslav state. This, Zimmerman argues, led to a profound 
reorientation in attitudes towards migration. Where migration was once seen as 
an ordinary response to various political, social, and economic conditions in the 
years preceding WWII, it was now an act akin to treason, and ‘those that went 
abroad were generally severing their ties with the Yugoslav political system and 
migrating for reasons that were either political or viewed as being political.’107 
The strict regulation of the movement of Yugoslav and non-Yugoslav persons 
alike in an attempt to insulate the people of Yugoslavia from the outside world, 
predominantly from émigré dissidents, meant that those escaping potential 
persecution had to do so by illegally crossing the borders of Yugoslavia.  
If emigration from Yugoslavia was a politicised act against the state, Tito and 
his government also politicised the act of repatriation as support for the state. 
The establishment of a communist Yugoslavia with the charismatic Tito at its 
head promising a new egalitarian utopia proved sufficiently alluring to those that 
had emigrated in the interwar years, whether out of nostalgia or out of socialist 
idealism. From 1945-1949, approximately 15,000 Yugoslavs throughout the world 
repatriated to Yugoslavia, while in 1948 and 1949, approximately 4060 Yugoslavs 
returned via the government-owned ships Partizanka and Radnik.108 What started 
as a spontaneous collective act of repatriation in response to the end of WWII 
became an organised and politicised action by the Yugoslav government who 
purchased the ships in 1947 in order to aid the return of diaspora Yugoslavs.  
 
1.3.3. WWII AND AUSTRALIA 
The outbreak of the Second World War only added to the swirling discontent 
Croatians in Australia found themselves in towards the end of the interwar 
period. As with WWI, Croatians were once again vilified and interned as enemy 
aliens, and much of this echoed the internment practices of WWI. Croatians were 
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again interned not because of their Croatian identity but because of their 
Yugoslav citizenship. Interment was again concentrated in Western Australia, 
and union pressure in a protracted industrial dispute once more underscored the 
reason for their internment.109 With communism the perceived solution to 
problems both in Australia and Croatia, Croatians in Australia lent their support 
to Tito and his Partisan troops during WWII, establishing the Yugoslav Red Cross 
Fund in response to the Axis attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941. In 1943 alone, the 
Savez raised over £106 000 in financial and material support, was active in the 
‘Sheepskins for Russia’ campaign, and encouraged its members to join the 
Australian armed forces.110 
Tito’s repatriation efforts of 1948/9 had a significant impact on the Croatian 
community in Australia. Approximately 1,250 of those that repatriated via the 
Partizanka and Radnik came from Australia, 52% of which were Croatian.111 
Promises from the Yugoslav Government that repatriates would be well looked 
after, propaganda which stressed the need for material and financial aid in 
postwar reconstruction, as well as the need for labour in order to kick-start 
industrialisation, and regular articles promoting repatriation in Napredak created 
a general climate of return, which one eyewitness described as a ‘frenzied 
movement of people endlessly intoxicated by an idealised patriotism!’112 As Lalich 
points out, this repatriation effort was the ‘largest organised voluntary collective 
departure of members of an ethnic community in Australia.’113  
Though statistically small by present standards, this repatriation was felt as 
an exodus and described by Calwell as such.114 The effect of this sudden mass 
departure on the community was profound; 
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The small community was well acquainted with one another, socialising at work, 
at picnics, evening dances, at homes, and then suddenly a large portion left, 
leaving behind a void.’115  
Aside from the numerical significance of the repatriation, the exodus also 
shattered the ideological foundations of the community. It depleted the Savez of 
its leaders, members, and influence, at a time when the anti-communist policies 
of the Australian government were making it difficult for the Savez to remain a 
viable organisation for the Croatian community to organise around, and 
communism an impossible ideal to sustain under the anti-communist policies of 
Menzies.116 Further fracturing the organisation was the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, 
which caused bitter factional disputes within the organisation.  
At the same time that the Savez was fracturing and left-leaning, Yugoslav-
oriented Croatians were leaving Australia, right-leaning, nationalist-oriented 
Croatians were arriving as part of Australia’s postwar immigration programme. 
WWII had profoundly changed Australia’s relationship with immigration. The 
Pacific Crisis had come perilously close to fulfilling colonial prophesies of 
invasion from the north. Australia’s reliance on American, rather than British, 
assistance heightened Australia’s long-standing sense of isolation from the rest of 
the Empire, and crushed whatever vestiges of reliance on British protection had 
remained in the interwar years. The war also cemented Australia’s need for 
defensive and economic self-sufficiency, as it had highlighted Australia’s limited 
capacity to produce manufactured goods. Coupled with the casualties of war and 
the declining birth rate, Australia was left feeling particularly exposed. As early as 
1942 the Curtin Government had begun to plan for post-war reconstruction, to be 
characterised by economic security, higher living standards, and social equality. 
Economists advised that without large-scale population growth, Australia’s 
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labour supply would not be able to sustain the economic development needed, 
while demographers warned that without immigration to offset the declining 
birth rate, population would decrease at an alarming pace.117  
These warnings and the concerns for security that the war had engendered 
led to the belief that Australia needed to populate, and needed to do it fast if it 
was to have a future. Thus, it was decided even before the war had ended that a 
radical reconfiguration of immigration was needed in Australia’s post-war 
reconstruction. By 1943, the Interdepartmental Committee on Post-War 
Migration was established in order to investigate and report specifically on the 
creation, planning, and implementation of a post-war immigration policy.118 Two 
years later on 2 August 1945, Calwell gave his first Ministerial Statement as the 
newly appointed Immigration Minister. Although policy details were vague, 
Calwell’s Ministerial Statement disclosed four notable departures from Australia’s 
previous approaches to immigration.119 
First, Calwell associated immigration to population growth rather than 
population restriction, and set quantifiable targets, rather than quotas. This 
changed the nature of immigration planning from the short to the long-term, and 
from a predominantly reactive enterprise to a proactive one. Second, where 
economic prosperity was once seen as a pre-condition for immigration, Calwell 
now positioned immigration as the means to economic prosperity. Third, while 
Australia’s future was once thought to be dependent on rural development and 
agriculture, Calwell fashioned industrialisation and suburbanisation as the twin 
pillars of post-war reconstruction. Finally, though not directly, Calwell suggested 
that a move away from Australia’s long-standing tradition of sourcing migrants 
exclusively from Britain should be considered. 
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Shortly after this Ministerial Statement, Calwell convened the Immigration 
Advisory Committee and charged it with a fact-finding mission on the emigration 
potential of Britain and western Europe. The committee found ‘considerable 
popular enthusiasm, and strong governmental and business support for 
emigration from the UK, but only mixed prospects in northern and western 
Europe.’120 This meant that, at least initially, Calwell’s immigration policy did not 
differ much from its predecessors. However, by 1947 it became apparent that 
British immigration alone would not be able to overcome the labour and material 
shortages needed by the expanding economy, which had reached full 
employment.   
Calwell thus embarked on a 12-week, 23 country tour to see whether the net 
could be cast wider. What he found was a Europe brimming with refugees that 
could fulfil Australia’s labour demands, and an organisation, the International 
Refugee Organisation (IRO), willing to provide the elusive and expensive 
shipping required to get them to Australia. Thus, the Displaced Persons (DP) 
scheme was created, and though only in effect until 1953, it was responsible for 
the arrival of approximately 170,000 migrants to Australia. The consequences of 
this first experiment with mass non-British immigration proved far-reaching, not 
only establishing that Australia’s future was no longer tethered to British 
immigration alone, but also opening the door for waves of assisted passage 
agreements with other countries.121 As Australia was turning its immigration tap 
on, Croatia’s hitherto primary immigration destination, the United States, opted 
to keep theirs down to a small trickle by re-committing to the interwar system of 
immigration restrictions. These restrictions helped propel Croatian emigration 
towards Australia, and by 1954 the community almost tripled its 1947 size.122 
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1.4. POST-WWII EMIGRATION 
Somewhere on the seas of the Indian ocean, the boats of Yugoslav-oriented 
repatriates crossed with the boats of nationalist-oriented Croatians on their way to 
Australia.123 
 
Unlike their pre-war predecessors who were characterised by their relative 
homogeneity, post-war Croatian migrants were a thoroughly heterogeneous 
group. They migrated from a variety of places - rural, urban, within, and outside 
modern-day Croatia - were of varying socio-economic backgrounds, and included 
men and women of different ages and marital status, as well as children. Rather 
than settling in regional cities built around particular industries, such as Broken 
Hill and Boulder-Kalgoorlie, post-war migrants settled in Australia’s capital cities 
and large regional centres, such as Newcastle, Wollongong and Geelong, 
favouring the East coast over the West. Post-war Croatian migration, however, 
was not a singular phenomenon, and comprised of four different waves, each 
with its own particular set of characteristics and reasons for migration. Croatian 
migrants can themselves also be loosely categorised into five groups; displaced 
persons, political migrants, economic migrants, refugees, and family reunion 
migrants.124  
 
1.4.1. DISPLACED PERSONS AND POLITICAL REFUGEES, 1947-1959 
The first wave of post-war Croatian migration included those who came 
under the DP scheme until 1953 and those who illegally crossed Yugoslavia’s 
borders and entered official refugee programs as political migrants in 
neighbouring countries. Given Croatia’s wartime experience, and Tito’s 
persecutions in the aftermath, it is no surprise to find that this first wave was 
mostly comprised of those that had served in the defeated armies of the NDH and 
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their families.125 Often categorised as refugees or political migrants, for the small 
handful that could be categorised as economic migrants, the act of migration 
itself had become a politicised act, at least in the eyes of the Yugoslav 
Government. Whether pro-Ustaša, pro-Croatian independence, or simply anti-
communist, one thing was for certain: these people were fiercely nationalistic and 
vehemently anti-Yugoslav, run out of their homeland by the communist rule they 
had wished to avoid,  risking their own lives and those of their families in their 
escape.  
Across all migrant groups, the ambitious Australian post-war immigration 
programme created a number of overt and covert issues which were 
unanticipated, ignored, or held little political capital to policy makers. In the 
absence of government assistance, ‘immigrants resorted to mutual help to solve 
collectively experienced problems.’126 Existing Yugoslav organisations were 
spurned as the concept of a ‘Yugoslav’ nationality, with a unified Yugoslav state 
based on this identity, was anathema to the entire wartime experience of this new 
cohort of Croatians. To have escaped the clutches of Tito’s Yugoslavia, only to 
find themselves classified as Yugoslavs in Australia and directed towards 
Yugoslav organisations was an insult of great proportions.127 Thus, these ‘New 
Australians’ set about establishing organisations under the Croatian name to help 
with navigating the pressing issues of accommodation, work, and language, while 
providing venues for social activities in order to mitigate the feelings of 
displacement and loneliness migration had caused.128 
Though arguably uncharacteristic of other migrant groups, when considering 
the wartime experience of Croatians migrating and establishing these new 
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community structures, it is altogether understandable that the issue of Croatian 
independence would become central to organisational life and give the 
community a particular and political impetus for its actions. Politicised by the 
interwar years, and roused by the war, these migrants believed that it was their 
duty to maintain the struggle for Croatian independence now that they had 
access to a democracy and its resources of free speech, protest, and political 
advocacy, relatively free of the consequences such actions back home could 
bring. The views of these DPs were only reinforced with the return to Australia of 
the 1948/49 repatriates, who, disillusioned with the Yugoslav Government and its 
promises of a communist utopia, began returning to Australia as early as the 
1950s. These repatriates were at a minimum anti-Yugoslav, if not completely anti-
communist.129   
 
1.4.2 ECONOMIC (AND POLITICAL) MIGRATION – 1960-1979 
The next wave of post-war Croatian migration consisted predominantly of 
economic migrants, with the largest numbers arriving after the opening up of 
Yugoslavia’s borders to combat rising unemployment of the early 1960s. With 
migration accepted and even encouraged by the Yugoslav state, the decision to 
emigrate became available to a much wider demographic, and Croatian migration 
to Australia increased to numbers unparalleled either before or after. This 
emigration received legal reinforcement with the bilateral agreement between 
Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970, which proved to be a significant pull factor of 
Croatian emigration to Australia. The legal pull factors, Banović argues, were 
augmented by the same economic pull factors that characterised the interwar 
years, as the difference in real wages and the standard of living between 
Yugoslavia and Australia became even larger in the post-war period.130  
Initially, Yugoslav migration was a Croatian affair. By 1971, Croatians made up 
slightly more than one-fifth of the total Yugoslav population, yet accounted for 
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39% of Yugoslavs abroad. Though the 1970 bilateral agreement led to an increase 
in Croatian migration to Australia, it also led to the increased migration of other 
Yugoslavs, diminishing the traditional Croatian dominance of Yugoslav 
migration. That Australia officially recorded these migrations as ‘Yugoslav’ makes 
it difficult to know the exact size of Croatian migration during this period. 
Notwithstanding, Croatians still made up a large proportion of Yugoslav 
migration, and between 1961 and 1976, the number of ‘Yugoslav-Born’ people in 
Australia increased from 49,776 to 143,591. The two year period between 1970 and 
1971 was the most substantial period of Yugoslav-born migration to Australia, 
with approximately 53,363 arrivals. By 1972, however, the number of arrivals 
halved, and from 1975, failed to reach over 5000 arrivals/year until 1994, with the 
arrival of refugees from the 1990s wars of independence.131  
Not only were Croatians migrating at unprecedented levels, but they were 
even more diverse than the first wave of postwar migrants. This resulted in a 
greater diversity of cultural practice and across a wide variety of issues – from 
questions of identity formation and tradition, wartime experience, to political 
belief. This heterogeneity of views in part precipitated the gradual move from the 
political and welfare organisations of the 1950s to the social and cultural 
organisations that would define organisational life in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
political platform outlined by the first post-war organisations did not always fully 
coincide with the views of those arriving during the years of economic migration. 
This was particularly the case in the aftermath of the Croatian Spring in 1971,132 
which resulted in the establishment of new organisations yet again. 
 Where the Croatian migrant to Australia remained homogenous, however, 
was on the question of class. The majority of Croatians migrating during this 
period were drawn from the working class, as this was where the greatest surplus 
of Yugoslav labour lay. Unlike their predecessors in Australia, who for the most 
part were uneducated and mostly illiterate peasants from villages, these migrants 
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were skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labourers with at least 4-7 years of 
completed schooling.133 Due to Australia’s immigration policies at the time, 
however, those that may have been better educated would have nonetheless 
found themselves employed in working class positions, as this was where 
Australian labour shortages lay and thus the types of jobs available to migrants.  
Australia’s comparatively open post-war immigration program and consistent 
high standard of living remained the predominant pull factor of immigration 
during this period. As migrants poured into Australia in unprecedented numbers, 
they radically reconfigured the life of the nation, prompting changes in economic 
and legal structures, as well as socio-cultural and environmental change. The 
reason the Australian Government was able to accept immigrants for so long, 
however, was due to changes in the social and cultural place of migrants in 
Australian society; that is, in the abandonment of the White Australia Policy and 
the adoption of multicultural policy in its place. This afforded a wealth of 
opportunity for Croatian migrants already in Australia as it allowed, and in fact 
encouraged, Croatians to express their cultural identity. That multiculturalism 
stressed ethnicity over nationality meant that Croatians were able to legitimately 
advocate as Croatians and bypass the issues raised by Yugoslav citizenship. 
Furthermore, Croatian political activism was able to resume its traditional 
patterns in advocating for identity recognition through campaigns for access to 
services, including that most Croatian of proxy battlegrounds, language 
recognition. At the same time that Croatians were enjoying their newfound 
visibility in Australian society, Croatian migration to Australia was decreasing at 
a rapid rate. Whitlam’s reduction of immigration to a well-controlled minimum 
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1.4.3. PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIC MIGRATION – 1980-1990 
The third wave of migration was characterised by a high proportion of 
economic migrants from the professional, rather than working, classes pursuing 
career advancement and a higher standard of living, often with the aim of living 
in the ‘western’ world.134 The death of Tito in 1980 ended an era spanning 35 
years, and as much as time stood still out of grief, it did so out of fear as well. Tito 
had left behind ‘a system in a state of paralysis, unable to cure itself.’135 The 
greatest threat to the post-Tito regime was economic collapse. The economy had 
deteriorated to near-catastrophic proportions in the last years of Tito’s life, and it 
was only in late 1981 that a federal commission was established to examine the 
crisis. By this time, Yugoslavia’s external debts had already ballooned to a total of 
approximately $US 20bn, and the new federal government found it could not 
service the debt. Though the political interest of the West in keeping Yugoslavia 
in tact meant that partial moratoriums were granted and international banking 
institutions continued to fund the state, the debt continued to place immense 
pressure on the economy.  
In the face of these economic and political hardships, some standards across 
Croatia saw improvement, and the most significant of these was the Croatian 
‘education boom’ of the 1970s. This boom produced a new class of professionals 
engaged with both the interior life of Yugoslavia and that of the world outside. 
Despite efforts by the collective leadership to minimise the burgeoning economic 
and political crisis, ‘a literate, urbanized population could hardly be kept in the 
dark about the growing crisis around them, especially as so many people had 
extensive contacts abroad.’136 Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, where the Croatians 
emigrating were mostly labourers and tradesmen of the working class, Croatian 
migration in the 1980s was mostly made up of professionals and academics that 
could not fulfil their social and professional aspirations within the Yugoslav 
context. They migrated to the West in search of a higher standard of living and 
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opportunities for career progression. The Yugoslav ‘brain drain’ resulted in the 
migration of Croatians who were educated, upwardly mobile, and usually with 
some English language proficiency.  
This cohort of Croatian migrants was also encouraged from Australian 
quarters, as the Fraser Government moved towards economic rationalism in 
immigration policy. Whereas before the 1980s immigrants were deliberately 
attracted by assisted passages and government-led recruiting drives, entry for 
migrants has become comparatively more difficult and no government-based 
incentives have since been provided.137 The introduction of the Numerical 
Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS) in 1979, based on a flexible allocation 
of points, paved the way for a fundamental change in the way immigration was to 
be understood. It applied a human capital approach to immigration, whereby 
points could be adjusted to meet particular occupational or educational shortages 
or surpluses. Though it did not apply to family reunion or refugee admission, 
NUMAS was nevertheless designed to only allow entry to those migrants deemed 
economically viable. Like Whitlam’s reduction of immigration to a well-
controlled minimum, Fraser’s introduction of a demand-driven system also 
significantly reduced the political and legal ease of Croatian migration. However, 
the introduction of NUMAS encouraged skilled, English-speaking Croatians to 
migrate to Australia instead of the traditional unskilled and non-English speaking 
migrants of the 1950-60s, and thus significantly changed the composition of the 
Croatian community in Australia. 
Unlike their predecessors, these migrants felt they ‘fitted better into the 
Australian way of life than in their native environment’ where the ‘climate of 
irrationality’ inadequately valued their skills.138 Feeling out of place in Croatia, 
these migrants also felt out of place with the Croatian communities they found in 
Australia. This new wave was more individualistic and secular in outlook, and 
experienced the ‘community’ as a straight-jacket for their middle-class 
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‘cosmopolitan’ outlook and aspirations.’139 Rather, this wave of Croatian migrants 
looked to English-speaking and ‘Australian’ community structures to fulfil their 
identity needs and provide opportunities for socialisation.  
 
1.4.4. WAR REFUGEES AND ONWARDS– 1990-PRESENT  
The final great wave of Croatian migration to Australia came with the wars of 
independence in the 1990s. Perhaps of all of Croatia’s history, none has received 
more outside historical attention than this period. In contrast, very little 
academic research has addressed this wave of Croatian migration to Australia, 
despite the fact that the influx of Croatian refugees from Bosnia changed the 
community yet again by disrupting long-held narratives of Croatian nationhood 
and identity.140 Future academic research, both historical and sociological, will 
fully assess their impact upon Croatian community life and structures. However, 
based on personal observation and involvement within my local Croatian 
community, this impact seems most evident in the reinvigoration of faith and 
folklore as the organisational centres of the Croatian community. Both 
Catholicism and folklore were important aspects of local life in Bosnia, as it was 
across religious and cultural, rather than territorial, lines that identity was drawn. 
The experiences of Bosnian Croatians both within Yugoslavia and during the war 
differed, at times significantly, from those in Croatia. These migrants therefore 
often found themselves at odds with the political agenda of the community in 
Australia, or were apolitical altogether. In the same way the Yugoslav 
organisations of the interwar period were unacceptable to post-war migrants, the 
post-war political organisations misguided to the economic migrants of the 1960-
70s, and those in turn partially or completely avoided by the 1980s cohort of 
Croatian migrants, so too were the organisational centres of the Croatian 
community during the war problematic to the wave of the 1990s. As a result, 
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rather than assimilating into the political or social organisations of the 
community, Croatians from Bosnia tended to concentrate within church 
structures and folkloric organisations. 
Croatian migration to Australia has reduced dramatically since this post-war 
intake, with only a small, almost negligible, intake of new migrants. Instead, a 
growing number of Australian-born Croatians are migrating to Croatia, creating 
what Lalich has identified as a move from traditional diaspora relationships to a 
transnational social space and flow.141 Furthermore, changes in the community 
now seem to be generational rather than migrational in nature.142 The 
community is becoming increasingly ‘Australianised’ - 60% of those declaring 
Croatian ancestry at the 2011 Census were born in Australia, while of those born 
elsewhere, approximately 70% arrived before 1981. Consequently, it is also an 
increasingly English speaking community, with less than half of those declaring 
Croatian ancestry speaking the language itself. Of those who speak Croatian, only 
8,037 speak very little, or no English at all, and of these non-English speakers, 
67.4% are aged over 65, with a further 21.9% aged 45-64yrs. The community is 
also becoming increasingly female, with women outnumbering men in every age 
range from 20-69yrs. Finally, and contrary to popular perception that the 
community is aging, approximately two-thirds of the community is under the age 
of 50yrs.143 This indicates that perhaps it is not the community itself that is aging, 
but that younger Croatians are opting out of active participation in traditional 
Croatian organisations and structures, in the same way migrational waves before 
them did.  
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The traditional structures of faith, folklore and football, however, seem to 
promise a measure of longevity. Catholicism continues as a central element of 
Croatian national identity both in Croatia and Australia, and the association 
between church and Croatian cultural preservation has endured, if not 
strengthened, over the years. There are 14 Croatian Catholic Centres currently in 
operation across Australia under the jurisdiction of the Franciscan Provinces of 
Bosna Srebrena in Sarajevo, Saints Cyril and Methodius in Zagreb, the 
Archdiocese of Vrhbosna in Sarajevo, and the Archdiocese of Rijeka. These 
centres not only provide pastoral care for their communities, but also the 
infrastructure around which most social, sporting and leisure activities of the 
community are organised.  For example, aside from activities related to religious 
practice, the Croatian Catholic Centre in Figtree is home to the Croatian Folkloric 
Group Wollongong, hosts club meetings and functions for local Croatian soccer 
club South Coast United, a women’s Pilates class, pensioner social days, Croatian 
language instruction, and a host of social gatherings, functions, and music 
concerts throughout the year.144  
Though experiencing a decline in attendance and numbers after the 1990s, 
folkloric groups are experiencing something of a renaissance, with 15 groups in 
operation across Australia comprising predominantly of second- and third-
generation Croatian children.  These groups maintain links with each other 
through gala nights, the biannual inter-group festival, and the annual children’s 
festival, sometimes involving visiting groups from New Zealand and Croatia. 
Though not as regular, folkloric groups still participate at multicultural events, 
particularly in conjunction with the Catholic Church and at local community 
celebrations such as Australia Day. However, with the establishment of an 
independent state, the role of folkloric groups seems to be changing from an 
outward expression of Croatian identity as a serious pursuit, to that as a gateway 
for second and later generation Croatians and their children to connect with their 
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heritage, the focus on fun and entertainment rather than professional 
performance.  
There are currently 34 active Croatian soccer clubs, and the considerable 
contribution of Croatians to football in Australia is one most readily associated 
with the community. The fruits of these clubs have been borne out at the highest 
echelons of the world game. There have been 47 Croatian Australians, including 7 
captains, who have played for the Australian national side, and the Australian 
team is sometimes referred to as the ‘second Croatian national side’.145 A large 
number of A-League players are of Croatian descent, as are many of Australia’s 
most successful exports of the game. Croatian clubs have also nurtured the 
talents of Australian greats such as Graham Arnold, Craig Foster, and Robbie 
Slater, while the Adelaide Raiders was once home to indigenous activist Charlie 
Perkins. However the greatest indicator of the strength of Croatian clubs in 
Australia can be found in the annual Australian-Croatian Soccer Tournament. 
Now in its 43rd year, it is the oldest ethnic football competition in Australia.  
That these three avenues of cultural expression – faith, folklore and football – 
continue to endure is no accident. Rather, they speak to the legacy of Australian 
responses to immigration policy, migrants, and migrant communities, and in 
particular the legacy of Australia’s post-war immigration programme. In the same 
way this chapter has followed the history of Croatian migration to Australia and 
focused on the push and pull factors of this migration, the following chapter will 
attempt to do the same with Australia’s post-war immigration programme, 
focusing on the construction of an identity which has mediated the relationship 
between post-war Australia and its migrant ‘Other’ – the Good Australian 
Migrant. It is through this national figure, with its inherent expectations and 
assumptions, that Croatian political activism was and still is perceived and 
understood.  
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Australia wants, and will welcome, new healthy citizens who 
are determined to become good Australians by adoption.1 










On 18 March 2002, Federal Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock welcomed 
Ms Cristina Jurado, a 29 year old woman from the Philippines, at Sydney 
International Airport.2 Jurado was Australia’s six-millionth post-WWII migrant, 
and along with her husband and young children, had arrived in Australia under 
the skilled migration program. That the Immigration Minister had taken the time 
to personally welcome Jurado, and that this welcome was captured by the media, 
was not unique. Jurado was merely the newest face in a long line of ‘milestone’ 
immigrants, the welcome of which was a tradition as old as Australia’s post-war 
immigration program itself.  
Despite the years and circumstances separating them, each milestone arrival 
was contrived to reflect the aspirations of Australia’s immigration program: the 
British tradesmen arriving to rebuild post-war Australia;3 the little girls 
reassuring Australians that these migrants were not a threat nor too different 
from Australians, but who guaranteed the future of the nation;4 the young 
English bride here to fulfil her destiny as an Australian housewife and mother;5 
the compassionate nation welcoming families burdened by physical disability;6 
the reunion of Vietnamese husband and wife ripped apart by war, but also a 
symbol of Australia’s evolution by its bicentenary year;7 and Jurado, the female, 
educated, English-speaking, professional from southeast Asia with her young 
family, emblematic of 21st century Australia. At the heart of each arrival was a 
two-way reflection on Australia’s immigration program; a moment of national 
self-congratulation on achievements past, and a gaze cast towards Australia’s 
future.  
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From Arthur Calwell to Phillip Ruddock, Federal Immigration Ministers have 
acted as the nation’s proxy, modelling the ‘national embrace’ expected of 
Australians as good hosts. This embrace found institutional expression through 
the Immigration Department and its various campaigns and publications. Local, 
religious, and social organisations were enlisted to encourage migrants to mix 
with their local community, while communities were encouraged to extend a 
local embrace. The national embrace of migrants was reinvigorated with the end 
of the White Australia Policy and the introduction of multiculturalism by the 
Whitlam Government. This change not only recognised the social and cultural 
changes wrought by immigration, but celebrated them as an intrinsically 
Australian quality.  
It is this congratulatory national embrace that has come to define Australia’s 
understanding of its post-war immigration program; a politically, economically, 
and socially successful ‘bold experiment’8 in humanitarianism, acceptance, and 
cohesion, executed without conflict or violence, which radically and rapidly 
changed the face of the nation and resulted in the most multicultural yet peaceful 
country in the world. Though much of the program was indeed successful, 
Australia’s post-war immigration history is also a contested one, neither as 
simple, congratulatory, nor as harmonious as its supporters assert. Even the oft-
repeated and somewhat intuitive claim that Australia has become the most 
multicultural society in the world as a result of its post-war immigration program 
does not stand up to scrutiny - as at the 2011 census, the United Kingdom was the 
top country of birth outside of Australia, while the four largest ancestry groups 
were English (36.1% of the total population), Australian (35.4%), Irish (10.4%), 
and Scottish (8.9%).9 
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The narrative of the national embrace cannot be sustained by history as the 
grand arch of post-war immigration, or even as a dominant component of that 
history. Rather than an exercise in humanitarianism, the Australian government 
used immigration as a tool of social engineering, with policy ‘influenced by 
ideologies: imperialism, racism, utilitarianism, economic rationalism and 
humanitarianism,’10 in order to create or maintain the vision of what Australia 
ought to be - not necessarily what it was or could be. This vision was not 
determined solely on developments within the domestic sphere and in 
consideration of Australia’s own intrinsic needs, but also in response to 
international developments and Australia’s position relative to the rest of the 
world. As Jupp notes, the success of Australian immigration has largely been due 
to deliberate planning, and though bureaucrats and politicians are assumed to 
have superior wisdom in determining public policy, the implementation of a 
vision of what Australia ought to be was not a value-free process.11  
If the embrace extended by the Immigration Minister was a reflection of how 
the hosts ought to receive migrants into the community, the individual at the 
centre of the campaign was a reflection of who the migrant ought to be.  Though 
the arrival campaigns presented the extension of the national embrace as 
unconditional, the reality of migrant life in Australia proved that this too was an 
aspirational ought, rather than a reflection of the relationship between migrant 
and host. Extending the national embrace was a provisional act, and rested on a 
particular caveat - that the migrant had to become a ‘Good Australian’ as quickly 
as possible.12 This too was not a value-free process and included constructing a 
vision of how a migrant ought to behave.  
This chapter will argue that these expectations of oughts – of what Australia 
ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to 
be and how they ought to behave – are embodied in the aspirational figure of the 
‘Good Australian Migrant’. This figure is a post-war construction, defined and 
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refined by successive governments in order to convince a population accustomed 
to an insular, limited, and restrictive immigration policy to accept not just a 
significantly higher inflow of migrants, but an ethnically diverse one.13 The three 
broad functions of the Immigration Department – selection and entry, 
settlement, and citizenship – ascribed certain characteristics and expectations 
which demarcated the social space migrants were to occupy, and therefore 
provide the structure for this chapter. Section 2.1 demonstrates how the selection 
and entry requirements of Australia’s first major migrant recruitment campaign – 
the DP scheme – defined who the Good Australian Migrant ought to be. Section 
2.2 explains how settlement policy, particularly assimilation, defined expectations 
of how the Good Australian Migrant ought to behave. Finally, Section 2.3 explores 
the intersection between immigration and citizenship. That the Department 
regulated the entire immigration process from selection through to citizenship 
meant that it was ‘both the custodian of prevailing concepts about who should be 
regarded as having the ‘privileges’ and duties of Australian citizenship, and was 
also in a position to influence their change.’14 It is precisely in this nexus between 
the construction of political acceptability and the mediation of citizenship that 
the Good Australian Migrant finds its genesis.  
Though the characteristics of these expectations have evolved as historical, 
political, social, and cultural changes have exerted their influence, the 
expectations themselves have not, and still cast significant shadows on the ways 
in which migrants are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. In building 
the figure of the Good Australian Migrant, this chapter gives shape to something 
historians have long tacitly acknowledged but have not explicitly defined – that 
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the migrant is a constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and 
conditions which mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant 
Other. Like the previous chapter, this one also covers some broad and at times 
seemingly extraneous ground in order to provide the foundations needed to 
reimagine the historical narrative of Croatian political activism in the post-war 
period. The expectations associated with the Good Australian Migrant help 
explain how Croatian activism has been misunderstood, and also how this 
misunderstanding can be manipulated in the name of political expediency. Put 
simply, when Croatians do not meet this checklist, they are read as ‘bad’.  
The Good Australian Migrant has become one of the many versions of ‘being 
Australian’ that comprise the pantheon of figures within Australia’s national 
identity. It sits alongside other recognisable figures such as the Bushman, the 
larrikin, the digger, or the lifesaver.15 It is an aspirational figure and does not 
encompass the entire range of migrants or migrant experiences in this country, in 
the same way Ward’s construction of the ‘Australian character’ did not reflect the 
lived experience of most Australians.16 As Nail explains,  
A figure is not a fixed identity or specific person but a mobile social position. 
One becomes a figure when one occupies this position. One may occupy this 
position to different degrees, at different times, and in different circumstances. 
But there is nothing essential about a person that makes the person this figure.17  
Therefore, the Good Australian Migrant captures the figure of the migrant in 
Australia’s national imagination, and the attributes against which the actions of 
those who may occupy this position are understood and evaluated; against who 
we believe migrants ought to be, rather than who they actually are or could be.  
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2.1. SELECTION AND ENTRY 
Reading through the [Immigration Officer] manuals of 1969 to 1972,  
one gets a very definite idea of what Australian policy-makers expected an immigrant to be.  
Young, white, able bodied, and male emerge as the attributes of the intended model immigrant.18 
 
2.1.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS LABOUR 
Chifley and Calwell argued that the only way to ensure the success of 
Australia’s post-war reconstruction was through a significant and rapid increase 
in Australia’s population and labour supply, and that the fastest way to achieve 
this was through mass immigration. That the labour capacity of migrants was the 
foremost motivation for selection was proven in the initial intakes of the DP 
scheme; of the migrants recruited, 93% were available for job placement.19 
However, in order to ensure that these migrants could in fact find employment 
and work alongside Australians without disrupting industrial relations, Calwell 
needed the support of the trade unions that mediated industrial relations, and of 
the labour force that would be expected to work alongside migrants.  
In order to appease trade unions, historically opposed to immigration for fear 
of disrupting Australia’s ‘Workingman’s Paradise’, Calwell included a number of 
caveats that served as pre-conditions to immigration; that no migrant would 
enter Australia until he or she was tied to continuous employment, that proper 
housing and other social amenities could be established to allow for ease of 
settlement, that the demobilisation, rehabilitation and re-employment of ex-
servicemen and women would be resolved as a priority, and that adequate 
shipping could be secured for their transportation.20 Unlike customary surplus 
forces that are repatriated once the labour need dissipates, Calwell justified the 
permanency of these migrants through Australia’s need to populate ‘for reasons 
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of defence and for the fullest expansion of our economy.’21 In outlining these 
conditions of immigration, Calwell effectively delineated the social space 
migrants would occupy as one of non-competition – migrants would not compete 
with Australians in employment, housing, or transportation, and thus would not 
disrupt the status quo presently enjoyed by Australians. This tenet of non-
competition, Calwell believed, was essential in preventing the growth of 
opposition to the migration policy in general, and the long-term benefits to both 
the nation and the migrant would justify the initial costs.22  
Non-competition in employment was formally expressed in the 1-2 year work 
contracts DP migrants were required to sign in return for their assisted passages. 
This carte blanche, as Kunz describes it,23 ensured that the type and location of 
work during the migrant’s initial years in Australia was completely at the 
discretion of the Immigration Department, without any regard for the wishes of 
the migrants, their individual circumstance, or any education completed prior to 
arrival. Migrants were made to understand in the interview process that they 
could not choose where or in what capacity they were to work during this time, 
and that they were unable to change that employment without the consent of the 
Department. Thus, the occupations of migrants were simply categorised as 
‘labourer’ for males, and ‘domestic’ for females, and it was not guaranteed that 
members of a family would be sent to the same place during the contract’s 
duration. The contract system signified to both migrants and the Australian 
public that the economic contribution of migrants was to be first and foremost in 
the interest of the nation, and not the individual or their personal prosperity. 
Though the function of the migrant as economic has not changed over the 
years, the nature of the economic contribution and its manifestation in selection 
criteria has. Until the election of the Whitlam government in 1972, post-war 
immigration policy followed a ‘Populate or Perish’ model, characterised by an 
open and supply-driven ethos. This model focused on the number of migrants 
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arriving and operated under the assumption that immigration was an economic 
stimulant, making high-level immigration and economic growth mutually 
reinforcing pursuits. In the face of precarious economic conditions in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, and in particular rising unemployment, proponents of 
reducing immigration argued that high-level immigration was a hindrance rather 
than a help to the economic wellbeing of Australia. Using the rationale that 
prevailing economic conditions warranted only a small immigration intake of 
those migrants with skills in areas of severe and urgent labour shortages, the 
Whitlam government reduced immigration to some of the lowest levels on 
record.24 Despite this sharp and almost overnight change in immigration policy, 
the logic behind the change remained thoroughly economic.  
This change in immigration policy was reflective of wider developments in 
economic and political circumstance and thought which saw economic 
rationalism gain prominence as the dominant philosophy within government 
ministries and departments.25 In 1979, the Fraser Government institutionalised 
economic rationalism in immigration policy with the introduction of NUMAS. If 
the ‘Populate-or-Perish model’ of immigration focused on the quantity of 
migration, the model underpinning NUMAS focused on the quality of migration, 
i.e., the human capital of migrants. This model of immigration was demand-
driven, based on an allocation of points that allowed entry only to those with the 
employment, education, and language capabilities needed to meet particular 
occupational or educational shortages or surpluses. Thus, where the Populate-or-
Perish model emphasised an economic contribution, the introduction of NUMAS 
emphasised a very particular type of economic contribution, designed to only 
allow entry to those migrants deemed economically viable, with the point 
allocation system flexible enough to adapt quickly to changes in the economic 
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environment. Though it has been altered to suit needs as they arise, this model of 
immigration remains the foundation of the current system of skilled migration to 
Australia.26  
The reduction of the Good Australian Migrant to his or her economic utility 
contradicts Australia’s popular understanding of its immigration history as one 
guided by benevolence and humanitarianism. This is particularly true of Calwell’s 
DP scheme, which is often held up as a hallmark of Australian humanitarianism, 
but is also from which the economic primacy of the Good Australian Migrant 
originates.27 While national histories often present a romanticised understanding 
of the past, in the case of Australia’s post-war immigration history, the 
pragmatism of successive Australian governments was especially ‘obscured by 
Labor legendeering, and by the air of self-congratulation in which Menzies’ 
Liberals enveloped [immigration] by the mid-1950s.’28 This was only reinforced 
with the introduction of multiculturalism, which tied the pragmatism of previous 
governments to principles of assimilation and legacies of the White Australia 
Policy, and not to the economic essentialism of immigration policy itself. As 
Collins explains,  
The prime reason for immigration has been the need to provide adequate labour 
reserves for the expansion of Australian capitalism. The precise way this reserve 
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army is tapped – numbers, skills, country of origin and so on – does reflect 
immigration lobbies and ‘demand side’ issues but this does not negate the 
primacy of the labour supply function of immigrants.29 
Thus the grand arch of post-war immigration is far better framed by economic 
considerations, particularly the supply of labour, with political, social, and 
humanitarian considerations secondary.30  
As Cox highlights, this has important implications in understanding the 
function of immigration policy. If the logic of immigration policy stems from 
economic considerations, then ‘immigration cannot be perceived as a solution to 
international situations unless the economic needs of the country of immigration 
happen to coincide with the set needs in question.’31 This implies that in order for 
an immigration program to be perceived as desirable and successful, the 
economic considerations of the host country must coincide with the 
humanitarian considerations of a refugee or surplus population. This may explain 
why the post-war immigration program is remembered as successful, while those 
thereafter are not remembered as optimistically; Europe’s need to resettle its 
refugee population coincided with Australia’s post-war reconstruction efforts and 
this mutual benefit is the core of the program’s genesis and perceived success.  
By extension, the Good Australian Migrant is first and foremost an economic 
entity, and any political, social, and humanitarian aspects are secondary and 
subservient to the labour capacity of a migrant. This gives rise to a second 
implication - if the economic contribution of migrants is the motivation for an 
immigration program, then that program will not be geared to the well-being of 
the migrant. Rather it will consist of only those measures essential to ensure that 
contribution, and ‘only when other concerns are converted into political pressure 
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will a comprehensive set of welfare provisions be introduced.’32 This in part 
explains the persistence of assimilation policy and the marginalisation of 
migrants in semi- and un-skilled employment well after inherent social 
disadvantages were recognised; it is not until sufficient political pressure is 
developed, such as the establishment of an ‘ethnic lobby’,33  that it became 
politically expedient for the Government and its authorities to place migrant 
welfare on the agenda.  
Just as the justification for immigration has been couched principally in the 
rhetoric and logic of economics, the primary function of the Good Australian 
Migrant is also economic, measured by labour capacity, often determined by 
their ability to close shortfalls in industries and occupations. This means that the 
Good Australian Migrant serves to secure the economic prosperity of the nation, 
but without entering into direct competition with Australian workers. The Good 
Australian Migrant must also contribute significantly to the nation’s bottom line 
before they earn the right to receive its spoils, particularly in the form of welfare. 
However, in return for bearing these costs, the Good Australian Migrant receives 
the opportunity to provide a better and more secure life for themselves and their 
family, one not possible in their country of origin. This better life is attributed to 
Australia’s economic and political stability, with its system of fair wages and safe 
working conditions designed to lead to the financial independence of anyone 
willing to work hard enough for their lot. Even though settlement outcomes are 
improving as skilled migration increases, particularly of those with tertiary 
qualifications and strong English-language skills, the expectation that migrants 
must take up the work that is available to them, rather than the work they want 
or are qualified for, still remains.  As Collins recently lamented, ‘the cliché of 
highly educated immigrants driving cabs for a living or getting jobs as unskilled 
labourers is sadly still very true today.’34 
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2.1.2. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS MALE 
The Good Australian Migrant is almost invariably a ‘he’. This is mostly due to 
historical circumstance – the national infrastructure and building works at the 
heart of Calwell’s post-war reconstruction required ‘manpower’, and as the term 
suggests, manual labour was exclusively the province of men. The official press 
release of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) cemented the maleness 
of the migrant by emphasising the need for ‘horny-handed sons of toil.’35 That 
Australia’s post-war immigration program was built around importing this 
manpower is reflected in the early intakes of the DP scheme; seven males were 
recruited to every two females.36 This gender imbalance in selection and 
recruitment, coupled with the economic imperative of labour, meant that in the 
initial years of the program, ‘’migrant’ became synonymous with ‘worker’ and 
more specifically a ‘male worker in a manual job.’37  
The maleness of the Good Australian Migrant was reiterated in immigration 
publicity such as the ‘There’s a man’s job for you in Australia’ poster campaign 
and the promotional film Men Wanted, both of which ‘reinforced the muscular 
vision of Australia as a strong nation of youth and opportunity.’38 General 
recruitment campaigns depicted Australia as a place of ‘industry and sunshine’, 
where displaced migrants could replace the gloom and misery of their current 
situation in Europe with a stable home, good health, and economic prosperity in 
Australia.39 These campaigns drew on the symbols of family and suburbia that 
characterised the social rhetoric of 1950s Australia. Though this symbolism 
depended on the presence of women as wives, mothers, and daughters, the 
procurement of the house in which the family makes a home, and the economic 
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prosperity of that family was (and arguably still is) coded as a male pursuit, one 
the Australian male provided for his female counterpart.  
Publicity and educational campaigns in Australia focused overwhelmingly on 
the male migrant, either in equipping him with the information necessary to be a 
productive worker, or in selling his virtues as a worker to the Australian public.40 
These campaigns were built on stories that celebrated the successful assimilation 
of male migrants, which repeated a similar pattern – first the Good Australian 
Migrant learned the language and customs of his new home, then through work 
and play learned the ways of the Australian male, completing his process of 
assimilation via marriage with an Australian girl. The most famous example of 
this assimilation pattern can be found in They’re a Weird Mob, published in 1957 
by John O’Grady under the pseudonym Nino Culotta.41 This ‘male 
migrant/female Australian’ trope was also codified in the Australian Women’s 
Weekly, in which migrants were presented almost exclusively as male, the 
‘typical’ Australian woman was assumed to be Anglo-Australian and Australian-
born, and stories focused either on the male migrant assimilating successfully 
through work or marriage to an Australian girl, or in etiquette pages advising 
how Australian women should behave towards migrant men.42  
The happy ending promised by assimilation stories, however, did not 
translate so easily to reality, as intermarriage between migrants and Australians 
remained significantly low. Coupled with the gender imbalance of the early 
intakes, this soon precipitated a number of social consequences that threatened 
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the success of the publicity campaigns, and in turn, support for the immigration 
program itself. The most publicised of these were ‘bachelors of misery’43 - single 
male migrants unable to make a marriage, and as such plagued by loneliness, 
alcoholism, mental breakdown, and suicide. The cause of this misery was often 
reduced to the ‘imbalance of the sexes’ in migrant selection. Government, media, 
and sometimes the migrants themselves, therefore argued that the simple 
solution to this problem lay in the increased intake of single migrant women.44  
The construction and conflation of the migrant as male in the initial years of 
the immigration program, and particularly under the DP scheme, had two 
important consequences. On the one hand, it resulted in the masculinisation of 
the immigrant population, while on the other it marginalised migrant women 
and their experiences in immigration discourse.45 Much like their Australian 
counterparts in the 1950s, the role of migrant women in Australian society was 
confined to the domestic sphere, where they were expected to fulfil their duty as 
Australian wife and mother. However, Kunek argues that this role too served a 
covert economic imperative; migrant women were to ‘act as a stimulus to 
consumer demand through the formation of families which would effect[sic] 
workforce expansion and create employment.’46 This characterisation of migrant 
women as ‘‘immigrant wives’, ‘breeders for Australia’, and ‘unskilled 
dependents’’47 obscured the fact that migrant women were more likely to 
undertake paid work outside of the home than Australian-born women in the 
post-war period.48 Thus migrant women became both ‘factory and marriage 
fodder,’49 marginalised in both the public and private spheres, and 'simply did not 
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exist on the dominant social agenda with needs and legitimate aspirations in 
their own right.'50 
The implications of this marginalisation and invisibility magnifies when we 
consider that, contrary to the historical narrative, ‘there was a more or less 
balanced intake, with only slightly fewer women,’ in total immigration from the 
beginning of post-war immigration through to the early 1970s.51 The early 
construction and conflation of the migrant as male in the initial years of the 
immigration program, the rhetoric of the ‘imbalance of the sexes’ and ‘bachelors 
of misery’, and the ushering of Australian women out of employment and into 
the home all conspired to reinforce the centrality and predominance of the male 
migrant at the expense of the female migrant. In the same way migrant welfare 
was not an issue until sufficient political pressure could be applied, it would take 
the social and cultural revolutions of the 1960s and the rise of women’s rights in 
the 1970s to challenge the marginalisation of migrant women.52   
Though the Good Australian Migrant as male can be easily explained by 
historical circumstance, the perseverance of it in the face of social changes and 
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political pressures is more difficult to explain. Yet as much as the social changes 
and activisms of the 1970s and onwards challenged the position and associated 
gender norms of women in Australian society, they did not displace the 
hegemony of male identities in the national imagination, nor the construction of 
Australian identity as male in general.53 The enduring maleness of the Good 
Australian Migrant is certainly not unique, but true of most figures in the 
national pantheon.  As Elder asserts,  
Iconic images of the quintessential or typical Australian are not of bush folk, but 
bush men; they are not of participants of war, but male diggers; they are not of 
volunteers at the local nursing home, but of male volunteer lifesavers who 
patrol the beach.54  
The bushman, the digger, and the lifesaver are all identities which are male by 
default and female on second thought. Even mateship – that all-Australian term - 
is a masculine ideal, representing a relationship and a behaviour that in its purest 
form only occurs between men, even if it can be loaned to relationships between 
men and women, or between women.  Though six-millionth migrant Jurado 
demonstrated how far the Australian migrant had come, as highly educated, 
English-speaking, cosmopolitan, Asian, and as female, the fact that her reasons 
for migration were tied up in notions of family, home, and motherhood  
demonstrates that the more things change, the more they stay the same.55  
 
2.1.3. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS HEALTHY 
The Good Australian Migrant must be healthy and able-bodied in order to 
fulfil his expectation of gainful employment upon arrival. This means that he is 
also young, as youth and health often go hand in hand, or at least young enough 
to contribute his fair share in labour and taxes before he becomes reliant on the 
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state in his old age.  In the same way initial intakes of the DP scheme favoured 
males over females, it also favoured those in the 20-29yr old age bracket. As Kunz 
highlights,  
The predominance of young age groups among Australia’s DP’s probably reflects 
not only the drive for young people, but also Australia’s stringent health criteria 
to which mainly older refugees fell victim.56 
The stringency was such that even those working within the scheme recognised 
its overzealous nature - one senior IRO official described some of the criteria as ‘a 
bit absurd’ because it did not always reflect accepted medical guidance,57 while 
an Australian doctor later recounted that ‘many of the earlier applicants, refugees 
and immigrants, were excluded from coming to Australia really without a good 
reason. They were simply rejected because they had old scarring.’58 
 As with gender, the youth and health demanded of migrants was closely 
tied to their economic function in Australia’s post-war reconstruction efforts. The 
male labour that was necessary for the industrial and agricultural work migrants 
were to complete in service of the nation was physically demanding, both in 
strength and endurance, and Calwell wanted ‘the best that is in the field.’59 For 
female migrants, youth and health were also necessary in order to fulfil their role 
as ‘prospective breeders’, and officers were ingenuously instructed that ‘women of 
child-bearing age should be capable of bearing children.’60 This narrow selection 
of the young, healthy, and able-bodied quickly found Australia accused of 
‘skimming the cream’. However, as Persian pointedly notes, the cream was always 
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the objective, as ‘the Australian government plan was to import a workforce, not 
give succour to refugee dependants.’61 
The association between migrant health and employability was reinforced by 
another premise; that the migrant should contribute to, rather than burden, the 
public purse. The economic relationship between the migrant and the host 
society was and remains a one-way street, at least until the migrant has earned 
his keep. As one selection officer rationalised, ‘we did not want people to come to 
Australia and then end up in public hospitals.’62 Australian selection teams were 
also instructed to reject those presenting with minor complaints out of a concern 
that the DPs would ‘utilise these disabilities to claim unfitness for work in 
particular localities or particular jobs.’63 That is, lest they used these disabilities to 
game the contract scheme before their time was up.  
As early as late 1948, however, the government itself was forced to relax some 
health and age criteria as ‘the best in the field’ became increasingly scarce. The 
principle of ‘net gain’ began to guide the selection process, allowing for the entry 
of those deemed less desirable on the assumption that these initial ‘inadequacies’ 
in the short-term would be offset by gains in the long-term.64 As the bias 
favouring the 20-29 year old age bracket slowly diminished, and despite the 
moderation of health criteria, the expectation that migrants should contribute to, 
rather than burden, the public purse conspired to keep migrants relatively young, 
and health an important criteria in the selection process.65 There were only a 
handful of instances where this expectation was vetoed, and only after pressure 
from both within and outside Australia, such as the compassionate intakes of 
1949 which saw sick parents or close relatives accepted,66 and the compassionate 
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intake prompted by the World Refugee Year in 1959-1960, which saw refugee 
families with a physically handicapped member accepted.67  
These compassionate intakes, however, have been few and far between, and 
the frequency of rejections based on disabilities that may ‘cost the taxpayer’ attest 
to the economic utilitarianism, rather than humanitarianism, inherent in 
immigration policy. As recently as 24 February 2017, the family of a 16 year-old 
girl with autism was denied permanent residency based on her disability. The 
rhetoric of economic utility permeates the reasoning behind the decision – 
immigration health checks found that the girl would ‘result in significant cost to 
Australian taxpayers,’ and the Assistant Immigration Minister refused to 
intervene as it was ‘not in the public interest.’ Even advocates for the girl 
remaining in Australia coded their arguments in the rhetoric of economic utility, 
albeit of her mother - her employment as a doctor in two medical practices was 
emphasised and described as ‘of immense public interest’, and she was described 
as someone who has ‘done nothing but contribute to our country.’68 
Australia’s preoccupation with health, however, has a long history of priority 
in immigration selection and control that pre-dates the Good Australian Migrant. 
As Bashford argues, health has been a historically important site of inclusion and 
exclusion in attempts to secure Australia territorially and culturally, and has 
formed part of the legal and technical constitution of prohibited foreigners.69 
Though employability did drive the post-war justification for health and medical 
selection criteria, it was also a legacy of a much longer history which positioned 
health as an important signifier of un/desirable migrants. This has persevered in 
immigration selection criteria in both skilled and humanitarian intakes, 
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exemplified in the September 2015 announcement that Australia would be 
resettling 12,000 Syrian refugees in a special humanitarian intake.70 In addressing 
concerns over this intake, Immigration Minister Peter Dutton emphasised the 
rigour of the selection process, in particular the ‘health and security’ checks 
involved,71 and that even after selection, refugees would have to submit to a ‘final’ 
health check.72 That health was held up as important as security and character 
checks, particularly in the face of current fears over terrorism demonstrates the 
strength of the legacy of health as a signifier of un/desirable migrants.  
  
2.1.4. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AND ‘COLOUR’ 
For its first two decades, post-war immigration operated in the shadow of the 
White Australia Policy, and entailed an explicit, if not institutionalised, racial 
component to selection criteria which posited the Good Australian Migrant on a 
sliding scale of ‘whiteness’.73 A conscious effort was made to ensure migrants 
would look sufficiently enough ‘like us’ so as to assure the Australian public that, 
by virtue of this fact, the New Australian would become the 'disappearing 
migrant’; that is, instantly assimilated.74 Calwell was acutely aware of the political 
capital questions of race held in determining long-term support for his 
immigration program. This was, in effect, the genesis of the ‘Beautiful Balts’ 
campaign; Calwell was adamant that the first shipload of migrants to Australia 
were to be a purposeful sample of ‘ideal types’ to act as the scheme’s young, 
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single, healthy, educated, preferably male, fair-haired, fair-skinned, and blue-
eyed ‘Trojan Horse’.75  
The positive reception of these Beautiful Balts, coupled with the quickly 
diminishing numbers of ideal types, emboldened Calwell and Australian officials 
to widen the limitation of nationality in order to continue ‘’creaming off’ the 
single and healthy.76 There continued, however, a hierarchy of preference based 
on representation of race and perceived cultural affinity. This was reflected in 
degree of effort devoted to recruitment and in the progression of eligibility; in 
1947, Ukrainians and Slovenes had become acceptable candidates for the 
program, with Czechs, Poles and Yugoslavs soon thereafter. By the end of 1949, 
all ‘European races’ became acceptable.77  Calwell continued to refer to the DPs 
and ‘Balts or ‘Baltic People’ well after the limitation on nationalities had been 
lifted. Kunz describes this as ‘a typical Calwell touch… for years all non-British, 
non-Mediterranean immigrants were by unsuspecting Australians referred to as 
‘Balts’.’78  
The racial composition of migrants slowly decreased in importance as it 
became increasingly incompatible with foreign policy objectives, as Australians 
became increasingly comfortable with the migrant presence, and as migrants 
began to advocate for their needs and rights. The dismantling of the White 
Australia Policy, the introduction of multiculturalism, and the advent of non-
European migration contested the expectation that migrants must look ‘like us’. 
Nonetheless, the legacy of the White Australia Policy continues to cast a 
significant racial shadow. Though the Good Australian Migrant is no longer 
posited on an overt sliding scale of whiteness, there remains a marked difference 
in the treatment of those that look Anglo-Celtic or northern European, and those 
that do not. As academic and media presenter Waleed Aly has written, Australia 
                                                          
75 Persian, ‘Displaced Persons (1947-1952)’, 94–95. 
76 Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 11. 
77Kunz, Displaced Persons, 43. 
Markus, ‘Labour and Immigration 1946-9: The Displaced Persons Program’, 80.  
Persian, ‘Chifley Liked Them Blond’, 91–101. 






may not be an overtly racist country anymore, but it does have high levels of low-
level racism, ‘the subterranean racism that goes largely unremarked upon and 
that we seem unable even to detect.’79 
Nonetheless, as the ethnic composition of migrants diversified, the 
introduction of NUMAS and the ‘human capital’ model to immigration policy 
standardised other demographic traits, such as levels of education, profession, 
and language capability. The net effect of these changes across employment, 
gender, health and ‘colour’ amount to one of an ethnically and gender diverse 
Good Australian Migrant, but one who is now more likely to be English-speaking, 
highly skilled or specialised, and of a targeted profession where a shortage exists. 
This has served to reinforce rather than diminish the expectation that a migrant 
will contribute, rather than be a burden, on the public purse, particularly as the 
concern over population growth that once underpinned the principle of net gain 
has become less relevant, and by some quarters, rejected. Though women are 
more likely to migrate and enter employment than ever before, and are no longer 
‘invisible’ or classified as dependent migrants, the default gender of the Good 
Australian Migrant remains male, as do the expectations of health and relative 
youth.  
 
                                                          







I could see him all the time and he would look at me sort of pleadingly.  
But this fellow really was a very dark gypsy with crinkly black hair, and although  
I was sympathetic towards him, I visualised him walking down Martin Place and as  
such he would have been a ‘stare object’… He was muscular, he looked a hardworking type and  
just the pleading look about him, ‘please, can’t I go?’ I often think, ‘Well, why didn’t I take a punt?’  
But for his sake as well as Australia’s, I rejected him.80 
 
2.2.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS ‘LIKE US’ 
The expectation that migrants would look ‘like us’ was only one in a number 
of measures designed to reassure the Australian public that the intention of post-
war immigration was to strengthen the nation, not to change it. The logical 
extension of looking ‘like us’ was that migrants would also learn to behave ‘like 
us’, and this expectation was coded in the rhetoric of assimilation. Exactly what 
assimilation meant or how it should be implemented, however, was contested 
from the outset. Opinions ranged from an enforced and immediate assimilation 
that restricted any outward expression of cultural difference, to a gradual process 
of cultural attainment over generations.81 By 1954, Wilfred D. Borrie had observed 
that  
As popularly used in Australia the word [assimilation] implies a variable and a 
constant; a minority being made like a majority; immigrants conforming to and 
accepting the habits and customs, the lore and culture of the Australian-born 
population.82  
Assimilation conflated the physical appearance and cultural behaviour of 
migrants, with the process deemed complete when the migrant was no longer 
able to be distinguished from the Australian-born by either appearance, speech, 
or behaviour.83 Much like a sliding scale of whiteness informed the selection 
process, assimilation posited the Good Australian Migrant on a sliding scale of 
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‘Britishness’ based on ‘prejudicial judgements about which ethnic groups were 
most desirable in terms of perceived cultural affinity or assimilability.’84 This 
cultural hierarchy of preference guided the establishment of migrant reception 
and training centres run by the Immigration Department, the largest of which 
was at Bonegilla.85 Though their purpose in the first instance was to provide 
accommodation and allow for the processing and allocation of employment 
under the terms of the two-year work contract, these reception centres also 
sought to aid in the entry of the migrant into their local communities.86 In effect, 
these centres helped jump-start the process of assimilation by deconstructing the 
DP migrant, and reconstructing him or her as the more palatable Good 
Australian Migrant ready for introduction to the Australian community.  
Though assimilation was a national objective, it was to be achieved at the 
local level. Employment organisations, churches, and schools were enlisted as 
‘agencies of assimilation’ as these were the sites where the process of assimilation 
(or lack thereof) was most tangible. 87 The institutional face of assimilation at 
both the national and local levels was the Good Neighbour Council, whose 
principle objectives were  
To assist the settlement and assimilation of migrants into the ‘Australian Way of 
Life’, to educate Australians to accept and welcome migrants, and to encourage 
a greater appreciation amongst all Australians of the privileges and benefits of 
citizenship.88 
Launched in January 1950, the Good Neighbour network of committees and 
branches quickly expanded to comprise of 300 local branches and 10,000 
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volunteer members.89 Intellectual and political reinforcement of assimilation 
came in the form of the Australian Citizenship Conventions held between 1950 
and 1970. These forums served an important symbolic function as ‘positive proof 
of the broad consensus supporting the immigration program.’90  
If these were the agencies of assimilation, Haebich argues that the process 
itself had four overlapping phases that were intended to prevent the growth of 
ethnic enclaves, keep government expenditure to a minimum, utilise migrant 
workers for national projects, and calm any public anxieties about their 
presence.91 The first phase was that of ‘Australianisation’, including those basic 
services of English-language and outreach teaching that were provided by 
reception centres and agencies of assimilation at the local level. The second phase 
lay in joining the workforce, which was for the government a vital stage in the 
assimilation process as it ensured the cultural and financial well-being of the 
migrant. Living in the community was the third phase and addressed the social 
well-being of migrants, who were expected to join local groups in order to 
immerse themselves in the social landscape of their community. They were 
directed to seek assistance in medical and welfare needs from the relevant state 
and federal departments like all other Australians, while children were to be 
immersed in their local schools. The final phase of the assimilation process was 
naturalisation, with Australian citizenship tangible proof that assimilation was 
complete.92 Through this process, the ‘disappearing migrant’ who looked ‘like us’ 
during selection, would turn into the ‘invisible migrant’, indistinguishable from 
other Australians in both image and conduct.93 
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The rhetoric of assimilation related to a wider set of ‘symbols of persuasion’ 
deployed by the government as part of its post-war social reconstruction 
agenda.94 As Haebich explains, these symbols were the ‘imagined ideals of a 
lifestyle to strive for and codes of behaviours to emulate’, and ‘brands used to 
promote the nation, suggest its history, unify the people and sell its resources and 
products.’95 The first of these was the ideal of an ‘Australian way of life’, which 
was ‘a prescription for behaviour which covered all social relationships, including 
language, living habits, work and industrial relations.’96 This way of life revolved 
heavily on the rhythms of the ‘Australian Family’ – Dad as breadwinner going to 
and from work, Mum as homemaker tending to the needs of house and home, 
and 2 or 3 children growing up, attending school, and eventually forming an 
‘Australian Family’ of their own. Finally, the ‘Australian Suburbs’ were the site 
where these national symbols came together - the home and garden in which the 
family unit practiced the Australian way of life. Successfully living this ‘Australian 
way of life’ as an ‘Australian family’ in the ‘Australian Suburbs’ was closely tied to 
consumerism. As White explains,  
The familiar picture of suburban family life, with its focus on home and garden, 
and on a catalogue of family possessions such as refrigerators, washing 
machines, radiogrammes, television sets, and of course, the family car, was the 
basis of post-war affluence and the vast new consumer economy which the 
manufacturers and governments encouraged.97 
In this way, an ‘Australian way of life’ was a far more tangible and less 
controversial way of measuring ‘being Australian’ than the national or typical 
Australian ‘type’ that had preceded it since the early nineteenth century.98  
Distilling the essence of being Australian through a ‘way of life’, rather than a 
national ‘type’, also served the intellectual needs of the times. As White explains, 
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‘the idea of a ‘way of life’ fulfilled both general Western needs and more specific 
Australian ones.’99 The anxieties produced by Cold War ideology, which framed 
the rise of communism in the East as a burgeoning clash of civilisation with the 
democratic West, meant that nothing less than a ‘way of life’ was at stake. The 
anxieties produced by Australia’s post-war immigration program also threatened 
a ‘way of life’, a culturally British one which was perceived as threatened by non-
British immigration. Therefore, an ‘Australian way of life’ 
Provided a mental bulwark against communism, against change, against cultural 
diversity; it could call forth a common emotional response to the Cold War and 
to immigration, in defence of stability and homogeneity.100 
The social uniformity and stability the ‘Australian way of life’ promised was 
framed as both the best defence against these threats, and a much-needed respite 
in the midst of such global and domestic insecurity both in the aftermath of 
WWII, and in the burgeoning Cold War that followed.  
Despite its widespread use, exactly what the Australian way of life was, which 
lifestyle to aspire to, or which codes of behaviours to emulate, was contested 
from the beginning.  As Lack and Templeton highlight, 
Chifley and Calwell, as aggressive Australian nationalists, expected 'New 
Australians' to adopt an Australian culture; Menzies and Holt upheld the notion 
of British civilisation under the Southern Cross. Labor expected migrants to 
'learn to speak Australian'; Liberals hoped they might acquire the King's 
English.101 
If it was difficult for the Australian-born to find consensus on what the Australian 
way of life was, it was particularly difficult for migrants to discern, let alone learn 
and live by. Moreover, the ideals and standards of the rhetoric did not always 
match the lived reality of Australians. This is captured in the oft-cited example 
from journalist Elizabeth Webb, quoting one of Calwell’s New Australians as 
exclaiming,  
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What is this Way of Life? No one yet tells me what this is! Yet always they tell 
me I must adopt it! I lead a quiet life; I break none of your laws – what more 
must I do? The man who makes his money gambling is honoured by your 
Government – he pays no income tax. So perhaps I give up my honest livelihood 
here and go always to the races? Or perhaps I begin to behave like you behave in 
pubs. I drink beer until I am stupid. Or learn to ‘put in the boot’ and bash the 
other fellow with a bottle, always an empty bottle, when he disagrees with me? 
Is this the way of life I must learn? Thank you. No. I stay a bloody Reffo!’102 
It is precisely in this ambiguity, however, that White recognises the conceptual 
strength of an ‘Australian way of life’; 
Since it was never defined, and often was simply a formula for expressing a 
general prejudice against outsiders and a distaste for non-conformity, all 
migrants could be criticised for failing to adopt ‘the Australian way of life’.103 
Thus, the political capital of the Australian way of life, and of assimilation in 
general, lay not so much in defining what it was, but in defining what it was not – 
an exercise in which the Australian-born could assume moral authority. 
Further adding to this ambiguity was that although assimilation was central 
to ensuring support for the immigration program, there was a ‘disjunction 
between assimilation as ideology and assimilation as practice.’104 As rhetoric, 
assimilation was an oft-deployed means of calming anxieties, expressing a vision 
for the nation, policing migrant behaviour, and stressed as central to the success 
of the immigration program. However, the implementation of assimilation policy 
did not match the rhetoric, and was instead ‘left to poorly briefed, poorly 
resourced and understaffed government agencies, aided by a voluntary system 
run by amateurs.’105 Though this disjunction has important implications for the 
study of Australia’s post-war immigration program, particularly with questions of 
how it was implemented, in building the Good Australian Migrant it is the 
rhetoric that defined expectations, rather than the lived reality of post-war 
immigration. The Good Australian Migrant is, after all, a vision of what the 
migrant ought to be, not what he actually was, is, or could be. Therefore, it is the 
rhetoric of assimilation and the associated symbols of persuasion that defined the 
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social, cultural, and geographic expectations of the Good Australian Migrant as 
one who should adopt Australian values, be ‘family-oriented’, and live in the 
suburbs, rather than in the city or rural Australia.  
Though evolved, these expectations still inform much of how Australians 
perceive themselves and the Good Australian Migrant today. The Australian 
suburbs are still thought of as the geographic heart of the Australian nation, 
while the nuclear Australian Family is the heart of Australian society, as reflected 
in state structures which either assume or advantage the suburban nuclear 
family.106 The enduring gender wage gap, discrepancy between maternity and 
paternity leaves, and lack of comprehensive and accessible childcare continue to 
reaffirm a pattern of family life with Dad as breadwinner and Mum as caregiver, 
even if the expectation of Mum remaining ‘at home’ has diminished.  Discourses 
regarding marriage equality, reproductive rights, divorce, custody arrangements, 
and even asylum seekers all invoke the sanctity and protection of the ‘Australian 
family’, while politicians regularly appeal to the ‘working family’ as a voting bloc.  
Though the ‘Australian way of life’ has changed in meaning from a British 
dualism or homogeneity to a multicultural diversity and heterogeneity, the 
expectation that the Good Australian Migrant must adopt Australian values, 
however they may be coded, remains. Though the word assimilation is no longer 
used, Haebich argues that the ideals of assimilation still exert influence in current 
debates about national identity, citizenship, and immigration. She terms this 
‘retro-assimilation’, which 
…mixes 1950s dreams of an assimilated nation with current ideas of nationhood 
using today’s spin to create an imagined world based on shared values, visions 
and agreements where all citizens will be treated equally and the same and 
share fully in the benefits of Australian society, once they agree to cast off their 
differences and become the same.107 
Retro-assimilation therefore draws on a grab-bag of clichés from the past to 
explain the present, without any critical interrogation of this past, or of the 
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original meanings and significance of them.108 The notion that there are self-
evident and shared ‘Australian’ values is an example of such a cliché, and ignores 
the fact that even in the seemingly homogenous 1950s, there were different ways 
of being Australian and little consensus on which values were to be promoted. 
Like the New Australian of the 1950s that did not know whether to adopt the 
family-man rhetoric or pub-culture reality of the Australian way of life, the 
migrant of today may well ask precisely which ‘Australian values’ should be 
emulated – the rhetoric of tolerance, pluralism, and acceptance preached by our 
political and intellectual elite, or the xenophobia, islamophobia, and homophobia 
that is increasingly permeating both realpolitik and the lived reality of 
Australians?  
More recently, the pejorative ‘unAustralian’ has become common in 
articulating ways of being Australian, defining it by what it is not, rather than the 
more problematic what it is. This mimics the change in 1950 from a national 
‘type’ to a ‘way of life’ in responding to critiques of the Australian way of life 
raised by the increasing diversity of Australian society. In the same way defining 
an Australian way of life retained moral authority with the Australian-born, the 
use of ‘unAustralian’ as a pejorative does the same, but with a latitude that does 
not require a consensus on or definition of what being Australian actually means; 
we can differ in our ways of being Australian, but agree on what constitutes being 
unAustralian, drawing boundaries of exclusion rather than inclusion.  
Nonetheless, much like the ambiguity of the Australian Way of Life in the 1950s, 
labelling someone or something as unAustralian can be an arbitrary expression of 
general prejudice or distaste for non-conformity, often reflecting existing political 
and ideological divisions, which can place competing expectations on the 
present-day Good Australian Migrant. 
 
 
                                                          






2.2.2. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS GRATEFUL 
The expectation that the Good Australian Migrant would become ‘like us’ was 
justified in the language of gratitude. As Murphy explains, 
The presumed magnetism of Australianism was always there and if sometimes it 
did not seem to work, then the belief that the country was doing ‘these people’ a 
favour in rescuing them from poverty in Europe was that they should respond 
by being ‘like us’’.109   
This expectation of gratitude essentially framed assimilation as a quid pro quo – 
Australia would allow migrants into the country, offering security and prosperity, 
and all that was asked in return was that they would become ‘like us’ out of 
gratitude. The positive attributes of an Australian way of life meant that migrants 
would naturally recognise the advantages of becoming ‘like us’ in the first 
instance. If migrants could not recognise these benefits, or disagreed with it, the 
expectation of gratitude meant that they should do it anyway.  
The expectation of gratitude not only ensured cultural homogeneity and 
stability by obliging the Good Australian Migrant to become ‘like us’, but also 
deflected any criticism of this way of life. As Kunz explains,  
The dogma that newcomers are ‘lucky to be here’ absolved the community from 
the responsibility to help the New Australian’s in any meaningful way. Indeed, it 
put the onus of contented gratefulness on the immigrant, and ensured that any 
criticism from them be rejected as ingratitude.110  
This ensured that any changes to the Australian way of life could not come from 
migrants, and further cemented the moral authority of the Australian-born in 
determining the limits of the nation. This, Kunz argues, served to frame criticism 
as an exception; ‘if an immigrant had any complaint, he must have been 
exceptional: an ungrateful person, badly selected.’111 Thus not only was it 
expected that the Good Australian Migrant would become like us, but that he 
would also to keep any opinions he had about becoming like us to himself.  
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The expectation of gratitude operated in much the same way as the 
expectation of health. If physical health was an important signifier of 
un/desirable migrants in selection, gratitude was a measure of moral health, and 
an important signifier of un/desirable migrant behaviour upon settlement. 
However, ingratitude was both a transgression of Good Australian Migrant 
behaviour and an explanation of the immorality of transgressions in general. This 
introduced yet another conditionality that framed any criticism as an exception – 
if a migrant could not appreciate the good being bestowed upon them, then they 
were always free to ‘go back’ to where they came from. The language of gratitude 
was therefore used to police migrant behaviour first by reducing the actions of 
migrants to displays of ingratitude, and secondly in denouncing them as 
superfluous as there was always the simple alternative of leaving.  
Though social, political, and cultural developments since the 1950s have 
changed when and how gratitude is deployed, it is still undeniably a feature of 
Australia’s relationship with its migrant ‘Other’. Particularly in this era of 
unprecedented global mobility, the reproach of going ‘back to where you came 
from’ in policing migrant behaviour and dismissing their criticism, has added 
gravitas due to the unprecedented ease and relative low cost of travel. However, 
the expectation of gratitude is no longer confined to migrants only, but extends 
to their descendants as well. This is exemplified in Dawn Fraser’s comment 
during the 2015 Wimbledon tournament that young tennis stars Nick Kyrgios and 
Bernard Tomic should ‘go back to where their parents came from’ if they want to 
continue with their perceived poor conduct both on and off the court.112 The 
logic behind Fraser’s comment, Attard surmises, is that ‘Kyrgios is like he is 
because he's not one of us and if he doesn't want to be like us, he should go back 
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to where his parents came from.’113 Kyrgios’s bad behaviour, in other words, is a 
product of his otherness in name, appearance, and lineage, despite being 
Australian-born. That his (and Tomic’s) perceived bad behaviour could stem 
from his Australian upbringing – especially in Australia’s culture of 
hypermasculinity and sport – is not even entertained by Fraser.  
The persistence of the expectation of gratitude is closely tied with the 
exaggeration of Australian humanitarianism in immigration history. If Australia’s 
post-war immigration program was the exercise in humanitarianism it is so often 
held up to be, then perhaps an expectation of gratitude was not so unreasonable. 
However, Australia’s post-war immigration program was first and foremost about 
Australia and its requirements of population and labour, and not about rescuing 
migrants from their countries of origin. As Markus explains,  
The idea that immigration was of great national value never came to occupy a 
central place in public rhetoric; Australians have found it difficult to move 
beyond the understanding that they were conferring a great favour by allowing 
immigrants to enter the best country in the world.114 
Gratitude, therefore, can be argued to be a misplaced expectation, and one which 
should be at the very least reciprocal. Though it is undeniable that Australia has 
provided security, opportunity, and prosperity to generations of migrants 
searching for a better future for which they may be grateful for, the economic, 
social and cultural contributions migrants have made to the development of the 
Australian nation means that we too should be grateful for the security, 
opportunity, and prosperity it has afforded us. In fact, it can be argued that a 
greater expectation of gratitude should fall on the Australian-born given the 
disproportionate gains host societies enjoy from immigration in comparison to 
migrants.   
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2.2.3. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS A BLANK CANVAS 
The expectation of assimilation, Tavan argues, rested on ‘a view of 
immigrants as people devoid of history or subjectivity, whose identity could be 
created in accordance with the needs and desires of the Australian community.’115 
The most effective way for the Good Australian Migrant to ensure successful 
assimilation, therefore, was to cast away all vestiges of their past self. Like the 
economic carte blanche DP migrants were once expected to sign, the Good 
Australian Migrant was expected to sign away his previous identity, memory, 
education, and history, and become a walking blank canvas upon which Australia 
could project its expectations and aspirations. Who the migrant was, is, or 
wanted to be became secondary to who and what Australia wanted him to be, 
and was simply part of the price to be gratefully paid by the migrant in the quest 
to become like us. 
Damousi reiterates this view, arguing that the suppression of individual and 
collective memory was one of the ideological bases along which assimilation was 
formed, and as such, ‘migrants were expected to construct a future without a 
past. It was only the future that would shape them as citizens.’116 This echoes 
Haebich’s ‘celluloid migrant’; ‘the stock figure in promotional films who stood for 
all imagined newcomers and who, denied any sense of self-determination or 
individualism, submitted passively to the process of assimilation.'117 If the 
‘disappearing migrant’ embodied the expectation that migrants would look ‘like 
us’, and the ‘invisible migrant’ embodied the expectation that migrants would 
behave like us, then the ‘celluloid migrant’ was the one that embodied the 
expectation of the Good Australian Migrant as a blank canvas. 
For some migrants, particularly those in the immediate post-war period, the 
ability to leave their old life behind and start anew proved desirable, and may 
have even acted as an incentive for migration to Australia. The ability to forget 
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the past was certainly a feature of DP migration, with Kunz describing the 
introduction of IRO Identity cards as a source of ‘joyful relief’ as they ‘certified a 
politically blameless past, safeguarded the holder from repatriation, guaranteed 
continued minimum maintenance and opened the door to possible 
emigration.’118 Bosworth has also recognised that some migrants have proven 
reluctant in giving a voice to their individual and collective pasts. This was either 
out of a perception that simple-minded and cultureless Australians lacked the 
sophistication needed to understand the context from which they had emigrated, 
a more sinister or overtly political need to distance themselves from their past - 
particularly with questions of wartime allegiances, or simply because the trauma 
of their experience was so great that they welcomed the opportunity to indulge in 
total denial in a country perceived to be at the ends of the earth. Thus, he 
explains, ‘for many a European migrant the aptest of aphorisms is that which 
advises ‘happy is the man (and nation) who has no history.’119  
Nonetheless, whether out of obligation or a wilful forgetting, a significant 
characteristic of becoming this blank canvas included becoming apolitical, or at 
most as sympathetic to the government agenda as any average voter. Though the 
expectation of political apathy is tied to the expectation of gratitude and its 
implication of accepting the Australian way of life without criticism, the 
allowance for some political sympathy can be traced back to Menzian politics, its 
emblematic anti-communism, and Australia’s troubled history with WWII war 
criminals. On 22 March 1961, Sir Garfield Barwick on behalf of the Government 
offered the following explanation of the ‘two deep seated human interests’ central 
to the issue of the potential existence of war criminals in Australia as a result of 
the immigration program: 
On the one hand, there is the utter abhorrence felt by Australians for those 
offences against humanity to which we give the generic name of war crimes. On 
the other hand, there is the right of this nation, by receiving people into this 
country, to enable men to turn their backs on past bitternesses and to make a 
new life for themselves and for their families in a happier community. This has 
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formed a precious part of the heritage of the West, in which Australia has an 
honorable share.  
In a given case the choice between these two human interests may present a 
government with a difficult decision. In the present instance, however, the 
Government came to the clear conclusion that, all questions of legal obligation 
apart, if such a choice had been necessary to resolve the matter, its right of 
asylum must have prevailed. Australia has established a thorough, though of 
course not infallible, system for sifting and screening the hundreds of thousands 
of migrants who have enriched our national life since the World War. In default 
of a binding obligation requiring Australia at this point of time to do otherwise, 
these, who have been allowed to make their homes here, must be able to live, in 
security, new lives under the rule of law.120 
It has not escaped the attention of many scholars that the very people who could 
have ‘slipped through the system’ were the same people who would be 
sympathetic to the Menzian conservative agenda.121 Barwick’s defence of the 
migrant right to a new life did not arise from a noble sense of social responsibility 
or a defence of the rights of naturalised citizens. Rather, Barwick simply was not 
interested in who the migrants were prior to their arrival, providing they worked 
hard for Australia. The economic contribution migrants were expected to make 
was of a far greater importance in the early years of immigration, and as long as 
the ‘bad’ individual became a Good Australian Migrant, their past indiscretions 
were irrelevant.  
The expectation that a migrant would become a blank canvas under 
assimilation ‘disavowed a multi-dimensional identity - one in which stories and 
identities from the past remained intact but which could be integrated with new 
experiences.’122 The social changes of the 1960s and the advent of 
multiculturalism in the 1970s challenged this wholesale disavowal, allowing 
migrants a multi-dimensional identity which could integrate the old self with 
new experiences. However, it seems as though a limit persists on which past 
narratives are able to co-exist with the migrant’s Australian identity.  Narratives 
of culture, dance, song, food, hobbies, and faith are not only accepted but 
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encouraged, framed as the threads of the multicultural fabric of the Australian 
nation. Political pasts, however, are still routinely spurned, particularly those that 
involve conflict. The directives to ‘leave your problems over there’ or to ‘stop 
bringing your problems over here’ are perhaps the most illustrative of this, often 
levelled whenever migrant groups clash between each other, particularly at 
sporting events, or when a ‘problematic’ community engages in protest or 
criticism.  
 
2.2.4. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS CULTURAL CAPITAL  
The introduction of multiculturalism as official government policy in the 
1970s was a watershed in the relationship between Australia and its migrant 
other. It radically changed the way Australian institutions responded to the 
migrant presence, identifying and catering to needs and issues specific to 
migrants and migrant communities that had hitherto been ignored. The 
expression of cultural difference that had been discouraged under assimilation 
was now central to multiculturalism, and not only was it tolerated, but 
encouraged as an intrinsically Australian quality.  Whereas the walking blank 
canvas the migrant was expected to be under assimilation included casting away 
ones culture, language, and everyday customs in order to become ‘like us’, 
multiculturalism celebrated cultural diversity as ‘us’ and the ‘real’ Australian way 
of life. Though ostensibly accepting migrants as part of the Australian social 
fabric, multiculturalism did not eliminate the expectations levelled at the Good 
Australian Migrant; it simply changed the way they manifested in everyday life, 
and placed an additional expectation of the contribution of cultural capital to 
Australia’s newfound multicultural identity.  
Early critiques, particularly from the Left, argued that multiculturalism only 
valued the superficial aspects of cultural identity while doing very little to address 
the social inequality inherent in the migrant experience.123 Furthermore, the 
                                                          






cultural capital expected of migrants was limited to that deemed acceptable to 
the sensitivities of the Australian-born - palatable little morsels fit for (white) 
Australian consumption. In the same way migrant labour was acceptable only 
when it was tied to the needs of the national economy and the tenets of non-
competition, the cultural capital of migrants was limited to the narrow and non-
threatening activities that Jupp terms ‘Pasta and Polka’ activities, or which I call 
the three F’s - Faith, Folklore, and Football. Migrants were free to practice their 
own religions, indulge in the folkloric traditions of their cultures in the forms of 
food, dance, music, language, art, and crafts, and participate in the sports and 
leisure activities that coloured their memories of the ‘old life’, with football 
(soccer) becoming the most recognised face of this, and also the best example of 
the limits placed on these activities.124  
This limited cultural capital, however, was not new or unique to 
multiculturalism. As Jupp explains, from the very beginning of Australia’s post-
war immigration program ‘public displays of exotic culture were welcomed and 
officially encouraged.’125 Kunz even argues that the cultural capital of migrants 
was exploited by the architects of the immigration program, portraying migrants 
as ‘happy New Australians who were perennially smiling into cameras and ever 
ready to change into national costumes after a hard day’s labour to entertain 
their benefactors with charming dances.’126 These activities, Jupp argues, were 
acceptable under assimilation because they were limited to those activities that 
‘made life more interesting without challenging Anglo-Australian hegemony.’127 
While the freedom of cultural expression and easier access to services under 
multiculturalism resulted in an undeniable and tangible improvement to the lives 
of Australian migrants, the enduring social and political inequality inherent in 
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the migrant experience has led some historians to increasingly argue that 
multiculturalism was less the watershed it is often thought to be, and more a re-
institutionalisation of Anglo-Australian hegemony under an internationally and 
domestically acceptable guise.128  
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Becoming an Australian citizen is not the same as becoming an Australian.129 
 
2.3.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS CITIZEN 
At the 1956 Australian Citizenship Convention in Canberra, Minister for 
Immigration Harold Holt delivered an address titled Building for a Better 
Australia. In explaining the importance of taking out Australian citizenship for 
migrants, Holt reasoned 
We want our foreign-born migrants to become naturalized Australian citizens 
since that is the final proof of their acceptance of Australia and of Australia’s 
acceptance of them.130  
Citizenship - or naturalisation as it was then termed for non-British migrants – 
was considered the natural end-point of migrant settlement and assimilation. If 
successful assimilation was achieved when it was impossible to tell the 
‘immigrant’ from the ‘national’, citizenship was the proof of achieving invisibility 
for the migrant, and the measure of the success of assimilation policy in general. 
Citizenship was in effect the confirmation of the status of a migrant as a Good 
Australian Migrant.  
This confirmation was based on the intricate connection between, and 
usually conflation of, issues of citizenship and issues of immigration in Australian 
history. As Davidson points out, with the exception of Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders, the population of Australia is entirely made up of migrants and 
their descendants, and as such ‘the citizen voice can be controlled by the control 
of migrants.’131 For a country of migration such as Australia, exclusion from 
citizenship begins with physical exclusion at the border, and ‘the rules governing 
the state’s relations with outsiders and then immigrants establish real rules of 
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exclusion from the body politic.’132 This control was at the heart of the White 
Australia Policy – by excluding the migration of non-Europeans, and minimising 
the migration of the non-British, the citizenry of Australia was preserved 
culturally and ethnically British.  
Prior to the creation of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948, there was no 
such thing as an Australian citizen, only British subjects. Australian identity was 
defined relative to its similarities and differences with its British counterpart, 
rather than on its own terms. The concept of citizen rights was shaped by the 
history of Australia’s colonies as penal colonies, and in their pursuit of British 
rights for its inhabitants equal to those back in Britain. After federation, both 
Australian identity and citizen rights were defined relative to the aim of 
becoming an economically, socially and politically ‘better’ version of Britain that 
was ‘more British than the British.’133 However, developments in the post-war 
period challenged these narratives of being Australian, both in terms of 
Australian citizenship generally, and in the conferral of it to non-British migrants 
specifically. 
The formulation and definition of Australian citizenship was prompted by 
Canada’s creation of the Canadian Citizenship Act 1946, the first to create a 
citizenship separate from that of a British subject within the Commonwealth, 
rather than any significant pressure to assert an Australian identity as separate 
from British. This was given further political impetus with the establishment of 
the post-war immigration program, which demanded an articulation of 
Australian citizenship vis-à-vis non-British immigrants.134 However, as Jordens 
points out,  
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No Australians… had any conception of what being an Australian citizen as 
distinct from a British subject actually meant. This was because citizenship was 
conceptualised in relation to British culture and ethnicity, not in terms of the 
rights and responsibilities of the citizens of an autonomous state.135 
Therefore the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 only served to institutionalise 
the understanding of Australians citizenship as defined by British culture and 
ethnicity. The Act defined an alien as someone who was neither a British subject, 
Irish citizen, nor a protected person. Therefore, ‘the image of Australians 
enshrined in Australian citizenship legislation was that of an Anglo-Celtic 
people.'136  
Because of this enduring conception of Australian citizenship based on 
British culture and ethnicity, the emphasis of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 
1948 was ‘on proving and affirming that you ‘belonged’ and then on acquiring not 
active rights as equal citizens but passive rights to consume benefits and 
privileges.’137 For non-British migrants, becoming culturally Australian and 
affirming belonging was as important, if not more, than attaining the legal status 
and rights of Australian citizenship. In the same way Australia’s status as a 
country of migration meant that citizenship included the physical exclusion of 
migrants, ‘the requirement that citizenship depends on belonging beforehand to 
an existing, structured national family has effectively functioned to exclude great 
numbers of people from citizenship here throughout Australian history.’138 The 
most obvious of these exclusions was racial, as until 1967 the White Australia 
Policy explicitly excluded non-European migration due to their perceived 
inability to assimilate. However, as already argued throughout this chapter, 
selection criteria and settlement policies also contributed to the exclusion of 
certain people and attributes from the body politic regardless of their physical 
presence on Australian territory, in an attempt to maintain the citizen voice as 
culturally British as possible. This is the exclusion in operation which gave 
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preference to Calwell’s ‘Beautiful Balts’ who looked similar to the Anglo-Celtic 
people enshrined in citizenship legislation, in the expectation of assimilation that 
sought to suppress any difference in favour of the Australian way of life, in the 
health criteria which kept the body politic physically able, and in the bias 
towards male migrants that favoured male labour, but also a masculine body 
politic. The focus on privileges and benefits of Australian citizenship further 
marginalised migrants because ‘the newcomers were not seen as having any 
intrinsic social and political qualities and values which might enrich Australia.’139  
Jordens suggests thinking of the mediation between immigration and 
citizenship as a ‘citizenship bargain’. This is ‘a metaphor for the set of mutual 
expectations governing how actors affected by a government program involving 
rights and responsibilities normally associated with citizenship should interact 
with one another.’140 Until 1973, she argues, ‘alien and British migrants were 
offered very different citizenship bargains.’141 British migrants were able to 
exercise all the civil, social and political rights and responsibilities normally 
associated with citizenship while aliens only received a ’partial’ package of 
limited participation in public life until full citizenship was granted. This not only 
entrenched a perceived inequality between British and non-British migrants, but 
also an inequality between citizenship through birthright, and citizenship 
through naturalisation.  
Changes in the citizenship bargain, Jorden explains, are usually prompted 
either through non-compliance with the bargain agreed upon, or when the 
bargaining resources of the parties change.142 Despite significant monitoring and 
marketing of citizenship to migrants, take-up rates during the 1950s and 1960s 
remained low. Some explained this low take-up as either the product of 'migrant 
ignorance and apathy’ and accused migrants of ‘[wanting] the privileges but not 
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the responsibilities of citizenship.'143 There were, however, real barriers to selling 
Australian citizenship to both British and non-British migrants. Those within the 
Immigration Department responsible for the promotion of citizenship uptake 
found that some forms of non-compliance were due to practical barriers posed by 
laws and regulations which prevented a path to citizenship for some. Conceptual 
barriers to citizenship, however, were primarily the result of the discrimination 
between British and non-British migrants entrenched in legislation and society 
that resulted in unequal citizenship bargains. Put simply, ‘for many, the costs of 
relinquishing their former citizenship were obvious, and the benefits of attaining 
Australian citizenship remained obscure.’144 
Immigration department bureaucrats were therefore amongst the first to 
identify and agitate for change, either in reducing practical barriers to citizenship 
by simplifying requirements or making it less costly to comply with, or in 
reducing intangible barriers by advocating for the removal of discriminatory 
practices, as evidenced by the amendments to and revisions of citizenship acts.145 
Though the non-compliance of migrants challenged the citizenship bargain, it 
was the change in bargaining resources that the advent of the Whitlam 
government heralded that significantly changed the nature of Australian 
citizenship. First, the three decades of an increasingly diverse migrant intake had 
the unintended consequence of a slow but certain abandonment of a British-
Australian nationalism in favour of a new Australian nationalism based on 
cultural pluralism. Thus in 1973, alongside the introduction of multiculturalism 
which affirmed this new vision of Australian belonging, the Whitlam 
Government also equalised citizenship requirements between British and non-
British migrants. Second, under this new nationalism, the bargaining position of 
migrants, who previously had few resources, no political power, nor the vote due 
to the delay between arrival in Australia and conferral of citizenship, was 
strengthened. Finally, the development of an understanding of citizenship based 
on an equality of rights rather than British culture or ethnicity was assisted by 
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Whitlam Government ratification of a number of United Nation covenants on 
civil, political, cultural, economic and women’s rights.146  
Despite these moves towards a rights-based and less exclusionary vision of 
Australian citizenship, two constants have remained. The first is the concept of a 
single national identity, which seemed to lose currency under the governments of 
Whitlam, Fraser, and Hawke, but which was resuscitated in the late 1980s with 
bicentenary debates regarding Australian identity, and immigration debates 
regarding Asian immigration. These debates also prompted what Davidson 
describes as a retrograde retreat to a communitarian ‘family’ model of 
citizenship.147 This produced the second constant in Australian citizenship – the 
primacy of the nation as a ‘family’ to which a migrant must demonstrate 
belonging. Thus, Australian citizenship remains a cultural citizenship through 
which citizens consume as privileges and benefits, but one whose privileges and 
benefits are now informed by notions of rights and responsibilities. The Good 
Australian Migrant is still expected to demonstrate their belonging, albeit to an 
Australian national identity based on a multicultural diversity and heterogeneity 
rather than a British dualism or homogeneity, but which nonetheless entails 
adopting an apparently self-evident and agreed upon set of ‘Australian values’.  
Therefore the Good Australian Migrant is still expected to become both 
Australian and an Australian citizen. This expectation continues to exclude those 
who are perceived as unable or refusing to ‘belong’ from the body politic. 
Contemporary debates about asylum seekers and Muslim immigration are an 
example par excellence, in which Australian Senator Pauline Hanson can declare 
to the Parliament that ‘we  are  in  danger  of  being  swamped  by  Muslims who  
bear  a  culture  and ideology that is incompatible with our own,’148 despite the 
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fact that Muslims make up only 2.2% of the Australian population,149 nor the long 
history of Muslims in Australia, some of which pre-dates European settlement.150  
 
2.3.2. THE ‘GOOD AUSTRALIAN’ IN THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT 
Just as it is not enough for the migrant to become an Australian citizen, it is 
also not enough for the migrant to simply become Australian. The Good 
Australian Migrant, as the name suggests, is expected to become a Good 
Australian. Although this may seem a reasonable request to make of migrants, 
exactly what constitutes this Good Australian, and more importantly, who defines 
it, has important consequences in the mediation of the relationship between 
Australia and its migrant Other. As Murphy notes, ‘there was always the 
suggestion about the term that newcomers had to be ‘good Australians’ while the 
native-born could get away with just being Australians.’151 This produces a 
conditionality to citizenship which differentiates those that are citizens through 
birth from those that are citizens through migration. This echoes the unequal 
citizenship bargains of the 1950-60s under assimilation, and just like the 
‘Australian way of life’, the ambiguous Good Australian is an aspirational vision 
which the Australian-born are rarely expected to meet themselves.  
The concept of a Good Australian was not unique to the post-war period, nor 
was it only applied to post-war migrants. In the inter-war years, parliamentarians 
often claimed to speak as ‘Good Australians’ when arguing a particular position, 
most frequently in debates regarding protectionism and trade unionism. In the 
1920s some, such as South Australian Senator Albert Alfred Hoare, used the term 
to argue against immigration from Southern Europe, arguing that Southern 
Europeans could not make Good Australian citizens due to their cultural or racial 
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incompatibility.152 The concept re-emerged in the late 1930s with the issue of 
Jewish refugee immigration and in debates relating to the 1940 amendment of the 
Immigration Act. Objecting to the proposal to reduce the period of residence 
required before naturalisation to one year, NSW Senator Macartney Abbott 
argued,  
In my opinion, the law ought to be amended to provide for closer supervision of 
the conduct of immigrants and of their habits of life, so that the authorities 
might be better able to judge of the qualifications of aliens to become good 
Australians.153 
In the post-war period, the ability of certain migrants to become Good 
Australians was frequently deployed in discussions of naturalisation, in particular 
in debates relating to proposed amendments and revisions of citizenship acts. 
Because the acceptance of migrants into the body politic is conditional on 
their status as Good Australians, the behaviour of migrants, both public and 
private, is policed in ways the Australian-born simply are not. This extends to 
community groups, and it is from here that the sins of a small migrant minority 
can become representative of entire communities. All migrants of a particular 
community must be Good Australians, and when transgressions occur, the 
majority can and will be held accountable, with the transgression framed as a 
product of a particular cultural trait that stems from their migrant Otherness. 
This is why the Federal Immigration Minister Peter Dutton suggested in 
November 2016 that because second- and third-generation Lebanese-Muslims 
made up a sizeable proportion of people arrested on terrorist-related offences, 
the Lebanese-Muslim migration intakes of the 1970s were a mistake.154 Like Dawn 
Fraser and her Kyrgios/Tomic comments, Dutton situates the misconduct of 
these individuals in their ‘migrantness’, rather than in any shortcomings in their 
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Australian upbringing. The transgressions of the Australian-born, on the other 
hand, are cast as exceptions to the rule, with the transgression attributed to an 
inherent personal quality, such as the mental health of the individual, rather than 
an inherent cultural trait.155  Therefore, whereas migrants exist in the absolutes – 
Good/Bad, All/None, the Australian-born are allowed to exist in the shades of 
grey, where the actions of one are not indicative of the whole.  
In much the same way being Australian is most easily defined by what it was 
not, one way of policing Good Australian behaviour is through the naming and 
shaming of bad migrant behaviour. Often, this bad behaviour becomes over-
exaggerated, particularly when criminal activity is involved, and the crimes of one 
or a handful of perpetrators are identified as endemic to entire communities. This 
in turn is used to justify actions taken against particular communities in the 
name of maintaining Australian law and order. This is demonstrated by the 2015 
amendment to the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 which gave the Australian 
Government the ability to strip dual citizens charged with ‘terrorism-related 
conduct’ of their Australian citizenship, and in the February 2016 leaked Liberal 
cabinet document which included a proposal that would see refugees admitted 
under Australia’s humanitarian program monitored even after they receive 
citizenship. In both instances, the Government was accused of creating a two-
tiered system of Australian citizenship that differentiated between citizenship by 
birth and citizenship by grant.156 Perhaps the only non-migrant group to 
experience this kind of over-exaggeration and conditionality to citizenship were 
Australian communists in the 1950s and 1960s. The degree of scrutiny, both 
historical and contemporary, that this has spurred, including denunciations that 
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the actions of the government constituted the abuse of citizen rights, speaks 
volumes.157 
 
2.3.3. WERE CROATIANS GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANTS? 
On first impression, it seems that Croatians were both the best of migrants 
and the worst of migrants, oftentimes simultaneously. This is perhaps most 
readily noticed in the shorthand history of the community, which identifies the 
characteristics that adhered to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant 
as ‘positive’ contributions, while those that contravened expectations are 
portrayed as negative qualifiers. As is the case with many other post-war migrant 
communities, the economic contributions of Croatians are often framed as that 
which helped ‘build the nation’. Particular distinction is given to the involvement 
of Croatians in the construction of major, labour-intensive public infrastructure 
projects, and their employment in key post-war industries, such as steel and 
manufacturing. That histories highlight these particular economic contributions 
is neither incidental nor accidental. Rather, they demonstrate key expectations of 
the Good Australian Migrant – the provision of male, able-bodied labour, and 
most importantly, labour which was to the benefit of the nation.  
The cultural contributions of Croatians are limited in the same way, with 
historical interest concentrated on the Three F’s deemed acceptable for the Good 
Australian Migrant – faith, folklore, and football. Moreover, each of these cultural 
contributions emphasised traits Croatians shared with their Australian 
counterparts. The Catholicism of Croatians demonstrated both their shared 
heritage with Irish Australians, and the cultural difference between Croatians and 
other Yugoslavs, particularly of Orthodox or Muslim religions. Though Folklore 
focused on cultural difference, that Croatians participated in local, regional, and 
national events demonstrated a shared engagement with Australian civic life and 
a visible involvement in Australia’s cultural scene. The considerable contribution 
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of Croatians to football in Australia is perhaps the one most readily associated 
with the community, and how better to demonstrate Australianness than 
through the love of sport, particularly one that is worshipped by the British? Each 
of these cultural contributions in some way bumped Croatians a little higher up 
the sliding scale of ‘Britishness’, amplifying the perceived cultural affinity and 
assimilability of Croatians. 
While the trajectory of post-war Croatian settlement has mimicked that of 
most post-war migrant communities, the Croatian community has also had a 
distinctive characteristic in its very visible, at times extremely divisive, political 
activism. This activism violated the expectation of the Good Australian Migrant 
in many ways. The community dared to be more than just labour and cultural 
entertainment, and was neither ahistorical nor apolitical. This was inevitably 
coded as ungrateful behaviour that was in no way ‘like us’, and therefore did not 
demonstrate a willingness to belong to the national family. During the 1960s and 
1970s, allegations of political violence and terrorism exponentially amplified these 
perceptions, launching the community into the national spotlight, and marking 
Croatians with a reputation for extremism that still haunts the community. 
However this history of the post-war Croatian community is far more 
complicated than a simple balance sheet of positive and negative characteristics 
based on the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant. Instead there is a 
complex interplay of varying contexts, causes, and characters that have left this 
general impression of the community in public memory. The following three 
chapters will explore this complicated history in greater detail, and demonstrate 
how each particular period, with the contexts, causes, and characters specific to 
each, exerted their influence on both the political activism of the community, 





CHAPTER 3:  
THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY  






It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian 
origin should continue to hope for the establishment of an 
independent Croatia and within a democracy like Australia 
they have a right to advocate their views so long as they do so 
by legitimate means.1 
Sir Robert Menzies, 27 August 1964 
 




On 27 August 1964, Menzies delivered a Ministerial Statement on Yugoslav 
immigrant organisations to ‘make some observations to the House about the 
Government’s general policy in relation to migrant organisations and about 
immigration from Yugoslavia.’2 He believed it necessary to address concerns 
raised both in and outside the Parliament about the activities of Yugoslav 
organisations. In particular, he provided responses to the 38 questions that Dr 
James (Jim) F. Cairns had placed on notice earlier, ranging from the general – 
such as the broad history of the Ustaša movement, to the specific – such as how a 
group of Croatian men came to be photographed standing on an Australian army 
tank.3 However, the title of the Ministerial Statement was somewhat of a 
misnomer; it was Croatian and not Yugoslav organisations causing Cairns and 
others concern. Inherent in these concerns was the suggestion that Croatians 
were a problematic migrant group, and that the government was not doing 
enough to address their activism, whether out of ignorance or out of political 
expediency.  
Menzies’ response was two-fold. In a departure from the accepted rhetoric of 
the 1950s, he argued that migrant organisations in and of themselves were no 
longer viewed by his government as problematic. Rather, they aided migrant 
integration, functioning much like any other agency of assimilation. Migrant 
organisations were only problematic when they engaged in activities ‘which tend 
to frustrate integration.’4 Menzies dismissed the suggestion that migrant 
organisations were any more or less problematic than other organisations, and 
considered the governmental responses some advocated as unwarranted. While 
he conceded that the possibility of illegal activity always existed, he also noted 
that Australian authorities were capable of investigating, and if necessary, 
prosecuting either migrant organisations or individuals within them, just as with 
any other individual or organisation. 
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On the question of Yugoslav migrants, Menzies cautioned that ‘to 
understand the attitudes of these migrants it is necessary to remind ourselves 
that this part of Europe has an exceedingly complex and troubled history.’5 The 
establishment of a communist Yugoslav state at the end of WWII, coupled with 
the ‘deep differences of religious, cultural and historical kinds’ between the 
peoples of Yugoslavia, resulted in a number of Yugoslav migrant communities 
throughout the world establishing organisations in opposition to the communist 
government. Croatians in Australia were therefore no different to others 
elsewhere in advocating the establishment of an independent Croatian state. 
Furthermore, Menzies reasoned that in a democracy like Australia, Croatians had 
‘a right to advocate their views so long as they do so by legitimate means.’6 That 
there may be individuals prepared to do so by illegitimate means was a proven 
possibility. He explained that though isolated acts of violence had occurred 
within the Yugoslav community, the suggestion that there was an organised or 
systemic series of attacks associated with Croatians or their activism was 
unsubstantiated. Reiterating his previous position, Menzies argued that existing 
Australian authorities were capable of investigating and prosecuting such 
instances without any further involvement by the government. In concluding his 
Ministerial Statement, Menzies remarked:  
So I make the Government’s position quite clear: This Government will not 
interfere with freedom of opinion. Equally, it will not tolerate any activities which 
constitute a breach of the law.’7  
Menzies’ Ministerial Statement was met with immediate criticism. The NSW 
state executive of the ALP accused him of ‘notable omissions’ and his government 
of a ‘complete evasion of its responsibilities to maintain law and order among all 
sections of the community.’8 Some 30 years later, David McKnight echoed these 
same sentiments, bluntly characterising it as ‘a masterpiece of evasion, legalism 
and special pleading’ and ‘the most benign statement that could possibly be 
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made.’9 Though these observations have some merit, they are based on a limited 
snapshot of the complex domestic and international contexts and historical 
legacies that not only led Menzies to deliver his Statement, but compelled 
Croatians to engage in political activism, provoked Cairns to raise questions, and 
even help to explain McKnight’s observations so many years later. Rather than a 
masterpiece of evasion, it is more accurate to argue that Menzies believed some 
opinions were freer than others, and some breaches of the law were more 
perilous than others, the distinction of which can be reduced to the Cold War 
adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. 
This chapter seeks to explain these contexts and legacies, and in conjunction 
with the foundations laid in earlier chapters, reimagine the historical narrative of 
Croatian political activism in this period as more than the Cold War political 
football it is often reduced to. Section 3.1 will contextualise the first wave of post-
war Croatian emigration and the centrality of organisational life to these 
communities. Croatian migrants, like many others of this period, were influenced 
by their wartime experiences, and their organisations quickly developed political 
undertones which sought to establish a Croatian identity as separate from 
Yugoslav, framed in the advocacy for an independent Croatian state. Section 3.2 
will outline Australian responses to these organisations and their activism. They 
were problematic because migrant organisations were objectionable under 
assimilation policy generally, the political activism of Croatian organisations 
contravened the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant specifically, and 
advocacy for an independent Croatian state was problematic in and of itself. 
However, Australian responses to Croatian political activism were tempered by 
the Cold War myopia of Australian politics. Section 3.3 demonstrates how these 
paradigms were disrupted by the changes of the 1960’s in international and 
domestic contexts, as well as changes within the Croatian community itself.  
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3.1. THE FIRST WAVE OF POST-WAR CROATIAN 
EMIGRATION 
Before ethnic and multicultural initiatives received financial aid – that is, before 
Australia embraced multiculturalism in the 1970s – Croats displayed a remarkable 
degree of flexibility, initiative and determination in setting up a range of 
structures to meet their social, cultural and welfare needs and did so  
without material or moral assistance from governmental agencies,  
either Australian or Yugoslav.10 
 
Croatians comprised the majority of the more than 26,000 Yugoslavs who 
settled in Australia from 1947-1954 under the DP Scheme, and the further 20-
30,000 who migrated to Australia up until the early 1960s.11 These Croatians were 
either refugees displaced by WWII, or political migrants escaping the oppressive 
post-war climate of Yugoslavia. Most had illegally crossed Yugoslavia’s borders, 
initially escaping to countries such as France, Germany or Switzerland, or to DP 
camps in Austria and Italy.12 Unlike their predecessors who were overwhelmingly 
from the Croatian coast and following established patterns of chain migration, 
post-war Croatians hailed from diverse regions across Yugoslavia and different 
social and occupational backgrounds. Though men still out-numbered women at 
approximately 1.7:1, and unmarried young males continued to comprise a high 
proportion of the intake,13 the first wave of post-war Croatian migration was both 
numerically larger and more demographically diverse than the pre-war and inter-
war intakes. 
The post-war Croatian community came to be characterised by a high level of 
organisation, establishing associations, organisations, and social groups to help 
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with navigating the pressing issues of accommodation, work, and language, while 
providing venues for social activities in order to mitigate the feelings of 
displacement and loneliness migration had caused, particularly within the 
paradigms of the three F’s – faith, folklore, and football. However, the vigour of 
this community in establishing organisations was driven by more than just their 
social and welfare needs. Post-war Croatians purposefully rejected the Yugoslav 
organisations that had served the community during the inter-war years. To have 
escaped the clutches of Tito’s Yugoslavia, only to find themselves classified as 
Yugoslavs in Australia and directed towards Yugoslav organisations was an ‘insult 
of great proportions.’14  
Therefore, alongside the high level of organisation the post-war Croatian 
community also came to be characterised by a high level of politicisation. These 
migrants believed that it was their duty to maintain the struggle for Croatian 
independence now that they had access to a democracy and its resources of free 
speech, protest, and political advocacy, free of the consequences such actions 
back home could bring. When considering the wartime and post-war experiences 
of the Croatians migrating during this period, it is altogether understandable that 
the issue of Croatian identity and independence would become central to 
organisational life. The high level of organisation and high level of politicisation 
established in this period continued to define the community and its activism 
over the next five decades, abating only when Croatian independence was 
achieved in the 1990s. 
 
3.1.1. THE CENTRALITY OF ORGANISATIONAL LIFE 
Organisations established by the first wave of post-war Croatian migrants 
served two broad purposes. In the absence of government-led services, Croatians 
primarily established organisations to meet the social and welfare needs of 
migrants upon settlement. This included navigating the pressing issues of 
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accommodation, work, and language, and providing venues for social activities 
that mitigated feelings of displacement and loneliness. The second purpose of 
Croatian organisations lay in their symbolic currency; Croatian organisations 
were a tangible representation of the cultural and political identity of post-war 
Croatian migrants. Their very establishment was an inherently political act that 
sought to differentiate and disassociate their members from a ‘Yugoslav’ identity 
and community. Organisations therefore became both the arbiter of social access 
and space and the arbiter of the collective cultural and political identity of the 
post-war Croatian community. The power of each came to mutually reinforce the 
other, making organisations and their leaders central to the definition of the 
community and its boundaries.  
In addressing the social and welfare needs of migrants, Croatian 
organisations were no different to those of other DP groups. Australia’s post-war 
immigration program had created a number of overt and covert social issues 
which were unanticipated, ignored, or held little interest to policy makers.15 
These were exacerbated by an assimilation policy that viewed government 
assistance as a hindrance rather than help to migrant settlement. Migrant-
specific services, it was argued, would only delay assimilation and even encourage 
the formation of segregated communities. Instead, the fastest way to ensure 
assimilation was to push migrants into existing social structures and services in 
English. In the face of such an approach, ‘immigrants resorted to mutual help to 
solve collectively experienced problems,’16 and the very policy which purported 
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to avoid the segregation of migrants created the conditions necessitating the 
establishment of migrant organisations.  
Most post-war migrant communities developed following a similar pattern. 
Initially, informal groups formed wherever a concentration of migrants of the 
same nationality could be found – at hostels, lodgings, workplaces, or simply in 
geographic proximity. The exchange of information and assistance that occurred 
between members of these informal groups developed into a valuable reserve of 
social capital, and access to these networks of information and opportunity 
proved integral to successful migrant settlement in the initial years of 
settlement.17 As social capital accumulated, informal groups formalised, often led 
by those that had previously held leading roles either in their homelands (such as 
army officers or ex-politicians) or in the refugee camps of Europe,18 and ‘most 
started from scratch with cultural and language activities, entertainment, mutual 
assistance, and a language newspaper.'19 As migrants accumulated wealth 
through employment, and organisations in turn accumulated financial resources 
through their members, organisations rented, bought, or built facilities ‘where 
the atmosphere and tastes of the old country could be recreated, and the new 
generation taught traditional ways and values.’20 Within a few years of their 
arrival, almost all migrant groups had established a national body comprised of 
delegates from various local organisations.21 These national bodies in turn 
affiliated with diasporas in other countries, and co-operated with other national 
groups in Australia when common goals presented themselves, such as with anti-
communist activism or in campaigning for migrant access to services.  
Though the initiative and enterprise displayed by migrants in their 
establishment of organisations is extraordinary, particularly when considering 
the lack of government assistance, limited capital, and relatively low levels of 
socioeconomic status, English language proficiency, and education, it is also not 
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surprising. As Persian explains, migrants arriving in Australia were already 
experienced in community building through their time in the DP camps of 
Europe, which had developed into ‘training grounds for community leaders and 
modeled [sic] a community building process to be used after resettlement.’22 DP 
migrants simply replicated those same processes in Australia, made even easier 
with the greater resources at their disposal. For those from Southern Europe, and 
especially from its rural regions, this was amplified by a long tradition of relying 
on family, religious, and community networks for support and information rather 
than state-provided services.23  
Post-war Croatians replicated this pattern of community development. 
Initially, informal groups formed wherever Croatians found themselves, whether 
at Bonegilla, one of the many migrant hostels across the country, or in the private 
homes of individuals.24 These groups quickly formalised, with the first post-war 
Croatian Club established in Adelaide as early as 1950. In Sydney, the Australian 
Croatian Association (Australsko-Hrvatsko Društvo – AHD) was established in 
1951, and the first welfare association, Croatian Caritas, in 1952.25 Catholic 
congregations developed alongside local Australian parishes and priests in the 
early 1950s, and a number of Croatian priests and nuns migrated to provide 
pastoral care.26 Croatian-language publications were also quick to develop, with 
Društveni Viestnik and Hrvat the first bulletins to be published in 1951 and 1952 
respectively.27 In 1957 Spremnost was established, and from 1958 began printing 
the first national croatian-language weekly newspaper, published uninterrupted 
until its closure in 2007.28 By 1958, the first Croatian national umbrella 
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organisation, the Central Council of Croatian Associations (Središnji Odbor 
Hrvatskih Društava Australije – SOHDA), was formed in Sydney.29  
Post-war migrants were unique to the Australian experience of immigration 
as they ‘brought a specific type of past with them which was hitherto unknown in 
Australia - that is, a wartime experience.'30 This distinct experience of violence, 
dispossession, and poverty influenced both the individual and collective 
identities of post-war migrants, colouring relationships within migrant 
communities and outside of them. As Damousi explains, 'one of the ways in 
which this [wartime] experience was transposed to Australia was through a 
continued connection to and interest in politics.'31 Though this included an 
interest in Australian politics and the broad international political environment, 
most often this concentrated on the post-war political contexts of migrant 
homelands, particularly when it intersected with Australian anti-communism. 
This focus on homeland politics, Kunz argues, can be explained by 
an almost obsessive feeling of historical responsibility which permeates the 
thinking of refugees who, on reaching safety and freedom feel they must carry on 
the fight and spread the message which the oppressed at home cannot 
proclaim.32 
For reasons ranging from the simple – such as language barriers, to the more 
complex – such as the discouragement of their political involvement, migrants 
were limited in their access to Australian institutions, and instead turned to the 
structures of their organisations to channel their political activism.  
Some organisations were openly political, ‘created to advance, through 
political means, the day of return to the homeland.’33 These organisations were 
usually led by those with former ties to political organisations of the homeland, 
or those with more politically extremist views. Although leadership and 
community building experience, whether in the homeland or the DP camps of 
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Europe, explains much of how these individuals (overwhelmingly men) came to 
assume leadership positions in Australia, Kunz also highlights that assimilation 
policy, hostile towards the establishment of migrant organisations, ‘tended to 
discourage any but extremists from seeking leadership roles.’34 Those 
organisations that were not ostensibly political, such as social and sporting clubs, 
welfare associations, and cultural groups, still held a political undercurrent, 
whether through the composition of its members, tacit or explicit support offered 
to various actions, activisms and causes, or simply through their affiliation with 
other organisations.  
As time passed and the likeliness of return to the homeland waned, political 
causes gradually lost credibility, their influence diminishing in favour of more 
pressing concerns. Migrant organisations increasingly centred their activities on 
the social and welfare needs of migrants, either in filling the socio-emotional void 
of life in an assimilationist Australia, or in the preservation of culture for future 
generations.  The drift away from the political concerns of the homeland towards 
the social concerns of life in Australia prompted changes in community 
leadership, either through the rise of new leaders within existing organisations, 
or in the establishment of new organisations that displaced the influence of older 
ones. These new leaders in turn reinforced the shift in focus by prioritising social 
concerns over political ones.  
Even with this shift, most organisations retained at least nominal support for 
the political concerns that preoccupied the initial post-war years. The reason for 
this was two-fold; in practical terms, the social and financial capital that had 
defined early community life continued to be held (however superficially) by 
those still invested in political causes, and retaining access to that capital meant 
maintaining, at the very least, the pretence of support. Second, while the 
feasibility of achieving political aims may have diminished, the symbolism in its 
rhetoric remained a powerful force in community building and identity-making. 
The political past of a migrant community provided a useful site of myth-making 




from which a community could pinpoint its origins, and therefore purpose, in 
Australia.   
For Croatians, political and social activism was more closely related than for 
other comparable migrant groups; while Poles were free to be Polish, the Greek 
free to be Greek and Estonians free to be Estonian despite their Soviet 
citizenship, Croatians were not free to be Croatian. Instead, Croatians were 
officially considered Yugoslavs in both citizenship and nationality, and Croatian 
political activism was more than a politically-oriented advocacy for an 
independent state in the face of communist domination. More accurately, it was 
an advocacy for the very existence of their national and cultural identity, for 
which political independence was the logical end-point. Croatian activists needed 
to first convince Australians that they were a national group separate from 
Yugoslavs, with their own identity, culture, institutions, and history that entitled 
them to self-determination, and then on the basis of that self-determination 
could they advocate for an independent non-communist state.  
Because of this, the establishment of Croatian rather than Yugoslav 
organisations was an inherently political act, whether it was a large organisation, 
such as the AHD, or as small as the local soccer team. To participate in local 
sporting competitions or to engage in advocacy for the provision of services as 
Croatians rather than Yugoslavs was just as political an act as to directly advocate 
for an independent Croatian state. Conversely, the establishment of political 
organisations and advocacy for an independent Croatian state was just as social 
an act, as these organisations and activisms provided a venue through which key 
aspects of individual and collective identities could be performed, validated, and 
rationalised. The obsessive feeling of historical responsibility earlier described by 
Kunz manifested in the first wave of Croatian migrants and their organisations in 
a very clearly defined raison d'être. As Skrbiš explains, 
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This internally complex grouping of political migrants nurtured a specific kind of 
ideology, politics and world-view, centring on the re-establishment of the 
independent Croatian state and the question of Croatian ethno-national survival 
amid the perceived threat from Serbia.35 
Organisations and their leaders assumed a central role in this symbolic economy, 
acting as the self-appointed leaders and representatives of the community. More 
importantly however, they thought of themselves as the ‘legitimate bearers of the 
Croatian democratic tradition and Croatian culture in general.’36 According to 
this view, the homeland was besieged by a communist government resolved to 
eradicate it, and therefore the responsibility of preserving and passing on this 
tradition and culture rested with the diaspora. This political raison d'être defined 
by the first wave of Croatian migrants prevailed throughout subsequent 
generations, for as long as Croatia remained under Yugoslavia, the raison d'être 
remained unchanged, even if the way it was expressed and advocated for did.  
The dual aims inherent to all Croatian organisations in greater or lesser 
degrees – the socio-emotional and the politico-cultural - entrenched the 
centrality of organisations and their leaders to the community and in the daily 
life of Croatians. Organisations became the arbiter of social access and space 
through the physical infrastructure they owned, the material wealth they 
accumulated, and the social capital they engendered. These were the physical 
places where Croatians could meet other Croatians, the social networks that 
helped individuals find accommodation and employment, the friends that 
provided emotional support, and the place where committees with access to 
resources could organise events that filled the social calendars, fundraise for 
those in need, and provide solutions to problems experienced by many but which 
were difficult to surmount individually. The importance of access to these spaces 
in the everyday lives of Croatians was magnified by an assimilationist Australia 
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which both blatantly and subtly isolated migrants from participation in wider 
society.37 
Because they were Croatian rather than Yugoslav, these organisations were 
also the arbiters of collective identity. This was primarily achieved via three 
abilities - to extend or deny membership to individuals based on their political 
allegiance, personal histories, or particular world view; to organise and 
participate in certain activities, or boycott and demonstrate against others; and to 
speak publically on behalf of the community as a whole due to the generally 
higher English-language proficiency of their leadership. Allowing oneself to be 
subjected to the scrutiny imposed by organisations and their leaders was, Skrbis 
explains, the test of one’s dedication to diasporic Croatianism.38 It was not 
enough to simply be Croatian; one had to prove their Croatianness. Failure to do 
so resulted in isolation from the community and the denial of social access and 
space, often with the shorthand accusation that the individual was a closeted 
Yugoslav. As such, the power of each purpose came to mutually reinforce the 
other; the more control over social access and space an organisation had, the 
easier it was to enforce support (however nominal) for a particular political 
agenda. Conversely, the stronger the support for the political agenda of an 
organisation, the easier it was to accumulate social and financial capital from 
which social access and space could be created.  
 
3.1.2. EARLY POLITICAL ACTIVISM  
The raison d'être of the early post-war Croatian community manifested in its 
political activism via two core arguments – that Yugoslavia was an illegitimate 
state that did not represent Croatia, Croatians and their interests either at home 
or abroad, and that the concept of Yugoslavism as a whole was a false premise 
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that denied the identity, history, and sovereignty of the Croatian nation and its 
people.  These were further distilled to one very simple message; Croatians were 
neither communist nor Yugoslav. The first wave of post-war Croatians placed a 
heavy emphasis on the reestablishment of an independent Croatian state, and 
consequently its activism centred on making this political dream a reality.  
The first reason for this was the chronological proximity to the events of 
WWII. As explained in Section 1.3, most Croatians in Australia had either fought 
in the armies of the NDH, or were driven out by Tito’s Yugoslavia, and therefore 
subscribed to the notion that Croatia was a conquered homeland. These 
Croatians believed that with sufficient political and/or military pressure, the 
fledgling Yugoslav state could be toppled and Croatia granted its independence 
once more. Second, the rhetoric of a conquered homeland neatly intersected with 
the anti-communism that defined Australian political life, giving the community 
an entry to domestic political conversations. Third, this rhetoric of Croatian 
independence and anti-communism was explicitly linked to the political right, 
which aligned with the political agenda of the elected government, bestowing 
upon post-war Croatians a moral authority over their inter-war predecessors. 
Thus, it should not be surprising to find that political activism in this period 
was influenced by the legacies of Ustashism. As Skrbiš explains,  
The fact that Croatia existed as an independent political entity between 1941-45 
ought to be seen as an important factor which influenced the formation of the 
political consciousness of the diaspora. The entire post-Second World War 
Croatian diaspora discourse was based on the transformation of this historical 
fact into a source of inspiration. The re-establishment of the Croatian state was 
considered an ultimate goal.39 
The state of the NDH, for all of its faults, was idealised and mythologised as a 
watershed for Croatian independence. The NDH had been singularly governed by 
the Ustaša, a regime that had also portrayed itself as the next iteration and 
rightful custodian of Croatian nationalism. Those who migrated to Australia had 
either served in the armies of this glorified state, or were at least politically 
sympathetic to the regime’s independence agenda.  
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Some political organisations held explicit ties to Ustashism, such as the 
Croatian Liberation Movement (Hrvatski Oslobodilački Pokret - HOP) or Croatian 
National Resistance (Hrvatski Narodni Otpor - HNO), while others borrowed 
from its iconography and vocabulary to legitimise either their organisation or 
agenda. In Croatian halls one could find a picture of Pavelić hanging on its walls, 
usually alongside other figures from Croatia’s history. Celebrations of events 
specific to the NDH were held, the most prevalent being the ‘10. Travanj’ events 
celebrating the establishment of the NDH on 10 April. To be linked to Ustashism, 
however tenuous, served not only to demonstrate that one was devoted to the 
reestablishment of an independent state, but also as a shorthand, at least within 
the community if not outside of it, that proved one was truly Croatian; that is, 
not Yugoslav and not Communist.  
Just as communism was able to cross ethnic lines in the inter-war years, anti-
communism was able to do so in the post-war years. Anti-communism was a 
characteristic common across most DP migrant groups, and Croatians were able 
to draw similarities between their activism and that of other diasporas, 
particularly those under the yoke of the Soviet Union. Anti-communism was also 
able to bridge the gap between the old world and the new by echoing the DP 
experience of migrants and Australia’s immigration policy in post-war settlement. 
As Persian explains, after June 1948, the IRO’s focus in determining DP eligibility 
changed from the ‘genuine’ victims of Nazism to anti-communist ‘dissidents’, and 
from group to individual eligibility. DP migrants had to therefore ‘prove’ their 
individual persecution in order to be identified as political refugees. This led to a 
tradition of ‘new theatricality’ and storytelling which emphasised the anti-
communist credentials of an individual against the Cold War ideologies of the 
West.40 This theatricality and storytelling was easily transposed to the activism of 
migrant communities, as the repetition of individual stories with similar 
characteristics merged into a group identity.  
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Anti-communism also provided Croatians with a mode of participation in 
Australian political life and a means to articulate its activism in a language that 
was familiar to Australia’s political environment. Croatians enacted their activism 
through participation in anti-communist events such as Captive Nations Week, 
seeking membership to groups such as the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, and 
participating in government initiatives such as the Australian Citizenship 
Conventions. Protests, such as that in front of the Elizabethan Theatre in 
Newtown on 12 October 1959 framed Croatian political activism within Cold War 
and anti-communist paradigms,41 as did pamphlets and publications, particularly 
those in English. As early as 1952, Croatian organisations began petitioning 
parliamentarians, objecting to their identification as Yugoslavs.42 
 Anti-communism was not only an effective way to distance the post-war 
Croatian community from the Yugoslav state, but also from the inter-war 
Croatian community. The communist legacy of the inter-war community 
contributed to the zeal with which post-war Croatians posited their anti-
communism, and the motivation for this differentiation was both internal and 
external to the community. Internally, communism and Yugoslavism were 
anathema to post-war Croatians – anyone that subscribed to a communist or 
Yugoslav vision for Croatia’s future, however nominally, was nothing less than 
morally bankrupt and a traitor to the nation, either to be distrusted or openly 
reviled. Externally, the Australian political climate was more accepting of the 
political agenda of the post-war community, and therefore bestowed upon them 
a moral authority in determining the boundaries of Croatian identity in Australia. 
The more entrenched this moral authority became, the less those with alternative 
versions of being Croatian were able to exert their influence. This in turn 
homogenised the definition of Croatian identity, narrowing the boundaries of the 
community and, coupled with the numerical imbalance between inter- and post-
war Croatians (particularly after the repatriations of 1948 and 1949), perpetuated 
the cycle. The characterisation of the Croatian community in Australia as both 
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not-Yugoslav and not-communist became so entrenched that the fastest way to 
cast aspersions upon someone within the community is to brand them as a 
Yugoslav or a communist, even to this day.  
Though Croatian political activism was superficially concerned with the 
political rhetoric of self-determination and anti-communism, the practical 
application of it was more aligned with questions of ethnicity and identity. This 
can be explained as a legacy of the Croatian National Revival of the 1800s, 
whereby political activism was inextricably tied to questions of cultural identity, 
language, and the history of nationhood. Like the Austro-Hungarians and the 
Serbian monarchy before them, Yugoslavs and Yugoslavism were posited as a 
political and cultural threat that denied both the political sovereignty and 
cultural identity of the Croatian nation and its people. It was also an 
advantageous intersection between old world ideas and the new Australian 
environment. The social space carved out for migrants by Australia’s post-war 
immigration program allowed, and even encouraged, migrants to practice their 
cultural traditions, albeit mostly within the confines of the three F’s most 
available to them – faith, folklore, and football. This neatly intersected with the 
cultural dimension of Croatian political activism and consequently, Croatians and 
their activism were most visible when engaging with these pre-existing 
structures.  
The Catholic Church was perhaps the most public of platforms from which 
Croatians could practice their activism, and ‘of all the local institutions it was 
perhaps the church that Croatians have found most sympathetic and accepting.’43 
Familiar with its structures and practices, Croatians were able to express their 
cultural identity and political grievances simply through their participation in 
common church activities such as mass, street processions, and Marian or 
Eucharistic congresses as Croatians. This was reinforced by the shared anti-
communist stance between the church and community, and particularly 
highlighted in their shared interest in the persecution and imprisonment of 
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Zagreb’s Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, both a symbol of Croatian nationhood and 
the communist persecution of the catholic clergy worldwide. Publications of the 
church, particularly the Catholic Weekly in Sydney, often included articles 
regarding the plight of Stepinac, Catholics in Yugoslavia, or Croatian migrants in 
Australia.44 This shared activism was best demonstrated in the 1955 mass held at 
St Patrick’s Cathedral in Melbourne dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the 
imprisonment of Stepinac. Presided by Archbishop Daniel Mannix, 
approximately 3000 attendees, predominantly Croatian, prayed for Stepinac’s 
release.45  
Though the cultural expression of migrants is more readily associated with 
the multicultural policy of the 1970-80s, it was also a feature of migrant life under 
the assimilation policy of the 1950-60s. In fact, Kunz argues that the cultural 
capital of migrants was not only welcomed, but exploited by the architects of the 
immigration program, with the entertaining and ‘exotic’ traditions, dances, 
costumes and cuisine of migrants framed as a positive by-product of immigration 
for Australians to enjoy.46 Croatians for their part were keenly aware of Australian 
fascination with the folkloric traditions of migrants and used it to their 
advantage; ‘the knowledge that Australians found European folk costumes to add 
a ‘colourful’ dimension to public events led many Croatians to don such attire 
where possible and appropriate.’47 Any opportunity where the community could 
showcase their traditions as Croatians, rather than Yugoslavs, were seized upon 
and exploited as an act of political defiance. Events such as Australia Day 
celebrations,48 immigration weeks and festivals, and trade or exhibition shows 
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often featured a Croatian stand that showcased traditional crafts, a group of 
young people in folk costumes, often singing or dancing, or plates of Croatian 
food against the backdrop of Croatian flags, emblems, images or maps.49  
Nowhere was the twin purpose of Croatian political activism more 
intertwined than at the soccer club, perhaps the easiest structure for Croatians to 
appropriate. Compared to other forms of activism, it was relatively easy to pull 
together at least 11 men, enter a team under a Croatian name, pop on a version of 
the tricolour or Croat Šahovnica, and travel to various local, state, and national 
destinations to spread their message of defiance against the Yugoslav state.  This 
was made even easier as a tradition of Croatian soccer clubs in Australia already 
existed, with the first, Zora, established in 1931 in Sydney. The Adelaide Raiders 
(Adelaide Croatia), Melbourne Knights (Melbourne Croatia), and Sydney United 
58 (Sydney Croatia), established in 1952, 1953 and 1958 respectively, would 
develop into the foremost of Croatian clubs in Australia, participating in various 
local, state and national competitions, and affiliated with some of the largest 
names in the sport.  
With little power or position in politics, the workplace or church, the soccer 
club came to occupy a unique position in post-war migrant communities. As 
Mosely explains, 
Within soccer the immigrant’s qualifications were recognised and admired. A 
lack of the English language was not serious. There was freedom to compete on 
equal terms with anyone, and win in both the literal and metaphorical sense. The 
game provided the European immigrant with the rare opportunity for expressing 
himself. He could stake out an area in society in which his voice bore weight and 
in which he had the chance to dominate. As such, there was freedom to release 
pent-up emotions, be they ambition, passion, frustration or aggression.50 
Along with the ease of establishment, the freedom Croatians found within soccer 
meant it also became a significant channel for their activism. As Hay notes, this 
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quickly branded Croatian clubs with a reputation of hostility, clannishness, and 
over-politicisation, reduced to the epithet of ‘those bloody Croatians.’51  
If the re-establishment of an independent state and the rhetoric of anti-
communism defined the theoretical foundation and ideological framework of 
Croatian political activism, its practice, and arguably true purpose, was steeped in 
reasons of ethno-national survival. As Drapac explains, the basic premise of most 
overtly Croatian activism in the post-war period was that  
Communist Yugoslavia was stifling Croatian identity. All association was 
therefore directed at maintaining and shoring up Croatian identity in the face of 
this perceived threat to its very existence. The error onlookers made, however, 
was to assume that most of this activity was generated by a backward looking 
right wing politics. Had it truly been the case that Croats yearned nostalgically 
for the establishment of a revived Ustasha state, then Croatian activism would 
have had only limited potential for growth and change.52 
The reestablishment of an independent Croatian state and the great return to the 
homeland were the means to achieving the goals of ethno-national survival, the 
myths that justified the activism and not the end itself.  
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3.2. AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES IN THE MENZIAN AGE 
What amazes me is that nobody blames Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, 
Hungarians, Poles or dozens of other nationalities for their talk and work for 
freedom of their ex-country, although most of them were unfortunate to tolerate 
and co-operate with the brutal Germans during the last world war.53 
 
The responses of Australia’s political, legal, and media authorities to Croatian 
political activism in this period can be described as controlled. On the one hand, 
Croatian political activism was problematic in the eyes of these authorities 
because Croatian organisations were deemed incompatible with the aims of 
assimilation generally, Croatian political activism contravened the expectations 
of the Good Australian Migrant specifically, and advocacy for an independent 
Croatian state was problematic in and of itself. On the other hand, the anti-
communist, right-leaning, and conservative nature of Croatian political activism 
played right into the Cold War political agenda of Menzies and the Coalition 
Government that would hold power for 23 consecutive years.  
Further complicating the situation was the relationship of the West with 
Yugoslavia. On the one hand, communism was considered a direct threat to the 
security and stability of the Western world and its democratic traditions, and 
Yugoslavia was a communist state. On the other hand, a communist alternative 
to Soviet hegemony, particularly after the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, was considered 
to be strategically important for the West, particularly if that communist state 
was open to relations with the West, as Yugoslavia proved itself to be. 
Furthermore, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was undesirable, as it was believed 
that it would either create a territorial vacuum the Soviet Union could capitalise 
on to expand its territory, or it could become a catalyst for another bloody 
conflict that had the potential to escalate into World War III.  
Croatian political activism therefore raised suspicions, not least because 
Croatian activism was not a new phenomenon to Australian authorities. 
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However, an increasing frequency of violent incidents amongst Yugoslavs, 
coupled with a military incursion into Yugoslavia in 1963 that involved nine 
Croatians from Australia, legitimised concerns many had raised about Croatian 
political activism. Nonetheless, these incidents were deemed as belonging to an 
overwhelmingly small minority, rather than indicative of Croatian political 
activism as a whole. In light of the general hostility towards migrant political 
activism at the time, that the Coalition granted this benefit of the doubt owed 
more to the conservative, right-leaning, and anti-communist characteristics 
Croatian political activism shared with the Coalition political agenda than it did a 
particular concern for the civil liberties of Croatians.  
 
3.2.1. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF ACTIVISM 
Croatian organisations attracted the attention of Australian legal authorities 
before their activism began in earnest. ASIO held a particular interest, and 
commenced surveillance and information operations on the premises and 
members of organisations from their very establishment.54 Croatian organisations 
were deemed problematic from the outset because migrant organisations in 
general were ‘regarded as contrary to assimilationist goals and the national 
interest, and therefore a danger to be avoided.’55 Throughout the 1950s, ethnic 
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communities and their organisations were referred to as ‘national groups’, a term 
which  
reflected mainstream fears that migrants would remain isolated from Australian 
society in ethnic enclaves, and that their organisations would perpetuate the 
political and social problems of their homeland in Australia.56  
If the goal of assimilation was to make migrants ‘like us’, migrant organisations - 
and especially ethnic-specific ones - were a tangible barrier to assimilation. They 
were believed to discourage engagement with Australian institutions and 
communities and English-language learning, and heightened the visibility of 
migrants rather than serving to make them invisible or indistinguishable from 
the Australian-born.  
Moreover, the surveillance of Croatians and Croatian organisations was not a 
new phenomenon in Australia. During WWI, Croatians, particularly those 
organised around the Croatian-Slavonic Society, were placed under surveillance 
due to their status as enemy aliens.57 In the inter-war years, the Yugoslav 
organisations Croatians were organised around attracted the attention of legal 
authorities due to their involvement in trade unionism, and political ties with 
communism and international socialism. Such was the political activism of the 
Savez that from January 1937, the CIB began surveillance operations on its 
members which continued for almost two decades.58 Particular attention was 
paid to publications emanating from the community,59 and from 1940-1942 the 
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Australian Government banned Napredak, the official newspaper of the Savez 
from circulation due to its communist sympathies. 
If the mere existence of Croatian organisations or communities was 
problematic enough to warrant the interest of legal authorities, that they were 
openly political and engaged in activism was even more so. Not only were 
Croatian organisations contrary to assimilationist goals, but the fact that they 
were Croatian rather than Yugoslav organisations meant that they were 
inherently doing the very thing that was feared most - perpetuating the political 
and social problems of Yugoslavia. By disputing their identification as Yugoslavs, 
Croatians were resisting who and what Australia wanted them to be and were 
anything but the blank canvas they were expected to become. Not only did they 
hold on to their past self, cultural identity, and histories, but actively promoted 
and advocated for them. That Croatian political activism was considered a direct 
challenge to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant is encapsulated in 
the following question to the Senate from NSW ALP Senator James Ormonde in 
1963:  
I ask him [Minister assisting the Minister for External Affairs John Gorton] 
whether any attempt is made to tell intending migrants, whether they be 
Croatians or otherwise, that when they come to Australia they must leave many 
of their national habits behind them and that they are going to a country 
where private armies have not any standing and where the type of organization 
that they are interested in and have been brought up to respect is not an object 
of respect in Australia... I point out that at naturalization ceremonies new 
Australians are told that they are expected to be good Australian citizens and 
are expected to observe Australian standards and ideals… They are a 
minority group organized to keep alive hates they were not prepared to leave 
behind in their own country.60 [own emphasis] 
Thus Croatians were perceived as resisting the expectation to become ‘like us’ – a 
resistance experienced as a rejection of the presumed magnetism and superiority 
of the Australian way of life.  
Croatians earned themselves the reputation of being ‘too political’ not only 
by engaging in political activism (a contravention of the expectation of being 
apolitical), but also in placing conditions on their contribution of cultural capital. 
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Croatians were happy to make cultural contributions through faith, football, and 
folklore, but they demanded their right to political expression in return. By 
incorporating their political activism with their cultural contributions, Croatians 
were resisting the passive exploitation of their cultural capital and making 
demands the standards of the Good Australian Migrant dictated they were not 
entitled to make. These transgressions attested to the fact that Croatians were 
definitely not demonstrating their gratefulness at the opportunities life in 
Australia afforded them.  
In direct contrast, however, Croatians viewed their activism precisely as that - 
as a tangible expression of their gratefulness. The high naturalisation rates of 
Croatians attests to the importance they attached to Australian citizenship,61 and 
as Drapac explains, Croatian organisational life and its political activism  
was a means by which individuals who had little education, poor English 
language skills and limited economic and professional opportunities exhibited an 
attachment to and an understanding of democratic processes and values in the 
pluralist society they had embraced as their own.62 
Rather than taking them for granted, Croatians believed it their moral duty to 
exercise their newfound rights as Australian citizens and mobilise their 
organisations to make use of the democratic resources of free speech, protest, 
and political advocacy. In doing so, Croatians were able to ‘experience the 
fullness of Australian civil society’ and engage in an active citizenship.63 
Croatians understood and enacted their citizenship based on a wholehearted 
acceptance of the rhetoric of Australian citizenship as the equality of rights, 
rather than the reality of Australian citizenship as privileges and benefits based 
on norms of British culture and ethnicity.64  They were engaging in an active 
citizenship, whereas the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant only 
sanctioned a passive or minimalist citizenship that kept the migrant invisible but 
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answerable to Australian civic responsibility. Therein lies one of the biggest 
paradoxes in the history of Croatian political activism in Australia – Croatians 
were problematic not because they rejected Australian citizenship, but because 
they actually enacted it. 
If Australian authorities were generally concerned with migrant 
organisations, they were especially concerned with Croatian organisations 
because Croatian political activism was problematic in and of itself. Advocacy for 
an independent Croatian state was in direct competition with the political 
desirability of a Yugoslav state within Cold War paradigms. As Drapac explains, 
‘there was a degree of inevitability to this process’ as it ‘coincided with two 
features of intellectual and political life in Australia and abroad.’65 The first was 
the international standing of Yugoslavia within the Cold War context. It was in 
the interest of both the East and West to support a united Yugoslavia, not least 
because it provided a buffer zone between the two camps. For the West, 
‘Yugoslav unity was intrinsically good and politically beneficial.’66 After the Tito-
Stalin split of 1948, Yugoslavia was touted as a communist alternative to Soviet 
hegemony. It became ‘the acceptable, indeed the attractive and humane face, of 
the new communism’ and attracted the positive attention of the New Left in 
Europe and abroad.67  More importantly, Yugoslavia was of strategic importance 
to the United States. As Lees explains, Yugoslavia was a crucial to America’s 
“wedge” strategy to create divisions between the Soviet Union and other 
communist states;  
Although developed for use in both Europe and Asia, the wedge received its most 
sustained application in U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, where it also revealed its 
greatest strengths and weaknesses.68 
This strategic importance only rose as Yugoslavia built and promoted its policy of 
Non-Alignment and relative openness to the West.  
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The disintegration of Yugoslavia was also feared, so much so that from the 
1948 Tito-Stalin split, ‘Yugoslavia’s continued existence depended upon aid 
received from the West.’69 The prospect of Yugoslav disintegration had only two 
foreseeable outcomes – it would either create a territorial vacuum an 
expansionist Soviet Union could capitalise on,70 or become a catalyst for another 
bloody conflict that had the potential to escalate into World War III. For the 
Soviet Union, separatist movements, even if based on the principles of national 
communism, were perilous. The events of the Poznan Protests and the 
Hungarian Uprising in 1956 justified these fears, and any Croatian separatist 
aspirations were branded as ‘ideologically and geo-politically dangerous.’71 This 
fear of disintegration, Drapac explains, ensured that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union provided Yugoslavia with the material and moral support it 
needed at different times.72 
The second feature of intellectual and political life that made Croatian 
activism problematic was the international scholarship of fascism and the Second 
World War and the rhetoric which followed from it. Yugoslav scholarship in 
particular linked Croatian activism with Ustashism, and ‘official Yugoslav 
historiography did not make any distinction between the Ustaša movement and 
Croatian patriotism or between the regime in Croatia from 1941 to 1945 and the 
state itself.’73 This contrasted markedly with the way Serbian collaboration was 
portrayed. As Drapac explains, even though both Croatian and Serb forces 
collaborated with the Nazi regime during WWII, Yugoslav scholarship treated 
Ustaša collaboration as a ‘generalized phenomenon’ that applied to all Croatians, 
and Serb collaboration as representing the acts of a small group of traitors or 
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individuals.’74 This resulted in placing a collective guilt on the Croatian nation for 
the war crimes perpetrated by the 1941-45 regime, and discredited any aspirations 
for independence as inevitably linked to the chauvinism and brutality of the 
Ustaša regime.75 
Croatians were not alone in their anti-Yugoslav activism. Serbians, 
Macedonians and Slovenians also advocated against Yugoslavia, Tito, and 
communism.76 However, Croatians became the face of anti-Yugoslav activism for 
the very simple reason that Croatians were the most numerous, both in Australia 
and as a proportion of Yugoslav emigrants in general. This was reinforced by the 
vested interest of the Yugoslav Government generally and Tito personally in 
portraying Yugoslav separatism as a Croatian affair. Croatian emigrants and their 
activism were viewed as the largest threat to Yugoslav unity and state legitimacy. 
The historical reality of the NDH proved that Croatian separatism could 
theoretically, if not realistically, result in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. 
Separatism was therefore actively discredited first by portraying it as a Croatian 
pursuit, and then by emphasising the ideological links between Croatian activism 
and Ustashism. This effectively denounced any Croatian political activism as a 
fascist pursuit in resurrecting the brutality of the Ustaša regime.  
Aside from the obvious power the Yugoslav Government wielded in 
promoting this particular narrative of Ustashism, it was also perpetuated by the 
limited paradigms of Ustaša scholarship both within and outside of Yugoslavia. 
As summarised by Bartulin, between 1945-1990 the literature predominantly fell 
into one of three models. The most ubiquitous was the Marxist-Yugoslav model 
                                                     
74 Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 161–62. 
75 Writing about the conflation of the adoption of the Šahovnica as a national emblem (the Croatian red 
and white check) with support for fascism and racism during British coverage of the 1998 World Cup, 
Bellamy found that, ‘media reports on Croatia follow Yugoslav historiography in attaching collective guilt 
to the Croatian nation, not only for the crimes of the Second World War, but also for more recent 
crimes…..The attempt to reclaim the Šahovnica, is not therefore an attempt to offer an apologetic for 
Croatian fascists and racists, it is instead an attempt to steal their clothes and point foreign observers 
towards a more sophisticated understanding of Croatia’s history and  contemporary situation.’  
See: A. J. Bellamy, ‘Reclaiming the Croatian Flag’, Rethinking History, 3(3), 1999, 325. 
76 For example, See: 
NAA: A432, 1964/2357 PART 2 




perpetuated by Yugoslav scholarship. Within this model, the NDH was defined 
exclusively as a Nazi/Fascist puppet state and Croatian separatism framed as a 
fascistic or extremist movement. Closely related was the Catholic or clerico-
fascist model, which defined the NDH through the paradigm of political 
Catholicism and Ustashism as a Catholic-Croatian type of fascism. The third 
model developed in response to these first two models. Emerging from émigré 
circles, and articulated by anti-Yugoslav Croat intellectuals in the émigré journal 
Hrvatska revija (Croatian Review), the Nostalgic-Apologetic model defined the 
NDH as a simple realisation of independent Croatian statehood. Under this 
model, the mass crimes of the Ustaša regime were either downplayed or ignored, 
collaboration with the Nazi regime explained variably as inevitable, 
opportunistic, or Croatians simply making the most of a terrible situation.77 
There still remain deficiencies in Ustaša scholarship, some of which relate 
directly to Croatian political activism. As Drapac points out, exactly what Ustaša 
support signified is not clear;  
Generalisations about Ustaša support have not to date provided the nuanced 
profiles we have for collaborators elsewhere. Nor do we have studies that relate to 
the ideological lineage of the NDH and the reception of propaganda policies to 
the way in which the regime developed and then imploded… Normally analyses 
of European collaboration discuss motivation and intention when assessing 
people’s behaviour. Opportunity, geographical location, careerism, self-interest, 
disillusionment, racially-derived ideological commitment, the process of 
‘barbarization’ resulting from total war and people’s simple strategies for survival 
from day to day led to different kinds of behaviour and had different 
consequences.78 
Like in all wars, the reasons for enlisting are varied, ranging from the intimately 
personal to the highly idealistic, and applies to those who found themselves 
fighting for the NDH under its many guises. While it is true that some whole-
heartedly supported the Ustaša program in all of its brutality, for others the 
choice may have been more pragmatic, or not a choice at all. Some may have 
joined out of a desire to protect or avenge their families and villages against those 
they perceived would take away their freedoms, whether culturally or religiously. 
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For others, being an Ustaša may have simply been an expression of Croatian 
nationalism and the yearning for a state not subordinated to foreign rule. Others 
still may have simply joined the militia instead of the Domobrani because the 
former was better supported and equipped, and a means of escaping the dire 
poverty the war had unleashed across the region. Finally, war hysteria and the 
lure of adventure may have been enough for some, and joining the Ustaša was 
more a coincidence than a considered choice.   
The lack of academic interest in the motives for enlistment is compounded 
by a lack of academic interest in the various armies themselves, especially 
regarding the Ustaša militia. The reasons for this, as outlined by Tomasevich, are 
numerous; 
Because these forces were under German or Italian operational command during 
most of the war; because many accusations of terrorist and unlawful actions were 
levelled against them, especially the militia, both during and after the war; 
because they belonged to a defeated puppet state that disappeared at the end of 
the war; and finally, because after their defeat and surrender they were to a large 
extent destroyed by the victorious Partisans, very few studies have been written 
about them.79 
Korb also highlights that ‘empirical analyses of the collective violence committed 
in Yugoslavia during the Second World War are still rare.’80 This has led to a 
deficient scholarship steeped in Balkanist rhetoric. Acts of violence are depicted 
within a “genocide narrative,” and do not require explanation as they are either 
the result of repulsive barbarians or heinous outside control. This mirrors 
Drapac’s argument that WWII in Yugoslavia is mistakenly perceived as an 
‘exceptional’ war - ‘It was exceptionally brutal and racist. It was exceptionally 
complex and tragic.’81 This Balkanist discourse in literature concerning WWII in 
the region, Korb argues, often neglects what happened on the ground.82  
Australian authorities in Australia operated and continue to operate within 
these paradigms in their estimation of Croatian organisations and political 
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activism. Links to Ustashism were a cause for concern and were one of the 
predominant reasons for the early surveillance of Croatian organisations and 
individuals. The reason why support for the establishment of an Independent 
Croatia could be equated with support for the politics of wartime collaboration 
and the Ustaša was, as Drapač points out, fairly straightforward 
In Croatian club rooms around the country hung pictures of Ante Pavelic… Why 
would one not associate the activities taking place within those clubrooms with 
the Ustasha, or at least with a tacit acceptance of the nature of the Ustasha 
regime?83 
That Croatia existed as an independent political entity between 1941-45 was an 
important factor in shaping the political activism of émigré communities, and the 
mythology of the NDH and Ustashism exerted a significant influence amongst 
first wave Croatian migrants. However, as Skrbiš explains,  
to make the myth functional, the possibly embarrassing historical facts, such as 
collaboration with Nazis and Fascists had to be dismissed as lies or ‘explained’ in 
terms of historical inevitability.84  
This nostalgic-apologetic model of Ustaša history allowed individuals and 
organisations to freely and openly associate themselves with Ustashism as it 
simply symbolised the struggle for an Independent State of Croatia, rather than 
support for the wartime collaboration of the Ustaša regime during World War II.  
Ustashism was also a point of contention within the Croatian community, 
and controversies over ‘the picture of Pavelic’ became increasingly common when 
the second wave Croatians began emigrating in the 1960s:  
What others outside Croatian club culture could not immediately perceive was 
the extent to which the presence of images of Ante Pavelic in Croatian clubs was 
a source of considerable tension among its members.’85  
As Skrbiš documents, images of Pavelić (along with Ustashism as a whole) were 
deemed outrageously offensive, unnecessary and outdated, or simply a historical 
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truth.86 Why Ustashism was able to endure as an acceptable symbol of Croatian 
activism, however, lay in the lobbying power and influence the first wave of post-
war migrants were able to retain. This particular cohort of Croatian migrants, 
through their leadership positions, were the arbiters of social access and space 
and  the collective cultural and political identity of the post-war community in 
the period before government support was available under multiculturalism. The 
community was essentially forced to ‘fall in line’ with Ustaša mythology in order 
to retain the access to social capital and space those organisations provided. 
However, even after their withdrawal from leadership, this cohort was sufficiently 
loud and held enough clout to make demands upon the generations that 
followed. As one of Skrbiš’ respondents succinctly explained - ‘to keep the peace 
you keep the picture.’87 
These qualifications are not intended as an apologia for Ustashism. Rather 
they are an explanation of what it symbolised to a particular cohort of Croatians 
at a particular point in time, and how this symbolism informed their 
understanding of the world and their activism. The use of an ‘idyllic’ time in a 
nation’s history is not a new political tool. For Croatians in Australia, the 
mythology of the NDH and Ustashism was understood as an ‘idyllic time’ when 
Croatia was independent and nationalism was ripe. To make this myth 
functional, the harsh realities of the NDH had to be explained away or denied.  
The endurance of this mythology is attributable more to isolation than 
extremism. As the context in Croatia changed, first under Yugoslav rule, and later 
as an independent nation, Croatians in Australia found themselves cultural 
refugees lost in a sea of time. Unable to relate to their homeland, nor find 
acceptance in their new environment, Croatians clung onto these myths as 
lifeboats which justified their existence in Australia.  
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Assimilation policy, the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, the 
political desirability of a Yugoslav state, and links with Ustashism rendered 
Croatian political activism ideologically problematic in different ways. These 
ideological concerns, however, were legitimised by incidents of violence and 
unlawfulness that increasingly posed a genuine concern for Australian 
authorities. It cannot be claimed that Croatian political activism was 
unequivocally problem-free. As is true for all activism, there are always those 
prepared to resort to extralegal, illegal, and violent means to further their cause, 
and Croatian political activism was no different.  
That antagonisms and hostilities existed between ‘Yugoslavs’ was not 
unfamiliar to Australian authorities, in a large part owing to the activism of 
Croatians. These incidents were widely regarded as isolated and individual 
instances of issues, frustrations, and in some cases, simplistic tit-for-tat violence, 
borne of the WWII hangover still nursed by the community. It was mostly the 
hostilities that erupted on the football field that caught media attention in the 
first decade of post-war settlement. The hostility between Croatian, Serbian, and 
Yugoslav teams was, according to Mosely, the most publicised example of conflict 
between ethnic clubs in NSW competitions between 1949-1959.88  
However, these isolated incidents took on a more sinister significance when 
news broke on 5 September 1963 that nine Croatians travelling on Australian 
documents (two of them with Australian passports) had been arrested by 
Yugoslav authorities in July after attempting an ill-fated military incursion into 
Yugoslavia.89 That the men had travelled from Australia to carry out this 
incursion was of a nominal concern to Australian authorities, as the dual 
citizenships of the individuals meant that the government viewed it as a matter 
between Yugoslavian citizens and the Yugoslavian Government. More pertinent, 
however, were allegations by the Yugoslav Government that the incursion was 
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orchestrated by an underground Ustaša organisations called the Croatian 
Revolutionary Brotherhood (Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo - HRB), that was 
recruiting and training Croatian terrorists in Australia.90 
In light of the ideological concerns raised by Croatian political activism, the 
1963 incursion was perceived as the smoke to the fire (and for some the actual 
fire) that Croatian political activism could potentially be. News of the incursion 
resulted in unprecedented attention from Australian authorities, 
parliamentarians, and the media into the nature and intentions of Croatian 
organisations and their activism. In September and October 1963, questions were 
raised in both houses of Parliament which drew on the ideological problems of 
Croatian political activism to question the Government’s response to the 
incursion and the HRB.91 Leading the charge was Cairns in the House of 
Representatives and Ormonde in the Senate. Their questions – mainly regarding 
alleged links between Croatian activism and Ustashism - over the next year would 
come to occupy the bulk of responses provided alongside Menzies’ Ministerial 
Statement in August 1964. 
Aside from general reporting on developments in Yugoslavia and in the 
Australian parliament, newspapers increasingly reported on the Croatian 
community and its activism, calling on leaders (and leaders calling on 
newspapers) to provide responses to events on behalf of the community.92 
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Naturally, this resulted in a greater public presence of the community and a 
larger platform from which to publicise their views and activism.93 This 
newfound media interest, however, also came at a cost as newspapers 
increasingly framed Croatian political activism as a problematic phenomenon.94  
More than anything, Croatian political activism was problematic because it defied 
the expectation that migrants become ahistorical and apolitical upon their 
arrival, as demonstrated by the editorial from The Age following news of the 
incursion - 
Australians generally know little about, and want to have no part in, the 
Croatian-Yugoslav dispute. Their one concern with the matter is that migrants 
from that part of the world should leave their differences behind when they come 
to this country to make a new home… Australia has amply proved that a genuine 
welcome awaits the migrant seeking a new life and new opportunity here. That 
welcome does not extend to political trouble-makers.95  
News of the HRB and the 1963 incursion somewhat blindsided Australian 
authorities, particularly ASIO, as very little was known about the group at the 
time.96 The initial response of Australian authorities was one of increased 
attention to Croatian organisations and Croatian political activism, but limited by 
existing paradigms. For the Commonwealth Police Force (CPF), the 
organisational charters of Australia’s various police forces and their jurisdictions 
tempered any expansion of investigation capabilities. Though the CPF instituted  
a policy of interviewing all male Yugoslavs applying for travel documentation in 
the hopes of preventing further incursions, ‘most areas in which the CPF might 
have taken an interest were covered by state laws and state police jurisdictions’.97 
ASIO on the other hand, was tempered by both its organisational charter and 
culture. Spry was adamant that ASIO officers only engaged in matters of security 
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interest, and wanted to ‘ensure that there was no blurring of the line between 
ASIO’s investigative function and the CPF’s executive function.’98  
Thus on 28 October 1963, Spry presented a summary of ASIO’s ‘extensive 
investigations’ into the HRB to Immigration Minister Alick Downer. While ASIO 
could confirm the existence of HRB and its recruitment of young single men, it 
could not substantiate claims that terrorist or sabotage training had taken place – 
only ‘some form of elementary training… on a small scale without efficient co-
ordination or control.’ The report concluded that as a group, Yugoslavs ‘cannot 
be singled out as constituting any special security threat to Australia’, while the 
HRB was ‘insignificant as far as the security of the Commonwealth is concerned 
and should be regarded as an extreme manifestation of a more widely felt desire 
for an independent Croatia.’99 Spry generally characterised Croatians as good 
anti-communists, not hostile to Australia’s democratic government, and a 
comparatively well-settled migrant group. Though some may interpret these 
assessments as evidence of ASIO’s left-leaning bias, even Blaxland admits that ‘in 
the main, Spry was right, except for a very small group.’100 
On 25 November, an interdepartmental meeting between senior officers of 
the Departments of Prime Minister, Immigration, External Affairs, Attorney-
General, and ASIO had been scheduled in order to discuss the HRB. The meeting 
served to highlight the differing priorities and assessments of each of the 
departments. While ASIO emphasised the broader political context of Croatian 
activism and the case of the HRB, the Prime Minister’s Department was narrower 
in outlook, focusing on the particulars of Croatian nationalism and the optics of 
the situation. In contrast, the Attorney-General’s Department focused on the 
particulars of prosecution, particularly in the relative difficulties in prosecuting 
organisations as opposed to individuals. As would be expected, External Affairs 
was concerned with the potential for diplomatic embarrassment, while the 
                                                     
98 ibid., 127. 
99 NAA: A6980, S360693, ‘Corro, DG of ASIO to Immi Minster, 28 October 1963’  
100 Blaxland, The Protest Years, 126. 
163 
 
Immigration department was concerned with how this activism compromised 
assimilation. What they could all agree on, however, was that 
applicants for migration should be warned at the selection interview that they 
would be expected to forget their national feuds on going to Australia and that 
activities such as those of the [HRB] are not encouraged here.101 
Despite their differences, the one thing common between all departments was 
the notion that Croatian political activism was problematic because it 
discouraged Croatians from becoming Good Australian Migrants upon their 
arrival.  
With Menzies calling an early election for November 30, domestic political 
concerns took priority and Croatian political activism faded from the national 
spotlight. The issue of the 1963 incursion returned with the trial in Yugoslavia of 
the nine men in April 1964.102 However, it was the explosion of a bomb in Sydney 
on 7 May that firmly placed the Croatian community and its activism back in the 
spotlight. While the incursion and subsequent trial were abstract events that 
occurred well away from Australia, the bombing was a tangible act of violence, 
the aftermath of which was laid out for all of those opening their weekend 
newspapers.  The only victim of the blast, 35-year old Croatian Tomislav Lesic, 
accused Communist agents for the attack, warning other Croatians that they 
could be next. Others alleged that Lesic was a known ‘extremist’ who in all 
probability had built the bomb himself and suffered the misfortune of having it 
detonate too early. These allegations and counter-allegations prompted fears that 
a ‘Croat war’ in Sydney was imminent.103  
As both houses of Parliament debated the bombing and the circumstances 
surrounding it, Croatian political activism turned into a bona fide political 
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football, deployed by both sides of Government to justify their political 
agendas.104 Like before, this political football was mostly kicked by Ormonde in 
the Senate, but the most volatile player was Cairns.  Both inside and out of 
parliament, Cairns argued that Croatian organisations, and the Croatian 
Liberation Movement in particular, were ‘Nazi-type Ustasha’ organisations, their 
aims synonymous with fascism and Ustashism, and that the government was 
deliberately protecting and shielding them.105 Such was Cairns’ condemnation 
that it resulted in two highly publicised political stoushes. The first was between 
Cairns and A-G Snedden, over Cairns’ patronage of the Yugoslav Settlers’ 
Association and alleged communist links, which escalated to the point of a no-
confidence motion against Sneddon on 20 May.106 The second came between 
Cairns and Wentworth, who first clashed during a television appearance 
discussing the situation in the Yugoslav community in May,107 and would cause 
uproar in the House debating the same issues in September later that year.108 
As would be expected, newspapers across Australia reported on the debates 
in parliament, repeating claims made by both sides of government. Newspaper 
editorials for the most part emphasised two points – that the debates in 
parliament were more partisan than of substance, and that the far greater issue at 
hand was the importation of historical feuds from abroad which was unbecoming 
of Good Australian Migrants.109 Despite qualifications by parliamentarians and 
newspapers alike that these incidents of violence were the actions of a minority, 
what these debates in fact served to do was, in true Good Australian Migrant 
fashion, hold the majority of Croatians accountable for the transgressions of an 
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overwhelming minority, and delegitimise Croatian political activism as a 
whole.110  
Croatians responded to the incursion, bombing, and debates that followed in 
much the same way as Australian authorities. Mirroring their qualifications, 
Croatians denied allegations of the existence of terrorist-training organisations, 
but conceded that the potential for extremist elements within the community 
existed, particularly amongst young single men. They stressed that any incidence 
of violence was the work of a minority, and that the overwhelming majority of 
Croatians were law-abiding, their activism committed only to advancing Croatian 
independence through democratic and nonviolent means.111 Croatians took 
umbrage to their characterisation as Fascists or Nazis, and also made counter-
allegations that these incidents of violence and the 1963 incursion were the work 
of Yugoslav agents provocateur, aimed at discrediting Croatian political activism 
in general, and HOP specifically. For their part, the leaders of HOP - the main 
target of Cairns’ accusations – sought a deputation before Immigration Minister 
Hubert Opperman in a bid to clear the misrepresentation of their organisation 
and Croatian activism in general.112 
 Though 1964 saw an increase in the frequency of disturbances between 
Yugoslavs, various authorities and police forces reported that they had been 
unable to substantiate claims of wider organisation and co-ordination of violent 
acts by any Croatian individual or organisation.113 The CPF argued that though 
there was some evidence that an organisation was still in existence possibly 
recruiting individuals to undertake incursions, it could only be the HRB, as all 
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other Croatian organisations were moderate and non-violent in outlook.114 The 
NSW Police located the catalyst for the disturbances in NSW, SA, and WA in the 
increased allegations of Fascist sympathies amongst Croatians from pro-
Communist organisations, which intensified the anti-Communist campaign by 
Croatians in response. Moreover, it argued that it was the very ‘airing of 
ethnical[sic], political, and religious hatreds’, made worse by their discussion in 
Federal Parliament, that had led to this escalation.115  
It was in this context of allegations and counter-allegations, politicking and 
electioneering, explanations and qualifications that Menzies gave his Ministerial 
Statement. In many ways, these events served to prove both sides of the debate 
‘right’. On the one hand, that the HRB existed, the 1963 incursion occurred, and 
that violence between Yugoslavs was escalating meant that there were some 
problematic aspects to Croatian political activism, and that perhaps insufficient 
attention was being paid to these by Australian authorities. On the other hand, 
the alleged equivocation by Menzies that these incidents were not indicative of 
all Croatians, that they were not of great import to national security, and that 
they did not warrant the extreme responses as advocated by those such as Cairns, 
proved itself on the right side of history, as did the argument that the 
transgressions of a minority should not impinge on the civil liberties of the 
majority of Croatians and their right to political activism. However, that Menzies 
and his Coalition government held Croatian civil liberties in such a high regard 
was the result of a conspiracy of contexts that afforded Croatians latitude in their 
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3.2.3. AUSTRALIAN COLD WAR MYOPIA 
The identification of Croatian political activism as an anti-communist, 
conservative, and democratic advocacy of the right of the Croatian nation to self-
determination and political independence played into the wider Cold War 
myopia that not only defined Australian political life, but worldwide. As Manne 
argues, Australia’s post-war acceptance of migrants and refugees was in part 
guided by the ideological setting of the Cold War – those escaping communism 
were supported by the political right, the Catholic Church, and anti-communist 
intelligentsia, while those fleeing right-wing regimes were supported by the 
political left, the trade union movement, and left-wing intelligentsia.116 Brawley 
echoes this sentiment, arguing that ‘refugees in this post-war era were important 
pawns. Every refugee accepted by the West was yet another indictment of the 
Communist system.’117 In this ideological framework, every Croatian accepted by 
Australia and every time Croatians were politically active and visible was an 
indictment of communist Yugoslavia and of Titoism. 
This ideological legitimacy also had practical applications. The electoral 
advantage gained by opposition to communism was in part responsible for the 
Coalition’s ability to govern for 23 consecutive years. Menzies’ failed 1951 
referendum to ban the CPA was a victory for H.V Evatt and the ALP, however, 
‘though Evatt had won this battle, the fallout was so costly that it was Menzies 
who won the war.’118 Fractures within the ALP as a result of the referendum, as 
well as the perception that members were communist sympathisers, conspired to 
keep the ALP out of office.119 On the other hand, the Petrov affair, the Korean 
War, and Australia’s proximity to South-East Asia coupled with the popularity of 
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the Domino theory, conspired to keep the Coalition in office and sustained the 
political currency of Menzies’ ‘reds under the beds’ moral panic.120 
Opposition to communism also fed into wider schisms in Australian political 
life. For the trade union movement, the post-war period saw the CPA, the 
Catholic Social Studies Movement (the ‘Movement’), and the ALP in a three-way 
struggle for control.121 Within this, Croatians were a welcome ‘numbers boost’ on 
behalf of the Movement and the ALP, particularly in the face of the CPAs 
fractured relationship with the Yugoslav community after the Tito-Stalin split.122 
Croatians were also drawn into the sectarian division between the Protestant and 
Catholic churches. In the same way Menzies saw in Croatians a pool of potential 
anti-communist voters, the Catholic Church saw in Croatians a pool of potential 
parishioners. As already explained, the shared anti-communism and common 
interest in the case of Stepinac led to the public embrace of Croatians and their 
activism by the Australian church, and it certainly helped that the Archbishop of 
Adelaide, Matthew Beovich, was the son of a Croatian migrant. 
The anti-communism of Croatian political activism held one other, less-
evident practical application. The fact that Croatian political activism attracted 
the attention of Yugoslav authorities, and that ASIO knew that Yugoslav secret 
agents were monitoring them, gave Australian authorities an opportunity too 
great to pass up; 
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In the Byzantine world of the security services, low-level violence, mostly 
directed against foreigners, paled beside an opportunity to garner information 
against rival spies.123  
The more public the Croatian activism, the more likely the Yugoslav Government 
was to initiate intelligence operations in Australia. In return, ASIO could initiate 
counter-intelligence operations, and collect invaluable information about the 
techniques of a communist intelligence service. The problematic few engaging in 
violence was a small price to pay for such an intelligence coup, especially when 
that price was being paid by the Croatian community.  
That Croatians were also proving themselves Good Australian Migrants 
helped to mitigate adverse views on their activism. Croatians excelled in fulfilling 
their expectation of labour and contributing to the economic prosperity of the 
nation. They were often associated with the construction of major, labour-
intensive public infrastructure projects, the most notable being the Snowy 
Mountains River Hydro-Electric Scheme,124 and employed in large numbers in 
key post-war industries, such as steel, manufacturing, building and construction, 
and agriculture. Croatians were highly interactive with their local communities, 
mainly through the local church and football competitions, but also through 
their participation in local community events, happy to contribute their cultural 
capital. Perhaps most important of all, the comparatively high naturalisation 
rates of Croatians was proof of their status as Good Australian Migrants. Not only 
did naturalisation demonstrate their acceptance of Australia, but also indicated 
that arguably, Croatians were more invested in Australia than other migrant 
groups.  
The gradual move from assimilation to integration policy also tempered 
responses to Croatian political activism. Criticism of assimilation came early in 
the 1950s from those that were involved in the provision of services to migrants, 
such as teachers, health workers and employers, and who experienced first-hand 
the inequalities assimilation policy produced. Over the next decade, the research 
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of academics, such as Jean Martin, Jerzy Zubrzycki, and James Jupp, also began to 
reflect the failure of assimilation, and demographers Wilfred D. Borrie and 
Charles A. Price became particularly influential change agents due to their 
positions as principle academic advisers to the Immigration Department.125 By 
1964, the department had officially abandoned the term ‘assimilation’ for 
‘integration’, the negatively connoted ‘national groups’ for ‘ethnic communities’ 
and ‘ethnic organisations’, and as a whole had ‘developed a less fearful attitude 
towards the existence of ethnic minorities and their organisations.’126 In this 
context, Croatian organisations found a legitimate role and space in Australian 
society that was simply not the case under the more hard-line assimilation policy 
of earlier years, and which removed at least some suspicion over their 
establishment.127 
As 1964 drew to a close, Croatian political activism subsided as an issue in 
parliament. Though this might have been inadvertent as issues of governance 
took precedence - such as budgeting and legislating - it could also be interpreted 
as an admission on behalf of the ALP that perhaps this issue was doing more 
electoral harm than good. The fallout from the Cairns fiasco which occupied 
much of 1964 proved detrimental, contributing to the perception that the ALP 
was sympathetic towards communism at a time when the ‘red scare’ still held 
political currency. The 1963 and 1966 elections bookended this period, and the 
overwhelming victory of the Coalition in 1966 with the ‘Play it Safe’ slogan 
indicated that anti-communism was an important electoral issue. Though 
Senator Tony Mulvihill would take up the mantle of Cairns and Ormonde and 
regularly raise the issue in the Senate throughout the rest of the 1960s, Croatian 
political activism would not be resurrected in proper until 1970. 
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3.3. THE PARADIGMS SHIFT 
The perception of a high degree of politicisation within Croatian clubs became a 
source of some consternation by Australian authorities as close diplomatic ties 
were being forged with Yugoslavia from 1966.128 
 
The decade of 1963-1972 saw an escalation of violence within the Yugoslav 
community, including 14 bombings, 11 documented threats of violence, six 
incidents of vandalism, four incidents of violence involving weapons, four arrests, 
two murders, and a second incursion into Yugoslavia in June 1972, this time 
involving six Australian citizens and a further three who had previously lived in 
Australia.129 Though some of this escalation in violence can be explained by the 
increased public attention of 1963/4 which escalated hostilities between Yugoslav 
migrants, it is also attributable as simply a statistical phenomenon. The opening 
up of Yugoslavia’s borders from the early 1960s increased Yugoslav migration to 
unparalleled rates, and particularly of non-Croatian Yugoslav migrants. 
The increased effort of Australian authorities to forge closer diplomatic ties 
with Yugoslavia culminated in a bilateral agreement between Yugoslavia and 
Australia on 21 July 1970. This included an assisted passage scheme that would 
result in 53,363 arrivals in 1970 and 1971 alone. 1970 was also the year Croatian 
political activism resurfaced as an issue in parliament. This was partly because of 
the shadow Croatian activism increasingly cast over the emerging diplomatic 
relationship between Australia and Yugoslavia, but also because the paradigms 
within which Croatian political activism was perceived and understood had 
undergone profound shifts that placed Croatian political activism increasingly at 
odds with Australia’s social, political, and cultural environment. 
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3.3.1. THE SECOND WAVE OF CROATIAN EMIGRATION 
Though the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 afforded Tito the space needed to 
introduce an alternative model of communism, it also left an ideological vacuum 
in exactly how this ‘Yugoslav Way’ would translate into practical forms of 
governance. Thus, the 1950s were defined by a number of internal divisions 
within the Communist leadership in regards to the substance and form the 
‘Yugoslav Way’ would take, none more pronounced than the failure of 
agricultural collectivisation and the ensuing Milovan Djilas affair.130 As the 
economic woes of Yugoslavia steadily worsened, liberal and conservative factions 
began to emerge around two dominant issues; centralism vs decentralism of the 
state, and liberalisation vs protectionism of economic policy.131 
By 1961, Belgrade was beginning to acquiesce to pressures from party liberals, 
and introduced three reform measures to temper increasing internal divisions 
and Yugoslavia’s economic woes; the relaxation of wage controls, the 
reorganisation of financial markets, and the opening of the Yugoslav economy to 
world markets. It is this last reform that was to have a significant impact on 
Croatian migration, as it brought the illegal migration that had characterised the 
decade earlier out of condemnation and into tolerance as an economic 
consequence. However as inflation quickened and economic problems continued 
to grow, the reforms of 1961 were found to be insufficient, and compelled the 
federal government to enact a series of sweeping economic reforms in 1965. As 
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See also: Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 290. 
173 
 
Zimmerman explains, not only did these reforms institutionalise the demands of 
reformist communists, but they also elevated 
the notion of open borders to the level of state policy. Rather than a stance of 
tolerance or resignation, the open borders policy had come to be identified in 
official utterances as one of the key defining features, along with market 
socialism and self-management, of what was distinct and positive in the Yugoslav 
socialist variant and an element that set off Yugoslavia from the Soviet model.132 
With migration accepted and even encouraged by the state, the decision to 
emigrate became available to a much wider demographic.  
Yugoslav migration to Australia increased to numbers unparalleled either 
before or after. Between 1961-1969, the average rate of migration increased from 
approximately 3000 arrivals per year to over 12000 in 1969. The bilateral 
agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970 legally reinforced this 
emigration, and the two year period between 1970 and 1971 alone saw 
approximately 53,363 arrivals. Between 1961 and 1976, the number of ‘Yugoslav-
Born’ people in Australia increased from 49,776 to 143,591 – almost a threefold 
expansion in only 15 years, not including those born in Australia. 133  
It is difficult to know the proportion of Croatians within these numbers as 
Australia did not officially distinguish between the various Yugoslav groups. 
Though Yugoslav migration in the post-war period had been predominantly 
Croatian,134 the opening of the borders in the 1960s and the bilateral agreement 
of 1970 led to the increased migration of non-Croatian Yugoslavs to Australia. 
The numeric expansion of the community, coupled with the new diversity in 
ethnic make-up, led to a diversity of views in matters of Yugoslav affairs that 
diminished the dominance Croatians enjoyed in the 1950s. As can be expected, 
with this greater diversity, a greater degree of disagreement and hostility between 
the various groups followed. The greater size and diversity of the community also 
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accounted for 39% of Yugoslavs abroad. Croatian migration from Bosnia-Hercegovina highlighted this 
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meant that, if for no other reason, incidents of violence would statistically 
become more frequent.  
Despite their comparative decline, Croatians continued to constitute the 
largest proportion of Yugoslav migration, and the period between 1960-1972 was 
characterised by an exceptionally rapid expansion of the community. Officially 
classed as economic migrants, these were the first Croatians to come to Australia 
as documented immigrants. The social profile of second wave migrants was even 
more diverse than the first, with an unparalleled diversity across class, education, 
gender, age, and place of origin. This diversity also included political orientation 
and views, and as Tkalčević explains, many of these second wave Croatians 
argued that the identification of émigré Croatians exclusively with right-wing 
ideologies was false. For these Croatians, particularly those arriving after 1971, the 
political platform as outlined by the first wave and their organisations did not 
always fully coincide with their views, and some even established their own 
organisations to reflect this.135  
The 1960s also prompted the community to become more focused on life in 
Australia. The lack of government assistance in the face of this influx of Croatians 
meant that organisations were occupied with meeting the more straightforward 
demands the settlement of newcomers required. The social and cultural life of 
Croatians in Australia boomed as memberships swelled, interests expanded, and 
resources accumulated. Attention also turned to the preservation of language, 
culture, and tradition across generations. Not only were a greater number of 
children migrating to Australia, but a generation of Australian-born Croatians 
were being raised that had no experience of Croatia, and were growing up in an 
English-speaking world. Thus, the practice of establishing a local Hrvatska škola - 
‘Croatian School’ came into being, with the first schools opened in Adelaide in 
1961 and Sydney in 1963. Hrvatska škola would become a mainstay throughout 
most communities and rite of passage for Croatian children, even to this day.  
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As more Croatians poured into the community and political views became 
more diverse, social and cultural clubs increasingly formed the nexus of the 
community. Whereas the organisations of the first wave were clearly politically 
defined, the political orientation of second wave organisations was less-defined, 
instead placing priority on the social concerns of everyday life in Australia. This 
did not eliminate the political concerns or activism of the community, but 
instead resulted in a shift from an emphasis on political rhetoric to one of ethno-
national survival. Though Croatians were increasingly at odds as to how or when 
or what type of an independent Croatian state should be established, the one 
thing they could all agree on was that they were not ethnically, culturally, nor 
linguistically Yugoslav. 
It was often argued, both at the time and afterwards, that despite their 
official demarcation as economic migrants, second wave Croatians were also 
political migrants, even if their politics differed from their predecessors. Though 
they were not escaping the overt persecution of the late 1940s and 1950s, the 
socio-political reality of Yugoslavia meant that Croatians, particularly those with 
dissenting views to the Yugoslav federal government, used the structures of 
economic migration to escape the Yugoslav totalitarian regime, either out of a 
fear of direct persecution, or in general protest to the economic, ethnic, and 
political discrimination faced by Croatians at the hands of Yugoslav officials.  
Despite the correlation between these economic and political reasons, it can 
be problematic to conflate the two, or argue the primacy of political reasons for 
migration. The absence of archival records or comprehensive oral histories about 
the reasons for migration of this wave means that it is difficult to estimate the 
extent to which political considerations informed the decision to migrate. 
Zimmerman and Brunnbauer both argue that the greater determinant of 
migration seems to lie in entrenched patterns of chain migration.136 Yugoslav 
migrants were more likely to originate from areas where there existed a cultural 
memory of migration, particularly as a well-established method of managing 
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adverse economic conditions. It is easier to decide to emigrate for a person whose 
father or grandfather has already done so, where there is a relative or friend 
already abroad who could help facilitate the move, or where there are existing 
ties to a community in the diaspora, even if the connection is as tenuous as a 
friend of a friend or someone from the same village. As demonstrated in Chapter 
1, Croatians, particularly those from the Dalmatian region, had a well-entrenched 
tradition of emigration, particularly to Australia. This cultural memory could 
therefore account for the higher proportion of Croatians emigrating in the 1960s 
– put simply, Croatians migrated because they already had somewhere to go and 
had a tradition of going. 
The pre-eminence of economic imperatives to migration in the 1960s, rather 
than political persecution, is perhaps best understood by looking to the fall in 
rates of migration in the 1970s. Just as Croatian nationalism was reaching its 
zenith in 1971, the relative proportion of Croatians in Yugoslav migration was 
already diminishing, and by the 1980s had significantly reduced.137 If migration 
was of a political nature, it could reasonably be expected that the relative 
proportion of Croatians would stay steady, or even increase in the wake of the 
1971 Croatian Spring and its purges.138 However as Goldstein argues, the 1970s 
was a period of economic prosperity in Croatia – the standard of living was at its 
highest levels, and the average Croatian worker could expect to live a ‘Good Life’ 
full of consumer goods, Western fashions, German cars, and weekend trips 
away.139 This economic prosperity did not extend to the poorer republics of 
Yugoslavia, and migrants from these republics formed a growing proportion of 
both intra-Yugoslav migration, as well as Yugoslav outmigration. If the economic 
boom of the 1970s led to a decreased rate of Croatian migration despite a climate 
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of increased political persecution, the 1960s can be understood in the reverse – an 
increased rate of migration due to the economic bust of the late 1950s/early 1960s 
despite a climate of comparative political freedom that favoured 
liberalist/decentralist policy, even if it was within a communist paradigm.140  
Furthermore, it is difficult to know whether individuals emigrated actively 
and purposefully for political reasons, or whether their emigration was economic 
and became politicised upon their arrival into a community that had already 
constructed migration as political. Part of the reason why remembering this wave 
of migration as political has remained unchallenged is because the conflation of 
the economic with the political formed a large part of the way the community in 
Australia has rationalised the cognitive dissonance generated by the act of 
migration with its political activism. If one is as patriotic a Croatian as is often 
asserted, the act of voluntary migration can be perceived as a cowardly or 
traitorous act, or simply the easy way out - all accusations levelled at Croatians in 
the diaspora to this day. However, if one is ‘forced’ to leave their homeland, as 
was the case with the first wave of Croatians, this dissonance can be resolved and 
their activism understood as long-distance nationalism. This goes some way to 
explaining why Croatians in Australia were politically active to the degree they 
were; because of the dissonance caused by the act of migration, it was not enough 
to simply be Croatian in Australia, you needed to prove yourself the right kind of 
Croatian. This demonstration was often encapsulated in the popular label of an 
individual as a Veliki Hrvat – a ‘big’ Croatian. 
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3.3.2. THE END OF THE MENZIAN AGE 
Though historians bookend the period of the ‘Sixties’ at different times with 
different events and in different places, all agree that significant social, political, 
and cultural changes occurred in Australia somewhere between the late 1950s 
through to the mid-1970s. Anti-Vietnam protests, student activism, indigenous 
civil rights activism, LGBT activism, women’s liberation, the sexual revolution, 
environmentalism, counter-culture, and youth revolts are all hallmarks of this 
period of social upheaval. Though the various movements were distinctive and 
divergent, Piccini argues that there was a significant enough interrelation and 
interconnection between the movements, both domestically and internationally, 
that can characterise the 1960s as a transnational ‘movement of movements.’141 
It is important to remember, however, that the 1960s as they are shaped in 
cultural memory are also distorted and limited. Historians now generally accept 
two important qualifications to the historiography of the period. The first is that 
though politics and protest were important and influential features, only a 
minority of the population was ever really involved. As Robinson and Ustinoff 
point out,  
the reality is that the vast majority of Australians were neither hippies nor dope-
smokers; involvement in youth protest movements was, in the main, an 
experience for middle-class university students; and sexual liberation was a hotly 
contested debate.142 
Second, the question of whether and how these broad upheavals impacted the 
daily life of Australians remains ambiguous. Some, such as O’Hanlon and 
Luckins, have found that there are very real reflections of the ‘new values’ of the 
1960s in the everyday life of Australians, while others, such as Smaal, argue that 
perhaps the rhetoric did not always match the lived experience of people.143  
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Nonetheless, the social transformations of the 1960s had an important impact 
on Australia’s political environment. Elected leader of the ALP in 1967, Whitlam 
recognised that these upheavals, along with demographic and economic changes 
of the post-war period, had created new political constituencies the ALP could 
exploit to win office. Burgeoning migrant communities desperate for government 
assistance; an expanding white collar middle-class more likely to respond to an 
aspirational, values-based political program than the working-class solidarity and 
union strength platform Labor had traditionally relied on; and new cultures less 
focused on class, religion, or anti-communism as the basis of political 
identification and more on the ideals of equality, rights, and community all 
delivered a political platform from which an election campaign could be 
formulated.144 At the same time, those agitating for change ‘ultimately arrived at 
the same conclusion as older challengers to the established order. It would 
require legislative change – action by the state – for marginalised groups to 
achieve equality.’145 Thus, Piccini explains,  
the election of Labor’s Gough Whitlam in December of 1972 is often pictured as 
the radical wave [of the 1960s] finally making landfall, while that government’s 
inglorious dismissal three years later captures the tide’s quick retreat.146 
One of the crowning achievements of the Whitlam government was its 
official policy of multiculturalism, which introduced the formal government 
assistance migrant communities had so desperately wanted and needed. Not only 
did this policy accept the cultural differences of migrants that had been 
discouraged under assimilation and integration, but encouraged these differences 
as an intrinsically Australian quality. Multiculturalism afforded a wealth of 
opportunity for Croatian migrants and their activism. The emphasis it placed on 
cultural expression, coupled with the inter-relatedness of the cultural and 
political in Croatian activism, provided Croatians with the ability to engage in 
activism across many platforms not previously available to them. That 
multiculturalism stressed ethnicity over nationality meant that Croatians were 
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able to legitimately advocate for their causes as Croatians and bypass issues 
raised by their Yugoslav citizenship. Furthermore, Croatian political activism was 
able to resume its traditional patterns in advocating for identity recognition 
through campaigns for access to services, including that most Croatian of proxy 
battlegrounds, language recognition.  
Just as multiculturalism was one of the outcomes of the transformations of 
the 1960s, so too was a purposeful repudiation of the anti-communist position 
that had defined the 1950s and the 23 years of Coalition government rule. As 
Whitlam enacted a number of changes in order to establish Australia’s newfound 
neutral stance in international affairs, the pivot away from anti-communism as a 
political ideal represented an end to the latitude Croatian political activism 
enjoyed. The loss of this political currency, coupled with the political diversity of 
the second wave of Croatian migration led to a shift in Croatian political activism. 
Whereas emphasis once lay on the ‘not-communist’ message of Croatian 
activism, the focus now lay on the ‘not-Yugoslav’ message.  However, changes in 
the international political environment limited the political currency of the ‘not-
Yugoslav’ message as well.  
 
3.3.3. THE COLD WAR THAW  
The events of WWII made legitimising a new Yugoslav state between fiercely 
nationalistic groups, scarred by an unending series of hostility and brutality 
against one another, a difficult feat to achieve. In order to do this, the Tito regime 
invoked what Ramet has termed the ‘legitimating triad’ of Tito’s Yugoslavia - 
‘Brotherhood and Unity’, Self-management, and Non-alignment. ‘Brotherhood 
and Unity’ (Bratstvo i Jedinstvo) served as the moral pillar upon which Yugoslav 
state legitimacy was built. It invoked the mythology of WWII and Partisan victory 
as a triumph of anti-fascist resistance and a symbol of inter-ethnic cooperation 
between the Yugoslav peoples under communism. The 1948 Tito-Stalin split 
required an articulation of Yugoslav communism that distinguished its political 
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and economic formula from that of the Soviet Union.147 This was to be achieved 
through the concept of self-management, which was deployed as both an 
economic and political pillar.  
The final pillar, Non-Alignment, combined the principles of brotherhood and 
unity and self-management and applied them to the world stage by promoting a 
‘third way’ in international politics. This meant Yugoslavia could stand in 
solidarity with others to create a foreign policy movement that was independent 
of the Soviet bloc or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), while 
demonstrating its progressiveness relative to both. Though non-alignment as a 
concept was introduced to the international political lexicon in the early 1950s, it 
was not until 1961 that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was institutionalised, 
with Tito convening the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-
Aligned Countries in Belgrade.  
As Brotherhood and Unity distinguished Tito’s Yugoslavia from the 
bloodshed of WWII, and the principle of self-management distinguished between 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Non-Alignment served to distinguish Yugoslav 
foreign policy from both other communist countries and the Western world. 
Tito’s leadership of NAM from 1961-4, coupled with the liberal/decentralist 
reforms enacted in Yugoslavia during the 1960s bolstered Yugoslavia’s desirability 
and strategic importance in the West; 
Taken in sum, these programmatic components struck many observers as 
amounting to a new vision of politics, a new dream; and at the height of the 
Titoist experiment, delegations from all over the world would visit Yugoslavia to 
study self-management and see what might be applicable in their own 
countries.148  
Self-management became the topic du jour for economists and politicians 
worldwide, either as a possible solution to internal criticisms of the communist 
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system, a possible conflict resolution tool within companies, or simply because of 
its unique combination of socialist and market economy principles.149  
Yugoslavia’s standing as a communist alternative to the Soviet Union was 
bolstered as revelations about the excesses and horrors of Stalinism came to light 
and ‘made it difficult for all but the most fanatical of Europe’s Left to idealize the 
Soviet Union and favour it over Yugoslavia.’150 This was augmented by 
Yugoslavia’s growth in geopolitical importance as the Cold War moved from the 
brink of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 to official détente in 1969. Though this 
importance was symbolic rather than practical, ‘leadership of the non-aligned 
nations brought Tito a certain stature on the global stage.151 As the West became 
increasingly enamoured with Yugoslavia and charmed by Tito, proclaiming 
oneself not-Yugoslav, anti-Yugoslav, or anti-Tito did not carry the same clout as it 
did in the previous decade. As Western countries, including Australia scrambled 
to establish political and diplomatic ties with this symbolic powerhouse of the 
‘Third Way’, Croatians and their activism became increasingly problematic. 
The net effect of these changes in paradigms was that even though the 
Croatian community was at its most diverse demographically and politically, the 
social transformations of the 1960s and the introduction of multiculturalism 
shifted the emphasis of Croatian activism from the political goals of the 
reestablishment of an independent state, to questions of ethno-national survival 
and Croatian identity in Australia. However, the Cold War thaw, and Australia’s 
reorientation in foreign policy meant that even though Croatians were more and 
more able to engage in their activism across different platforms, it was less and 
less politically acceptable to do so. This divergence would come to define the 
period of 1972-1979. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
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Overnight, the Croatians went from fellow travellers of the 
right and a bastion of anti-communism, to being former 










On 27 March 1973, Murphy rose to deliver his Ministerial Statement on 
Croatian Terrorism.2 Though less than a decade separated Murphy’s Statement 
from that of Menzies, their positions regarding Croatian organisations and their 
activism could not be more different. Murphy’s Statement took almost an hour to 
deliver, and included the tabling of 62 documents, amounting to more than 2000 
pages, drawn from police, ASIO, and departmental files. The purpose of his 
Statement was twofold – to expose the evidence and existence of Croatian 
terrorism in Australia, and to demonstrate the persistent denial of this threat by 
previous governments, particularly the former Attorney-General, Liberal Senator 
Ivor J. Greenwood. Murphy’s Statement consisted of six main themes; that there 
was evidence of Croatian terrorism in Australia, that there was evidence of 
Croatian terrorist organisations in Australia; that there was evidence of Croatian 
terrorists residing in Australia; that Croatian terrorism was able to develop in 
Australia due to the indifference and bias of previous governments; that 
Greenwood was particularly culpable of inaction through his tenure as Attorney-
General; and that Murphy and the Whitlam Government were determined to 
enact changes.3  
Like Menzies’ Statement in 1964, Murphy’s Statement was met with 
immediate criticism. However, this criticism was more than a disagreement with 
Murphy’s position or his allegations of Croatian terrorism. As Senator Reginald 
Withers remarked:  
Rather than spend some 60 minutes in this place trying to destroy his 
predecessor in office as Attorney-General it would have been far better for 
Senator Murphy to justify his own actions over the last 12 days, which have put 
the total security of this nation at risk.4  
These actions were the events of Friday 16 March 1973, when at 7:40am, 27 
Commonwealth Police officers entered the headquarters of ASIO in Melbourne. 
Acting on the orders of Murphy, officers sealed all safes, cabinets, and containers 
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on the premises, and held guard until Murphy’s arrival at 9:45am. After 
addressing and thanking staff in the auditorium for their ‘co-operation’, Murphy 
held a conference with ASIO’s Director-General, Peter Barbour, and officers from 
both ASIO and the Commonwealth Police, during which he ‘inspected certain 
files’.5 Approximately three hours later, Murphy left ASIO, phoned Whitlam to 
advise him of the day’s events, and caught a late afternoon flight for his home in 
Sydney. Thus, Murphy’s ‘Raid’ on ASIO was born. 
This was an unprecedented event in Australian political history. Never before 
had Australia seen a minister, much less the first Law Officer of the country, raid 
the department for which they were responsible. In the 11 days between the and 
his Ministerial Statement, Murphy maintained that the reason for his ‘visit’ to 
ASIO’s headquarters was to gather information to ensure security arrangements 
were adequate for the visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Džemal Bijedić, from 
20-22 March. ‘The most stringent security measures are necessary for the Prime 
Minister’s safety,’ Murphy explained, ‘because of the existence in our midst of 
Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisations. These were tolerated by the 
previous Government which even denied their existence.’6 Murphy had in fact 
indicated as early as 1 March that he would be delivering a statement based on his 
investigations into Croatian terrorist organisations that would ‘show quite a 
different picture from that painted by the previous Attorney-General.’7 However, 
his Raid on ASIO raised the expectations of his statement, which now needed to 
provide an explanation and justification for his actions on 16 March.8   
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This much-awaited explanation, however, was nowhere to be found in 
Murphy’s Statement, save for a fleeting mention at the end which ostensibly 
linked the Raid with the issue of Croatian terrorism; 
I should like to add a word about events of last week. I am advised that terrorists 
came to Canberra last week with the intention of killing the Yugoslav Prime 
Minister… In this situation, I make no apology for any steps which I took last 
week to ensure that the intentions of violent terrorists were thwarted.9  
It was only at the insistence of the Opposition in Question Time following the 
statement that Murphy directly addressed the Raid, explaining;  
The reason for my action in seeing to it that certain safes and containers were 
sealed was that I wanted certain information preserved. The reason for my visit 
was to ascertain certain information.10  
Even though Murphy faced an almost daily barrage of questions both inside and 
out of the Parliament for nearly two months after the Raid, he refused to 
elaborate on his motives, even when ‘he was so driven into a corner that he 
simply refused to answer further questions – a humiliating failure for any 
minister’.11 Hostility in the Senate came thick and fast, and ‘the ferocity of the 
subsequent parliamentary debates was equalled only by their frequency.’12 On 5 
April, the Senate seemed to be close to boiling point,13 and passed a motion of no-
confidence in Murphy – ‘the first time a censure motion had been carried against 
a minister in the Australian Senate.’14 
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The sheer spectacle of the Raid, coupled with the high drama that ensued in 
its aftermath, has meant that the search for an explanation of Murphy’s actions 
has taken precedence, both at the time and in subsequent studies of the Raid. 
However, in this quest to find answers to what was not in his Ministerial 
Statement – why Murphy raided ASIO - many have failed to ask an equally 
important, though less glamorous question – why did Murphy deliver this 
particular Ministerial Statement? It is this question that Section 4.1 seeks to 
answer. Much like Menzies’ statement of 1964, there are a number of complex 
domestic and international contexts and historical legacies that led Murphy to 
deliver this particular statement. In the same way Croatians and their activism 
were deployed as a Cold War political football, the political environment of 
1972/3 constructed the ‘Croat problem’ as a proxy battle for wider political 
debates, a short-hand for the positioning of political parties against one another. 
Like the debates of 1963/4, the debates of 1972/3 dissipated as domestic political 
concerns took over.  
Section 4.2 examines the response of Croatians to Murphy’s allegations of 
violence, extremism, and terrorism. Like their 1950s-60s counterparts, Croatians 
modified their activism as circumstances arose, deploying resources available to 
them to explain, defend, or speak back to these allegations. Just as Croatians in 
the previous period framed their activism in the rhetoric of anti-communism, 
Croatians in the 1970s framed their activism in the rhetoric of rights – both to 
their identity as Croatians, and to their rights of protest and activism as 
Australian citizens. The introduction of multicultural policy also influenced 
Croatian responses, as it provided Croatians with the ability to engage in activism 
across platforms not previously available to them. This activism within the 
frameworks of rights and responsibilities, multiculturalism and identity 
recognition, coupled with the scars of Murphy’s Ministerial Statement led to the 
establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ in 1977. This was a considered and co-
ordinated attempt to address and redress the reputation of extremism, violence 





Finally, Section 4.3 will explore the case of the Croatian Six. The arrest of six 
Croatian men on terror-related charges seemed to vindicate Murphy’s Ministerial 
Statement, and threatened to undermine the efforts of Croatians in repudiating 
the allegations levelled at them. However, responses were mitigated by paradigm 
shifts under way in the late 1970s, such as the advent of non-European 
immigration. In the same way the paradigm shifts of the 1960s resulted in the 
responses of the Whitlam government era, these changes in international and 
domestic contexts would define responses to Croatian activism in the 1980s. If 
the previous period was defined by the Cold War adage that the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend, this period was defined by the moral panic and the 
movement from Menzies’ ‘Reds under the beds’ to Murphy’s ‘Croats in the bush’, 






4.1. MURPHY’S FURPHY 
In contrast to the last Government's policy of trying to sweep this problem under the rug, we 
propose to bring it into the full light of day… These documents establish beyond doubt 
 that Croatian terrorist organisations have existed and do exist in Australia today. 15 
  
I have argued elsewhere that the reason for Murphy’s Raid on ASIO lay less in 
any overt threat of Croatian terrorism and more in the covert contextual 
considerations surrounding the Raid. These included the foreign policy benefits 
the Whitlam Government could gain by the appearance of ‘dealing with’ the 
Croatian problem, Murphy’s deep suspicions of ASIO and the generally strained 
relationship between ASIO and the ALP, Murphy’s personal hubris, including his 
adversarial and impulsive character, and bitter rivalries with Greenwood, the 
political right, and to a lesser degree, Whitlam himself.16 This section instead 
focuses on the question of why Murphy singled out ‘Croatian terrorism’ as his 
explanation for the Raid. Though there is necessarily some overlap with reasons 
for the Raid itself, there are unique reasons why Murphy’s statement targeted 
‘Croatian terrorism’, instead of right-wing extremism, politically-motivated 
violence, or even Ustaša terrorism.  
In the lead up to the 1972 election, Croatian activism was gaining momentum 
in Australia, due to the increase in Yugoslav migration to Australia as a result of 
the 1970 agreement, and developments in Croatian activism both worldwide and 
in Croatia itself. This increased activism was accompanied by an increase in 
politically-motivated violence, and responses to Croatian activism and these 
incidents became a symbolic point of difference between the Liberal Party and 
the ALP. Once elected, both Whitlam and Murphy concerned themselves with 
bringing the issue of Croatian activism under control, but for different reasons – 
for Murphy, the issue was one of law and order, or more precisely lawlessness and 
disorder, while for Whitlam, Croatian activism and the increased targeting of 
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Yugoslav diplomatic missions was a foreign policy issue. Whether intentionally or 
inadvertently, the actions of the Whitlam government resulted in what is best 
described as a moral panic.  
 
4.1.1. DEVELOPMENTS IN CROATIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
As explained in Section 3.3, the decade spanning 1963-1972 saw an escalation 
of violence within the Yugoslav community in both frequency and severity, which 
increasingly targeted Yugoslav diplomatic missions. Murphy attributed this 
escalation to the ‘curious defeatism and lack of initiative in successive Liberal 
governments’ reaction to these outrages.’17 Though the latitude afforded Croatian 
activism by previous governments may have emboldened some to act in ways 
they might not have otherwise, there are more nuanced explanations for this 
escalation in violence which take into account important contextual 
considerations. The growing momentum of Croatian activism, the increase in 
non-Croatian Yugoslav migrants with political agendas of their own, and the 
international phenomenon of politically motivated violence beginning in the late 
1960s far better explain these developments than the simplistic reason offered by 
Murphy.  
Croatian activism was gaining momentum in Australia during this period for 
three primary reasons. The first was the statistical growth of the community from 
1966 covered in Section 3.3.1. This made Croatian political activism larger and 
more visible in the public sphere. For example, whereas an anti-Yugoslav 
demonstration in Sydney’s Double Bay in 1968 attracted approximately 600 
protestors, an anti-Yugoslav demonstration in the very same place just 3 years 
later attracted almost 3000 protestors.18 The second reason for this momentum 
lay in developments in government policy which afforded migrants increasing 
freedom to advocate their views and express their identity. Lopez describes the 
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period from 1966-1970 as ‘Proto-Multiculturalism’ and argues that this period of 
ideological development coincided with the ‘high-water mark of integrationsim 
in migrant settlement and welfare policy.’19 Though not as promising as the 
multiculturalism that would come after it, this period nonetheless provided 
Croatians a far greater legitimacy to organise and advocate than had been 
extended under assimilation.  
The third and most important reason for this increased momentum, 
however, lay in the developments in Croatia itself known as the Croatian Spring 
(Hrvatsko proljeće, or masovni pokret - MASPOK). This nationalist reawakening 
began as a reform movement within the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC), 
and ended as a mass cultural and political movement. It developed around the 
notion that Croatia and Croatians were being economically, culturally, and 
politically disenfranchised by a process of ‘Serbianisation’ within the Yugoslav 
government and its institutions. The LCC, the Matica Hrvatska, and the 
University of Zagreb were the main institutions around which this movement 
organised. As with the national revival of the 19th century, the Croatian Spring 
would be led by intellectuals, and the activities of the Matica Hrvatska would be 
central in reinvigorating nationalist sentiment. The issue of language acted as a 
proxy issue representing all facets of the dispute, and became the foremost 
example of this ‘Serbianisation’, just as it had during the Illyrian movement and 
in the inter-war years.  
Though there were many antecedents, the catalyst for the Croatian Spring 
proper came with the 1967 ‘Declaration concerning the Name and Position of the 
Croatian literary language,’ which Čuvalo describes as the ‘first open 
manifestation of nationalism by Croatian intellectuals.’20 The declaration was a 
response to the publication of the first two volumes of the Serbo-
Croatian/Croato-Serbian dictionary, which presented Serbian expressions as the 
standard, and either omitted Croatian expressions altogether, or classed them as 
local dialects. Published in the Zagreb weekly Telegram on 17 March, the 
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declaration was signed by over 140 Croatian intellectuals, at least 18 Croatian 
cultural institutions, and most controversially, internationally renowned writer 
Miroslav Krleža.  It renounced the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement, which had 
established the Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian language, and instead argued that 
Croatians had a constitutional right to their own language. Continual efforts to 
unify the Croatian and Serbian languages, the declaration continued, had 
essentially downgraded Croatian to a local dialect, and therefore eroded this 
right. Because of the scope of its signatories, the declaration was perceived as the 
most direct and overt attack on the Belgrade Government and its language policy 
to date, and resulted in the forced removal of some from public life. Thus, the 
language issue ‘became one of the most heavily politicised and nationalised 
subjects in Yugoslav Croatia.’21  
The Matica Hrvatska was perhaps the most vociferous of all Croatian Spring 
participants. After falling into relative obscurity after WWII, an energetic new 
membership revived it in the 1960s, including Većeslav Holjevac, the popular 
former Mayor of Zagreb, Franjo Tuđman, a former general turned historian who 
would become Croatia’s first democratically elected president in 1990, Marko 
Veselica, Vlado Gotovac, and Šime Đodan. Under their stewardship, the Matica 
was transformed into ‘a vibrant powerhouse of popular nationalist agitation.’22 It 
publicised its views namely through print, most notably its journal, Kritika, which 
‘caricatured Belgrade as a metaphor for the ruthless, bourgeois, backward Serbs 
who were oppressing the more advanced Croats;’23 its bi-monthly literary 
magazine Kolo; and a vast number of pamphlets and booklets ‘which popularised 
their ideas about the renewal of Croatia’s nationhood, culture and economics.’24 
However its weekly, the Hrvatski Tjednik, became a phenomenon in its own 
right. First published in April 1971, the paper quickly skyrocketed to mass-
circulation, out-performing its competitors almost instantaneously, and created a 
public, nationwide profile for the intellectuals operating out of the Matica. 
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Alongside its sister publication devoted to economic issues, Hrvatski Gospodarski 
Glasnik, a wide variety of issues were covered, from Croatia’s economic 
exploitation and decline, demographic change, and the status of Croatians in 
Bosnia, through to the designs on postage stamps and lack of Croatian words on 
railway timetables. Its regular column distinguishing correct Croatian from 
common Serbian expressions became one of its most emblematic features. 
The Yugoslav-wide debates about centralism vs. decentralism of the state, 
and liberalisation vs. protectionism in economic policy featured heavily in the 
debates of the LCC throughout the 1960’s, and communist conservatives such as 
Vladimir Bakarić, Milutin Balić, and Jakov Blažević found themselves increasingly 
losing power to a democratic and nationally-oriented faction of younger 
communists that had grown up under Tito, who claimed that the centralist and 
protectionist policies of the central Yugoslav government was resulting in the 
economic disenfranchisement of Croatia. Headed by Savka Dabčević-Kučar, this 
liberally oriented leadership included prominent members such as Miko Tripalo, 
once President of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, who rose 
through the ranks to occupy a variety of important positions within both the 
Croatian republic and federal communist party systems, Pero Pirker, the mayor of 
Zagreb from 1963-1967, and Dragutin Haramija, the Prime Minister of Croatia. 
The furore over the 1967 Declaration only encouraged the reformers, and in 1968 
Dabčević-Kučar was appointed the Head of Party in Croatia, while Tripalo 
became the Yugoslav Presidency member for Croatia. The complaints of the 
reformers, Tanner explains, ‘boiled down to two principle points: that there were 
too many Serbs in the army, the police and the Party in Croatia, and that too 
much money, especially hard currency, was being exported to Belgrade.’25 
The first confrontation between the two factions came at the Tenth Plenum 
of the Croatian Central Committee in January 1970. The session was convened in 
response to a campaign by Miloš Žanko in the later months of 1969 aimed at 
discrediting Dabčević-Kučar’s leadership via a series of articles published in 
                                                 





Borba that attempted to portray her leadership as a fascist revival. The majority of 
the committee strongly backed Dabčević-Kučar, and though her victory was ‘less 
significant than it appeared… The public perception in Croatia was that Dabčević-
Kučar had won her fight and the result of the Tenth Session caused a tremendous 
stir.'26 She was seen to have made the Croatian Communist Party’s independent 
vision for Croatia public and outside of central party organs, and from this point 
on ‘drew steadily closer to the ideology of Matica Hrvatska and the nationalists.’27 
It is also from this point that the Croatian Spring left the confines of the 
communist party and the walls of the Matica, and moved into the streets as a 
mass movement. Rallies were held in favour of Dabčević-Kučar’s leadership 
where the Croatian Šahovnica flag, rather than the Yugoslav red star, 
predominated, patriotic songs of the Croatian homeland were revived, often 
played in restaurants across Croatia, and Croatians begun to reclaim their history, 
reviving nationalist heroes such as Stjepan Radić, founder of the Croatian Peasant 
Party, Petar Krešimir IV the Great, the 11th century Croatian King under whom the 
Croatian realm reached its territorial peak, and Josip Jelačić, the 19th century Ban 
of Croatia.28 
The University of Zagreb was another prominent institution of the Croatian 
Spring, which in 1969 was set to celebrate the 300th anniversary of its 
establishment. Preparations for the celebration ‘gave the reformers a platform to 
spread their views,’29 which was reinforced by the election of Ivan Čičak (an 
outsider and avowed liberal) to the post of university pro-rector. The university 
also distinguished itself when its students formed the first independent students 
organisation in Yugoslavia, the Croatian League of Students, with Dražen Budiša 
at its head. Following patterns in Europe and the United States, the student 
movement in Croatia became one of the most politically aware and active of 
social groups. This student movement would become the most radical and 
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enduring symbol of the Croatian Spring, with Čičak and Budiša later emerging as 
influential political figures.  
Student advocacy culminated on 22 November 1971, when 3000 members of 
the Croatian Students Union gathered in Zagreb, and unanimously voted to begin 
a strike at 9am the following day. Their demands were ‘a synthesis of the 
immediate and strategic goals of the Croatian Spring,’30 including the various 
linguistic, economic, military, and political demands raised in the preceding 
years. By 25 November, similar student actions supporting those in Zagreb 
formed in Split, Rijeka and Dubrovnik, and ‘within a matter of days, at least 
30,000 university students across Croatia were on strike.’31 At the insistence of 
Dabčević-Kučar herself, the protest ended peacefully after a few days, but was not 
without consequences. 
The problem of increasing Croatian dissidence across political, economic and 
cultural grounds was exactly what Tito feared would destabilise and delegitimise 
his administration, particularly in light of the Hungarian crisis in 1954 and the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, Tito’s reaction to these 
developments in Croatia 
followed a pattern repeated several times in the era of the Croatian spring: Tito 
would arrive from Belgrade, incandescent with rage and full of ideas that had 
been put into his head by the Serb generals, the secret police and the Party 
officials in Serbia. After seeing matters for himself, he would go away mollified 
and apparently convinced that matters were less serious than he had first 
thought.32 
The onset of mass student protests, however, both enraged and embarrassed 
Tito, who was in the United States on a state visit at the time.33  Disappointed his 
attempt to appease Croatian demands for liberalisation and decentralisation had 
only served to feed the beast he saw as Croatian nationalism and separatism, he 
became convinced of the need for swift action. 
                                                 
30 Goldstein, Croatia, 182. 
31 Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 257. 
32 Tanner, Croatia, 197. 





On 1 December 1971, Tito convened the Yugoslav Presidency in 
Karadjordjevo, and harshly reprimanded Croatian Communists for allowing 
nationalism to grow unfettered. The leaders of the Croatian Spring, including 
Dabčević-Kučar, Tripalo and their closest associates, were removed from all 
offices and banned from public life, and replaced with loyal ultra-conservatives. 
Rank and file members were expelled by the hundreds, which caused an even 
greater imbalance in the proportion of Serbs within the party. As spontaneous 
demonstrations broke out in response to the forced resignations of the popular 
leadership and expulsion of Croatian party members, police repression was swift 
and heavy-handed, and thousands were ‘detained, harassed in various ways or 
forced into the sidelines of public life.’34 The Matica Hrvatska was closed down, 
and figures from the Matica, editors of the Hrvatski Tjednik, and student leaders 
were put to trial and jailed for their activities during the Croatian Spring. 
The aftermath of the Croatian Spring had important ramifications for Croatia 
and its diaspora communities. Tito’s purges effectively suppressed every form of 
political opposition in Croatia until the democratic elections of 1990, rendering it 
the ‘silent republic.’35 With the removal of governmental, institutional, and grass-
roots avenues of political activism, the Croatian body politic descended into an 
apathy from which it did not emerge for almost two decades. For Ramet, this 
apathy was the product of nationalist Croatians simply ‘dropping out’ 0f political 
activism, as the aftermath of the Croatian Spring left them ‘deprived of any input 
into the politics of the society’36  Goldstein, on the other hand, believes that this 
apathy may have been in part the result of the economic progress in the 1970s, 
which ‘right up till 1978-9, was the period when the standard of living was at its 
highest.’37 Regardless of its cause, the apathy of the homeland shifted the onus of 
the advocacy for Croatian independence to the diaspora, and in the wake of the 
Croatian Spring, the activities of Croatians abroad intensified. The Croatian 
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diaspora, including the community in Australia, was no longer an outpost of the 
Croatian independence movement - it was now the crucible of it.  
As Croatian political activism was gaining momentum in Australia, the 
community was experiencing a comparative decline as a proportion of total 
Yugoslav migration. The opening of Yugoslavia’s borders in 1966 and the bilateral 
agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970 led to the increased 
migration of non-Croatian Yugoslavs and a diversity of views in matters of 
Yugoslav affairs. This included non-Croatians who were pro-Yugoslav, non-
Croatians who were anti-Yugoslav, and even some Croatians who were either 
pro-Yugoslav or at least not anti-communist. If the Croatian Spring had proved 
anything, it was that advocacy for Croatian independence was not exclusively the 
province of the right. As can be expected, with this greater diversity in views both 
within the Croatian community and with other Yugoslav communities, a greater 
degree of disagreement and hostility between the various groups followed.  
In the same way Croatian activism was gaining momentum due to the 
increased size of the community, so too was the activism of other anti-Yugoslav 
communities, including Macedonian, Slovenian, and even Serbian communities. 
Evidence suggests that the activism of these communities may have also included 
the types of violence usually attributed to Croatians.38 However, as argued in 
Section 3.2.1, because anti-Yugoslav activism was both intentionally and 
inadvertently portrayed as a Croatian affair, some acts of violence may have been 
misattributed to Croatians. This was exacerbated by the limited understanding of 
Australia’s political and legal authorities in the complexities of the Yugoslav 
community, whose predominantly Anglo-Saxon personnel lacked the necessary 
historical, cultural and language resources, knowledge, and capabilities needed to 
interpret and contextualise these developments.39 For these personnel, issues in 
the Yugoslav community often boiled down to a separatist Croatian element, 
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whose irrational political agenda, steeped in the right-wing dogmas of WWII, 
antagonised an otherwise peaceful migrant community. 
Though these contexts help to explain why Croatian activism became more 
visible, and why there was cause for greater disagreement within the Yugoslav 
community itself, neither necessarily account for the escalation in violence. This 
is better explained by the phenomenon of politically-motivated violence, which 
had increasingly become a feature of various movements and their activism 
worldwide.40 Political violence was a common feature in the struggle for civil 
rights in America, apartheid in South Africa, and the Troubles in Ireland. 1968 
was a hallmark year for this violence, with the events of March in Poland, May in 
France, the Prague Spring, the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr and Robert 
F. Kennedy in America, the Chicago Riots, and a number of anti-Vietnam protests 
around the world.41 July 1968 even saw the first mass protest in Yugoslavia since 
WWII, when students in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Sarajevo went on strike 
to protest student conditions and the wider economic issues stemming from the 
1964 reforms.42 These various movements worldwide all involved individuals that 
believed violence was sometimes necessary for social change, particularly when 
democratic modes of protest failed to yield results. Therefore, though political 
violence was illegal, it was not an altogether illegitimate means of protest during 
this period.  
Croatian political activism was not immune to these developments. Croatian 
political violence was significantly greater in Western Europe and America 
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compared to Australia, both in the frequency and in the intensity of violence. As 
Pluchinsky highlights, from 1962 to 1977, 60% of all Croatian attacks took place in 
Western Europe, primarily West Germany, Sweden, France, Austria, Norway and 
Belgium. Of these, over 67% occurred in West Germany and Sweden alone.43 The 
most dramatic of these incidents happened in Sweden, when in 1971, the Yugoslav 
ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Rolovic, was assassinated by members of the 
Croatian National Resistence (Hrvatski Narodni Otpor – HNO), and in 1972, when 
a Swedish aeroplane was hijacked by three Croatians. The issue, however, was 
most pressing in West Germany, where violence occurred most frequently and 
over the longest period. Despite this, a West German Governmental report in 
1972 clearly stated that ‘the vast majority of Croats in the Federal Republic are 
docile. [The problem of terrorism was] a matter of only a tiny, virulent 
minority.’44  Much like the Australian authorities, the West German authorities 
were ‘no more effective in bringing to trial the perpetrators of these acts of 
violence, that appear to be politically motivated, than has been the case in 
Australia.’45  
 To give Murphy and his Ministerial Statement credit, violence and extremism 
was increasingly becoming an issue within Croatian political activism. However, 
his insinuation that this was an inherent phenomenon to Croatian activism, or 
explanation that the government had failed to keep it in check, was at best far too 
simplistic, and at worst deliberately misleading. Instead, the aftermath of the 
Croatian Spring and the added onus of responsibility it placed on diaspora 
communities lent Croatian activism in Australia a new sense of purpose, 
importance, and urgency. The increasing rate of Croatian migration to Australia 
only added to this momentum and resulted in a larger and more noticeable 
activism. As the Yugoslav community expanded and diversified in origin and 
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political opinion, activisms increasingly came into conflict with one another. This 
conflict sometimes became violent as individuals took cues from the worldwide 
phenomenon of politically-motivated violence and the belief that political 
violence was a legitimate, and even necessary, means of protest and social 
change.  
 
4.1.2. OLD FRUSTRATIONS, NEW PARADIGMS 
An explanation for why Murphy framed the issue of Croatian political 
activism in the way he did can be found in Australia’s political environment 
between the 1969 and 1972 federal elections, where the ‘Croat problem’ became a 
proxy battle in a wider struggle to define a new set of Australian values and way 
of life within the paradigms created by the social and political changes of the 
1960s. Whereas the Liberals were conservative, staunchly anti-communist, and 
the party of Cold War ideologies that persecuted innocent Australians for their 
left-leaning politics, the ALP fashioned itself as the party of change and 
progressiveness, eager to usher in the post-Cold War era, and concerned with 
those who posed a real threat to the security of Australia. 
The issue of Croatian political activism was only one in a wider debate 
regarding protest, violence, and government responses. Anti-Vietnam war 
activism, student activism, indigenous civil rights activism, LGBT activism, 
women’s liberation, environmental activism, and various other left-oriented 
movements all involved clashes with police and resistance from the Coalition 
Government. As with Croatian activism, individuals within these movements 
engaged in political violence as a means of protest and social change. Whitlam 
and Cairns, two of the leading voices on the issue of Croatian activism in the 
1960s, as well as other ALP Minsters, became advocates for some of these protest 
movements, at least in aim if not in method. Cairns was, in fact, the chairman of 
the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign in Victoria, a passionate advocate for the 





the first leading the 100,000 strong Moratorium march in Melbourne on 8 May 
1971.46 For Cairns and many others, the heavy-handedness with which the 
Government addressed these protest movements stood in complete contradiction 
and hypocrisy to the leniency afforded Croatians and their activism.47 In the same 
way support for the protest movements of the late 1960s/early 1970s became a 
symbolic point of difference between the ALP and the Coalition, so too did their 
position regarding Croatians.  
This ideological battle was situated in a narrower struggle within the political 
left over how to define itself, as various ideological splits had resulted in 
competing strains of left-wing politics. Communist factions developed along the 
varying ideologies of Maoism, Trotskyism, Stalinism, Marxism, and Leninism, 
and after the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948, Kruschev’s ‘Secret Speech’ in 1956, and the 
Prague Spring in 1968, varying degrees of pro- and anti-Soviet sentiment. These 
fractures in turn filtered into the trade union movement.48 For the most part the 
protest movements of the late 1960s/early 1970s that were the cause of so much 
social and civil unrest also originated from the left. Like their worldwide 
counterparts, these various movements all fractured along violent and non-
violent lines, which only exacerbated the fact that political violence was 
historically more closely associated with left-wing movements in Australia, and 
particularly with trade unionism. Not surprisingly, the left faction of the ALP 
itself fractured as various members navigated these fissions.49  
Croatian activism was therefore an attractive target for this proxy battle for 
three reasons - it was a right-oriented activism with which ALP members had 
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little history of affiliation, but with whom the Liberals were allegedly 
intertwined;50 the political violence that was typically the source of denunciation 
for left-oriented activism was becoming an increasing problem within Croatian 
activism; and it was an easy target because it emanated from a community of the 
migrant ‘Other’ that sat uncomfortably within the paradigms of the Good 
Australian Migrant. Problematising Croatian activism allowed those inside the 
political system to articulate a vision for Australia that maintained the values and 
ideals the Left represented, but which also distanced them from the associated 
political violence that was both unbecoming and unelectable of a politician. It is 
no surprise then, to find that the Senators most vocal about the ‘Croat problem’ – 
Murphy, Mulvihill, Arthur Gietzelt, Douglas McClelland, and Justin O’Byrne - 
were those from the ALP Left with affiliations to trade unionism or various 
protest movements. This made them easy political targets for accusations of 
radicalism and denunciations as communist. 
The results of the 1969 election, where the ALP came within four seats of 
winning, affirmed Whitlam’s leadership of the party and the new vision it was 
offering to Australians. Perhaps emboldened by this result, the ALP increasingly 
raised the issue of Croatian activism and its associated violence in parliament 
from 1970.  In the Senate, Mulvihill upheld the mantle that had passed from 
Cairns to him in the late 1960s as the ideological crusader against Croatian 
activism. Much like Cairns did in the 1963/4 debates, Mulvihill framed his 
questions within the ideological problems that had defined Croatian activism in 
the previous period – namely the links to Ustashism, Fascism and Nazi Germany, 
and the political undesirability of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.51 Interestingly, 
Murphy for the most part was silent on Croatian activism, only rising to speak on 
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the issue within the rhetoric of law and order to question the competence of 
Attorney-General Greenwood.52  
The House of Representatives did not have an ideological crusader such as 
Mulvihill. Cairns, who had served this purpose in the 1963/4 debates, was now 
preoccupied with his role in the anti-war movement. Whitlam, however, 
repeatedly raised the issue as one negatively effecting Australia’s diplomatic 
obligations. As he explained during the debate regarding the Public Order 
(Protection of Persons and Property) Bill 1971; 
There can be no doubt that one of the alarming trends in the world today is for 
citizens to insult, to harass, to molest, to kidnap and to kill diplomats or consuls. 
It is a trend which every civilised nation must condemn. If there is to be any hope 
of good relations in the world and peace between nations then the official 
representatives of nations are entitled to respect… The violence in this 
community against missions has come from the right wing. It has come from the 
Ustashi, from migrants to this country who supported Hitler and Mussolini in the 
break-up of Yugoslavia…53  
For Whitlam, the problem of Croatian activism lay less in its ideological concerns 
and more in the practical impediments to diplomacy and government it posed. 
The precariousness of Australia’s diplomatic position was only exacerbated by the 
ideological origins of Croatian activism. By 1972, there had been three bombings 
of the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney (January 1967, November 1968, and 
June 1969), a bombing of the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Melbourne (October 
1970), and an attack on the Yugoslav Embassy in Canberra (November 1969). As 
Whitlam explained, these not only jeopardised Australia’s reputation and 
capabilities within the diplomatic world, but repairs and funding Commonwealth 
Police to manage the issue also came at a ‘not inconsiderable’ cost to Australian 
taxpayers.54 
These contexts culminated in two events that cemented Croatians and their 
activism as both problematic and politically symbolic, which mirrored those that 
had initiated debates in 1963/4. The first came on 5 July 1972 when news broke 
                                                 
52 Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No. S.15, 1972, 992-3. 
53 Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, No.HR.14, 1971, 1577. 





that Croatians from Australia may have comprised the 19 men involved in a 
second incursion into Yugoslavia.55 The second event came on 16 September 1972, 
when close to midday, two bombs targeting Yugoslav premises exploded on 
Sydney’s George Street. Like the 1963 incursion and the 1964 Lesić bombing, 
these events appeared to confirm the long-held ALP allegation that in their 
unsubstantiated zeal to persecute left-wing activism, Coalition governments had 
abrogated their responsibility to control and curb the real threat to Australians - 
right-wing extremists. 
On 16 August 1972 the Yugoslav Government presented an Aide-Memoire to 
the Australian Government that confirmed the involvement of six Australian 
citizens in the incursion, and a further three who had previously resided in 
Australia. More disturbingly for Australian authorities, however, were the series 
of allegations regarding Australia’s implication in the incursion, which included 
that the headquarters of this group were located in Australia, that the Australian 
Government was providing shelter to the ringleaders, and that the HRB, thought 
to have become defunct by Australian authorities since 1967 had been 
reorganised in early 1972 as the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation 
(HIRO).56  ASIO, Commonwealth Police, and various governmental departments 
were tasked with investigating the claims of the aide-memoire, which even 
resulted in the dawn raids of Croatian homes in NSW and Victoria by 
Commonwealth and State police.57 However, initial media and political responses 
were somewhat muted, whether out of distraction, - the last budget of the 
McMahon government was released on 15 August and election speculation was 
gaining momentum - or out of detachment - as with the 1963 incursion, this was 
an abstract event that had happened well away from Australia. 
The George Street bombing, on the other hand, happened in the heart of 
Sydney, and though it did not result in casualties, 16 individuals were wounded 
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by the blasts, both premises suffered extensive damage, and both bombings were 
accompanied by threats of further violence.58 Like the 1964 Lesić bombing, this 
tangible act of violence had a more profound effect on politicising the issue of 
Croatian activism than did the incursion. They were immediately ascribed to 
Croatian terrorists, with Cairns, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Australia Uroš 
Vidović, and prominent Yugoslav community member Marijan Jurjević, declaring 
them a confirmation of organised Croatian terrorism in Australia.59 Newspaper 
editorials echoed these sentiments in varying degrees,60 with the Canberra Times 
going so far as call for an immediate suspension of all Yugoslav migration to 
Australia;  
Since enough terrorists have slipped through the net to create a crisis in this 
country and since police action to stop their activities have been of no avail the 
next logical step is to close the pipelines.61 
On 19 September, both houses of Parliament debated the bombing, with the 
Government facing heavy questioning throughout question time. In the House of 
Representatives, Whitlam described it as the ‘biggest mass crime in Australia,’ 
and moved a motion calling on the Government to set up specialist intelligence 
and police organisations to address overseas terrorist movements in Australia.62 
In the Senate, the ferocity and frequency of questioning was such that the 
President at one point exclaimed  
Honourable senators have asked 43 questions in an hour and 10 minutes… I think 
honourable senators might consider whether we should go on with the business 
of the Senate.63 
Murphy too moved a motion to refer the matter of alleged Croatian terrorism to 
the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence for urgent inquiry and 
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report, which prompted a lengthy debate.64 Though both motions from Whitlam 
and Murphy failed, the status of Croatian activism as a political football became 
firmly entrenched.  
 In the face of these escalating allegations, Croatians remained steadfast in 
their activism and responses. Like the 1963 incursion, the 1972 incursion was 
explained as the actions of a naïve and foolish minority, while the community in 
Sydney in particular vehemently objected to the claim that the bombings were 
the work of Croatian terrorists.  As in 1963/4, counter-allegations were raised that 
the escalating acts of violence were the work of Yugoslav agents provocateur, 
aimed at discrediting Croatian political activism abroad, particularly in light of 
the events of the Croatian Spring.65 However, on 10 October Prime Minister Billy 
McMahon called the federal election for December 2nd, and as the attention of 
both parties turned to campaigning, debates about Croatian activism subsided, 
even if Mulvihill remained relentless in his prosecution of the ALP case on 
Croatians.  
 
4.1.3. FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
This interplay of domestic political forces both in Croatia and Australia 
becomes even more complex when we consider the foreign policy aspirations of 
both Tito’s Yugoslavia and the Whitlam Government. Yugoslav foreign policy was 
an important factor in the legitimisation of Tito’s regime and personal rule in the 
face of ideological and economic challenges throughout the 1960s. The more 
pronounced these challenges became, the more important success in foreign 
policy became to Tito and his Government. In Australia, Whitlam’s reorientation 
of foreign policy away from the Cold War divide and closer to the principles of 
non-alignment was also tied to questions of legitimacy, proven by Whitlam’s 
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establishment of the ‘Duumvirate’ immediately after his election from which he 
enacted as much foreign policy change as possible. Tito and Whitlam therefore 
found natural allies in each other, and the intersection of the foreign policy 
aspirations of these two governments had profound consequences for the 
Croatian community in Australia.  
As was the case with the rest of the world, the 1960s in Yugoslavia were 
characterised by political, social, and economic upheaval. These resulted in two 
significant threats to the legitimacy of Tito and his regime – increasing 
ideological dissent internal to Yugoslavia’s communist paradigms, and a rapidly 
growing diaspora throughout the world that was increasingly able to articulate 
alternate visions for Yugoslavia’s future. This political threat was made even more 
precarious by the worsening economic situation in Yugoslavia during the 1960s, 
including growing unemployment, inflationary pressure, perennial balance-of-
payments deficits, unused capacities, and rising inventories of unwanted goods.66  
Thus, as Neibuhr explains, ‘the more Tito’s state failed to deliver on its domestic 
promises, the more leaders needed success in some other area.’67 Foreign policy 
was to provide the arena for this success.  
The first threat to Tito’s legitimacy – internal dissent – originated from Tito 
himself. The Tito-Stalin split of 1948 and Tito’s continued advocacy for policy 
creation independent of the USSR inadvertently raised the same question for the 
republics of Yugoslavia; if Titoism argued that Yugoslavia was entitled to create 
policy independent of the USSR based on the prevailing conditions of the 
Yugoslav country, then the logical extension of this argument was that the 
republics of Yugoslavia should be entitled to create policy independent of 
Yugoslavia based on their prevailing conditions. The introduction of self-
management as policy only exacerbated this logical disconnect, for ‘once it was 
conceded that individual enterprises had a right to run their own affairs, the 
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republics naturally demanded the same rights at state level.’68 Thus, the republics 
found themselves in the curious position of being denied the right to 
autonomous decision-making, while it was simultaneously extended to the state 
as a whole above them, and to individual enterprises below them.  
As the economic woes of Yugoslavia steadily worsened, liberal and 
conservative emerged around two dominant issues; centralism vs decentralism of 
the state, and liberalisation vs protectionism of economic policy. The more 
economically developed republics of Croatia and Slovenia were keeping the entire 
Yugoslav state afloat, financing the less developed regions such as Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Serbia to their own detriment. The increasingly centralist 
policies of Belgrade however, meant that these very same republics had 
decreasing political power and autonomy, with less and less say in where the 
surpluses they generated went, and left them feeling exploited. This internal 
debate about the practical application of the ‘Yugoslav way’ invariably resulted in 
animated political debates, reforms, and dissident scandals. In the 1960s, the 
increasing momentum of liberal factions from Slovenia and Croatia was 
reinforced by the economic reforms of 1961 and 1965, and the fall of Aleksandar 
Rankovic, hardline centralist and UDBa chief, in 1966. These events precipitated 
the spread liberalism across all of Yugoslavia’s republics, and led to a number of 
social and political movements, of which the Croatian Spring remained the 
foremost example.  
The second threat came as a result of the 1961 and 1965 economic reforms 
that opened Yugoslav borders to organised migration. As Zimmerman explains, 
The trickle of the 1950s became by the mid-1960s a rivulet… With the economic 
reforms, the rivulet became a flood – a flood which abated only with the 
stagflation and recession that followed the 1973 jump in global oil prices.69 
The sheer size and rate of Yugoslav emigration meant that Yugoslav political and 
academic attention turned to the issues of those abroad. By 1970, total 
outmigration from Yugoslavia amounted to roughly a million workers, which 
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constituted approximately one-fifth of the Yugoslav workforce and was twice the 
population of Montenegro at the time. These relative figures, Zimmerman argues, 
made Yugoslavs abroad a ‘seventh republic’ of the Yugoslav state that Tito and his 
Government felt needed governing.70  
Size, however, was not the only reason for this – the overly Croatian 
demography of the seventh republic was also a cause for concern.71 The loss of 
control over citizens that accompanied migration posed significant ideological 
challenges to the Yugoslav government; 
[The seventh republic was] a place where the major media were independent of 
Yugoslav authorities, where the mores of modern Western industrial capitalism 
and “bourgeois” democracy prevailed, and where there existed and operated 
groups fundamentally opposed to the Yugoslav idea, to communism, or to both.72  
Tito perceived post-war Croatian communities throughout the world as a threat 
to his legitimacy from the very outset of his leadership after WWII. As long as 
Yugoslavia’s borders remained closed, and emigration was defined as an act akin 
to treason, the threat from the seventh republic was relatively contained and 
easily denounced. The legitimisation and institutionalisation of migration with 
the reforms of the 1960s, however, exponentially increased this threat, not only in 
the ability of anti-Yugoslav sentiment to spread abroad due to the increasing size 
of communities, but also in its ability to filter back into Yugoslavia, either 
through the movement of temporary workers, or through holiday-making 
permanent migrants.  
Yugoslav foreign policy, therefore, sought to counter the threat of increasing 
internal dissent and the rapid development of a sizeable, predominantly 
Croatian, diaspora by way of three principal methods. First, it attempted to boost 
Tito’s legitimacy domestically through his reputation and successes with 
nonalignment on the world stage. Second, it attempted to retain a measure of 
control over Yugoslavs abroad by leveraging Yugoslavia’s reputation and position 
in international relations to negotiate its diplomatic relationship with host 
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countries of sizeable Croatian diaspora.  Finally, Yugoslavia used the channels of 
these first two methods to ideologically delegitimise Croatian dissent both 
domestically and abroad.  
The symbolic status of Yugoslavian nonalignment legitimised Tito’s 
government in three important ways. First, it reinforced Tito’s leadership and 
authority as the elder statesman of Yugoslav politics. Though the political and 
social unrest of Yugoslavia in the late 1960s may have weakened the cohesive 
strength of Yugoslavia, it had strengthened the authority and influence of Tito 
himself. Tito’s charisma and achievements through NAM only reinforced his 
reputation domestically - as Niebuhr summarises, ‘If [Tito] could solve the 
world’s problems, why would he not be able to solve those facing Yugoslavia?’73 
Second, involvement in NAM earned popular support for the regime, not only 
due to the impression of credibility, capability, and influence, but because it 
aligned the regime with ‘progressive’ movements throughout the world, 
particularly the decolonisation movements of various countries. Finally, as the 
reputation of Tito and his regime strengthened internationally, the easier it 
became to marginalise and delegitimise opposition groups or detractors both at 
home and abroad. It is here that Niebuhr situates the real power of nonalignment 
– ‘its ability to secure “international legitimacy” for national liberation 
movements (presumably including Tito’s) because of gains in international 
affairs.’74 The symbolic status of nonalignment domestically, therefore, far 
outstripped any practical clout internationally, and this held as true for any other 
country as it did for Yugoslavia. 
The international standing Yugoslavia was able to accumulate through its 
nonalignment, its strategic importance as a communist alternative to Soviet 
hegemony, and the academic and political curiosity in its principle of self-
management all acted as positive leverage in Yugoslavia’s ability to negotiate 
diplomatic relations with the host countries of sizeable Croatian diaspora. 
Zimmerman argues that there was a perceptible shift in the way the Yugoslav 
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government approached managing the seventh republic. From 1965-1972, the 
general picture of Yugoslav management was  
one of Yugoslav authorities governing the workers prior to their departure and 
negotiating with the Western European states and Australia about the ways those 
states would govern the workers during their stay abroad [authors emphasis].75  
However, growing internal dissent, such as that of the 1968 Belgrade student 
demonstrations and the Croatian Spring in 1971, the rapid growth of the seventh 
republic as a result of migration reforms, and broader events, such as the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, meant that from the early 1970s,  
Yugoslav decisionmakers[sic] acted increasingly as though they had to treat the 
workers, while abroad, as nearly as possible as a matter of domestic politics. The 
Yugoslav government began to implement measures to govern the migrants - to 
control, to inform, to socialize, etc. - while they were abroad, rather than limiting 
itself to measures prior to departure, or to negotiations [about how those states 
would govern].76 
The Croatian demographics of the seventh republic, only added a political 
impetus to this change.  
 As discussed in section 4.1.1, the increasing rate of migration of non-
Croatian Yugoslavs resulted in a diversity of views in matters of Yugoslav affairs. 
This complicated the managing of the seventh republic as it was no longer viable 
to simply dismiss it in its entirety as a hostile enemy of the state. The Yugoslav 
government now had to find a way to manage pro- and anti-Yugoslav 
communities, both in relation to the Yugoslav state and in relation to each other. 
By 1976, this division of the diaspora was officially entrenched in the Yugoslav 
government lexicon as the positive diaspora and hostile/enemy emigrant groups,77 
and resulted in two broad approaches to managing the seventh republic.  
For pro-Yugoslav groups, the Yugoslav government actively sought to retain 
or ensure the loyalties of their citizens upon emigration, and from 1970,  
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turned their attention to providing services intended to retain the Yugoslav 
workers’ identity with the homeland and with the “right” values, as well as to 
provide for the political socialization[sic] – what in the old days used to be 
termed “civic training” – of Yugoslav youths abroad.78  
This included producing and disseminating Yugoslav print and media targeted at 
those abroad, the provision of material for children’s education abroad, and the 
ability to access social welfare benefits.79 For anti-Yugoslav groups, the police 
state was increasingly used to control dissidence through intimidation. Though 
this was primarily exercised upon the return of migrants to Yugoslavia, Vukusic 
argues that from 1966, the relaxation of repression in Yugoslavia as a result of the 
fall of Ranković was correlated with a sharp increase in the intensity of UDBa 
activity against Yugoslav emigrants abroad. This particularly targeted Croatians, 
and from 1966-1971 alone, he argues that the UDBa executed 23 Croatian 
emigrants, with a further 5 unsuccessful assassination attempts.80 
 In light of the worldwide growth of Croatian communities, and in the face 
of numerous liberation and decolonisation movements, an important goal for 
Yugoslav foreign policy became to prevent Croatian activism from reaching the 
status of a national or liberation movement. Though the delegitimisation of 
Croatian dissent was not a phenomenon unique to the 1970s (see sections 1.3.2 
and 3.2.1), the Yugoslav government framed their denunciations in particular 
ways so that they would carry greater salience. The first was its portrayal of 
Croatian activism as a terrorist pursuit. Given the international condemnation of 
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terrorism and political violence in the period from 1968, this was the most 
effective way to undermine the actions of Croatian diaspora worldwide. The 
second drew on the history of Yugoslav delegitimisation and portrayed this 
terrorism as an extension and evolution of the fascist ideology from which 
Croatian political emigration and activism emerged. Finally, the Yugoslav 
government drew on its perceived strategic importance to portray Croatian 
activism as dependent on, and a tool of, Soviet expansionist aspirations to 
destabilise Yugoslavia.81  
 It is therefore not difficult to imagine a connection between the increasing 
violence attributed to Croatians in Australia with Tito’s foreign policy aspirations 
and need to legitimise his regime domestically - the community has steadfastly 
maintained as much. These allegations and counter-allegations are not, however, 
mutually exclusive events – both Croatian extremists and Yugoslav agents 
provocateurs may have been responsible for the escalating violence of the late 
1960s/early 1970s, and evidence to date seems to suggest this was the case. By 
1973, ASIO was convinced that Yugoslav intelligence agents were operating in 
Australia, drawing on sympathisers to act on their behalf, or penetrating 
extremist Croatian organisations through agents provocateur.82  
 In the same way non-alignment afforded Tito and his government a moral 
platform from which to marginalise internal dissent, so too did its 
delegitimisation of Croatian activism and dissent abroad. Internal criticism, 
particularly that emanating from Croatia, was often dismissed as ‘nationally 
inspired’, and as Drapac explains,  
this obsession with nationalist deviationsim cleared the way for still more inflated 
analyses of Yugoslav ‘successes’ and militated against pluralism. It also ensured 
the old argument, that there was nothing wrong with Yugoslavia, but that its 
people were troublesome, could never subside.83 
Constructing dissent as an external rather than internal phenomenon, and 
further linking it to the separatism/nationalism of an extremist diaspora, 
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delegitimised any grassroots movement within Croatia and the other republics. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that Tito would describe the student demonstrations 
of the Croatian Spring as a ‘long and carefully prepared counter-revolutionary 
activity initiated from abroad [own emphasis],’84 even if the catalysts for the 
movement were internal to Yugoslav politics. This approach justified both Tito’s 
internal policies on dissidence (in the name of protection from an external 
threat), and his external policy on Croatians abroad, and impressed ‘upon the 
world that the Yugoslav state was not made more precarious by dictatorship, but 
by the pre-existing nationalist evil.’85 
Just as foreign policy was central to Tito’s legitimacy, so too was it to 
Whitlam’s. At the opening of Parliament on 27 February 1973, the Governor-
General’s speech identified the ‘recognition of new and momentous directions in 
the pattern of international relations’ as one of the four principle grounds upon 
which the Whitlam government was elected to rule.86 However, such was the 
importance of foreign policy to Whitlam that on 5 December 1972, only three 
days after the election, Whitlam had the Governor-General swear himself and 
Lance Barnard in as Prime Minister and deputy Prime Minister respectively, 
rather than allow McMahon to remain caretaker Prime Minister until a full 
cabinet could be determined. The purpose of this ‘Duumvirate’ was so that 
Whitlam could fulfil the campaign promises that did not require legislation. This 
including enacting foreign policy changes that would symbolise Australia’s new 
direction in international affairs; on 8 December Whitlam ordered the closure of 
the Rhodesian Information Centre in Sydney; on 21 December, Australia formally 
recognised the People’s Republic of China; and on 22 December, Whitlam 
announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with East Germany.  
This purposeful repudiation of the anti-communist position of the previous 
government was intended to steer Australia towards closer relations with non-
aligned countries. It is possible that Yugoslavia saw an opportunity to exploit 
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Whitlam’s foreign policy objectives to further its own objectives, particularly in 
the management of the seventh republic. As Strangman explains, because Tito 
had been a founding member of NAM,  
Yugoslav support would be important for Australian acceptance in this group. It 
is likely that Yugoslav diplomats were pressing for something to be done about 
the alleged Croatian terrorists in Australia, before extending the olive branch to 
Australia in the foreign affairs field.87  
More specifically, a NAM summit meeting was to be held in Algeria from 5-9 
September 1973, and it was hinted that ‘… Australia would like to attend such a 
meeting, or at least have the right to be there in an observer role.’88 For the sake 
of his foreign policy, it was in Whitlam’s best interest to be seen as dealing with 
the issue of Croatian activism in Australia, and Bijedić’s pending visit to Australia 
from 20-22 March 1973 provided Whitlam with the perfect opportunity to shore 
up Yugoslav support.  
With the foreign policy stakes so high, it is no surprise to find both Whitlam 
and Murphy concerning themselves with the issue of Croatian activism 
immediately after their election. Whitlam, acting as the Attorney-General under 
the Duumvirate, conveyed his dissatisfaction with ASIO’s handling of the issue to 
Director-General Peter Barbour, explaining that he thought ASIO should be 
doing more to ‘control’ Croatian terrorist groups.89 On 12 December, before his 
appointment as Attorney-General, Murphy requested to view Attorney-General 
Department files on Croatian extremists. Once sworn in, Whitlam tasked Murphy 
with preparing and ensuring security arrangements for the Bijedić visit were 
adequate, who in turn instructed ASIO, Commonwealth Police, and various 
governmental departments to investigate and prepare risk assessments that 
would inform security arrangements. Murphy emphasised the ‘great importance 
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he [attached] to ensuring that no harm comes to the Yugoslav Prime Minister 
during his visit to Australia.90 
These investigations would set off the chain of events leading to the Raid on 
ASIO, including the establishment of task forces, inter-departmental committees, 
and in the case of ASIO, ‘Operation Amber’, which brought together ASIO 
officers from around the country with knowledge of Croatian affairs to monitor 
Croatian extremists in relation to the Bijedić Visit;91 repeated instances of the 
rivalry between ASIO and Commonwealth Police interfering with preparations; a 
former Commonwealth Police officer with a deep suspicion of ASIO acting as an 
advisor to Murphy who both exacerbated and distorted this rivalry; a leaked 
ASIO report that was understood to suggest ASIO was concealing information 
regarding Croatian terrorist activities in Australia; a midnight visit to the ASIO 
office in Canberra; and an agitated Murphy, who needed to ensure the Bijedić 
visit passed without incident, the Yugoslav delegation was impressed with the 
‘handling’ of Croatians in Australia, and that his statement to parliament would 
deliver on his promises. 
It was in this context that Whitlam ‘welcomed Mr Bijedić as the first leader of 
the Yugoslav Government to visit Australia and outlined the new orientation of 
Australia’s foreign policy.’92 The visit proved to be free of any incident and 
somewhat of an anti-climax.93 For its part, the Croatian community had 
organised a three-hour demonstration at Parliament House prior to the Bijedić 
visit on 18 March, attended by over 3000 people.94 Although another 
demonstration had been planned for the day of Bijedić’s arrival, it was cancelled 
by community leaders ‘because of the hysterical atmosphere that has been 
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created… Any persons who did attempt to demonstrate would be regarded by the 
community as agents provocateur.’95 
The symbolism of a communist head of state visiting so early in Whitlam’s 
prime ministership, and the publicity that it would generate, would be a powerful 
legitimisation of Whitlam’s foreign policy aspirations. More practically, the NAM 
summit in Algeria was looming, and Australia needed a sponsor – who better 
than one of the founding constituents to provide this sponsorship. For 
Yugoslavia, the visit presented a unique opportunity to exploit the change of 
government in order to further its own foreign policy objectives in managing 
Croatians abroad. As Strangman explains, similar diplomatic pressure had been 
applied to both Austria and America in 1972, but with little success. Was the 
Yugoslav Government’s achievement with the Bijedić visit to Australia, 
Strangman asks, ‘the culmination of a diplomatic strategy pursued by the 
Yugoslavs since 1972?’96 Just over a month after the events of the Raid, the Bijedić 
visit, and Murphy’s Ministerial Statement, the answer, at least according to Peter 
Samuel, seemed to be yes; 
The sole beneficiaries of the Croatian liberation activity are the authorities in 
Belgrade. What Murphy has overlooked is the fact that the threat to Belgrade 
comes not from anti-Communist nationalists or reactionaries but from ethnic 
and factional rivalries within the ruling Communist Party in Yugoslavia and from 
the Russians. The people in power in Belgrade find it very helpful to have foreign 
based ‘fascists’ and ‘counter-revolutionaries’ being seen to make incursions. It 
creates in Yugoslavia a diversion, an atmosphere in which to call for unity, and an 
outside evil with which internal dissidents can be associated in propaganda, 
prosecutions and suppression. That is why Yugoslav Government agents are 
involved in what is ostensibly anti-Yugoslav activity in Australia.97  
 
4.1.4. ‘CROATIAN’ TERRORISM?  
Stripped of its context, Murphy’s Statement presented a troubling tale. 
However, in the context of these developments within Croatian activism, the 
three-year debate that deployed Croatians and their activisms as a political 
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football, and the foreign policy considerations of both Yugoslavia and the 
Whitlam Government, the statement was, as Withers immediately recognised, 
merely a ‘reiteration of statements about a reign of terror – most of which we 
[The Senate] have heard time and time again.’98 Even though Murphy presented 
an overwhelming amount of documentation, he failed to connect a single 
terrorist act to any one terrorist, let alone uncover a coordinated, concerted effort 
by an entire organisation that would impugn Greenwood or the previous 
government. However, this was no mere oversight or happenstance. By the end of 
Greenwood’s Shadow Ministerial Statement on 04 April 1973, it was clear that 
Murphy had presented a deliberately constructed statement, long on allegation 
and short of evidence, made in the knowledge that he would be protected by 
parliamentary privilege. Though Murphy was measured and calculated in his 
selections, simplifications, and silences, Greenwood had no trouble 
demonstrating just how easily Murphy’s allegations could be dismantled. Each 
and every of his assertions could be, and was, contested.99  
 The narrative of Croatian terrorism as put forward by Murphy was a 
deliberate construction of evidence, rather than a considered reflection 
supported by evidence. His allegations rested on a guilt-by-association approach. 
Croatian organisations were judged as terrorist simply because of their 
association with ‘undesirable’ principles such as Ustashism, by their 
‘revolutionary’ or anti-Yugoslav aims, or because of their association with 
questionable individuals. Individuals were judged as terrorist simply because of 
their political beliefs, affiliations to Croatian organisations, or previous criminal 
offences, even if these offences were not of a terrorist nature. The history of 
conflict within the Yugoslav community was simplified to a narrative of fanatic 
Croatians terrorising peaceable Yugoslavs. Most incriminatingly, especially for 
the first officer of the law who prided himself on his civil rights record, incidents 
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that were perpetrated against Yugoslavs were attributed to Croatians even when 
the perpetrators could not be found. 
Perhaps Murphy sincerely believed while in opposition that there was 
credible evidence of organised Croatian terrorism in Australia that was being 
suppressed by either the Government or ASIO. However, after the Raid, Murphy 
understood that with the evidence he held, his case would not succeed in a court 
of law, but that it might be successful in influencing public opinion and the 
political agenda. Barbour had informed him as much in a letter sent to Murphy 
on 23 March, after the Raid but before the Ministerial Statement, which explicitly 
told Murphy,  
The conclusion appears inescapable that a terrorist organisation existed in 
Australia until 1968. There is ample information to indicate that individuals 
and/or groups exist in Australia prepared to use violence in support of their 
objectives. However, sufficient evidence has hitherto been lacking to enable 
prosecutions and other executive Government action to be taken to control the 
problem in Australia.100  
Despite the Raid, and despite Murphy’s insistence, ASIO’s assessment of Croatian 
activism remained unchanged. Murphy knew this, but dismissed it in favour of 
his narrative. After all, his was the burden of persuasion, not of proof. 
Knowing that he did not hold sufficient evidence for even one charge against 
a single Croatian that could be pursued in court, why did Murphy persist with 
this particular Ministerial Statement? Perhaps Murphy believed that it was only a 
matter of time before credible evidence, admissible in court, was found. Perhaps 
both he and Whitlam were so consumed with securing their legacies that they 
could not see the forest for the trees, and pressed on undeterred. Perhaps 
Murphy had backed himself into a political corner because he had promised a 
statement on Croatians that would refute the claims of his predecessor. To 
provide a statement that claimed anything less would be first, a humiliating 
admission that the last three years of ALP posturing on the issue were completely 
misguided, and second, a concession of defeat only weeks into  Murphy’s tenure 
as Attorney-General, made all the more spectacular due to his unprecedented 
                                                 





Raid on ASIO. The most likely answer, however, seems to be that Murphy sought 
to replicate the success of Menzies by creating a moral panic of the ALP’s own, 
that served both domestic and international objectives.  
Cohen defines a moral panic as a period when ‘a condition, episode, person 
or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and 
interests.’101 Bratich makes a further distinction between moral panics and 
conspiracy panics, 
Conspiracy panics help to define the normal modes of dissent. Politically it is 
predicated on a consensus ‘us’ over against a subversive and threatening ‘them’… 
threat detection in a conspiracy panic is not focused on the visible (as in 
behavioural conduct), but on the virtual [signs of danger].102 
Murphy’s Ministerial Statement, as well as his explanations in the Senate 
thereafter, displayed the characteristics of both. Cohen’s ‘Inventory’103 needed to 
create a moral panic - Exaggeration, Distortion, Prediction and Symbolisation – 
all featured in Murphy’s explanations. It was not the credible evidence of 
individual or organisational engagement with terrorist activities that made 
Croatians and Croatian organisations terrorist, but the possibility that they could, 
as exhibited by their political activism. Murphy’s assurance that he would ‘cut out 
the cancer of terrorism from our body politic,’104 not only demonstrated the 
consensus ‘us’ (Australians) against the subversive ‘them’ (Croatians), but also 
Murphy’s strategy to ‘problematise’, rather than incorporate, Croatian dissent.105 
Moral panics are not just a method of identifying and labelling threats, but 
are also a potent political tool, and ‘as conceptual devices they provide the 
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underpinning for material practices.’106 Moral panics have been utilised many 
times to justify or legitimise a government and its policies, and Murphy had 
experienced first-hand the power a moral panic can wield.  However, in order to 
be a credible panic, Murphy needed his subject to pose a large enough threat – 
real or imagined – to justify a change in government policy. ‘Ustasha’ violence or 
terrorism, as these acts were hitherto described, was a limited threat. The Ustaša 
label was only applicable to a handful of Croatian organisations, and an even 
smaller number of Croatians who held onto an early post-war vision of Croatian 
activism. This narrowness was in fact one of the reasons why Menzies could 
argue in 1964 that there was nothing unique about the minor minority of 
Croatians caught up in criminal acts that would justify a targeted or specialised 
action against Croatians in general. 
On the other hand, to have made right-wing extremism or politically-
motivated violence the subject of the statement would have made the threat too 
broad or too great for the government to surmount. If Murphy’s Statement had 
been about right-wing extremism in general, it could have been dismissed as just 
another perpetuation of the ideological war between the political left and right. 
This could have also alienated some of the centrist or right-leaning voters that 
had voted for the ALP precisely due to their disaffection with the prolonged cold 
war ideological battles of the preceding 23 years. Politically-motivated violence 
was not the monopoly of the right, and was in fact more closely associated with 
the political left from which Murphy hailed. To have attempted to manufacture a 
moral panic over politically-motivated violence would have left Murphy open to 
embarrassment and criticism due to his personal history and affiliations.  
 ‘Croatian terrorism’, it seems, was the ideal political opportunity for Murphy. 
The Croatian community was large enough to ascribe a potential threat to - 
particularly with the surge of arrivals in 1970/1 - but small enough to seem a 
manageable task. More pragmatically, the only way to make a connection 
between those mentioned in his Statement was through their ‘Croatianness’. 
                                                 





Most importantly, however, Croatians were simply an easy target due to their 
status as an ‘Other’. Within Australian paradigms, Croatians were a migrant 
‘Other’ with an uncomfortable relationship to the expectations of the Good 
Australian Migrant. The fact that Croatians also originated from the Balkans only 
added to their ‘Otherness’ - as Skrbiš points out, ‘the Balkans is the Other in the 
popular Western imagery.’107 The baggage of the Balkan Brute and of the Good 
Australian Migrant made Croatians an inherently suspicious group, whose 
unrelenting activism made the possibility of a threat seem credible. That there 
were individuals within Croatian organisations prepared to engage in violence 
and criminal activity was sufficient proof that there was a problem with the 
whole – Good Australian Migrants, after all, exist in the absolutes. However, like 
the need for a moral panic to seem a manageable threat, the group being targeted 
also needs to seem redeemable. The economic and cultural contributions of the 
Croatian community, as well as its Catholicism and relatively ‘Western’ identity 
compared to the rest of the Balkans, demonstrated that there was sufficient 
‘good’ associated with Croatians to provide enough hope for change.  
By making the subject ‘terrorism’, rather than violence or extremism, Murphy 
sought to exploit the political advantages the label of terrorism resulted in. As 
Hocking explains, the ability to determine when and how the label of terrorism is 
deployed is a potent political weapon, not only in labelling enemies, but also in 
what it then allows a government to do in response; 
The use of the ambiguous and problematic central term ‘terrorism’ in itself 
compounds the problems of an uncertain ‘counter-terrorism’ mandate ostensibly 
enacted in its name. In particular, it allows for the ready adoption of extreme 
measures that would otherwise be strongly resisted. The types of governmental 
response advocated in order to counter both terrorism and the threat of 
terrorism may in turn be disproportionate to the actual dangers presented by 
incidents of political violence in quite different political and social contexts.108  
Although the ALP had a majority in the House of Representatives, it did not have 
control of the Senate. By framing these issues as ‘terrorism’, Murphy not placed 
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counter-terrorism measures at the disposal of the Government, but also had in 
effect backed the Opposition into a political corner. If the Opposition opposed 
any measures, the Government was able to portray them as deliberately 
hampering Labor’s reform agenda in order to protect terrorists. On the other 
hand, if the Opposition supported any measures, it would essentially be 
conceding Murphy’s point that they neither could nor would deal with Croatian 
terrorism themselves when they were in power.  
 Without conclusive evidence, allegations of Croatian terrorism remain just 
that. A Croatian has never been found guilty of a terrorist offence in Australia, 
and the one exception, the case of the Croatian Six, seems to have been 
orchestrated by Yugoslav intelligence. Evidence of Yugoslav subversion is a little 
more forthcoming, however this too has been difficult to conclusively prove or 
disprove. Insofar as the Coalition can be accused of underestimating or avoiding 
the issue of Croatian extremism for the sake of their political agenda, so too can 
the ALP be accused of underestimating or avoiding the issue 
of Yugoslav subversion for theirs. The consequences of both shortcomings have 
been borne by the Croatian community alone - either beholden to the actions of 
a minor extremist minority of Croatians that the Australian Government under 
the Coalition could not or would not bring under their control, or beholden to an 
elaborate plan of Yugoslav espionage that the Australian Government under the 
ALP could not or would not bring under control. In either case, Croatians in 
Australia were nothing more than an expendable pawn in the political posturing 





4.2. CROATIANS RESPOND 
If he has any proof, let him take it to the courts... Let him bring the case to justice. 
But he has made these allegations without any proof.  
That is shocking for an Attorney-General to do.109 
 
We are 13,000 miles away from Croatia.  
Senator Murphy is 30,000 miles away from the facts.110 
 
The initial response of the Croatian community to Murphy’s allegations was 
predictable. Community leaders unequivocally denied the existence of organised 
Croatian terrorism, while those individuals and organisations that Murphy had 
named in his Statement challenged him to take his allegations to the courts. 
Counter-allegations of Yugoslav espionage were asserted, and leaders urged the 
community not to react to the provocations.111 As a show of strength and to 
demonstrate the nature of Croatians and their activism, on 8 April, a 5000-strong 
crowd packed the Hordern Pavilion in Sydney for 10. Travanj celebrations. 
Representatives from various ethnic communities, as well as NSW 
parliamentarian and founding President of the NSW Captive Nations Council, 
Douglas Darby, participated in this affirmation of Croatian identity, culture, and 
activism through word, song, and dance.112 
Though the actions of Murphy tarnished the community with a reputation it 
is still yet to shake, it did provide Croatians their first opportunity to engage with 
Australian political processes in the form of the Senate Select Committee on the 
Civil Rights of Migrant Australians, established on 17 May 1973. Though the 
double dissolution in 1974 and Dismissal in 1975 prevented the committee from 
ever producing a final report, participation in this process had a profound effect 
on the nature and approach of Croatian political activism. It entrenched the 
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change from political rhetoric to questions of ethno-national identity that had 
begun with the second wave of post-war Croatian migration in the 1960s by 
providing the community with a new framework of ideas and rhetoric through 
which to express their activism – the rhetoric of civil rights. This was reinforced 
with the introduction of multicultural policy, which stressed ethnicity over 
nationality, and allowed Croatians to advocate on the basis of their ethnic 
identity, rather than place of citizenship. Multiculturalism also influenced the 
practicalities of Croatian political activism. Not only did it provide a greater 
opportunity for Croatians to express their identity and activism, but also enabled 
the community to cultivate a reputation that countered the problematic one the 
Whitlam Government had assigned it. This newfound framework of rights and 
responsibilities, ethnic identity and multiculturalism converged in the 
establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ in 1977, which actively sought to 
manipulate Australia’s legal and political processes in order to legitimise Croatian 
political activism.  
 
4.2.1. THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF 
MIGRANT AUSTRALIANS 
 In the very early hours of 1 April, a mere four days after Murphy’s Ministerial 
Statement, a combined force of Commonwealth and State Police raided 
approximately 80 Croatian premises in Sydney and Wollongong, rousing 
unsuspecting men, women, and children from their sleep, and reportedly in some 
cases, failing to produce warrants.113 Though it was unclear whether these raids 
were as a result of Murphy’s Statement, the timing of them only added to the 
swirling discontent over Murphy’s handling of the ‘Croatian affair’. Though nine 
individuals were charged as a result of the raids, these were only for minor 
offences, and produced nothing more than would be expected from a random 
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sample of 80 households. Despite the large amount of confiscations, particularly 
of publications and documents, the raids did not yield any evidence to support 
Murphy’s allegations of Croatian terrorism or help prosecute just one Croatian 
for a single terrorist act.114 On the very same day, approximately 300 Croatians 
gathered in Canberra to establish a Croatian Civil Rights Committee in order to 
gather funds for the legal defence of any Croatians who may face deportation as a 
result of Murphy’s actions. Interestingly, this committee was initiated by a non-
Croatian, Leslie (Les) Shaw, a regular book review contributor for The Canberra 
Times and CSIRO employee, who would become a prominent advocate and 
spokesperson for the Croatian community. In light of the news about the NSW 
police raids, the establishment of this committee proved a shrewd move. 
However the events that would transpire in the coming weeks would elevate the 
importance of the Committee to a national level.  
On 3 April, Murphy disclosed to the Senate that one of the catalysts for his 
Raid on ASIO was the discovery of an Interdepartmental Committee meeting 
report, which he believed indicated that ‘the decision reported to have been 
taken at that meeting was inconsistent with the democratic process and 
inconsistent with responsible government.’115 The report intimated, at least to 
Murphy, that public servants may have been withholding information from the 
Government about Croatian terrorism. This was eclipsed on 4 April, when 
Greenwood delivered his devastating Shadow Ministerial Statement. Such was 
Greenwood’s success in dismantling Murphy’s Statement, the Sydney Morning 
Herald remarked that  
There must be many people beginning to conclude that the Attorney-General has 
been – not to put too fine a point on it – making fools of himself and his 
Government and misusing Parliament to try to fool the Australian people.116 
On the 5 April, Murphy suffered an enormous blow to his reputation in both 
houses. In the Senate, debates reached fever pitch, and Murphy faced the 
humiliation of a no-confidence motion in him passing. Adding insult to injury, on 
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the same day in the House of Representatives, Whitlam declared that after proper 
administrative enquiries into the report that allegedly vindicated Murphy’s Raid, 
it was found to be an accidental ‘wrong report of what was said.’117 This admission 
from Whitlam insinuated first, that Murphy had not undertaken ‘proper’ 
administrative enquires in response to the report, and second that the entire 
melodrama of the Raid could have been avoided if he had just taken this simple 
step. 
 On 10 April, the Opposition attempted to establish a judicial inquiry into the 
legality of Murphy’s actions and the veracity of his allegations of Croatian 
terrorism. Not only did Whitlam’s Government defeat this motion, but it 
effectively gagged debate on the issue in the House of Representatives.118 This 
triumph, however, was short-lived as only two days later on 12 April, Belgrade 
announced that three Australian citizens captured in the 1972 incursion had been 
executed by firing squad. This was carried out without any prior notification of 
the Australian Government, who had in fact been told at the time of the 
incursion that all nine Australian citizens involved had been killed.119 Even more 
disturbing was the fact that the men had reportedly been executed only three 
days before Bijedić’s arrival. Bijedić did not mention this matter during his 
visit.120 
The ill-conceived execution of the 1 April raids, the comedy of errors that 
beleaguered Murphy in his attempt to vindicate his Raid on ASIO, the execution 
of three Australian citizens without the Government’s knowledge by a supposed 
friendly government they had paraded around the country less than a month 
before, all steeped in an almost hysteria about possible deportations, abuses of 
parliamentary privilege, and potential ramifications for Australia’s migrant 
communities, resulted in the perception that Murphy was over-reaching in his 
position, the Whitlam government was too inexperienced and undisciplined to 
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govern, and that they were violating the rights of Croatians in the process.121 After 
a failed attempt in the previous week, on 17 May the Senate Select Committee on 
the Civil Rights of Migrant Australians was established. Comprising of seven 
Senators – three from the government, three from the opposition parties, and one 
independent, the committee was tasked to enquire and report on four matters; 
whether the civil rights of migrant Australians have been infringed; whether 
members of migrant communities have experienced intimidation or undue 
pressure from foreign governments and/or their secret police; the circumstances 
of Murphy’s Raid on ASIO; and any issues created by the dual nationalities of 
migrants. Though these investigations were also to include other migrant 
communities, the Croatian community was to become the central focus of the 
committee. 
The establishment of the Senate Select Committee, therefore, prompted the 
Croatian Civil Rights Committee established on 01 April to evolve into a national 
organisation. Renamed the National Croatian Civil Rights Committee (NCCRC), 
its main role now was to ‘prepare a submission and represent the Croatian 
community at the [Senate Select Committee] as the official voice of the Croatian 
diaspora community in the media.’122 As though flexing its muscle memory and 
replicating the organisational skills of the first wave of post-war Croatian 
migrants, the NCCRC quickly established sub-branches in all major cities across 
Australia and began the onerous task of documenting incidents of discrimination 
and grievances perpetrated by both Australian and Yugoslav authorities, and the 
effect of Murphy’s actions on the community.123  
The first hearing of the Senate Select Committee was held in Melbourne on 
19 July, and continued until November, with hearings also held in Canberra and 
Sydney. Submissions were sought in regards to the four matters, and even 
Barbour himself testified before the Committee on 08 August, attracting 
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significant attention as it was the first time the head of ASIO had ever been called 
upon to publically answer questions.124 One of the unforeseen consequences of 
Murphy’s actions and allegations, however, was that it gave the community a 
common goal which helped overcome the factionalism that had characterised the 
community in the first two decades of post-war settlement; 
It seems the more that Murphy, the police and the media attacked the Croatians, 
the more united they became and in the end the NCCRC had the full support of 
the Croatian community.125 
The NCCRC presented ‘a homogenised view of the Croatian diaspora in defence 
of the community and presenting their facts to the [Senate Select Committee] 
and the Australian public.’126 This was the first time the community had 
organised to actively engage in a dialogue with Australian political and media 
institutions as a community, rather than under the auspices of various 
organisations and their leaders, and would come to have an important impact on 
future community organisation.  
 As with the debates of 1963/4, Croatian political activism faded from the 
national spotlight as domestic political concerns took priority and curtailed 
debate. The practicalities of governance were always going to be an issue for the 
Whitlam Government as it had to contend with a hostile Senate controlled by a 
Coalition majority. By early 1974, the Senate had rejected nineteen government 
bills, including ten of them twice, and in early April, Whitlam attempted to 
politically manoeuvre an upcoming half-Senate election in his favour, resulting in 
the ‘Gair Affair.’ On 10 April 1974, these issues came to a head when Whitlam 
announced that the Governor-General had agreed to a double dissolution,127 and 
on 11 April, parliament was dissolved.  
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 The double dissolution effectively ended the Senate Select Committee before 
a final report could be produced. Two weeks before the 1974 election, however, a 
draft report was leaked and published by The Bulletin, which vindicated the 
Croatian community, condemned Murphy’s Statement and actions as a violation 
of the civil rights of Croatians, and inferred that the intimidation of the Croatian 
community seemed to be the real purpose for these events.128 Though this meant 
that the work that had been put into the preparation of submissions by the 
NCCRC and the community did not result in the official recognition and redress 
it might have had a final report been presented to the Senate, the participation of 
the community in this process was to have a lasting influence on its activism. 
 First and foremost, the Senate Select Committee legitimised Croatian 
activism in a way that had not been previously forthcoming. That Croatians were 
invited to contribute, rather than speaking of their own initiative, was important 
as it gave an amount of gravitas (however small) to the assertions of Croatians. It 
also provided a legitimate public forum through which Croatians could enter into 
the public record explanations of their activism and their grievances, both long-
standing and as a result of Murphy’s actions. Second, it provided an opportunity 
for the community to generate knowledge of and experience in the navigation of 
Australian political processes. This experience would come to help the 
community tailor their future activism. Third, it highlighted the advantage of 
professionalism and collaboration outside of the community in developing its 
activism – as Batarelo notes, without the professionalism of Shaw, it is 
‘questionable to what extent the Croatian diaspora could have been properly 
presented at the hearings.’129  
 These three developments all culminated in the fourth, and most important, 
influence of the Senate Select Committee – the replacement of the outdated 
rhetoric of anti-communism and political self-determination that had defined 
activism in the previous period with the rhetoric of civil rights. This change had 
both internal and external implications. Though the abandonment of political 
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rhetoric had begun with the arrival of the second wave of post-war Croatian 
migrants, a consensus had not yet developed on what or how this rhetoric could 
or should be replaced. The rhetoric of rights encoded in the purpose of the 
Senate Select Committee provided a useful alternative, which allowed Croatians 
to sidestep the factionalism and antagonism that had resulted from the diversity 
of political views. That this rhetoric of rights was framed by their status as 
Australian citizens also helped unify the community through their common 
experience of life in Australia and negotiation of identity within Australian 
society.  
 This internal change made Croatian activism more understandable and 
accessible to a wider Australian audience that had become well-versed in this 
rhetoric, not least because the Whitlam government had fashioned itself as the 
party of civil rights and liberties. More importantly, however, this change made 
Croatian activism sit more easily with the framework of the Good Australian 
Migrant. First it depoliticised the activism itself by changing the focus from 
political statehood to identity recognition, reducing the perception that 
Croatians were ‘too political’.  Second, it framed Croatians as Australian citizens, 
rather than by their Yugoslav citizenship. Finally, it changed the focus of the 
activism from what was happening in Yugoslavia to what was happening in 
Australia, weakening the accusation that Croatians were importing their 
problems from ‘over there.’ The introduction of multicultural policy only 
reinforced this change, as it legitimised the migrant presence in general and 
relaxed the assimilationist expectations of the Good Australian Migrant. 
 
4.2.2. CROATIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM UNDER MULTICULTURALISM 
Multiculturalism afforded a wealth of opportunity for Croatian migrants and 
their activism. That multiculturalism stressed ethnicity over nationality meant 
that Croatians were able to legitimately advocate based on their ethnic identity as 





emphasis multiculturalism placed on cultural expression provided Croatians with 
more frequent opportunities to express their identity, even if these opportunities 
remained relatively within the Good Australian Migrant confines of Faith, 
Folklore, and Football. Though multiculturalism seemed to depoliticise Croatian 
activism within Australian paradigms, the interrelatedness of the cultural and 
political in Croatian activism meant that rather than eliminating the role of the 
political, Croatians simply resumed the traditional patterns and practices of 
Croatian nationalism by advocating for identity recognition through campaigns 
for access to services and participating in cultural events as Croatians, rather than 
Yugoslavs. This included that most Croatian of proxy battlegrounds - language 
recognition. The legitimate space multiculturalism opened up for Croatian 
activism allowed the community to cultivate an image and reputation of Good 
Australian Migrant-ness that highlighted the economic and cultural 
contributions of the community, and also countered the problematic reputation 
the Whitlam Government had ascribed to it.  
For the most part, Croatian activism in the 1970s simply replicated the 
general patterns of the previous two decades. Participation in the processions, 
congresses, and ‘international’ masses of the Catholic Church, in community 
events, festivals, and exhibitions, and through the local soccer club, constituted 
the main activities of the Croatian community. Where the change occurred, 
however, was in size, scope, and frequency – the community of the 1970s was 
larger, the scope of its public profile greater, and the activism more frequent 
through the proliferation of government initiatives and ‘multicultural’ activities 
at the local, state, and national levels. Though the political element of Croatian 
activism remained – such as the stalwarts of 10 Travanj celebrations and 29 
November Yugoslav Day demonstrations – the greater part of Croatian activism 
was geared towards the recognition of Croatian identity in Australia as separate 
from a Yugoslav identity.  
This activism was bolstered by the development of the community itself. The 





demand for resources and physical space. Existing clubs and associations 
renovated, moved premises, or built new clubhouses to accommodate an 
expanding membership, while newer clubs sought out premises of their own. 
This process of redevelopment and renewal was made easier by increasing access 
to financial capital, whether from new members, earlier migrants who were 
financially well-established by the 1970s, or from government grants and funding 
flowing from multicultural policy. The need to co-ordinate the activities of clubs 
and associations saw the rise of intergroup associations – whether because of 
their growing number, easier access to multicultural initiatives, or out of a 
recognition stemming from the Senate Select Committee that more could be 
achieved through unification and coordination.130 
The proxy battle of language recognition was fought on a three-fold front – 
radio programming, ethnic language schools, and interpreter/translation services. 
Though all three were heralded as tangible expressions of inclusion under 
multicultural policy, each was an experience of marginalisation for the Croatian 
community. Even though the precursors to what would become SBS radio 
ostensibly included a ‘Croatian’ or ‘Serbo-Croat’ program, these were for the most 
part controlled by the Yugoslav community. Croatian ethnic schools were 
required to teach from a ‘Serbo-Croat’ syllabus set by the Yugoslav community if 
they were to be formally recognised or accredited, while interpreter/translation 
services were limited to either ‘Yugoslav’ or ‘Serbo-Croat’ interpreters, and 
accessing these services meant dealing with a non-Croatian translator, often at 
times of significant personal and private vulnerability. Activism therefore centred 
on the notion that Croatians were an ethnic group separate from Yugoslavs, and 
was therefore entitled to access to services in its own language and from its own 
people, and to organise content and delivery based on its own culture and issues 
relevant to its community, not one set by a Yugoslav agenda. The official 
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recognition of Croatian as a separate language by the Australian Government in 
1979 was therefore a major milestone in the activism of the community, and one 
which had important social consequences. As Drapac explains,  
The sense of inclusion this gave Croatians drew them into the social fabric, 
whereas previously official exclusion left many who were in need of these services 
outside the mainstream and without representation.131 
Croatian political activism throughout the 1970s was also characterised by a 
level of self-awareness and attempt to ‘manage’ the perception of its activism that 
had not been as overt in the previous two decades. Croatians modified their 
activism as opportunities or difficulties arose, with a view to present the 
community in the best possible light and minimise the prospect of negative 
publicity. The experience of Croatians under the Whitlam Government made it 
clear to the community that the perception of its activism in Australian society 
could have serious consequences on the everyday life of Croatians, and therefore 
the importance of managing this perception.  
Armed with a new political program arising from the ideas and rhetoric of 
the Croatian Spring and from their experience with the Senate Select Committee, 
the community was careful not to squander any goodwill that was extended 
towards it. For example, like the demonstration that was cancelled during the 
Bijedić visit in 1973, Croatians cancelled their Yugoslav National Day protests in 
Canberra in 1975 due to the politically fraught atmosphere that had pervaded due 
to Whitlam’s Dismissal and the election campaign that followed. As Lovokovic 
writes, any protest or demonstration was cancelled ‘so that opponents couldn’t 
exploit the protest of Croatians for their own corrupt intentions.’132 Similarly, 
when Red Star Belgrade travelled to Australia in 1977 for an international friendly 
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with the Australian side, a flyer was distributed throughout the community 
imploring Croatians to avoid attending any games.133  
 Multiculturalism not only provided the community with more opportunities 
to disseminate their activism and demonstrate their ethnic identity, but also an 
avenue to build on any goodwill and cultivate a reputation of Good Australian 
Migrant-ness through their contributions of faith, folklore, and football. As Hay 
writes of his involvement with soccer in Geelong in the late 1970s,  
[The] litany of criticism aimed at the Croatian club struck me as excessive and, 
increasingly, at variance with my experiences. Certainly Croatians played hard to 
win… Off the field the Croatians were marvellous company, friendly, passionate 
and interesting people, although the youngsters could be rude, offensive, 
chauvinistic, prepared to cheat and violent on occasion.134 
This ‘personal experience’ of Croatians and their activism through the paradigms 
of the Good Australian Migrant helped to counter the reputation for extremism 
and violence the Whitlam Government had ascribed to the community. Drapac 
summarises the importance of this turn to multiculturalism by Croatians,  
The reality of the situation meant that the media and government-manufactured 
Croatian ‘type’ was no longer sustainable because it was not rooted in the lived 
experience of Croats in Australia, or indeed the lived experience of Australians 
who came into contact with Croatian people. Croats did not exist in a vacuum 
nor were they simply reactive. They were contesting a negative and one-
dimensional interpretation of their identity and positing another in its place. At 
times, this led to a certain defensiveness on their part. On the whole, however, 
their reaction to the slurs against them led Croats (collectively) to be more 
outward looking: their behaviour was less ‘conspiratorial’ and ‘nostalgic’ than it 
was flexible, forward looking and adaptable.135 
Though initial attempts to manage the perception of the community and its 
activism may have been more an unintentional consequence of the internal 
changes within Croatian activism, an explicitly deliberate act of ‘perception 
management’ was to form the basis of one of the most memorable turns of 
Croatian activism in Australia – the Croatian ‘Embassy’ of 1977-1979 
 
                                                 
133 ibid., 173. 
134 Hay, ‘Those Bloody Croatians,’ 78. 





4.2.3. THE CROATIAN EMBASSY, 1977-79 
On 5 April 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, rose to 
deliver his Ministerial Statement on the ‘Croatian Embassy’ established in 
Canberra on 29 November 1977.136 This was the third statement to the Australian 
Parliament involving Croatians in the space of five years. However, the tone and 
reception of this Statement was markedly different from those that had come 
before it. The ideological and historical deliberations that had coloured previous 
statements were muted in favour of a focus on the practical, diplomatic 
implications the ‘Embassy’ posed for the Australian Government. Government 
concern was not with Croatian activism in general, but with the practice of using 
diplomatic language as a form of protest. For the Government, Peacock 
explained, the ‘Embassy’ was problematic because it ‘[impeded] the correct and 
orderly conduct of Australia’s international relations.’137 The Government was 
therefore 
deeply concerned lest other minority groups may be inspired by the continued 
existence of the self-styled Croatian Embassy to believe that they, too, may 
similarly interfere in and jeopardise Australia’s relations with sovereign states. 
Because the Government had found that existing legislation could only impose a 
slight constraint to ‘Embassy’ operations, Peacock advised that new legislation 
would be introduced that would prevent the false representation of diplomatic, 
consular or other official missions.  
Perhaps most uncharacteristically, the statement was met with bipartisan 
support, even if, as the Leader of the Opposition Bill Hayden remarked, ‘it must 
be conceded that the action comes belatedly and grudgingly.’138 The most obvious 
reason for this bipartisanship was the diplomatic embarrassment the technical 
legality of the ‘Embassy’ had caused the Australian Government, and the strained 
relationship that had developed between Australia and Yugoslavia as a result. The 
Yugoslav Government demanded nothing less than the immediate closure of the 
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‘Embassy’. Despite Australia’s explanation that there were complex legal and 
political issues involved, the Australian Government was accused of a lack of 
‘political will to find a solution satisfactory to Yugoslavia.’139 As one public servant 
explained, ‘it is clear that [Yugoslavia’s] concept of effective action and the speed 
with which it can be taken is much different from ours.’140 
The Croatian ‘Embassy’ was a unique moment in Australian history because it 
was the first embassy of its kind to be seen in Australia,141 the first Croatian 
activism of its type throughout the world, and because it resulted in the 
legislation that continues to shape Australia’s diplomatic relations to the present 
day. The historical significance of the ‘Embassy’, however, lay more in its purpose 
than in its outcome. The establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ can be 
understood as an expression of the knowledge and experience the Croatian 
community had accumulated through its activism. It was a considered and co-
ordinated attempt by a group of Croatians to address and redress the ‘Othering’ 
of their community and the problematisation of its activism that had occurred 
under Murphy and the Whitlam Government. This was achieved through four 
key approaches – the use of a mode of dissent and protest familiar to the 
Australian political environment; the emphasis of the legality of the ‘Embassy’, as 
well as its basis on Australian citizenship; the framing of the ‘Embassy’ as a 
symbol of a unified Croatian ‘voice’; and the presentation of Croatian activism 
through multicultural ideals in order to disassociate it from its political and 
problematic past. 
The most obvious source of inspiration for the ‘Embassy’ can be found in the 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy.142 Dešpoja, who had been a senior research officer for 
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the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, and a friend of Charles Perkins, readily 
admitted that this was the inspiration for the ‘Embassy’.143 The ‘Embassy’ 
exploited the political language of diplomacy to portray the failure of the 
Yugoslav Government to represent Croatia, Croatians and their interests, in the 
same way the Aboriginal Tent Embassy drew on the political language of 
diplomacy to 
cogently [portray] the failure of white governments to respond to Aboriginal 
demands. At its most basic, as one participant put it, the Embassy dramatised the 
truth that ‘foreigners had more representation than us’.144 
The use of the title of ‘embassy’ was deliberate and intended to provoke, as was 
the opening date itself - 29 November was Yugoslavia’s National Day. As Dešpoja 
reportedly claimed to a Commonwealth Police Officer on 6 December 1977, ‘we 
are only interested in making some political gesture, something political against 
Yugoslavia… Who knows it’s just to embarrass the opposition.’145 In the case of 
both embassies, the symbolism of place and space had as much of a role to play 
in its activism as did language. For the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, its position on 
the lawns of Old Parliament House was both highly provocative and a stark 
political statement about the position of Indigenous people in Australian society;  
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To stand on the road, with the big White building behind, and the small Black 
encampment in front, is to stand in a tense middle ground between two worlds of 
mutual incomprehension.146 
The address of the Croatian ‘Embassy’, 34 Canberra Ave, also had political 
symbolism. It was situated two kilometres from Parliament House (now Old 
Parliament House), a few hundred metres from the Soviet Embassy, whose 
alleged support of Croat separatism was a cause of worldwide concern, and in the 
suburb known to be the home of diplomats and legitimate embassies.  
The Croatian ‘Embassy’ however, was not familiar to the Australian political 
environment simply because it emulated the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Rather, 
Croatians were engaging in a form of activism that had heavily influenced the 
protest movements of the previous decade in Australia - that of ‘disruptive 
staging’ as proposed by Scalmer in his exploration of collective action in 
Australia.147 Disruptive staging is a political performance, where activists create 
‘stages’ out of public places (or make private places public) from which ‘actors’ 
can make claims on others. This staging is intended to be disruptive, either by 
involving a deliberate illegality, drawing a negative reaction from the state 
(usually police), or preventing the routine use of a particular space by other 
actors. Disruptive staging is also a performance of contestation, where claimants 
‘make their demands in the direct presence of their personal or institutional 
objects.’148 Essential to this form of activism is the theatrical; 
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[Activists] present themselves as if on stage, keen that we will comprehend not 
only their actions but their beliefs, motives, identities. We do not merely learn 
that they oppose the Vietnam War or support Aboriginal land rights, we also 
know why that may be so, and what may motivate them… Props and preparation 
are used in order to make the performance more convincing… There is, equally, a 
concern with symbolism...149  
Finally, media attention is important to the action of disruptive staging, as the 
target audience of the activism is not those that will physically bear witness, but 
those who will learn about it in the media.150 
In the case of the Croatian ‘Embassy’, the stage was a humble rental in a 
Canberra suburb, disrupting not only the routine use of that rental, but also the 
routine use of the political language of diplomacy and causing an international 
embarrassment for the state. The props of language, insignia, titles and flags were 
employed to make the performance more convincing, and through the actors 
‘playing’ the Charge d’Affaires and Secretary, Australians learned why Croatians 
had been advocating for independence for so long. By setting up an embassy, 
instead of a community or information centre, the activists were creating a 
performance of contestation, mobilising a physical proxy to counter the Yugoslav 
Embassy (and by extension the Yugoslav Government) and contest its claim of 
representing the Croatian community. The ‘Embassy’ therefore existed as a 
sustained physical protest against the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state in a way 
which drew on the Australian experience of protest to provide a point of 
reference from which Croatian dissent could become familiarised and 
understood.  
If the establishment of a quasi-embassy was a means to contextualise and 
familiarise Croatian activism within the Australian political environment, the 
emphasis on the legality of the ‘Embassy’ and its function as an expression of 
Australian citizenship was an attempt to redress Murphy’s problematisation of 
Croatian dissent. Indeed, the entire idea of the ‘Embassy’ was an almost 
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Machiavellian exercise in rebranding Croatian activism. As Čizmić states, from 
the outset the organisers were 
playing the ‘legal’ card right until the end. They knew that the Embassy would 
eventually be closed, but they wanted to turn its closing into a ‘Croatian win’. 
They wanted to show that Croatians were not terrorists, but that they obeyed 
Australia’s laws, and if the appropriate courts rule for its closure, they need to be 
respected.151 
This emphasis on legality and portrayal of Croatians as law-abiding citizens was 
closely related to the emphasis of the nonviolent nature of the ‘Embassy’, with 
Dešpoja frequently denunciating violent methods of protest as unacceptable.152 
Along with emphasising the legality of the ‘Embassy’ and the law-abidance of 
Croatians, ‘Embassy’ activists addressed the problematisation of Croatian dissent 
by emphasising that Croatians were simply exercising their right to protest just 
like any other group in Australia with a grievance; 
[The embassy] is only possible because Australia is a free country. This is possible 
only because in Australia the fact that I am a Croat, and that I believe Croatia has 
the right to be free, and that I say so – even though to say so may embarrass 
someone - is not regarded as sufficient cause to gag me, or to tie me up, or to 
throw me into prison.153 
The ‘Embassy’ was therefore a performance of the Australian citizenship as much 
as it was a protest against Yugoslav citizenship. It was because they were 
Australian citizens, rather than despite it, that the community was able to 
advocate for their cause, even if for some, such as Senator O’Byrne, ‘the Croat 
people are prostituting this great privilege.’154 
Emulating the successes of the NCCRC and the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, the 
Croatian ‘Embassy’ sought to control the representation of the community by 
establishing a focal voice that could speak on the community’s behalf. It gave the 
fractured and ad-hoc nature of Croatian activism continuity and cohesiveness 
through its form as a sustained protest, not confined to any one community, 
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organisation, or political creed. This conferred the ‘Embassy’ with a moral 
authority and ability to control which activisms, organisations, and associations 
were considered legitimate, and more importantly, which were not. In much the 
same way as post-war Croatian organisations, the ‘Embassy’ became an arbiter of 
the collective identity through its ability to bestow and withdraw ‘official’ 
support.  The Charge d’Affaires was most prominent as a guest of honour at 
various functions within the community, the host of various meetings of heads of 
organisations, as well as the face of the community to the ‘outside’, mainly 
through newspaper and television reportage, but also as a guest speaker to non-
Croatian functions.155 The ‘Embassy’ itself also became a place of protest and 
demonstration.156 
Because of this status as the arbiter of collective identity, ‘Embassy’ activists 
attempted to disassociate Croatian activism from its highly politicised past, as 
much for the community itself as for those outside of it. Like the Senate Select 
Committee and activism under multiculturalism, the endorsements and 
proclamations of Dešpoja as the Charge d’Affaires helped entrench the change in 
Croatian activism from the rhetoric of direct action against Yugoslavia to a 
symbolic protest based on the socio-cultural identity of Croatians. The regular 
‘Embassy’ column in Spremnost emphasised that the symbolic could be just as 
powerful, for example, reiterating that; 
with one simple on-going protest… within the law – without risking any lives or 
damaging any government property – the embassy delivered a large political blow 
to Yugoslavia.157 
Dešpoja frequently asserted that the ‘Embassy’ did not support any particular 
political belief or system of government, and even went so far as to argue that 
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Croatians were not necessarily against the existence of Yugoslavia, just that ‘we 
don’t want our country to be a part of theirs.’158 
 There was also recognition that Croatian nationalism needed to be rebranded 
in order to remove the stigma of it as the province of old men, nostalgic for a 
fascist state that could have been. This was best reflected in the choice of a 
Charge d’Affaires. From its very establishment, the organisers of the Croatian 
Embassy were  
aware that [the Charge d’Affaires] needed to be an individual that spoke English 
fluently and had a good understanding of Australia’s socio-political 
environment… it is not desirable for the person to be someone who during the 
Second World War had anything to do with the political life of the Independent 
State of Croatia, as pro-Yugoslav migrants will use that relentlessly to discredit 
the Croatian embassy.159 
They found this person in Dešpoja, who was not only all of these things, but also 
a university-educated former public servant of the Australian Government, and a 
young 39 years old. Alongside age and education, gender was also an important 
tool used to diversify and ‘soften’ the image of Croatian nationalism. This was 
also embodied in the appointed secretary and aide to the Charge d’Affaires, 21yr 
old Dinka Sidić, who was depicted as the epitome of the young professional 1970s 
woman. In 1979, she was promoted to Charge d’Affaires in August 1979 when 
Dešpoja could no longer perform the role.160 These markers of youth, education, 
and gender all referenced the ‘new nationalism’ and post-Cold War era the 
Whitlam Government was perceived as having ushered in.161 
 The ‘Embassy’ also capitalised on the opportunities multiculturalism had 
extended in order to rebrand Croatian activism. The precedence of ethnic 
identity over nationality was invoked to argue the case for Croatian ethnic 
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separateness, rather than the complicated history of the Balkans and Croatian 
statehood. The multicultural symbols of faith, folklore, and football continued to 
be the main sites of Croatian activism, in what can be described as an exercise in 
positive public relations. The involvement of the ‘Embassy’ in the promotion of 
the relatively unintimidating issue of Croatia’s distinctive cultural and linguistic 
traditions through the proxy battles of radio programming, ethnic schooling, and 
translation services also gave the ‘Embassy’ tangible objectives, even if they were 
not directly articulated until it was faced with closure.162  
 These attempts at re-branding Croatians and their activism were reflective of 
a wider recognition of the necessity to enter into a conversation with the 
Australian public, to explain why they undertook the activism that they did, in 
ways that made that activism familiar and easily understood. This deliberate 
attempt at ‘perception management’ resulted in what Dešpoja described as one of 
the earliest and biggest successes of the ‘Embassy’;  
Croatians are this time the SUBJECT and not the OBJECT of discussions 
surrounding the Croatian question. Croatians started this debate. And the 
development and outcome of this unique dialogue relies heavily on them.163 
Through the ‘Embassy’, the Croatian community was finally being spoken with, 
rather than just about, an active participant, rather than a passive observer, in the 
Australian political environment.  
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4.3. PARADIGMS SHIFT AGAIN 
This was the origin of the pungent epithet for Vietnamese refugees, Yellow Croats; in 
one phrase, the sum of all these fears.164 
 
Two events in the late 1970s threatened to undo much of the re-branding of 
Croatian activism that the ‘Embassy’, the NCCRC, and the community as a whole, 
had engaged in throughout the decade. On 02 September 1978, Commonwealth 
Police arrested 19 Croatian men after raiding what appeared to be a military 
training camp near Eden. Just five months later, on 09 February 1979, NSW police 
announced that it had arrested six Croatian men on charges of conspiracy to 
bomb various public buildings. These arrests reverberated throughout the 
Croatian community, not only out of fear the political atmosphere of the 
Whitlam Government would return, but also because the involvement of 
Yugoslav agents provocateurs were suspected. At least in the case of the ‘Croatian 
Six’, this would eventually be proven a well-founded fear. 
Though both events seemed to vindicate Murphy’s original allegations of 
Croatian terrorism, there was little of the public or political outcry that had 
accompanied such news at the start of the decade. This may have been because 
both arrests were on the grounds of conspiracy, rather than after a crime had 
been perpetrated, and therefore were not as visceral or as tangible a crime as the 
bombings of the early 1970s had been. This nature also constrained any political 
or media commentary in the name of due process and the presumption of 
innocence. It may have also been an indication that Croatians had somewhat 
succeeded in disassociating their activism from extremism and terrorism. 
However the more likely reason can be found in Australia’s preoccupation with 
the humanitarian issues raised by the end of the Vietnam War and the outbreak 
of the Lebanese Civil War that led to the institutionalisation of non-European 
immigration in 1979.  
                                                 





4.3.1. MURPHY’S VINDICATION?  
On 2 September 1978, Commonwealth Police arrested 19 Croatian men after 
raiding what appeared to be a military training camp in thick bushland outside of 
Eden. At the time of the arrests, the men were dressed in uniforms of jungle 
greens, black berets with a red-and-white checked badge, and net masks over 
their faces. A large cache of weapons and detonators were found, and curiously, 
several rolls of film which the men maintained proved they were simply making a 
film. Police, however, believed they had found one of the secret ‘training camps’ 
of an underground Croatian army that had been the subject of rumours since 
Croatians first rose to national prominence in 1963. The day after, 
Commonwealth police searched a number of homes in Sydney and Canberra, 
seizing large quantities of documents that seemed to confirm the men had been 
preparing for another military incursion into Yugoslavia.165 Almost two years 
later, eight men would be convicted of training others for the purpose of entering 
a foreign country with intent to engage in hostile activities, while another five 
were charged with allowing themselves to be trained.166 
Front page media coverage was limited to the initial days after the arrests, 
with follow-up articles relegated to cursory reporting of court proceedings, as 
would normally be the case. In Parliament, the matter was only raised twice - by 
Harry Jenkins in the House of Representatives and only in order to denunciate 
media reports of Macedonian involvement, and by Gietzelt in the Senate, who did 
attempt to link the arrests as vindication of Murphy’s 1973 allegations, but whose 
question to the Government was dismissed as it would be ‘totally improper and, 
indeed, deplorable, if I [Attorney-General Peter Durack] were to make any 
statements implicating or implying in any way the guilt of the people in those 
proceedings…’167 However, before committal hearings for the Eden arrests could 
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even begin, the ‘Croatian Six’ (as they would become known) had been 
arrested.168  Media coverage followed the same pattern as the Eden arrests, so that 
by the time the guilty verdict was handed down on 18 February 1981, the men 
were described as ‘Yugoslavs’ who were ‘accused Croatian nationalists.’169 
 For the Croatian community, both cases whiffed of Yugoslav intelligence. 
Croatian responses to the Eden arrests varied. Some alleged outright that the 
camp was a Yugoslav set up. Some asserted that even if they were not, these men 
were deluded in thinking they could liberate Croatia by mounting any sort of 
activity from Australia, particularly after the purges of the Croatian Spring in 1971. 
Others simply denounced any connection between these men and the wider 
community, while others still expressed incredulity at the circumstances. Few 
even repeated the claims of the men themselves that they were simply making a 
film.170 The potential involvement of Yugoslav intelligence in the case of the 
Croatian Six was even recognised by ASIO at the time of the arrests. Blaxland 
reveals that ASIO had long held the suspicion that Yugoslav agents were active in 
Australia, had penetrated Croatian organisations, and were even believed it 
responsible for some of the violence attributed to Croatians.171 By 1978, ASIO had 
assessed that approximately one third of Yugoslav representatives in Australia 
were in some way connected to Yugoslav intelligence, and had appeared to have 
even prevented the assassination of a Croatian.172  
 Suspicion centred on Vico Virkez, who had originally turned himself in to the 
Lithgow Police and ‘confessed’ about the bomb conspiracy. ASIO had long 
suspected Virkez of being an intelligence official working with the Yugoslav 
Consulate in Sydney. In fact, just mere hours before he walked into Lithgow 
Police Station on the 08 February, ASIO had intercepted a phone call from Virkez 
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to the Sydney Consulate about the very same allegations he was to make to the 
Lithgow Police.173 Public suspicions were first raised when Virkez only received a 
sentence of 26 months, compared to the 15 years of the ‘Croatian Six’. Even more 
suspicious was the fact that after 10 months of his sentence, Virkez was released, 
and upon his release he returned to Yugoslavia. However, it would not be until 
1989, when The Australian published a series of articles Barry Lowe, that Virkez’s 
true identity, and the involvement of notorious Yugoslav agent Vinko Sindicic 
would be revealed. It was also uncovered that high-ranking public servants in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Prime Minister and the 
Department of Defence were informants, possibly agents, for the Yugoslav secret 
service.174 In 1991, Four Corners journalist Chris Masters not only interviewed the 
Croatian Six, who detailed their experiences of police corruption, missing 
evidence, and forced confessions, but also tracked down Virkez in Yugoslavia, 
who admitted that he was in fact an agent provocateur that had framed them.175  
 Though the Croatian Six were released when it became clear that Virkez had 
fabricated his confession, applications for a judicial review of the original 
convictions have consistently been dismissed. The most recent call for a judicial 
review occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2012 reinvestigation of the case by 
Fairfax journalist Hamish McDonald. The release of his e-book Framed, and 
accompanying articles in the Sydney Morning Herald gave long-awaited credence 
to what many had been alleging since the first arrests in 1979 – that these men 
were the victims of a gross miscarriage of justice at the hands of the corrupt NSW 
policemen, framed by the Yugoslav intelligence hell-bent on discrediting 
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Croatian activism in Australia, and ultimately betrayed by every Australian 
Government since.176 
 It is now known that the case of the Croatian Six was a deliberate attempt by 
Yugoslav intelligence to portray Croatians as extremists and terrorists, and some 
suggest that perhaps the Eden arrests were as well.177 This indicates that 
Croatians, through the NCCRC, multiculturalism, and the ‘Embassy’ had 
succeeded in re-branding Croatian activism sufficiently enough in Australia to 
warrant Yugoslav interference. The Yugoslavs failed on this account, at least 
partly, because Croatian activism was no longer as tied to extremism and violence 
as it was perceived to be at the start of the decade, evidenced by the 
comparatively muted response from Australia’s politicians and media. This 
response may also be a simple reflection of the fact that both the Eden and 
Croatian Six arrests were for conspiracy to commit a crime, rather than actually 
committing one – it is difficult to manufacture outrage or media attention for 
something that did not happen. However it seems that the most likely reason can 
be found in the fact that Croatian activism was no longer as politically symbolic 
as it was at the start of the decade. Murphy’s moral panic over ‘Croats in the bush’ 
had, by the end of the decade, been superseded by the anxieties the onset of non-
European immigration had caused.  
 
4.3.2. NON-EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION 
The late 1970s saw two major intakes of non-European refugees that 
challenged Australia’s political and social environment. The end of the Vietnam 
War and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, both in 1975, led to the arrival 
of Vietnamese and Lebanese refugees whose racial, religious, and cultural 
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identities challenged the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant in ways 
Croatians simply did not. As such, these newer arrivals displaced Croatians as the 
pre-eminent migrant ‘Other’ in Australian society. The politics of their arrival and 
settlement in Australia would diminish the political currency of Croatian 
activism, as new divides between the major political parties emerged. Particularly 
with advent of Vietnamese boat arrivals in 1976-1977, the moral panic over ‘Croats 
in the Bush’ was slowly replaced with that most traditional of Australian moral 
panics – non-European immigration. Though this did not completely erase 
Croatians and their activism from the public sphere - no less because of the 
actions of the community itself in keeping itself visible – it certainly depoliticised 
its symbolism in the Australian political environment. 
Australia’s immigration policy since Federation had explicitly, and later 
implicitly, been informed by the desire to prevent non-European immigration to 
Australia. Though the Whitlam Government had formally abolished the White 
Australia Policy and introduced the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, race 
continued to cast a long shadow on the way Australians perceived themselves 
and the world around them. The sliding scales of ‘whiteness’ and ‘Britishness’ still 
exerted a significant influence in determining the figure of the Good Australian 
Migrant. Both the Lebanese and Indochinese refugees of the late 1970s challenged 
the racial, religious and cultural expectations of the Good Australian Migrant. 
Though Lebanese migration to Australia dated back to the 1880s, these waves 
predominantly consisted of Lebanese Christians who were generally considered 
to be a part of the White, European world. The intake of 1976-7, on the other 
hand, was predominantly of Lebanese Muslims, whose religious identity posited 
them further down the sliding scales informing the Good Australian Migrant. For 
the Indochinese refugees, there was no ambiguity in their non-European identity 
and non-Christian religious identity. This was further complicated by the ‘boat 
arrivals’ that became symbolic of the late 1970s - though a very small proportion 





seated anxiety and perceived vulnerability to the ‘Yellow Peril’.178 The cultural 
identities of both groups – Arab and Eastern - were also situated outside the 
Western world, making them seem more foreign and not ‘like us’ to Australian 
sensitivities.  
The Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern identities of the Lebanese and the 
Asian, predominantly Buddhist, Eastern identities of the Indochinese thus 
challenged the Good Australian Migrant in ways Croatians simply did not. 
Though Croatians did carry the baggage of Balkanism and the legacies of 
Australia’s relationship with Southern Europeans, they were still unequivocally 
European. The Catholic identity of Croatians was shared with a sizeable 
proportion of Australia’s population, and Croatians were able to enter into a well-
established Australian Catholic Church that exerted significant institutional 
power. Finally, Croatians were not only geographically part of the Western world 
(even if on the periphery), but their culture and history was steeped in Western 
tradition.  
However, like Croatians, both the Lebanese and Indochinese refugees 
challenged the expectation that migrants would be apolitical, or at least no more 
political than the general population. As is the nature of refugee migration, both 
intakes were the result of conflicts. This made Australians uneasy about the 
prospect that, like Croatians and many of the other post-WWII intakes, these too 
might continue the political struggles of the homeland once settled in Australia. 
This fear was particularly pronounced in the case of the Indochinese refugees, 
whose potential liberation activism could cause problems of ‘legal control, 
diplomatic headaches with the new government in Vietnam, and a backlash 
among Australians,’179 not least because Whitlam had established diplomatic 
relations with North Vietnam in February 1973. Their anti-communism was 
another point of contention, at least for the ALP. Influential members within the 
party believed that Indochinese migration had the potential to distort the 
political balance of Australian domestic politics in the same way European anti-
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communist refugees did after WWII that was in part responsible for keeping the 
ALP out of office for 23 years.180 Finally, Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam 
War had caused deep divisions within Australia, and the issue of Indochinese 
refugees revived these divisions. 
In spite of these racial and political fears, in 1979 the Fraser Government 
established the Orderly Departure Program, negotiated with Vietnam in attempt 
to control and manage the refugee flow. Though these refugees were the Fraser 
Government’s greatest challenge at the time, its management of the crisis and 
implementation of the program also became its most distinguished legacy. 
Reminiscent of the assisted migration programs that had characterised the 1950-
60s, this program institutionalised Asian immigration to Australia for the very 
first time, and heralded the end of immigration as a predominantly European 
affair. By the end of 1982, almost 70,000 Indochinese refugees had settled in the 
country, and by the late 1980s, Asia had become the main source of immigrants 
to Australia, displacing both the United Kingdom and Europe.181 
 Non-European immigrants, therefore, slowly displaced Croatians as the pre-
eminent migrant ‘Other’ and diminished the political symbolism that had 
previously imbued Croatian activism. Backlash against Fraser’s immigration 
policy was already beginning to grow before the decade closed, particularly 
against immigration from Southeast Asia. As Crowley summarises, some of this 
backlash was racially inspired and some of it was political. However, some was 
also the expression of a genuine concern - the social and economic consequences 
of a high level of Asian immigration at a time of high unemployment.182 These 
anxieties would coalesce in the 1980s and come to ask serious questions of 
multiculturalism in general – the answers of which would once again influence 
responses towards Croatian activism.  
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CHAPTER 5:  



















To the working class, to the working people and citizens, to the 
people and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia – Comrade Tito is dead...1 
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia &  
The Presidency of the SFRY, 4 May 1980 
 






With these words delivered on a lazy spring Sunday afternoon, Yugoslavia 
learned of the death of its charismatic and enigmatic leader. Though his death 
was anticipated due to his age and ailing health, the outpouring of grief in 
Yugoslavia was considerable, and many can still remember where they were when 
they heard Tito had died. As citizens lined the tracks to watch Tito’s iconic Blue 
Train make its way from Ljubljana to Belgrade for the final time, leaders from 
around the world paid their tributes. Tito’s funeral, held four days later, is still 
considered to be one of the largest state funerals ever held, with delegates from 
all over the world paying their respects to the pioneer of the ‘Third Way’. It was 
the end of an era spanning 35 years, and as much as time stood still out of grief, it 
did too out of fear, for Tito had left behind ‘a system in a state of paralysis, unable 
to cure itself.’2  
Despite careful preparations for life after Tito, ‘what legitimacy the state had 
enjoyed disappeared with Tito.’3 Such was the political currency of Tito that 
following his death, the collective leadership that succeeded him operated under 
the slogan ‘After Tito – Tito!’ However, this leadership only exacerbated 
Yugoslavia’s pre-existing problems, inequalities, and resentments, with its 
rotating Presidency, changing political and economic structures, and an 
increasingly complicated decision-making process requiring consensus between 
parties that had less and less in common. As the central party began to lose its 
elder statesmen, and without any real successor or unifying figure to fill Tito’s 
void, the political quagmire Tito had spent his lifetime averting slowly unravelled 
the Yugoslav state.4   
However, not everyone met the news of Tito’s death with sorrow. For some 
Croatians, especially those in the diaspora, Tito’s death was the first moment of 
                                                 
1 As cited in Tanner, Croatia, 203. 
2 Goldstein, Croatia: A History, 188. 
3 Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 247. 
4 For detailed information on the political crisis following Tito’s death, see: 
Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 329–40. 
Tanner, Croatia, 203–20. 






hope for Croatian independence since the purges of the Croatian Spring a decade 
earlier. Spontaneous jubilations broke out as the news spread throughout 
Croatian clubhouses across Australia, and in Canberra, a celebratory 
demonstration was swiftly planned to coincide with the day of Tito’s funeral.5 
Though it would still take a decade for Yugoslavia to collapse, the sentiment of 
the moment - that Tito’s death signalled the death of Yugoslavia - would prove 
prescient.  
As Bongiorno writes, the ‘Eighties’ also represented a decade of hope in 
Australia, even if it began and ended in national pessimism and economic 
recession. Optimism, energy and excess fuelled this hope, while the reforms of 
Hawke-Keating government completely reconfigured the nation.6 For migrant 
communities, the implementation of the Galbally Report recommendations 
represented a decade of improved access to services, access to government grants 
and initiatives, and greater opportunities to participate in the social and cultural 
life of the nation. However, even in this spirit of hope and optimism, Croatians 
could not escape the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, and found 
themselves once again rallying against a reputation of violence – albeit this time 
in the soccer stands. The disquiet over soccer violence, however, was reflective of 
a more general anxiety about multiculturalism that would cast long and dark 
shadows over the hope of the decade, culminating in the FitzGerald Immigration 
Policy Review of 1988.  
Though this decade would come to a sombre end for Australia – replete with 
an economic recession, political scandal, anti-multiculturalism, and a crisis of 
national identity – for the Croatian community, the end of the decade would be 
one of triumph. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’s loss of 
geopolitical and strategic importance meant that Croatian political activism in 
Australia finally found the domestic and international legitimacy that had been 
denied it for four decades.  Therefore, Section 5.1 will outline the nature of post-
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Tito Croatian political activism in Australia. Though the greater part of this 
activism repeated the patterns of previous periods, Croatians also responded to 
the unique developments in Australia’s political, legal, and social environments 
in order to articulate their vision for Croatia after Tito. Changes in the political, 
legal, and social environments of Yugoslavia also influenced Croatian political 
activism in this period, as a third wave of Croatian migrants prompted some 
change in the nature of the community and its activism. Section 5.2 explores 
Australian responses to this activism. Though Croatian activism was no longer as 
politically fraught a subject, the issue of soccer violence, itself a reflection of a 
growing anxiety over multiculturalism, threatened to define the majority by a 
minority once more. Section 5.3 demonstrates that Croatian political activism 
finally gained the legitimacy denied to it for over four decades as both the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia unravelled. In Australia, the moment this legitimacy was 
entrenched can be pinpointed to one precise moment - the shooting of a 






5.1. CROATIAN ACTIVISM IN A POST-TITO 
WORLD 
By the end of the twentieth century, Croatians in Australia had finally gained a credible 
and respectable identity, having clawed back ground lost in the media-driven offensive  
of the 1960s and 1970s. How far they were the architects of this rebirth and how far  
they benefitted from changed circumstances here and in Yugoslavia has yet to  
be determined.7 
 
If the Whitlam Government ‘invented’ Australian multiculturalism, it was the 
Fraser Government that put it into practice, while the Hawke Government 
oversaw the highpoint of multicultural activity. In 1977, Fraser commissioned a 
review of migrant services and programs under the direction of Frank Galbally, 
QC.  Endorsed by Fraser in 1978 and continued by Hawke, the recommendations 
of the ‘Migrant Services and programs: The Report of the Review of Post-Arrival 
Programs and Services to Migrants’ (more commonly referred to as the Galbally 
Report) would come to define the practical implementation of multiculturalism. 
The Adult Education programme, a variety of community grants-in-aid, Migrant 
Resource Centres, the Telephone Interpreter Service, the Australian Institute for 
Multicultural Affairs, and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) were just some 
of the services and organisations established directly as a result of the Galbally 
Report. 
For Croatians, the implementation of the Galbally Report recommendations, 
coupled with Croatian language recognition in 1979, resulted in a decade of 
improved access to services, access to government grants and initiatives, and 
greater opportunities to participate in the social and cultural life of the nation. 
Though most of the activism in this period repeated the patterns of previous 
periods, Croatians did modify some of their activism in response to the changing 
environments of both Australia and Yugoslavia. Also influencing Croatian 
activism in this period was a third wave of Croatian migrants whose 
                                                 






demographics and politics differed from those of the previous waves, and who 
reinforced some of the generational changes that were occurring within the 
community. 
 
5.1.1 MULTICULTURAL EXPANSION 
Spurred by the opportunities of these new initiatives, the development of 
Croatian communities that had begun in the 1970s simply gained momentum in 
the 1980s. The financial capital of organisations that had accumulated over the 
previous periods was now reinforced by access to grants, loan schemes, and other 
initiatives, and led to a building and redevelopment ‘boom’ within the 
community. New clubhouses and facilities continued to be established, as did the 
relocation or redevelopment of older ones.8 The largest projects in the 
community come in the construction of churches. In 1983, the Croatian Catholic 
Centre in Wollongong opened, the first in Australia to be built by and for 
Croatians.  The church, hall, and priests’ residence were constructed in a record 
one year. Similar projects began in Blacktown and St Johns Park in NSW, 
Springvale in Victoria, and Hobart in Tasmania. As the physical space of the 
community expanded, so too did the number of groups and associations that 
resided within them. Folkloric groups, soccer clubs, and various cultural groups 
reflecting the diverse interests of communities multiplied, both as the number of 
second- and third-generation children increased, and as generational differences 
resulted in different needs, and sometimes even disagreement.  
Croatian activism in the post-Tito world, therefore, continued predominantly 
according to the same rhythms as before – through participation in faith, folklore 
and football, the annual 10 Travanj celebrations and November Yugoslav Day 
demonstrations, and through the protest of and petitioning against events as they 
arise. The recognition of Croatian as a separate language in 1979 allowed 
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Croatians to participate in new multicultural initiatives such as ethnic radio and 
television broadcasting, translation and interpreter services, and in producing 
government publications specific to the Croatian community. Croatian language 
recognition also led to the incorporation of the traditional Hrvatska škola into 
state education structures. Therefore from 1981, students in NSW are able to sit 
the Croatian language exam for their Higher School Certificate, and from 1983 
enrol in the Croatian language program at Macquarie University. In 1984, the 
Croatian Studies Foundation was established, and by 1994, this and the language 
program would evolve into the Croatian Studies Centre that is still in operation at 
Macquarie University. Another tradition arose from these activities – that of the 
Croatian Summer School or Ljetna škola– which from 1984 would bring together 
Croatian language students from across Australia in the summer school holidays 
for an intensive course in language, history and culture.  
From these endeavours, a new form of Croatian activism developed – that of 
youth/student activism. Though some youth and student groups had been 
established as early as the mid-seventies, it is not until the early 1980s that groups 
such as the Croatian Student associations in NSW and Victoria, the Croatian 
Catholic Youth groups of Victoria and Canberra, and the Croatian Youth groups 
of Adelaide and WA rise to prominence and begin to advocate in their own right. 
Fundraising for the Croatian language program at Macquarie University, 
organising student seminars and conferences, and participating at 
demonstrations and protests as the Croatian youth form the basis of this 
activism. In 1986, these groups combined under the auspices of the Federation of 
Croatian Students and Youth of Australia (FCSYA), who begin to co-ordinate 
activities at a national level, and who would play an important role in the 
wartime activism of the 1990s.   
In the same way Croatian activism reflected the rhetoric of anti-communism 
from 1947-1971 and the rhetoric of rights from 1972-1979, Croatian activism in this 
period reflected the rhetoric of discrimination that had been enshrined with the 






state and federal acts. In 1977, the Anti-Discrimination Act passed through NSW 
Parliament, while in 1984, an Equal Opportunity Act passed through both the SA 
and WA Parliaments. These were reinforced by the passage of the Sex 
Discrimination Act through the Federal Parliament in 1984, and the 
establishment of the Australian Human Rights Commission in 1986, which 
became responsible for monitoring and investigating infringements of federal 
anti-discrimination legislation.  
This shift to the rhetoric of discrimination was contemporaneous with 
another shift – that of a return to the rhetoric of political independence. Though 
this shift was reflective of the death of Tito and the hope this represented, it was 
also indicative of some of the success of Croatian activism on the question of 
Croatian identity in Australia. The recognition of Croatian as a separate language 
in effect recognised Croatians as not Yugoslavs. As the community could now 
access services as Croatians in their own right, they were able to freely conduct 
their business as a separate ethnic group. This shift in rhetoric was also 
reinforced by international geopolitical developments – as the political situations 
in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia became increasingly precarious throughout 
the decade, the question of Croatian independence became less far-fetched than 
it had been in previous periods. 
One of the manifestations of hope in the Post-Tito world was an attempt by 
the Croatian diaspora to foster better relations with its homeland. For the most 
part, this involved establishing communication with prominent individuals or 
groups within Croatia, and where possible organising visits to Australia.  
Sometimes, however, Australian groups also returned to Croatia, however not 
without controversy. In 1982, the folkloric group Koleda travelled to Croatia to 
participate in the International Folklore Festival of Zagreb, an event established 
in 1966 which continues to this day.9 Koleda was the most pre-eminent of 
Croatian folkloric groups in Australia, and had become the face of Croatian 
                                                 







culture and identity in Australian society through its participation at various 
multicultural festivals, exhibitions, and at the forefront of demonstrations and 
protests. When news of the tour became known, discontent and suspicion 
emerged. Some opposed the tour on the grounds that it seemed to be an official 
visit, rather than just a group of Croatians travelling to Croatia, and as such could 
only be of benefit to the Yugoslav state. Others were more direct in their scorn, 
accusing Koleda and the tour organisers of abandoning the Croatian cause and 
community in Australia.10 
Neither were matters as straightforward when Croatian groups came to 
Australia, and it seems that the hopes and aspirations of the community were not 
exactly congruent with those of the homeland. As a flyer distributed in response 
to news of the Koleda tour commented;   
All of our attempts at getting close to these sports clubs of ours from Croatia, 
have been without exaggerating, catastrophically disappointing. They did not 
want to come to our Croatian clubs, and told us that they were bothered by those 
pictures on the walls. We swallowed that, and tried to accommodate them by 
organising places where those images would not compromise them, yet the 
answer was the same: We cannot – the consul or the ambassador won’t allow us.11 
More success seems to have been found in fostering connections between 
diaspora communities, rather than with the homeland. This was particularly the 
case with Croatian priests, and also included visits from those residing in Croatia. 
The freedom of these priests to visit Croatian communities compared to the 
‘catastrophically disappointing’ sporting groups can be explained by their 
submission to and sponsorship by the Croatian Catholic Church, rather than the 
Yugoslav state; their purpose of religious ministry, rather than official 
representation of the state; and because the politics of the Croatian Catholic 
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Church was closer to that of the diaspora, particularly in their shared anti-
communism.   
 
5.1.2. THE THIRD WAVE OF POST-WAR CROATIAN EMIGRATION 
After Tito’s death, the precariousness of the collective leadership and state of 
Yugoslavia led to a resurgence in the repression of political dissent, and ‘anyone 
who expressed heterodox opinions too noisily, or was brave enough to take a 
stand against injustice in public, ran the risk of persecution.’12 Individuals were 
imprisoned once again for disseminating views deemed antagonistic to the state 
or to communism, the media was kept under intense scrutiny, student 
movements and universities were targeted, and the ‘struggle against nationalism’ 
reappeared as the principal goal of the LCC. Though the LCC still retained a 
limited monopoly over the police, army, legal system and state budget, it was 
increasingly unable to exert any real power in bringing political dissidents to 
account. This repression was gradually abandoned as state and party structures 
lost the strength and respect needed to impose their will on the people.13 
The greatest threat to the new regime, however, was not political dissent but 
economic collapse. The economy had deteriorated to near-catastrophic levels in 
the last years of Tito’s life, and it was only in late 1981 that a federal commission 
was established to examine the crisis. By this time, Yugoslavia’s external debts 
had already ballooned to approximately $US 20bn, and the new federal 
government found it could not service the debt. Yugoslavia was only kept intact 
throughout the decade because of the enduring political interest of the West in 
keeping it afloat. Though partial moratoriums were granted and international 
banking institutions continued to fund the state, Yugoslavia’s debt continued to 
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place immense pressure on the economy.  The inability to import sufficient oil 
reserves resulted in the shortage of petrol and oil derivatives in the same year of 
Tito’s death, and by 1985, inflation reached a record 70%.14  Imported 
consumables such as coffee and washing powder all but disappeared from 
Yugoslav shelves, and shopping trips ‘preko granice’ (over the border) became an 
altogether natural phenomenon. Unemployment doubled between 1984-1992, 
and those that were employed were often unpaid for months at a time. Even 
though workers began to strike more regularly, the more sinister threat of 
absenteeism and low productivity loomed large, and the newspaper Komunist 
estimated that in 1982 alone, almost 10% of Yugoslavia’s workforce was absent 
every day, while working hours averaged less than 5 hours a day.15  
The Croatian economy had its own additional difficulties. As money dried up 
across the state, so too did the public and private funding for the infrastructure 
projects Croatia’s construction industry had relied on in the economic boom of 
the 1970s. Similarly, as economies across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
contracted, so too did the once assured markets for Croatia’s metal and 
machinery construction industries, and as confidence in the Yugoslav economy 
plummeted, Croatia’s shipbuilding industry, once the third largest in the world, 
withered away.16 There were, however, two industries which provided Croatia 
with some economic reprieve. The transportation industry thrived thanks to 
Croatia’s geographic position both in relation to Europe, and to other Yugoslav 
republics,17 while tourism boomed in the 1980s, reaching the record figure of 
67,665,000 tourist nights in 1985.18 
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As debate over the roots of the economic problems grew, the political debate 
of the early 1960s resurfaced, again concentrating on the twin issues of 
conservative vs liberal economic policy and centralism vs decentralism. As before, 
those advocating for a liberal economic policy and market reform favoured 
further decentralism in order to grant each republic the ability to tailor economic 
solutions for their own conditions, while conservatives argued that this was 
precisely what had created this economic mess, and therefore the solution was to 
recentralise and reintroduce a system of social distribution to even out regional 
differences. Once again, the more developed republics were in favour of 
liberalisation and decentralisation (dubbed the ‘Slovenian model’), while 
underdeveloped republics favoured social distribution and recentralisation (the 
‘Serbian Model’).19 This dichotomy made reaching a consensus on initiatives to 
improve the economic condition of Yugoslavia even harder to reach, as any 
initiative would meet resistance from an opposing faction, and even when 
consensus was found, everything that ‘was done was wrong or came too late.’20 
 In the face of these economic and political hardships, some standards 
across Croatia saw improvement. The most significant of these was the Croatian 
‘education boom’ of the 1970s, which resulted in the increase of general literacy 
and the numbers of individuals completing higher education. This produced a 
new class of professionals in Croatia engaged with both the interior life of 
Yugoslavia and that of the world outside. Autonomy increased in many fields, 
most notably in health, science, media, and university curricula, and the principle 
of ‘moral and political correctness,’ that is, alignment with Yugoslav Party 
principles, was replaced with criterions of professionalism. Life expectancy 
increased while infant mortality decreased, and the rapid urbanisation of the 
1960s and 1970s meant that a larger proportion of Croatians were living in cities 
and large towns.21  
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Despite efforts by the collective leadership to minimise the burgeoning 
economic and political crisis, ‘a literate, urbanized population could hardly be 
kept in the dark about the growing crisis around them, especially as so many 
people had extensive contacts abroad.’22 Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, where those 
emigrating were mostly labourers and craftsmen of the working class, Croatian 
migration in the 1980s was mostly made up of professionals and academics who 
found they could not fulfil their social and professional aspirations within the 
Yugoslav context. They migrated to the West in search of a higher standard of 
living and opportunities for career progression. The Yugoslav ‘brain drain’ of the 
1980s resulted in the migration of Croatians who were educated, upwardly 
mobile, and usually with some working knowledge of the English language.  
However, unlike their predecessors, these migrants felt they ‘fitted better into 
the Australian way of life than in their native environment’ where the ‘climate of 
irrationality’ inadequately valued their skills.23 Feeling out of place in Croatia, 
these Croatian migrants also felt out of place in the Croatian communities they 
found in Australia. The principal reason for this, Colic-Peisker explains, is that 
this wave of Croatian migrants  
[perceived] the traditional ethno-national ‘ethnic community’ dominated by 
migrants from the previous working class wave as a straight jacket for their 
middle-class ‘cosmopolitan’ outlook and aspirations.24  
Whereas the two waves of migrants before them were made up of working-class 
migrants whose main axis of identification was their ascribed ethnicity, this new 
wave of Croatian migrants predominantly identified themselves according to 
their achieved professional status. Furthermore, while the previous waves tended 
to be more community-oriented, identified as Catholic, and tied to territorially 
defined communities, this new wave was more individualistic and secular in 
outlook, their professional identities resulting in a non-territorial and portable 
identity that was not as threatened or displaced through the process of 
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migration.25 Therefore, they instead looked to English-speaking and non-
Croatian community structures to fulfil their identity needs and provide 
opportunities for socialisation.  
Nonetheless, some of these migrants did join various Croatian community 
groups, and form in part an explanation for the perceptible reorientation of 
Croatian activism in the 1980s towards more intellectual pursuits and refined 
methods of activism. Thus, the organisation of public seminars, lectures, and 
conferences became more common throughout the 1980s, as did lecture tours by 
prominent academics, such as Professor Mirko Vidović in June 1983 and Professor 
Michael McAdams in May 1985. This was reinforced by the rise of an Australian-
born generation to positions of leadership, who were both relatively well-
educated and had grown up within Australian social and political paradigms, but 
whose only knowledge of the homeland was that found in the memories of their 
parents or in the textbooks of their classes. The establishment of Croatian studies 
at Macquarie Univeristy provided institutional support and gravitas to these 
pursuits, which culminated in the 1988 international conference/symposium 
titled ‘Croatia and Croatians in 20th Century: Perceptions and Reality,’ coinciding 
with Australia’s Bicentennial celebrations. Over 30 highly regarded academics, 
writers, and intellectuals from all over the world participated in the conference, 
including four from Croatia itself - Stjepan Šešelj, Pero Budak, Ante Starčević, and 
Vlado Gotovac. As Škvorc writes,  
It was the first time the relationship with homeland intellectuals was 
rehabilitated, and the first public appearance of figures from the so-called 
‘extremist emigration’ with intellectuals from Croatia.26   
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5.2. AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES 
I do not suppose that Mr Grassby or any other senior proponents of multiculturalism were in the 
stadium on this, the eve of Australia Day, but if they had been I think that they would have been 
interested in the degree of partisanship which the large (circa 7,000) crowd exhibited on behalf of 
the Yugoslavian visitors. Australia’s three goals and feats were greeted with a gloomy silence but 
Zagreb’s goals and feats were greeted with rapture. A visiting Martian would have supposed that the 
Australians were the visitors from foreign parts.27 
 
The 1980s saw two Yugoslav-born individuals in Federal Parliament for the 
first time – Liberal Senator Milivoj ‘Misha’ Lajovic was elected in 1975, while 
Lewis ‘Bata’ Kent became the ALP member for Hotham in 1980. Though both 
men periodically drew on their personal lives to politically position themselves 
within wider debates, Croatian activism as a subject of debate was relatively 
absent, particularly when compared to previous periods. Indeed, that there was 
no Ministerial Statement about Croatians to begin this chapter indicates the 
extent of the change in Australia’s responses towards Croatian political activism. 
Ustashism, however, returned to parliamentary debate as the issue of potential 
WWII criminals in Australia, and their alleged ties to the Liberal Party, was 
revived. This was first raised by the case of Lyenko Urbanchich in 1979, and 
resulted in a decade-long debate that culminated in the War Crimes Amendment 
Act 1988. However, these debates for the most part avoided the 1970s trope that 
Ustashism was synonymous with Croatian activism, seeming to take objections 
with individuals rather than communities, and Croatians were somewhat spared 
by the fact that the main targets of this debate in parliament, Urbanchich and at 
times Lajovic, were Slovenian and not Croatian.  
Just as Asian immigration displaced Croatians as the pre-eminent migrant 
‘Other’, so too was the Labor-Liberal paradigm that had made Croatian activism 
politically symbolic displaced by the symbolism of economic reform. Croatians 
were even displaced as the face of terrorism in Australia, as threats from different 
groups came to dominate the agenda. Nevertheless, Croatians were not able to 
                                                 






completely escape the reputation for violence that had been ascribed to it, and as 
the issue of soccer violence became a proxy battle for the increasing anxiety over 
multiculturalism, once again found themselves in opposition to the expectations 
of the Good Australian Migrant.   
 
5.2.1. DISRUPTIONS AND DIVERSIONS 
As discussed in Section 4.3., the onset of Asian immigration in the late 1970s 
challenged the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant in ways Croatian 
immigration had not. These refugees, most commonly identified as Vietnamese 
though also including ethnic Chinese and intakes from Cambodia and Laos, 
slowly displaced Croatians as the pre-eminent migrant ‘Other.’ Though their 
patterns of settlement did not differ much from those of other migrants, they 
became highly visible communities. In the 1980s, this was exacerbated by the 
settlement issues these refugees experienced, mainly due to the troubled 
economic environment of Australia, their low English language proficiency, and 
government inattention to the unique psychological aspects of the refugee 
experience, such as trauma and family separation.28 
The political symbolism of refugee settlement, therefore, displaced that 
which had previously imbued Croatian activism. At the same time, the 
problematic aspects of Croatian activism were no longer potent. The rhetoric of 
ethnicity and identity with which Croatians had rebranded their activism was not 
only mainstreamed, but exalted as an intrinsically Australian quality. The 
promotion of ethnicity over nationality allowed Croatians to sidestep the political 
issues their Yugoslav citizenship raised. The activities of faith, football, and 
folklore not only sat more comfortably within the expectations of the Good 
Australian Migrant, but were now celebrated, and even demanded, as cultural 
contributions to the nation. Though this activism still represented the political to 
                                                 






Croatians themselves, Australians perceived them as simply an expression of 
cultural identity. 
The perceived threat of Croatian extremism had also diminished throughout 
the 1980s, as groups such as the Ananda Marga, Armenians, and Palestinians 
displaced Croatians as the face of terrorism in Australia. By 1983, ASIO had 
downgraded the threat of Croatian violence to low due to a perceived ‘cooling of 
passions.’29 The Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing in 1978, the assassination of the 
Turkish Consul-General and his bodyguard in Sydney in 1980, the Sydney Israeli 
Consulate and Hakoah Football Club bombings of 1982, and the 1986 Melbourne 
Turkish Consulate bombing occupied the bulk of Australia’s legal, political, and 
media attention. The 1980s also saw the rise of domestic terrorism in the form of 
Jack van Tongeren and his neo-Nazi group the Australian Nationalist Movement 
in Western Australia, and National Action on the east coast. These groups 
pursued a right-wing, anti-multiculturalist agenda which used violence, 
intimidation, and bombings to terrorise those it saw believed threatening to their 
vision of Australia. This particularly targeted Asian communities, restaurants and 
businesses.30 Furthermore, these incidents seemed comparatively more violent 
and extreme than those that had been ascribed to Croatians. Though this 
perception was `informed by the same racial anxieties that had followed the 
introduction of non-European immigration, the fact remains that despite the 
frequency of alleged Croatian attacks throughout the 1960s and 1970s, none 
resulted in a fatality, and in most cases the only damage sustained was to 
property.  
The change in positioning and posturing of Australian political parties, 
however, seemed to be the most important factor in the depoliticisation of 
Croatian activism. As Kelly writes, the 1980s saw the erosion of the Labor-Liberal 
paradigm of politics, where intra-party, rather than inter-party, ideological 
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battles dominated.31 Though there was general agreement that only serious 
reform could address the economic problems plaguing Australia since the 1970s, 
the question of how this reform would and should be achieved featured as much 
in debates within the parties as between them. The symbolic economy of politics 
in the 1980s therefore, centred on economic issues and how best to achieve the 
reform needed to combat recession, even if this still included aspects of the social 
and the political. This was confirmed by the triumph of Hawke’s rhetoric of 
ending the ‘politics of division’ at the 1983 election. 
Hawke and his Treasurer Paul Keating quickly instituted a program of 
economic reform that would transform both the Australian economy and society. 
Though the greatest and boldest legacy of the Government’s reform agenda was 
the decision to float the dollar and deregulate the financial system, these were 
decisions that were replicated across most Western countries in this period. 
What was distinctive about the Hawke government’s approach, Bongiorno 
argues, was that  
It sought to combine a shift towards market with a commitment to social 
spending to reduce poverty, a basic level of government support for all, and a 
continuing role for unions in the workplace.32 
In this environment of reform and rapid change, however, the question of 
national identity was inevitable, and one that would come to define the period. 
 
5.2.2. RISE OF ANTI-MULTICULTURALISM 
The political strength of multiculturalism in the 1970s lay in its appeal to the 
growing number of electorates with sizeable immigrant minorities, and to those 
of the ‘New Middle Class’- the suburban white-collar workforce that had emerged 
from the affluence of the 1960s who identified with the political activism of the 
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left. However the appeal of multiculturalism was far from universal. As Jupp 
explains, 
By appearing to deny Australia’s British inheritance, [multiculturalism] alienated 
conservative elements in the Liberal Party. By encouraging cultural diversity, it 
annoyed those who had spent several generations building an Australian culture 
which, vague though its outlines were, was favoured well beyond conservative 
partisans.33 
Multiculturalism therefore only really appealed to a limited number of 
electorates, most of which were already Labor-controlled. It had almost no 
impact on rural and provincial districts, especially in conservative Queensland 
controlled by the National Party.  Therefore, according to Jupp, the bipartisan 
consensus that developed in the 1970-80s was never as entrenched within the 
electorate as it seemed in public rhetoric.  
By the end of the decade this dissonance would resurface in critiques of 
multiculturalism and immigration policy.34 Early critiques of multiculturalism 
were mostly found in the work of academics, and came from both the political 
left and right. Leftist critiques argued that multiculturalism only valued the 
superficial aspects of cultural identity – faith, folklore and football – while doing 
very little to address the social inequality inherent in the migrant experience.35 
However it was the criticism from the political right which have the most 
influence on public debate, particularly when it became entangled in criticism of 
Asian immigration.36  
Early academic critiques from the right included the work of philosophers 
Lauchlan Chipman and Frank Knopfelmacher, historian Geoffrey Partington 
sociologist Tanya Birrell, and political scientist Raymond Sestito. The basic 
arguments of these early critiques were that multiculturalism was a divisive force 
in Australian society which in turn encouraged separatism; that it denied a 
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distinct Australian heritage based on British origins; that it was simply a response 
to the ethnic vote or pressure from the ethnic lobby; or that it was ill-defined and 
an intellectual mess.37 However, the Fraser Government’s support of 
multiculturalism, with the bipartisanship of the Opposition, limited the reach of 
these critiques from the right, somewhat muting them in the public sphere. It 
was not until the defeat of Fraser in 1983 that these arguments against 
multiculturalism started to gain wider traction, finding a prominent outlet in 
Quadrant, which increasingly published academic critiques alongside more 
populist beliefs as the decade progressed. 
Most historians situate the catalyst of the rise in anti-multiculturalism in 
Geoffrey Blainey’s Rotary Club speech at Warrnambool on 17 March 1984. This 
speech was followed by a year of subsequent attempts to justify and elaborate his 
argument, and culminated in the publication of his book All for Australia at the 
end of the same year. Blainey argued that Australia’s current immigration policy 
lent preference to Asian immigration, whose intake was far outstripping the pace 
of public opinion and the successful economic, social, and cultural integration of 
migrants into Australian society. This consequently ‘tested’ the racial tolerance of 
Australians and strained community relations, as evidenced by escalating 
tensions and social discord that was not characteristic of European immigration 
during the post-war period. Thus, Blainey called for a reconsideration of the 
current immigration policy, which he referred to as a product of collusion 
between left-wing historians, welfare workers, the ethnic lobby, government 
bureaucrats, and politicians, whose support for high levels of Asian immigration 
were motivated by personal agendas that paid little regard to the needs and 
interests of the general population.  
The ‘Blainey debate’, as it came to be called, touched on a national nerve. As 
Bongiorno describes, 
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the editors of newspaper correspondence columns almost disappeared under the 
avalanche of letters from readers on the issue, covering almost every conceivable 
angle. 
Though some media commentators and conservative politicians praised Blainey, 
particularly in the initial stages of the debate, criticism of his views were swift, 
and predominantly came from fellow historians. In the same way Tito’s death 
came to represent the beginning of a long and slow unravelling for Yugoslavia, so 
too did the Blainey debate for bipartisan consensus in multicultural policy.38 As 
the bicentenary year drew nearer, reconciling Australia’s colonial history with its 
indigenous past, and navigating the place of Australia’s migrants within this 
proved controversial. Debates about Australia’s national identity asked questions 
about who we were, who we presently are, and who we wanted to be. Within this 
ideological climate, the assumed success of multiculturalism was increasingly 
questioned, particularly when faced with the practical issues of Asian 
immigration and settlement, the increasingly strained relationship with 
indigenous communities, and an increase of internationally-inspired terrorism. 
 
5.2.3. “THOSE BLOODY CROATIANS…” 
In January 1981, Croatian soccer club Dinamo Zagreb arrived for a tour of 
Australia. They were to play a series of friendlies with the NSW, South Australian 
and Victorian state representative sides, but the main attraction was to be their 
game against the Australian side as a special Australia Day weekend feature in 
Canberra. The tour attracted significant attention as Dinamo was considered to 
be amongst the strongest teams in Europe, the current cup-holder of the 
Yugoslav national league, and had thrashed the Australian side 4-0 at an 
international friendly in Zagreb just two months prior. The first game against 
NSW on 23 January passed without incident (and with a 2-1 upset win for the 
NSW side), with the 13,000-strong crowd was described as enthusiastic and 
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mostly ‘in the colours of Croatia.’39 The big game in Canberra two days later, 
however, was marred by controversy.  
Before the match began, a spectator had torn down the Yugoslav flag, while 
another had attempted to erect a Croatian flag. As police attempted to arrest the 
two men, the predominantly Croatian crowd yelled and whistled. The Dinamo 
side were outraged that the Yugoslav flag had been taken down, especially 
because the Australian flag was still up, and refused to take the field. After 25 
minutes of delay, a compromise was reached between officials that no flags would 
be flown, and all ceremony, except for the exchange of banners between players, 
would be abandoned. This, however, was not communicated to the organisers in 
the players tunnel, and three young Croatian women, ball boys, and a Croatia-
Deakin cheer squad led the teams onto the field, before an official 
unceremoniously and embarrassingly ordered them to leave. The game ended in 
a 3-3 draw, and a less than impressed Yugoslav delegation.40  
Though the next two games in Adelaide and Melbourne also passed without 
incident, the game in Canberra was a symbolic start to a decade where the 
perceived problem of soccer violence, and its relationship to Croatian activism, 
would be played out on the national stage. Though violence both on and off the 
field was not a new phenomenon to soccer, debates about immigration and 
multiculturalism in the 1980s nurtured the notion that the cause of soccer 
violence was the ethnic affiliations of the clubs themselves. Within this debate a 
difference arose between those activities that understood as expressions of 
culture (‘national’), and those understood as ‘nationalistic’,  
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Activities such as folk dancing, which seems to have become the symbolic 
cornerstone of multiculturalism, are depicted as ‘national’ rather than 
nationalistic and are, therefore, acceptable within the cultural mainstream. 
Conversely, displays of political allegiance to a former homeland are regarded as 
nationalistic rather than ‘national’ and do not achieve such acceptance.41 
This connection between the political and ethnic allegiances of teams with soccer 
violence was also reinforced by soccer officials and sporting bodies, eager to 
distance soccer violence from the sport of soccer itself.42 Soccer and soccer 
violence therefore became politically symbolic and a proxy battle for the wider 
debate over multiculturalism and national identity. 
This is not surprising, given that a degree of ambivalence had consistently 
been directed at soccer since the 1950s, not least because ‘the most 
distinguishable feature of the game has been its migrant presence.’43 Added to 
this was a resistance to the sport itself from other codes, who were increasingly 
wary of the growing popularity of soccer.44 In the same way soccer violence acted 
as a proxy of the multiculturalism debate in the 1980s, it started as a proxy of the 
assimilation debates of the 1950s, where 
Ignorance and prejudice easily mixed together as attitudes to migrants and 
attitudes to soccer shaded into each other. Incidents of violence particularly 
became a handy excuse for metaphorically bashing the game and its advocates.45 
Despite the significant involvement of British migrants, the game became so 
emblematic of post-war migrant communities it earned the disparaging title of 
‘wogball’, or as the game of ‘Sheilas, Wogs and Poofters’, as described by Johnny 
Warren, a former Australian Captain, in his eponymous biography.46  
                                                 
41 J. Hughson, ‘Football, Folk Dancing and Fascism: Diversity and Difference in Multicultural Australia’, 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 33(2), 1997, 173. 
42 ibid, 174 
43 P. Mosely, ‘Balkan Politics in Australian Soccer,’ in J. O’Hara (ed.), Ethnicity and Soccer in Australia 
(Campbelltown: Australian Society for Sports History, 1994), 33. 
44 ibid., 59–63. 
45 P. Mosely, Ethnic Involvement in Australian Soccer: A History 1950-1990 (Belconnen, A.C.T.: National 
Sports Research Centre, 1995), 61. 
46 J. Warren, Sheilas, Wogs & Poofters: An Incomplete Biography of Johnny Warren and Soccer in 






‘Jugoslavs’ became a focus of soccer violence as early as 1952, even if initial 
reports focused on the violence between Yugoslavs and everyone else.47 As 
Australians were made aware of the divisions between the Yugoslav communities, 
predominantly because of the activism of Croatians, this focus shifted to the 
violence between Croatian, Serb, and Yugoslav teams. Mosely argues that it was 
not so much the degree of violence that made the Yugoslav community stand 
out, but the frequency and level of nationalism displayed, 
Rival supporters sought to goad and provoke each other with flags, chants, 
insulting songs and verbal abuse. Of course the same could be said for any match 
with any supporters but the difference was the nationalist fervour that went with 
it, a fervour spiced by recent wartime experience. It can be argued that only sticks 
and stones break bones, but the sort of taunts used by Croats, Serbs and 
Yugoslavs against each other did, metaphorically, cut and bleed people.48 
The 1980s were by no means the highpoint of Croatian soccer violence,49 however 
the promotion of Croatian teams to state and national leagues made any violence 
that did occur more pronounced. This was reiterated by the rise of European 
soccer hooliganism, particularly in the United Kingdom, which was at its height 
in 1986, and of which ‘a strong copy-cat element appeared to exist among 
adolescent Croatians.’50 
Hay, however, points out that although we know there was soccer violence 
from 1950-1990, there has been no empirical study of evidence with which to 
verify, measure or compare its extent. Instead, 
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The focus on violence associated with soccer, while it did have an evidential base, 
was shaped by the cultural attitudes of the early 1950s and much of what followed 
has to be seen as the fitting of subsequent events into a predetermined pattern. It 
is far too simplistic to account for the violence related to soccer in terms of the 
politics of war-time and post-war Europe or the characteristics of migrants, 
without taking account of the peculiar features of the host society and its 
interpreters.51 
Other causes for violence, he argues, can be found in poor umpiring, 
overcrowding and unsuitable facilities, and a lack of crowd control. The 
reporting, and subsequent historical understanding, of soccer violence as 
politically or ethnically motivated, obscured other reasons for conflict, such as 
the difference between the physical style of British soccer and the more skilled 
European version, or even the mundane politics within clubs about which player 
starts and which player is benched, who should or should not be the coach, and 
various other personal conflicts.52 
Hay also argues that the conflict between Yugoslav teams has also been over-
stated, and is not necessarily supported by empirical evidence; 
Despite tension, most matches passed off peacefully at times when there were 
serious incidents taking place away from the game in Australia and 
Jugoslavia[sic], particularly in 1972. Indeed it could be argued that the soccer 
clubs were not so much the focus of violence, but rather oases where non-violent 
exchanges between opposed political groups were possible.53 
Therefore, the hyper-attention paid towards Croatian teams in the 1980s was 
more a result of the historical example that had been made of Yugoslavs in 
general within the issue of soccer violence, and the reputation of political 
violence the Whitlam government had branded the community with.  
Attempts to remove the nationalist elements from soccer first started in 
1960.54 By 1989, calls to ‘Australianise’ soccer were being made more forcefully,55 
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and the de-ethnicisation’ of the sport would define the 1990s.56 Though violence 
associated with Croatian teams would worsen, rather than improve in the next 
decade, this violence would be framed as a minority or youth issue, rather than 
one endemic to Croatians or their political activism.57 Part of the reason for this 
shift would come from the changes of the geo-political world in the late 1980s 
which would legitimise Croatian activism and precipitate the collapse of 
Yugoslavia.  
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5.3. THE TIDE TURNS 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the communist ‘alliance’ in Central and Eastern 
Europe was the necessary precondition for people to begin to imagine a world without 
Yugoslavia. It became more and more difficult to ignore the internal voices that demanded 
political freedom and equality. It was no longer possible to continue to label all 
oppositionists national extremists.58 
 
Despite the economic and political crises which beset Yugoslavia after the 
death of Tito, it would take almost a decade for the state to unravel. Though not 
the complete reason, the continued support Yugoslavia received from the West, 
and particularly from America helped Yugoslavia remain a viable state 
throughout the 1980s. In 1983 and 1984, an American-led group called the 
‘Friends of Yugoslavia’ negotiated significant debt relief for the country, avoiding 
near-certain economic collapse, while in 1984, the Reagan administration 
confirmed its position that ‘an independent, economically viable, stable and 
militarily capable Yugoslavia serves Western and U.S. interests.’ For America, a 
unified Yugoslav state continued to represent a bulwark against Soviet 
expansionism, and Yugoslav-American relations a reminder to Eastern Europe of 
the advantages of friendly relations with the West.59  
By the late 1980s, however, Yugoslavia had lost its viability. As Drapac 
explains,  
This was not because Tito had squandered a golden opportunity, but because the 
state had no obvious or admirable reason to exist… When Yugoslavia would no 
longer seem a necessity in the global context, and once powerful outsiders had 
less interest in its territorial integrity, then the will of the internal actors who 
wanted change prevailed.60 
The 1985 election of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and his introduction 
of the Glasnost and Perestroika policies had resulted in a number of nationalist 
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movements across the Soviet Union, prompting a movement away from the 
centralist communist model toward free elections and market economies. As the 
Soviet Union moved closer towards dissolution, the geostrategic importance of 
Yugoslavia to the West waned. Without the prospect of Soviet annexation, 
Yugoslav disintegration was no longer a threat. The eventual collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the fall of the 
Soviet Union itself eroded any interest the West may have had in supporting a 
Yugoslav state. However as Lampe states, ‘these dramatic events cost Yugoslavia 
more than its strategic importance to the West. They also eliminated the 
legitimacy of one-party rule across Eastern Europe.’61 The economic, political and 
national issues that had been brewing in Yugoslavia since the 1970s were able to 
come to the fore and determine the future of Yugoslavia’s republics, and Croatian 
political activism finally found legitimacy.  
For Croatian activism in Australia, these changes in the international political 
environment were reinforced by the Hawke Government’s commitment to its 
alliance with the United States, and as American interest in Yugoslavia waned, so 
too did Australian interest. Furthermore, unlike the previous ALP Prime Minister 
Whitlam, Yugoslavia did not factor into the foreign policy objectives of the 
Hawke Government, which was more concerned with regional engagement, and 
focused on its role as a ‘good citizen’ in the Asian-Pacific context.62 However, it 
would take one Croatian teenager to sour diplomatic relations between the two 
countries and turn the tide for Croatian activism in Australia. 
 
5.3.1. TOKIĆ SHOOTING 
On 27 November 1988, approximately 1500 Croatians gathered at the 
Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney for their annual ‘Yugoslav Day’ demonstration. 
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Only a handful of police separating them from the Consulate, speakers addressed 
the crowd through microphones, outlining the plight of occupied Croatia. Details 
of what ensued next are not clear, but it seems as though the crowd had become 
rowdy, and the heavily outnumbered police struggled to maintain control. 
Meanwhile, a handful of youths had allegedly entered consulate grounds to tear 
down a Yugoslav flag. Noticing the youths, the crowd surged forward, and a few 
more jumped the fence. Meanwhile, a Yugoslav security guard for reasons 
unknown, fired his gun at the crowd through the gate, hitting 16-year old Josip 
Tokić in the neck.63  
Naturally, the Croatian community was outraged, and demanded nothing 
less than the immediate closure of all Yugoslav missions and expulsion of 
Yugoslav officials. Though gravely concerned, the Australian Government initially 
demanded only that the security guard - alleged Matijas Zoran - present himself 
to police for questioning, that his gun be made available for examination, and 
that the Yugoslav Ambassador, Boris Cizelj, would assure that Zoran would not 
attempt to leave Australia before the matter had been resolved. Cizelj agreed to 
these requests, and by 29 November, the police believed they had enough 
evidence to charge Zoran. However, diplomatic conventions meant that while he 
remained at the consulate they were unable to arrest him without the permission 
of Cizelj.64  
As the Australian government waited for Cizelj to respond to their requests, 
Croatians held meetings, demonstrations, and vigils out of protest, while 
Australians were left questioning the diplomatic implications of the situation, 
and how it had been able to occur in the first place. The diplomatic impasse 
slowly escalated, and on 30 November, both Hawke and his Foreign Affairs 
minister Gareth Evans warned that the Yugoslavs could face expulsions or closure 
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if they continued to hold out on the arrest. On 1 December, Cizelj received formal 
warning that if Yugoslav authorities did not hand over Zoran within 24 hours, the 
consulate would be closed and staff ordered to leave.65  
At 6pm on Friday 2 December, the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney 
was closed, and all 21 people connected to the consulate ordered to leave the 
country by 6pm Monday– the first time any Government had closed a diplomatic 
mission in Australia.66 On 6 December, Belgrade retaliated with the expulsion of 
three Australian diplomats. Though Evans ruled out the possibility of any further 
action against Yugoslav representatives or a complete severance of diplomatic 
relations, the relationship between the two countries had soured significantly.67 
Before reconciliations could be made, Yugoslavia would begin to unravel, and on 
16 January 1992, Australia would become the first country outside of Europe to 
recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.  
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5.4. EPILOGUE  
On 17 June 1989, the Croatian Democratic Union – Hrvatska Demokratska 
zajednica (HDZ) was formed in Zagreb, electing Franjo Tuđman as its president. 
Though it was not yet an official organisation, its policy of incorporating émigré 
Croatians into their political program, meant that almost immediately after its 
establishment, representatives travelled to diaspora communities around the 
world to establish branches and gather support. More practically, however, these 
travels through the diaspora resulted in substantially large financial contributions 
to the party. In late August, prominent Osijek lawyer and Croatian dissident 
Vladimir Šeks came to Australia, establishing official HDZ branches in Sydney, 
and Melbourne. With this act, the post-war political activism of the Croatian 
community in Australia was reconnected with its homeland, four decades after its 
expulsion by Tito. From this moment, Croatian political activism entered an 
entirely new period that would see Croatia declare independence, fight an 
incredibly violent war to do so, rebuild the country from its war-torn pieces, and 
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On 18 July 2016, the ABC’s panel discussion program Q&A hosted a Senator 
from each of the parties newly elected in the wake of Australia’s 2016 election. 
This included Pauline Hanson, whose successful relaunch of her One Nation 
party resulted in four Senate seats. Just four days earlier, a radicalised Tunisian-
Muslim man had deliberately driven a truck into crowds celebrating Bastille Day 
in Nice, resulting in 86 deaths and injuring a further 434 people. Naturally, 
conversation turned to this latest in a string of Islamic State-inspired terror 
attacks, and in defending her anti-Islamic rhetoric, Hanson declared that 
We have terrorism on the streets that we’ve never had before. We’ve had murders 
committed under the name of Islam, as we have the Lindt café, Curtis Cheng and 
the two police officers in Melbourne, right? So this has happened. You have 
radicalisation…2  
Before she could continue, host Tony Jones interjected to clarify her assertion 
that Australia had never experienced terrorism. He explained that: 
When you say we never had terrorism in this country before, that’s simply not 
the case. In the 1970s there were multiple bombings by Croatian Catholic 
extremists. This has happen in Australia before. It’s not the first time. We should 
at least get that straight.3 
Members of the Croatian community were outraged at Jones’ assertion, with one 
even starting an online petition demanding Jones apologise that attracted over 
4000 signatures.4 On 20 July, the front cover of Croatian newspaper Za Dom 
Spremni carried the headline of ‘You have lied – Apology needed!’ and labelled 
Jones the ‘biggest enemy of Croatian Community in Australia.’5 
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Interestingly, in defending his claim, Jones and the ABC both cited the 
documents tabled by Murphy during his Ministerial Statement on 27 March 1973 
as the evidence for their claims.6 Though Jones never did apologise for his 
statements, this incident demonstrates that the issue of post-war Croatian 
activism still reverberates in the present. Not only are responses still informed by 
misunderstandings, falsehoods, and the selections, simplifications, and silences 
in Murphy’s Ministerial Statement, but post-war Croatian activism is still 
deployed as a political football whenever it seems fit. That Jones emphasised 
Croatian Catholic extremists demonstrates how easily Croatian activism was and 
is construed to meet the political purpose of the time. The Catholicism of 
Croatians was incidental, rather than integral, to their activism, however, given 
that Jones was making his point in relation to the current political debate over 
Islamic-inspired terrorism, and Hanson’s record of islamophobia, the nature of 
Croatian activism was simply equated with their religious identity.  
The contemporary resonance of this thesis becomes even clearer when we 
begin to draw comparisons between the experiences of Croatians, particularly in 
the 1970s, with the contemporary experience of Muslims in Australia, particularly 
since 2014, a year which brought the spectre of terrorism to the doorstep of a 
nation accustomed to being slightly removed from global conflict. On 15 
December 2014, as Sydney went about its Monday morning rhythms, Mon Haron 
Monis took siege of 18 hostages in the Lindt café at Martin Place. Declaring it an 
attack on Australia by Islamic State, the ordeal lasted into the early morning of 16 
December, and resulted in two civilian deaths and the death of Monis. For many, 
the ‘Sydney Siege’ capped off a year in which the spectre of terrorism loomed 
large over Australia - the radicalisation of young Australian Muslims, the rising 
number of individuals leaving the country to ‘join the jihad’, evidence of 
recruitment via social media, and claims of secret terrorist training camps, all 
shattered the illusion that terrorism was something that happened ‘over there’, 
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by individuals that were ‘not us’. The Lindt Café siege was the realisation of 
Australia’s worst fears; a terrorist attack on home soil. 
In Australia, these issues were steeped in a wider and longer context of 
political and social discomfort regarding the Muslim community in Australia. In 
the ‘post 9/11’ world, islamophobia had become a growing feature of the political 
and social landscape. The 2002 Bali Bombings, the 2004 Australian Embassy 
bombing in Jakarta, and the 2005 uncovering of a terrorist plot targeting Sydney 
provided the fuel for a growing cultural anxiety about the place of Muslim 
Australians in the nation, which spilled into the streets in December 2005 in what 
became the Cronulla riots. These anxieties blurred neatly with the issue of ‘boat 
people’, that is, asylum seekers arriving to Australia by boat, which rose to 
national prominence concurrently with terrorism and islamophobia. Both 
terrorism and asylum seeker arrivals concerned questions of national security, 
predominantly involving the Muslim ‘other’, and were underpinned by rising 
islamophobia. Thus, not only did both issues come to mutually reinforce the 
other, but were also mutually reinforced by the islamophobia that both 
underpinned, and arose out of, the issues. As events in 2014 escalated, so too did 
cultural tensions, which manifested in controversies surrounding Halal 
certification, calls to ‘Ban the Burqa’, accusations of ‘creeping Sharia Law’, 
proposed amendments to racial vilification laws, and the political return of 
Pauline Hanson herself.  Perhaps the best indication of how entrenched the issue 
of islamophobia had become by the end of 2014 arose out of the Lindt Cafe Siege 
itself, when Australians, anticipating an islamophobic backlash, rallied around 
the twitter hashtag #illridewithyou in order to demonstrate solidarity with 
Muslim Australians. 
To the casual observer, these events seemed indicative of an unprecedented 
chapter in Australia’s history, framed by a new and complex geopolitical reality. 
However to this fledgling historian, it all seemed a little too familiar. To borrow 
from Twain, while history may not have been repeating, it sure was rhyming. As 





current events I was witnessing, and the past events I was researching were 
becoming increasingly harder to ignore. So when on 16 February 2014 the front 
page of the Sunday Telegraph declared that a ‘Secret bush terror camp’ had been 
in operation in regional NSW, I thought of the front page of the Sun Herald on 2 
September 1978 declaring that police had raided the training camp of a Croatian 
‘Secret Army’, also in regional NSW. When news broke in February and again in 
September that police forces had arrested and charged individuals with 
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts on Australian soil, I thought of the case of the 
Croatian Six, who were convicted in 1981 for the same reason. The moral outrage 
levelled at those leaving Australia to join ISIS echoed those in 1963 and 1972 over 
young Croatian men leaving Australia to mount incursions into the territories of 
Yugoslavia. The scenes that played out on my television of the dawn raids on 
September 18 replicated the images which arose out of the raids carried out on 
the homes of Croatians over multiple years, but particularly on 1 April 1973. And 
finally, the concern of the Islamic community in the wake of the Lindt Cafe Siege 
that the actions of one would come to define the many, was one voiced by 
Croatians over and over again.  
Despite the differences in context, circumstance, and time, in each of these, 
the echoes of Australia’s responses to Croatian activism could be felt in the 
present. In part, it was Abbott’s exhortation to join ‘Team Australia’ on 18 August 
20147 that the sustained déjà vu started to make sense - it was not the 
Croatianness of the past that was resonating, but the Australianness of it all. 
Though the rhetoric of Team Australia may have been new, the ideas 
underpinning it were anything but, and bring to the fore a story as old as modern 
Australia itself – the relationship between Australia and the ‘Other’ in its midst. 
Put simply, Muslim Australians were now occupying the space Croatian 
Australians had once occupied, which has also been held by Asian Australians, 
Irish Catholic Australians, and a number of iterations of the ‘Other’. Likewise, in 
Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’, we can hear echoes of Pauline Hanson’s ‘One Nation’, 
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John Howard’s ‘One Australia’ policy, Calwell’s ‘New Australians’, and the ‘White 
Australia’ policy, all of which sought to mediate this relationship. 
This thesis has argued that there are three aspects which mediate the 
relationship between Australia and its migrant ‘Other’. The first are the push and 
pull factors which act as catalysts for migration, and determine the composition 
and characteristics of the community that develops in Australia. This in turn 
determines the activities and causes around which these communities in 
Australia organise. Without understanding these push and pull factors, the 
migrant ‘Other’ in Australia cannot be contextualised, explained, nor understood.  
The second aspect is the concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly 
constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions upon 
which migrant ‘Other’ is perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. It 
embodies what I call the ‘expectations of oughts’ – of what Australia ought to be, 
of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how 
they ought to behave. Though the substance of these expectations of oughts have 
evolved as historical, political, social, and cultural changes have exerted their 
influence, they still provide the foundations from which the relationship between 
Australia and the migrant ‘Other’ is mediated. 
Finally, domestic, transnational, and international contexts arbitrate the first 
two aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are created and 
understood. These paradigms shape the responses of legal, political, and media 
authorities to particular migrant groups, who occupy varying spaces and levels of 
the ‘Other’. As these contexts change, so too do the paradigms through which 
migrants are understood, and therefore legal, political, and media responses. In 
the case of Australian responses to Croatian activism in the post-war period, 
there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which responses can be grouped, 
1947-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989. 
The first period, 1947-1971, was informed by the experience and aftermath of 
WWII and Australia’s establishment of the post-war immigration programme. 





Croatian community, who pursued a political agenda that sought to establish a 
Croatian identity as separate from a Yugoslav one and advocated for an 
independent Croatian state. Though this activism was problematic in the eyes of 
Australian authorities, responses were tempered by the Cold War myopia of 
Australian politics and the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. These 
paradigms were disrupted by the changes of the 1960’s in international and 
domestic contexts, as well as changes within the Croatian community itself. 
The second period, 1972-1979, was defined by the symbolism of Croatian 
activism in Australia’s changing social and political environment. At the 
beginning of the decade, the election of Whitlam and his government ushered in 
a disavowal of the Cold War myopia that had defined the previous period. As a 
result of this disavowal, Croatians found themselves at the centre of a moral 
panic, their activism conflated with extremism and terrorism, they themselves a 
political football deployed by both the Australian and Yugoslav governments in 
their foreign policy endeavours. At the same time, the introduction of 
multiculturalism opened up a legitimate space for Croatian activism and allowed 
the community to address and redress the reputation that the Whitlam 
Government had ascribed them with, and an opportunity to re-brand Croatian 
activism. Though the Eden and Croatian Six arrests in 1978 and 1979 threatened 
to undo much of this re-branding, responses were mitigated by the paradigm 
shifts under way in the late 1970s that had changed Australia’s social political 
environment once more.   
The final period, 1980-1989 was defined by shifts in both the domestic and 
international contexts that caused Croatian independence to become politically 
acceptable, and in some corners, even desirable. The reconfiguration of Croatian 
activism within the paradigms of multiculturalism allowed it to sit better within 
the Good Australian Migrant framework, while the rise of second-generation 
Croatians and the arrival of a third wave of Croatian migrants reinforced these 
changes. Asian immigration caused a disruption in immigration paradigms, 





policy. However it was the death of the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, 
and the general demise of communism worldwide, that gave Croatian political 
activism its legitimacy, for Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic importance.  
Like most scholarship that is concerned with establishing new paradigms 
through which histories can be approached, this thesis has served to exacerbate, 
rather than solve, the paradox of Croatian political activism in Australia, creating 
more and not less demand for further research. This thesis perpetuates many of 
the issues identified in the literature review in the name of scope, but which 
could and should be addressed. The first is the use of the customary post-war 
definition of the Croatian ‘community’ as those who organised around overtly 
Croatian organisations that were of the ‘proper’ political inclination, and in 
particular those associated with the Catholic Church, folkloric, and football 
organisations. The activisms and responses of groups outside of these structures 
should be investigated in order to better reflect the heterogeneity of Croatians in 
Australia.  
In particular, Croatian Yugoslav communities and Croatian Muslim 
communities both deserve further historical attention. Croatian Yugoslav 
communities stood in the most direct opposition to the traditional Croatian 
‘community’, and would provide an interesting and important comparative study 
in the navigation of Croatian nationhood and identity during this period. The 
Croatian Muslim community, on the other hand, was initially integrated within 
the traditional Croatian ‘community’, and even established a Croatian Islamic 
Society that cooperated with other Croatian organisations. By the end of the 
1980s, however, this section of the community had become completely invisible. 
Investigating how and why this change occurred would be another avenue of 
research that would result in a more nuanced understanding of Croatian activism 
in Australia.  
This narrow definition of the Croatian ‘community’ also does not distinguish 
between the different communities across Australia, and perpetuates the unfair 





communities varied from state-to-state and city-to-city, so too did Croatian 
communities. Comparative studies need to be undertaken in order to capture this 
diversity. Particular attention should be paid to the Croatian communities of 
South Australia and Western Australia, who once formed the epicentres of 
Croatian communities, and whose histories vary significantly from those on the 
east coast of Australia.  
A similar issue arises in the question of sources. This thesis has relied 
predominantly on Federal Hansard, the collections of the National Archives of 
Australia, and the three main newspapers of Sydney, Melbourne, and Canberra – 
the Sydney Morning Herald, Age, and Canberra Times respectively, which on its 
own contributes to the issue of fragmentation. Expanding the range of sources to 
State Hansard and archival holdings, as well as state and regional newspapers 
would mitigate the east-centric approach of this thesis and the study of Croatians 
in this period generally. The comparative histories that would arise from such 
research would better reflect the range of responses to Croatians and their 
activism, and incorporate regional or local contexts that have been overlooked by 
the general and national approach of this thesis. 
Perhaps the most important undertaking for future research, at least in terms 
of the history of Croatians in Australia, will be to address the lack of primary 
sources and dearth of historical research into Croatians and their activism. The 
overwhelming majority of the everyday and grassroots history of Croatians and 
their activism remain behind private doors, uncollected and diminishing as time 
passes. Without a concerted effort to collect and archive these oral and 
ephemeral histories, this history will never be more than that which its 
leadership has portrayed it to be. Each and every period, moment, and form of 
activism mentioned in this thesis could make up a thesis of its own. These range 
from the more obvious cases, such as the two incursions in 1963 and 1972, the 
violence of the late 1960s/early 1970s, the Croatian ‘Embassy’, and perhaps most 
importantly, the case of the Croatian Six, to those that were less remarkable but 





Yugoslavia Day demonstrations. Plugging the gaps in the history of Croatians, as 
it were, will be an undertaking of unlimited size and scope, but a worthwhile one 
nonetheless.  
The most politically fraught of future research directions will be to 
investigate the allegations of Croatian terrorism, counter-allegations of Yugoslav 
agents provocateurs, and the implication of Australian governments and their 
agencies within this. Though it is unlikely that a definitive answer will ever be 
found, any clarifications or new understandings that can be made, should be 
made. It is telling how little historical attention has been paid to this field when 
Murphy’s Ministerial Statement of deliberate selections, simplifications, and 
silences is still taken as a benchmark of ‘proof.’ The importance of this research 
does not lie in its ascription of guilt or innocence – most of those involved in 
these activities have long passed – but in clearing up as much ambiguity as 
possible so as to depoliticise this history. When these competing histories are 
able to talk with each other, rather than at each other, we will be able to 
understand the context in which these events were able to occur. This knowledge 
can only become more valuable as the increasing spectre of global terrorism and 
politically motivated violence exerts its influence on our present. 
Ultimately, it is hoped that the model of analysis adopted by this thesis can 
make an important conceptual contribution to the study of Croatians in 
Australia, as well as Australia’s relationship with its migrant ‘Other’. By applying 
the three aspects which mediate this relationship – the push and pull factors of 
migration, the concept of the Good Australian Migrant, and the intersections of 
domestic, transnational, and international contexts – further research of 
Croatians in Australia can move understandings away from the descriptive and 
confrontational histories that currently define it, to those of critical interrogation 
that integrate contextual environments in order to create more nuanced histories 
and knowledge. By changing the components of these three aspects - for example 
substituting Croatians for another migrant group, adjusting the contextual time 





historical perspectives can be developed and comparative studies produced from 
which historians can interpret the relationship between host societies and their 
migrant ‘Others’.  
This approach may also be able to be applied to more recent or even present 
situations that are comparative in nature in order better understand the various 
aspects influencing our perceptions, in an attempt to avoid the mistakes of the 
past, and perhaps even help prepare for the future. For example, Australia’s 
current relationship with the Migrant ‘Other’ of asylum seekers and ‘boat people’ 
can be understood, managed, and even influenced through these three aspects. 
Understanding why asylum seekers are leaving the country of origin, and why 
they are choosing to come to Australia can have both practical implications, such 
as informing policy planning, and symbolic implications, such as influencing 
rhetoric. Interrogating what the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant 
currently are, and whether we accept this vision helps deconstruct why asylum 
seekers are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged, in the way that they 
are. Like the post-war government was able to deploy the Good Australian 
Migrant to promote acceptance of their mass immigration programme, so too can 
the figure of the Good Australian Migrant be deployed to influence immigration 
policy today. Finally, situating these two aspects within current national and 
international contexts can help determine the paradigms that are guiding 
responses.  
 This process will become more and more pronounced as conflict becomes 
increasingly global in nature and outcome. The devastation and displacement 
caused by the conflicts over the last few years have produced the worst migration 
crisis since World War II. Unlike previous years, where this displacement was 
relatively contained in the East and Africa, forced migration has begun to directly 
impact the West as larger numbers are travelling further and further to seek 





people literally walked across the continent in search of safety.8 According to the 
UNHCR, global, social and economic trends indicate that not only will 
displacement continue to grow in the next decade, but will begin to take different 
forms. Population growth, rising poverty, food insecurity, urbanisation, climate 
change, natural disasters, and conflict over scarce resources are expected to 
become the main causes of displacement, and most of this displacement is 
expected to occur in Africa and Asia.9 Voluntary temporary and permanent 
migration is also increasing, as advancing technologies, emerging industries, and 
economic disparities facilitate the movement of people. Further complicating the 
situation is that it is becoming increasingly harder to distinguish between the 
causes of migration, and between forced and voluntary migration. As 
WorldWatch notes,  
It will be increasingly difficult to easily categorize people displaced by separate 
causes. Environmental problems are often closely intertwined with 
socioeconomic conditions such as poverty and inequality of land ownership, 
resource disputes, poorly designed development projects, and weak governance.10  
While Australia may be afforded some reprieve from these issues by virtue of its 
distance, to believe that the population movement will bypass it altogether would 
be an act of extreme naivety or wilful ignorance. The presence of the ‘Other’ in 
Australia, and indeed of multiple ‘Others’, is only going to become more 
substantial as voluntary and forced migration come to define our geopolitical 
reality.  
 How well poised are we as a nation to deal with this? If our history is 
anything to go by, the answer does not look promising. However, history is 
fundamental to understanding our perceptions and reactions to the world around 
us, and therefore it is important that the stories of our ‘Others’ be heard, to 
                                                 
8 T. Miles, ‘EU gets one million migrants in 2015, smugglers seen making $1 billion’, Reuters, 22 
December 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKBN0U50WI20151222, 
accessed 23 December 2015. 
9 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees., The State of the World’s Refugees: In 
Search of Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–5. 





identify the rhymes in our history and make them work to our collective 
advantage, rather than disadvantage. As Lack and Templeton point out, 
Social tensions may indeed arise from time to time, but is exclusion of the victims 
the only, the best, or the most realistic solution to such problems? Critics look 
pessimistically at ethnic conflicts elsewhere but too rarely at the histories behind 
such conflicts or circumstances in which they have arisen. Perhaps they should 
be taken as illuminating particular histories rather than as inevitable outcomes of 
any ethnic mixing.11 
This thesis is an attempt to bring one of the perpetrators of this social tension in 
Australia out from the periphery. Australian responses to post-war Croatian 
settlement in Australia and the political activism of its community are not simple 
narratives of Good Vs. Bad Migrants, but of competing, conflicting, and 
concurrent histories, contexts, and influences which demonstrate that 
Australians have never truly been ‘excluded’ from world events. As Tavan warns, 
‘history attests to the willingness of populations to scapegoat minority groups 
during periods of insecurity.’12 With the beckoning of a future defined by greater 
insecurity than that which has come, it is important we explore this history and 
at the very least, learn to recognise the rhymes.  
                                                 
11 Lack and Templeton, Bold Experiment, 163. 
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may have  arrived. As the  honorable  memÿ  mised  to  the  United  Nations  and  is not in 
ber  knows,  educational  matters are   now   default  in any  way.  In addition to making 
dealt with  primarily  by  Senator  Gorton,  the  payment  promised,  Australia is bearing, 
who is in another place, and he may have the major part  of  the  cost  of maintaining 
received a  communication.  I  will  make  it   the police force there.  As I said, I have not 
my  business to find out whether  he has,  and    seen  the  report  and  cannot  comment  on it. 
to find out, also, the attitude of the Austraÿ However, on  the  rendering  of it given  by 
lian  Universities Commission  on the point.   the  honorable  member,  I  would  say  that it 
At present  I am  not  informed, but  I  will   is false. 
inform myself and then I will inform the 
honorable   member. 
YUGOSLAV IMMIGRANT 
NYLON STOCKINGS. ORGANISATIONS. 
Dr.   MACKAY.7 I   should   like  to  ask Ministerial     Statement. 
the  Prime  Minister  a  question.  The Press 
recently has  contained reports  that a certain  Sir   ROBERT  MENZIES (Kooyong7 
cross parliamentarian  from Queensland  has  Prime Minister)7b  y leave7Fo  r  some  time, 
sent  quantities  of  used   nylon stockings to there    have    been    references   both in  the 
the Prime Minister. Has the Prime Minister Parliament and elsewhere to the  activities 
received   these  stockings?   Has he examined of  certain   Yugoslav  immigrant  organisaÿ 
them   carefully?  Will  he cause  additional tions. The Government  is, and over a period 
and  equally independent  scientific examinaÿ   has   been,    in  possession    of   considerable 
tion to be made of the  strength  of the  fibres  information  on  these  activities. Certain of 
used and of the possibility of stronger synÿ this information is embodied in replies which 
thetic fibres of  suitable specifications being are  being  made  separately   to  the series of 
used by the manufacturers of stockings? questions on the matter which were asked Sir  
ROBERT MENZIES.7Thi  s is a very    in  the  previous  parliamentary  session. This 
interesting matter. I have received  a letter  applies  to questions  asked  by the  honorable  
from the honorable member  for Brisbane.  member for Yarra (Dr. J. F. Cairns), answers 
Did you also send some stockings? to  which  he  should  get  today.  However, I feel  I  should  also  take  the  opportunity to 
Mr.  Cross.7Yes  . make some observations  to the House  about 
Sir  ROBERT MENZIES.7 I am bound the Government's general policy in 
to  tell  the  House,   as  I  told  him  yesterday,      relation  to  migrant  organisations  and about that  my wife, on reading  newspaper  reports      immigration from Yugoslavia. 
that a  miserable bachelor was  taking  an In  the  years  since  World  War  n , Ausÿ 
interest in this problem and making these tralia's immigration programme has brought 
complaints,  said  to  me:  ÿHeavens!  He  is    to  this  country  people   from  all parts of on   to  it, is  he?   I  have been complaining Europe  with  a  diversity  of historical and 
about it for years.ÿ I ended, as  usual,  by  cultural backgrounds.  Many of these people 
being wrong both ways. were    refugees    from   oppression.   Many 
UNITED NATIONS.  derived    from   happier  circumstances.   This 
Mr.  GALVIN.7 I  direct   a question  to flow of  new  citizens  has   played an importÿ 
the    Minister   for  External   Affairs. Is  it  ant  part  in  building  the  nation.  It is someÿ 
correct,   as   recently  reported, that Australia  thing  which  has   given  us  great satisfaction 
still owes  to the  United  Nations an  amount     and   we  wish  to  see   it  continue.  However, 
of   £36,500,   the   balance    of  the   £94,000    it is basic  to our immigration policy that all 
pledged  for the  maintenance   of  the  peaceÿ     these   new  citizens  should  be  integrated as 
keeping  force in Cyprus?  If the  report  is    fully, and  as  quickly, as  possible  into Ausÿ 
correct,   when   is  it  intended   to  pay   the    tralia's  national  life.  The  people   of Ausÿ 
outstanding  amount? tralia endorse  this approach  and,  as  part of its   migration  programme,   the  Government 
Mr. HASLUCK.7 I have not seen this has  enlisted  the  help  of  community  and 
report   My understanding  of the  matter  is  public  bodies  throughout   the   Commonÿ 
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In this regard and on the whole the proÿ  Slovenes,  under  the  Serbian King Alexander. 
gramme   of  integration  has   met with  great The  Serbs  obtained   their  independence from 
success. the   Ottoman   Empire  during the  nineteenth 
century    and    were    numerically   the largest 
The Government  is  not  taking an  attitude group  in  the  new State. The  Croats  had against 
immigrants  from  particular   counÿ   formerly   enjoyed   a   degree  of   autonomy tries  
joining  in  their  own  associations.   We   within   the   AustroÿHungarian   empire   and do 
not  expect  newcomers   to turn their backs     retained   a  national  identity  dating  back   as on  
their  original  heritage.  On  the  contrary,     early  as  the  ninth century.  Deep differences it is  
wholly  understandable  that  immigrants  of  religious,  cultural  and  historical  kinds should 
establish  organisations  amongst  themÿ  have   existed   between   the   groups   despite selves  for  
a  variety  of  social   and  cultural     kindred racial  origins. 
purposes.  It  rather   follows  the precedents 
of the Irish and Scots in this country. These a 
Within the new State, the Croats sought 
organisations, as honorable members will  lar 
federal  concept of  government with  a 
know,  can  also  be  a most  valuable means    th 
ge  degree  of  local  autonomy.  In  1923, 
of assisting migrants to become fully inteÿ t 
e leader  of the  Croats,
t 
Stjepan  Radic of 
grated  into  the  Australian  community.  I  he  Croatian  Peasant  Par y  and  two of his 
have no doubt that the great majority of colleagues were assassinated in the Parliaÿ 
organisations     and     societies      to    which    ment  in Belgrade.  This precipitated  a proÿ 
migrants  belong  come  within  the  category    found  breach   between   Serbs  and   Croats. 
to  which  I have just  been  referring.  Howÿ  The  Croats   developed   strong  agitation in ever,  the  Government  looks  with disfavour     support    of   independence,   Peasant  Party 
on any activities of any migrant organisation leaders taking their cause to the League  of 
which  lend  to frustrate integration. Nations.  Some   Croat  parliamentary repreÿ sentatievs    were    arrested,    others,   among 
them Dr. Ante Pavelic, went into exile. 
The possibility always  exists  that  at some 
point, the  activities  of  a  particular  immiÿ  It was  at  this  time  that  a revolutionary 
grant organisation, or the activities of indiÿ movement called Ustashi, meaning ÿ insurÿ 
viduals within that organisation, may transÿ gents ÿ was founded, both  in Croatia  and  
gress the  law.  As  necessary,  investigations  abroad,  Pavelic being one  of its first leaders. 
are made,  and  will  be  made,  into  the  This  movement, in  common  with  other 
activities of various organisations including Croat organisations, took as  its symbol the  
some which are  not  organisations of  traditional Croatian  emblem  of a white and 
migrants alone or even  primarily.  If, as  a  red  check  shield  but  associated  with  this 
result of these investigations, there  is  eviÿ  emblem  the  letter ÿ U ÿ . The  traditional 
dence of illegal activities on the part of an emblem, both with and without the ÿ U ÿ, 
organisation, or individuals within an is to be found in extensive use today  by  
organisation, evidence which would  be  Croatian migrant groups  throughout  the 
receivable   in  a  court   of  law,  then  steps    world. 
will  be  taken   promptly,  as  may be  approÿ  It  is  difficult for people  coming to Ausÿ 
priate to  the  particular  case,  to  appeal to   tralia  easily   to  forget  their historical backÿ the 
law of the State  or  to  invoke  the  releÿ grounds.  Since  the  war  a number of organiÿ vant 
Commonwealth legislation. I  add  howÿ sations  opposed  to  the present  Government ever,  by  
way  of  reminder  to   the   House,   of   Yugoslavia   have developed   throughout that  it  is  
not  and  never has  been  the  pracÿ  the  world   amongst   refugees and   migrants tice to  make  
details  of security investigations from  that  country.  It  is understandable  that 
available or public. some  Yugoslav   migrants   of  Croatian   oriÿ 
gin  should  continue  to  hope  for  the  estabÿ 
I  turn  now  to  the  matter  of  immigration   lishment   of   an   independent   Croatia   and 
from  Yugoslavia.  To  understand  the  attiÿ  within  a democracy  like Australia they have 
tudes of  these  migrants  it  is necessary  to  a  right  to  advocate  their  views  so   long  as 
remind  ourselves   that   this  part   of  Europe    they   do  so  by  legitimate  means.  I  wish  to 
has an exceedingly complex and  troubled make  it perfectly clear  that  the vast majority history. 
Yugoslavia emerged  from the  politiÿ   of  the  migrants  from all parts of Yugoslavia cal 
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Commonwealth and State authorities are Government's point of view, if we are to 
continuing their investigations  of Yugoslav have  the  full discussion  on this matter  that 
and other organisations.  Recently the Acting   we believe we ought to have. 
Premier  of Victoria  issued  a  statement  on 
police  inquiries in  that  State.  He  said  that        Sir   ROBERT  MENZIES.7Th  e answer 
the  police  had  found  ÿ that  isolated  acts    to  that  is: ÿ Yes ÿ. 
of  assault  and  misbehaviour   had  occurred     Debate    (on   motion   by   Mr.  Calwell) 
but  found no evidence  whatever  to support    adjourned. 
allegations    of   Ustashi    violence   towards 
individuals    of   Yugoslav  nationality  from FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. which  systematic   or  organised   attacks could 
be   inferredÿ. That  I   take   to  mean   that  Motion   (by  Mr.  Fairh/all)7b  y  leave7 
individual attacks  have been noted but not proposed7 
an  organised  or  systematic  series  of  attacks.  (1)  That  Mr.  J. M. Fraser  be  appointed  a memÿ 
Similar  allegations  made  in Cairns  also were,     ber   of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  in 
I  understand,    found   by   the    Queensland    the    place     of    Mr.   Howson,    discharged     from 
police  to  be  unsubstantiated.    The  Commonÿ    attendance. 
wealth's  own investigations  so far have not    
ca
(2)  That  the  foregoing resolution be communiÿ 
produced   any  evidence   which  would  warÿ      ted  to the Senate by  message. 
rant  legal  proceedings.  Mr.  CALWELL  (Melbourne7Leade  r of 
the Opposition) [11.28].7Mr  . Deputy 
I  wish   to  make   the   Government's   posiÿ    Speaker,  I  understand   that  the  motion that    
Sir,   and   that   is   the   real   purpose    of  this   f the  Foreign  Affairs Committee  into two 
tion  in  this  regard   quite plain, however, are  discussing  arises  from  the splitting 
 
statement,   as   well  as   to   intimate  at   the    divisions7th  e first division  and  the  second 
same time that  the  particular questions  division. This is  not  a  division, in cowboy 
asked in detail have been answered in detail,  fashion,  between  the  goodies  and  the 
though   not  in  this  statement.   So  I  make baddies.   The  Committee  is  split into two 
the  Government's  position quite clear: This  divisions  each   of   which   is composed  of 
Government will not interfere with freedom  members   who  sit  on  the Government  side 
of opinion. Equally, it will not tolerate any  of  the  Parliament.  The honorable member 
activiiies which constitute a breach  of the  for Moreton (Mr. Killen) was appointed to 
law.  the   Committee   the   other   day,   and   the 
I present  the following paper7 discharge    of  the   Minister  for  Air (Mr. 
Yugoslav   Immigrant Organisations7Ministeria  l    Howson)  from  it  has  necessitated  the  proÿ 
Statement,    27th  August  19647 motion of a member  from the second diviÿ 
and move7 sion  to the  first division. So  the honorable 
That  the  House  take  note   of the paper. member  for Wannon  (Mr.  Malcolm Fraser) is  now to go into the  first division. 
Mr.   Calwell.7Mr  .   Deputy   Speaker,   I Mr.  Curtin.7Tha  t will improve  it. 
wish  to  ask   the  Prime  Minister  (Sir Robert 
Menzies) a question about this matter. He Mr. CALWELL.7 I do not know whether has   
said   that   answers7lon  g   delayed7t  o    it   will.  This  Committee  leaves   us  comÿ 
questions that were put on notice on  5th  pletely  uninterested.  We have never  said  at 
March  last  will be  forwarded to the honorÿ  any  time  since 1951  that  we  would  not 
able member for Yarra (Dr. J. F. Cairns)  join  a  foreign  affairs  committee,  but  we 
today, and, of  course,  made  public. I  ask:  have  always  said  that  we  would  join  one 
Will   the   House    have   an  opportunity7     only  on  our terms. 
indeed,  will it be accorded  the right7whe  n 
the  debate  is  resumed   and  this  matter  is Mr. Whittorn.7O  n your terms! 
discussed,   to canvass the  whole of  the issues 
raised  by the  honorable  member  for Yarra    te 





in his questions,  which  may or may not in      rms.  That  is  clear  enough.  Th   Go  ernÿ 
his  opinion  be  answered  satisfactorily? In  ment's  attitude is equally  clear.  It  says: 
other  words, I want from the Prime Minisÿ  ÿThese  are  our  terms.  We  want  you  to  
ter an assurance that the  canvassing  of any  join. We shall be very angry if you do not. 
                           









MINISTERIAL STATEMENT – MURPHY 





528 Notices of Motion SENATE Croatian Terrorism 
 
(2)   that  Mr President   and  Mr Speaker  be     ducting  business   were   to  be   proceeded  with, 
joint  chairmen   of  the   joint  meeting  that   is,  if  honourable  senators   were   to   ask and   be  empowered,  if  they  think it 
necessary,   to  draw  up  regulations for     questions  of  Ministers about   any  matters  that 
the  conduct of  such  joint  meeting;  concern  them.  I  also  would  be  quite happy  to 
and proceed  to the  making of the  statement  which 
(3)   that   at   such  a  joint  meeting   there   be      I  had   intended   to  ask   the  Senate   to  allow  me no   debate    on   the    subject    matter  of 
the  alternative sites  and  that  the  quesÿ     leave  to  make.  The  only  difficulty I see  is the tion   be   decided    by   a majority of difficulty  occasioned   by  the  passage   of a few 
votes; moments  while  certain  documents  are brought 
Invites  Members of  the  House of  Represenÿ  into  the  chamber to  me.  I  did  not  anticipate 
tatives  to  join  with  Senators   in  the  Senate       that  it would  be  necessary  to  have  them availÿ 
Chamber  or such  other  place as  may  be  able right  away. Perhaps  I  can table   those determined  by  Mr President  and  Mr Speaker 
for the purpose of the joint meeting; documents    at    the   end   of   my   statement.  I 
And  further  invites  the  House  of  Represenÿ  accede  to  the  proposition  that  has  been  put 
tatives  to suggest  any alternative  to  or  by  the  Leader of   the   Opposition  (Senator 
modification  of  the  Senate's  proposal,  with a Withers). 
view  to the  convening of a joint  meeting   of 
members   of  the   Senate    and   the  House  of Question  resolved in the affirmative. 
Representatives      to    determine    finally the 
question  where   the   new   and permanent   Parÿ CROATIAN TERRORISM 
liament  House be situated'. Ministerial Statement 
ESTATE D U T Y Senator     MURPHY    (New    South  Wales7 
Notice  of Motion  AttorneyÿGeneral    and    Minister  for  Customs and    Excise)7M   r   President,   I  seek   leave   to 
Senator K A N E (New South Wales)7I  give  make a  statement  on  Croatian terrorism, to 
notice  that  on  the  next  day  of  sitting I shall table   documents    in   relation   to   that subject 
move: and   to  have  incorporated  in  Hansard a sumÿ 
That  leave  be  given  to  bring  in a Bill for an Act mary  of  the documents. 
to  terminate estate duty. The   PRESIDENT7I    s  leave granted? 
SUSPENSION  OF STANDING ORDERS Senator    Withers7M    r  President 
Croatian  Terrorism and Related Matters The PRESIDENT7Ar   e    you refusing 
Senator   WITHERS  (Western   Aust ra l i aÿ leave? 
Leader  of the Opposition) (3.4)7 I move:  Senator    Withers7No   ,  I    am    not   refusÿ 
That   so   much   of   the   Standing   Orders    be  susÿ      ing  leave.    Although I   am    prepared to 
pended7 allow  such  a  statement  to be  put  down withÿ 
(1)  as  would  prevent question  time   being  postÿ  out  the  normal  2  hours  notice  being  given,  I 
poned until after  the  Leader  of  the Governÿ  do  not  know  whether  I  should  permit  docuÿ ment    in   tbe   Senate,    Senator     Murphy,  has 
made  his  statement   relating to Croatian terrorÿ     ments  which  I  have   not  seen   to  be incorporÿ 
ism  and  related matters, which   the  public  has  ated   in  Hansard.   Senator   Murphy has   asked been  
informed will be made this day; and for  leave   to  do  several   things. The Opposition 
(2)  as  would  prevent  questions  being asked  during will  grant  leave   to  his   making a  statement. 
question  time relating to that statement. But,  as  to the other  matters,  I think  he ought 
I  will  be   quite  brief   in  what   I   have   to   say    to    wait    until    he    has    made    his    statement 
about  this  motion, Mr  President.   Since   last   before   asking   for   leave.   I   do   not   think   he 
Friday   week   the   Senate  and   the   public   at    needs    leave    to   table   documents.    He   has    the 
large  have   been   awaiting  the   making  of  such      right   to  table   documents.   Therefore  I   do  not 
a   statement.   Certain   statements    have    been    see    why  he   has   sought   leave   in  that   respect. 
made  in  the  media  in  which  it  has  been canÿ  But  I  think  we  ought  to  deal  with  any request 
vassed that  certain  persons   in  this  place  could   to   incorporate   documents   at   the   moment   he 
have    their    political    or    personal    reputations     seeks  leave   to   incorporate  them.  We certainly 
put   at  stake.  This  is  a  statement   which  ought     give   leave    to   Senator    Murphy   to   make    a 
to   be   made    as   early   as   possible.   Therefore  I   statement. 
commend  the  motion  to the Senate.   Senator    MURPHY7M   r   President,   I  want 
Senator     MURPHY    (New  South   Wales7 to   put   evidence   before   the   Senate    in a  conÿ 
AttorneyÿGeneral and  Minister   for   Customs   venient   form.  There   is   a   table   of that   eviÿ 
and   Excise)  (3.5)7M   r   President,   I  would  be dence.   I   do   not   see    why,  even   at  this stage, 
quite   happy    if  the    ordinary   course    of conÿ    the Leader of the Opposition     (Senator 
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Withers)  should  be  placing  difficulties  in the  by  the   Australian   authorities   to  have   been 
way of my  doing  so.  However, 1 will do  the  defunct for some  years,  had  been  reorganised 
best I can. 1 will proceed now, if there is no early in 1972 as the HIRO (Croatian  Illegal 
objection. Revolutionary Organisation). 
The   PRESIDENT7i   s  leave   granted  for  Following receipt  of  this  aideÿmemoire, the 
Senator Murphy to make  a  statement on  Commonwealth  and  State  police conducted  a 
Croatian terrorism? There being no objection, series of raids  in  Melbourne and Sydney durÿ leave 
is granted. ing  the  month of  August  and  a great  deal of 
Senator   MURPHY7 I  have never  accepted material  was  seized.  It  is  to  be assumed  that 
the proposition that we must get  used  to polÿ   the first  law officer of Australia, the Attorneyÿ 
itical terrorism, involving bombings, murder, General, would be kept informed by  the 
intimidation  and  that  democratic  governments     police   of  the   results   of  their investigations, 
are powerless to suppress such  activities. That  especially  as  he  continued  to  be  closely  quesÿ 
such   actions  have  occurred  in  Australia  with    tioned  in  the  Senate  about  Croatian extremist 
increasing frequency in recent years is beyond activities. And, indeed, he admitted on  19th 
dispute.   There   was   a  curious   defeatism  and     September    1972  (Hansard,  page  902)  that he 
lack of initiative in successive Liberal governÿ had seen  a lot of material in the  possession  of 
ments'  reaction  to  these  outrages.  Honourable     the Commonwealth  Police. 
senators will  recall   that,   throughout   the   last   Senator   Wright7 I  rise  on  a  point  of order, 
session of the last Parliament, the former it  is  the  usual  practice  when  a  ministerial 
AttorneyÿGeneral   was    asked    a  great   number     statement     of   even     moderate     significance   is 
of  questions   by  Labor  senators  about   the  actiÿ   made   copies   are    circulated    to    honourable 
vities   of   Croatian   extremists   in   Australia.  A     senators.   Are copies  not  available? 
constant   theme   in   his   answers  was  that,   Senator    Negus7 I  wish    to  speak    to   the 
although there were undoubtedly individual  point  of  order.  How  can anyone  expect  the 
Croatian   extremists   in   Australia   who  were     AttorneyÿGeneral   to   produce   copies   of his prepared  to  resort to   the   most   violent   statement   when  the  Opposition has  asked him 
methods  in alleged  furtherance of  their cause, to  make  his   speech   some  hours   before   he there    was    no    credible    evidence    that   any     intended  to  do so? Croatian    revolutionary   terrorist organisation 
existed  in  AustraJia.  For  example  in  the Senÿ        The    PRESIDENTÿOrder!  I   have    made 
ate  on 24th August 1972, he said: inquiries   about    this   matter.   Because  it  has 
the searches and investigations carried out by the been brought on much earlier than was anticiÿ 
Commonwealth Police hitherto have not  been  able to  pated  by  the  Leader  of  the  Government  in 
discover  any  evidence  of an  organisation. the  Senate,  only  25  copies  have  been run off. 
He  again  repeated   this  assertion  on  19th Sepÿ     So  honourable senators  will have  to share  the 
tember    1972   in  answer   to  a  question   from   copies   that   we  have.   I   am   quite  sure  that 
Senator    Douglas   McClelland   (Hansard,  page     honourable   senators  on  the  Government  side 
894).   It   is   important   to   remember   that   the   of  the   chamber   will  be  happy   to  hand   their 
time   when    these    questions    were    being   asked       copies   to senators   on  the  Opposition side. 
and  answered  was  a time of  great public conÿ  Senator    McManus7 1  join   in the  protest 
cern  about terrorism. which  has  been  offered by  Senator  Wright. I 
The   reasons  for  this  were  twofold.  Firstly,   do  so  because   it  is  obvious  from  statements 
in  June  1972,  a group  of  19  Croatian terrorÿ   which   have   appeared   in  the  Press   over  the 
ists crossed into Yugoslavia from Austria and past 2  days  that  members  of  the  Press  have 
engaged  in  terrorist  activities  in  Bosnia. Six  received  from  Senator  Murphy's office copies 
were Australian citizens and 3 others had of  the  statement  which  he  proposed  to make. 
previously  lived  in  Australia.  As  a  result  the    The  Press  was able to state categorically what 
Yugoslav Government presented  a  strongly  Senator Murphy  intended to  say.  I  make  a worded 
aideÿmemoire to the Australian Govÿ strong protest that members of the  Press  have ernment 
alleging, inter  alia,  that  the  headÿ  been  supplied  with  copies  of  the  proposed quarters   of  the  
HRB (Croatian   Revolutionary   statement  but honourable senators have not. 
Brotherhood)  were  located  in  Australia,  that  The   PRESIDENT7Order  !  When  a  Minisÿ 
th    A t li    G t   h d  id d   k      i  i    i  
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Govemment  side,  if they  have  copies,  to  surÿ   The  evidence7overwhelmin  g evidence7i  s  to 
render them to honourable senators on the be found in documents which I am about to 
Opposition side. I understand  that a sufficient table. 
number   of  copies   is  now  available and  they  These documents  come  from the files of the 
will be distributed to all honourable senators AttorneyÿGeneral's Department, the Commonÿ 
immediately. wealth   Police   and   the   Australian  Security 
Intelligence   Organisation.   I   point   out that 
Senator MURPHYÿThe second     factor    although some  of the documents  tabled contain 
which  highlighted  the  question  of  Croat  terÿ    a  classification  stamp  such  as  'secret'  or 'conÿ 
rorism   in   Australia   and   which    attracted    fidential' they  are  no  longer  so.  They  have  all 
special  attention  from  the  Commonwealth  and   been   declassified   and   no   breach   of  security 
State police was the occurrence of 2 bombing is involved in  tabling  them.  In  contrast  to  the 
incidents  in  Sydney  on  16th September 1972  last  Government's policy of  trying   to  sweep 
involving    premises    and    persons    connected   this   problem   under    the   rug,   we   propose    to 
with  the  Yugoslav   community.  These   inciÿ   bring  it into  the  full light of day.  I  now table 
dents   left    unaltered   the    then    Attorneyÿ    the    documents.    These    documents    establish 
General's statement that there was no  organised  beyond doubt  that  Croatian  terrorist  organiÿ 
terrorism among the Croatian  community  in  sations have  existed  and  do  exist  in  Australia 
Australia. One must assume also that the today.  There  is  incontestable evidence  that 3 
AttorneyÿGeneral    would   have    known    that   a     extreme   Croatian   terrorist   organisations exist 
cache of explosives and documents had been in  Australia today.  They  are  the  Croatian 
discovered in the Warburton Ranges outside Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB); the United 
Melbourne about the middle of 1972 and that Croats of West Germany (UHNj);  and  the 
amongst  these  documents   were  several  stating   Croatian    Illegal   Revolutionary  Organisation 
the aims and objects of an Ustashaÿtype orgaÿ (HIRO). There are 2 youth organisations  that 
nisation   known   as    HIRO   (Croatian   Illegal    have  very  revolutionary aims  and  have been 
Revolutionary Organisation). This is the very used as recruiting grounds for the 3 extreme 
organisation   to  which  the  Yugoslav Governÿ    terrorist  organisations.  These   youth organisaÿ 
ment's  aideÿmemoire made  reference.  Howÿ   tions  are   the   Croatian  Youth  (HM) and  the 
ever, when the Senate rose on  27th  October World  League  of  Croatian  Youths  (SHUMS). 
1972, neither the  AttorneyÿGeneral  nor  any There  are  2  umbrella  type  general  organisaÿ 
Other member of the Liberal Government had tions which by their publications,  training 
produced any evidence of the existence in  camps,  discussion groups, funds and  close  links 
Australia  of  organised  Croatian  terrorism and     with  their  national  organisations   provide the 
it held firmly to the position that no such eviÿ climate for the forming of the inspiration to 
dence existed. the   youth   groups   and   the  extreme  terrorist organisations.    These     umbrella   organisations 
are the Croation Liberation Movement (HOP) 
On   taking  over   the   office  of  Attorneyÿ   with  its  official Ustasha   movement  within it 
General, I considered it my duty to find out for (UHRO) and the Croatian National Resistance 
myself whether  this  was  true  and  to  inform  (HNO) and  its Croatian Armed Forces  (HOS). 
the Senate and the people of  Australia  of the  Also  tabled  is  a  summary  of  the  documents 
facts.  The  impending visit  to  this  country of    which  1 seek   leave  to  have incorporated. 
the  Prime Minister  of  Yugoslavia gave special The  PRESIDENT7I  s leave  granted? urgency  to  this  investigation since,  if the true 
picture  was different from that  painted by the        Opposition  Senators7No  . 
previous   Government,   the   present   Governÿ  The  PRESIDENT7Leav  e is  not  granted. 
ment was entitled  to entertain  grave fears for This question has been raised before and 1 have 
the   safety   of  our   distinguished guest   and ruled  that  matter should not be incorporated 
would  be   in  duty  bound  to  take  adequate in  Hansard  before  honourable senators have 
precautions   for  his  safety.  I  am  now in a had  a chance  to see it. 
position  to  state categorically that  the  Liberal       Senator    MURPHY7Th  e   summary   conÿ 
AttorneyÿGeneral's  oftÿrepeated  assertion  that tains,  inter  alia,   the   report   of   the   Crime 
there  is  no  credible  evidence  of  the  existence    Intelligence   Bureau    of   the  Commonwealth 
in Australia of organised Croatian extremism Police  force  dated 6th  March  1968;  papers  
cannot  be  sustained   The  contrary is  true  and  about the   notorious  Andric  brothers;  papers 
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the    Croatian    troika   terrorist   cell,  a   selfÿ  in which he was  named.  Among the documents 
contained  group of 3 terrorists consisting  of an seized  were  a  detailed  map  of  the area  where 
intelligence officer, a scout and an  explosives the  Bosnian  guerrillas  had illegally  entered expert; 
documents concerning all of the Croaÿ  the country, a letter discussing  an initial ruling tian 
organisations I have mentioned; and docuÿ  body of  an independent  Croatia  including, ments   
indicating  links  with  overseas terrorist significantly,  the  name  Rover  of whom more 
organisations as well as other related later,   and   a   receipt   from Wollongong Post 
documents.      Office   for  the   transmission   of  a  registered 
It is impossible to  draw  any  other  concluÿ  postal  article to one  Vegar  at Offenburg, Ausÿ sion    
from   the    evidence    than  that  Senator  tria; (Vegar was  one  of the guerrillas  killed in 
Greenwood,  on   the   most   charitable view of the    Bosnian   operation);   a   bank  slip  issued 
his conduct, displayed an irresponsible indifferÿ by the A NZ Bank. Wollongong, acknowledging 
ence   to   information  which   was available  to transmission    of   money    to   Vegar;  a  letter 
him   and   which   proved   up   to   the hilt  the detailing  future  plans   for  the recruitment of 
seriousness   of   the   problem   to which  Labor volunteers  to  Australia  for further incursions 
senators    repeatedly    attempted    to  alert  him. into   Yugoslavia.  One   of   the  letters   signed 
Let  me  give  a striking  example. The Yugoslav refers  to  the   fact  that  the 'financial resources 
aideÿmemoire   was   received   by the Australian of the organisation which we took with us from 
Government   on   16th   August  1972.  Among Victoria  as   well  as  those  received later, have 
those  named  in the  aideÿmemoire  as being one now  been   used   up'.  Does   this  sound like  an 
of   the   ringleaders   of   Croatian  terrorism  i3 individual   operating independently of   an 
one  Jure  Marie.  He  was  already  well known organisation?   The  Commonwealth Police cerÿ 
to   the   Commonwealth  Police.   He first came tainly  did  not   think   so.   Their  conclusion is 
under   notice   in   1963    after   a   group   of   6    as follows: 
Croatian   terrorists,  allegedly  from Australia, 
entered  Yugoslavia illegally  for the stated  purÿ  The   evidence    contained    in   this document   when 
pose of waging a guerrilla campaign  against  the taken  into  consideration  with  that  enumerated in the 
regime.  Marie was  linked with the organisation aforementioned   memorandum    of   7 November   1972, 
of this incursion. would  seem   to  irrefutably implicate Jure Marie with a Croatian  Nationalist  Organisation  which apparently 
Investigations conducted over a period of 4 exists  in  both  Australia  and  Europe  and  which  has years   
established    the   existence    in  Australia    been  engaged   in an  attempt  to  overthrow  the  recogÿ nised  Government  of  Yugoslavia. It is also considered 
of a terrorist organisation known as the HRB that, regardless of what this  organisation  is  called, 
(Croatian  Revolutionary  Brotherhood).  Marie  it  is  in  fact  a  resurgence   of  the   former  Croatian 
was one of  its  leaders. After  a  number  of  Revolutionary   Brotherhood   (HRB)  and   appears   to police   
raids   in   1967,   including   on   Marie's    involve  a  number   of  persons   who  were previously identified  as  members  of  the  HRB. As  you  will recall 
premises,  the  HRB appeared  to  become  moriÿ  in  our  initial  assessment of  the  allegations  made  in 
bund  in a formal organisational sense, although   the  Yugoslav  aideÿmemoire   presented    on   16  August 
as  we  now  know  it  continued  to  operate 1972,  we expressed  'serious  concern  about  the  possible 
through  troikas  or  cells. However,  Marie conÿ   existence    of  a  clandestine    terrorist   organisation in Australia'.  We  also   stated,   inter  alia:  With  regard  to 
tinued to be the subject of scrutiny by the the allegations about the HRB, I would draw your 
Commonwealth  Police  and  a  possible  proseÿ attention  to  our  earlier  reports   (reference   224/283 
cution  of  him  under the  Commonwealth  headed Croatian  Nationalist  Activities  in Australia,  
Crimes  Act  was  considered   in  October   1970.    dated  5 July  1972, and  reference X.61, headed  Srecko Blaz  Rover,  born  3 February   1920,  Sarajevo, Yugoÿ 
He  was  also  the  subject  of  memoranda from  slavia,  dated   20  April  1972)   indicating  the   possible 
the Commonwealth Police to the Attorneyÿ  resurgence  of a HRB type organisation.  In the  past  it 
General's Department   on   9th   August   1971   has   generally   been   assumed   that   the   HRB  as   such 
and   12th   September    1972.   In  view   of   fhe    ceased  to operate as  an  organisation  in Australia circa 1967ÿ1968.  In the  light of intelligence gathered  by this 
questioning  in  the  Senate  to  which  he   was   Force  over   the  past   nine  months,  the  allegations  of 
being  submitted  at  the  time  one  assumes  that  its  continued  existence  by  the  Yugoslav  Government 
the  formeT AttorneyÿGeneral  would  have seen     must  be  taken seriously. 
these   memoranda. 
The  police report  from  which  I  have quoted 
Marie  was one  of   those   whose   premises   is  dated   23rd  November   1972.   However,   a 
were searched by the  Commonwealth  Police  preliminary  report  on  documents seized  from 
under warrant on 22nd August 1972, following Marie,  Rover  and  others  was made  by  the 
receipt by the Australian Government of the Acting Commissioner of Commonwealth Polÿ 
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12th September   1972   and   the   Attorneyÿ   bland  interim  reply  was  given  to  the  Yugoslav 
General would   undoubtedly   have   seen  this   Government   on  20th  October   1972,  mentionÿ 
report.  Though   all  the   seized   documents   had   ing  that  the   matter   was  being   investigated   but 
not been  translated  at  this  stage,  there  were   making   no   admissions   about   the   presence  of 
references  to maps,  to the  receipt  for  the  Croatian terrorist organisations  in our midst, transmission of 
money to  Vegar  and  to  handÿ  even though  evidence of  the  existence  of  such written  items  relating  
to  the  Croatian  Revoluÿ organisations  was   in   the   possession  of   the tionary Brotherhood and the 
organisational AttorneyÿGeneral when the interim reply was infrastructure  of  a   troika   group.  In  
short,  on    given.   No   further  reply   to   these    allegations or  soon   after   12th   September    1972,   
the   then      was   ever   made  by  the   Liberal  Government to 
AttorneyÿGeneral was in  possession  of  eviÿ  the  Yugoslav Government.  Yet  the  conclusion 
dence that the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherÿ  reached by  the Commonwealth   Police   and hood  
had been  revived,  was  functioning  conveyed  to  the   AttorneyÿGeneral's   Departÿ actively,  and 
was  associated  with  the June ment  as  earlv  as  17th  August   1972.  was  in incursion  into 
Yugoslavia  which  had  been  the    these words: 
subject  of  complaint  in the  Yugoslav  Governÿ It7 ment's   aideÿmemoire   of   16th   August  1972. 
Yet on  19th September   1972 he  returned  to his    That is the  aideÿmemoire7 
denials   of    the    existence    of    any    Croatian    does  contain  a core  of  almost  irrebuttable fact. 
terrorist   organisation   in  Australia and  never  In  addition,  the  DirectorÿGeneral of ASIO 
resiled  from  that  standpoint   throughout   the   on  7th  September   1972  stated  in reference  to 
life of the Parliament. the  aideÿmemoire  in  a  letter  to  the Attorneyÿ 
General's  Department: 
A responsible AttorneyÿGeneral, aware of Also  in  general  terms,  some  of  the  information  is 
Marie's  past  role  as   a  leader   of  HRB,  aware    almost    certainly   inaccurate;   olher   portions  contain 
of  the  fact  that  Marie  had  been   named   as  a    elements    of  truth   but  appear   exaggerated;    and  yet 
terrorist  in  the  Yugoslav  document,  aware  of   other   statements   are   wellÿbased.   Overall  the   Aide 
the  anxieties  about  the  resurgence  of Croatian     Memoire   and   enclosures    contain   sufficient accurate material  to  suggest    that   it  would   be   illÿadvised to 
terrorism  expressed almost  daily  by  Labor   dismiss   the   allegations   as   either   exaggeration   or 
senators, would surely  not have  reacted  to  the fabrication  until  such  time  as  the  results  of  current 
raid  on  Marie's  premises   and  the   seizure  of     inquiries  are known. 
documents I have referred to in  the  way  in  ASIO never  retreated  from that  stand  and  subÿ 
which Senator Greenwood reacted. Let  us sequently  agreed  with me that the aideÿmemoire  
examine  his  conduct in  this  matter  in  some  contained a  core of  irrebuttable  truth.  And 
detail, since it is symptomatic of the previous yet, on 19th September, the AttorneyÿGeneral 
Government's   attitude   to   the   problem.  The    said  in this place: 
first  point  to  note   is  that  the   raid  on  Marie,    It comes  to  the  quesiion  whether  we should accept 
and   other  suspected   terrorists,  was   not  made    allegations    made   by   the   President    and   the   Prime 
at  the  AttorneyÿGeneral's  instigation. On 23rd    Minister   of   Yugoslavia   as   having   a  basis   in fact notwithstanding  that  our  investigation of those allegaÿ 
August, the day after the raids, in  reply  to a  tions  in  Australia  has  proved  that  the  allegations  
question from  Senator  O'Byrne,  he  stated  in  are  without  such  a basis.  Simply, it  comes  down  to 
part: this:  Does   this  Senate   accept   what  is  alleged by the 
The  position  as  I have  stated  it for several  weeks7         President    and   the   Prime   Minister   of  Yugoslavia  in 
that   there   is  no  credible  evidence   of  any  Croatian      
preference   to  what   our   own  Commonwealth Police
 
terrorist groups in Australia7stil  l stands. The searches    
have found and what I have stated?
 
which were made yesterday by Commonwealth Police It had taken the then AttorneyÿGeneral only a 
officers, together with State Police officers, were not month  to  forget  the  Commonwealth  Police's directed  towards  obtaining  any  such  evidence     .   . . 
I should   state   that   the  searches   yesterday    were  made          'core  of  almost  irrebuttable  fact',  and  less  than 
as part of a  police  investigation  and  were  made  a  fortnight  to  forget  the  cautionary  advice of 
without my knowledge. ASIO. 
I  think  that  honourable  senators  may  rememÿ        In  one  of  the  many  debates  on  this  subject 
ber the anger with which that was expressed. last year Senator Greenwood indignantly asked 
Parliament  rose  on  27th  October  without  any     me7Hansard   ,    page    9257whethe   r    I    gave 
information  being  given  to  the  Senate   about   greater   credence    to   the    allegations    of   the 
the  contents  of  the  seized  documents. Marie   Yugoslav  Government  than  to  the  statements 
had been named as a terrorist in the Yugoslav which he had made. The answer is: Yes, and 
Government  protest  presented  to  the  Austraÿ  so do  the  Commonwealth  Police  and ASIO  lian   
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were  not  enough   to  convict  the last Governÿ  Among  the  voluminous documents on Sulÿ 
ment, through its AttorneyÿGeneral, of misÿ jak and the Australian branch of the terrorist leading   
the   Parliament   and    the  nation, of organisation  UHNj which I have tabled today deceiving 
a friendly foreign power, of imperilÿ is a letter  dated 30th  May  1972 from Mr ling the  lives 
of Australian citizens by shutting   Davis, Commissioner of Commonwealth 
its eyes to the evidence of organised terrorism, Police,  to the  Department  of  Immigration. there 
is yet another, perhaps more glaring The  letter, a copy  of which  was  in the files of example  of  
the  existence  of  a  dangerous,  the  AttorneyÿGeneral's   Department, sets  out violent
 Croatian revolutionary terrorist    the  fact  of  the  existence   of this organisation, 
organisation in Australia.  its  meetings,  its officeÿholders and its involveÿ 
ment  in  breaches  of  the  peace  in  Sydney over 
This organisation, separate and distinct from the preceding months. 
the HRB7th  e Croatian Revolutionary Brotherÿ 
hood7i  s  the  Australian Branch  of  the  UHNj       A    brochure    produced    by    the    Special 
7th  e    League   of   United   Croats   of   West    Reports  Branch  of  the  Department  of  Immiÿ 
Germany. Its leader in Germany is one Ante gration  in August  1972  on  Croatian extremist 
Vukic  whom our  Commonwealth  Police  conÿ  activities  makes  special  reference   to   the 
sidered such a dangerous man that they advised UHNj, its organisation  in Australia, its activiÿ 
the Department of  Immigration  against  grantÿ  ties  and  its  members.  A copy of this brochure 
ing  him  a  permit  to  visit  Australia  in May  was   forwarded   to   the   AttorneyÿGeneral's 
1972. The organisation in  Germany was  Department  on  25th  August  .1972  and  it was 
associated over the last decade with attempted specifically  directed  by  the  Permanent  Head 
murders of Yugoslav officials and  attacks  on  of  the  AttorneyÿGeneral's Department to 
Yugoslav embassies and employed  strongÿarm  Senator  Greenwood  himself.  His  most  veheÿ 
squads to  threaten  other  Croats  living  in  ment  denials of  the   existence   of  extremist 
Germany for the purpose of either conscripting Croatian organisations followed shortly  after 
them into the  organisation  or  extracting  his  receipt  of  this  document,  which  is  among 
financial contributions. the  documents  tabled today. 
A  branch   of  this  murderous   organisation   Moreover,   if  the   former AttorneyÿGeneral 
was  formed in Sydney  around  June  1971  and    was   unwilling  to  accept   the  evidence   which 
its membership  and  activities were well known   abounded   in government  files, he  had  only  to 
to the Commonwealth Police, its meetings, read the  daily newspapers  to  discover  that  the 
ironically enough, are or  were  held  in  the  New  South  Wales  police  stated in court  proÿ 
Ulster Room of the Irish National Association ceedings  which  were  fully reported,  that  Sulÿ 
Hall  in  Devonshire  Street,  Sydney.  Its  leader   jak  was  a  member   of  what  was  described  in 
is a man with  a  particularly  violent  record  the  press  as a  Croatian  terrorist  movement, 
named  Jakov  Suljak. His name  will certainly    the  United Croats  of West Germany. 
not come  as a surprise  to the former Attorneyÿ 
General   since    he   wrote   to   the senator  on   When  Suljak  was  arrested   on 19th October 
25th   October    1972,   after  being arrested  on  1972   a  considerable    quantity  of  documents 
a  charge  of  assault  and  mentioned  in  the  was seized  from  his  dwelling.  These  docuÿ course 
of his  letter  that  he  had also  been ments  established  the  fact  of  transmission of accused of the 
'city bombings', an  obvious funds  from  the  Australian  branch  to  the reference  to  the  
bombing.'  in   Sydney  on   parent   body  in  Germany.  A number  of phoÿ 16th September  
1972. tographs    of   armed    men    were   also  found, 
including  one   in  which   Suljak  can   be seen 
ln June 1969 Suljak was jailed in South standing beside  a Ustashi  flag in the  company 
Australia for a period of 9 months for 2 parÿ of other armed men. There is  no  doubt  that 
ticularly brutal assaults. He had already been the members of  the  Sydney  branch  of UHNj 
charged with similar offences  on  5 separate  consider  themselves Ustashi. Both  the  letter 
occasions and is  at present   on   bail  pending   of  Commissioner   Davis  of  30th   May  1972, 
trial  for assault  and  being  found in possession    and  his  detailed  report  of  26th  October   1972 
of an unlicensed  pistol.  On  llth  November  refer  to  incidents  in  which  the  organisation 
1969,  the  Commissioner  of  Commonwealth  was  involved  which  clearly  demonstrate   its 
Police, Mr J. Davis, recommended that he be Ustashi allegiance. For example, they publicly 
deported,  but  his  recommendation  was  not  displayed   an   Ustashi   flag  at  Sydney  airport 
acted  upon. and   also   at   a  Croatia   versus   Yugal soccer 
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match  in Sydney  on 15th August 1971. Several months  imprisonment.  This  was  not a simple 
of their members  have  admitted  to the  police  firearms offence. When  he  left Australia hurÿ 
that they  consider themselves Ustashi.  riedly on  19th May 1972  Marincic took with 
In  an  article  by  Suljak  in the  Novemberÿ   him  a  rifle  and  4  silencers   which  he conÿ 
December   1971  edition  of  the   organisation's    cealed  in a toy koala. 
paper   'Croatian   Call',   he   urged   Croats   in       Senator  Withers7Ho  w could  he  conceal  a 
Australia  to support  UHNj and stated: rifle and  4 silencers  in a toy  koala? 
It  is  our   duty  to  support   the  Croatian  Liberation  Senator  MURPHY7Th  e 4  silencers   were 
struggle     .  .  . for   without   a    bloody    shirt   there     concealed   in  a  toy  koala.  When   the rifle was will be  no  Independent  State  of Croatia. discovered      the     German   authorities    refused 
He does not confine his appeals  to  the  jourÿ  him  entry  and  he  returned  to Australia with nalistic   
level  but   regularly  'stands  over'  other gun    and   silencers.   He  also   was in possession 
Croats   for donations   to the cause. of  a   booklet   in   the   SerboÿCroatian language 
At this  point  honourable  senators  might containing  instruction  on sabotage  and  of the 
well  ponder   a  few  questions.   Why  was   this   names   and   addresses   of  Ambroz  Andric in 
man, Suljak, not deported in 1969 as recomÿ France, Adolf Andric in Germany  and  Pave 
mended   by  the   Commissioner   of  Commonÿ    Vegar  in  Germany.  AH 3 of  these  men were 
wealth Police?  Why  has  his  organisation,   named   in  the   Yugoslav   Government   aideÿ 
which flaunts  its  Ustashi allegiance,  and  memoire  as  participants  in the  Bosnian incurÿ 
which  is  acknowledged   by  ASIO  in  another    sion and it will be recalled that Jure Marie had 
document which is tabled  today,  to be  a terÿ  also  maintained  contact  with  Vegar.  Al! 3 
rorist  organisation,  been  allowed  to  continue   were  killed  in this adventure,  according  to the 
in existence? And, above all, why was this Yugoslav Government. Surely it  is  a reasonÿ  
existence  denied  by Senator Greenwood? able   inference   that   Marincic  went   to Gerÿ many  to join the  Bosnian  incursion or at least 
A  rather   surprising   beneficiary   of   the   to  help equip  it. 
former AttorneyÿGeneral's benevolence is 
one   Zdenko   Marincic.   Marincic   arrived   in   On   18th   October   1972,    the    Assistantÿ 
Australia   on   16th   January   1970.   He  became     Director  of  the  Special   Reports   Branch  of the 
Secretary    of   SHUMS   (Union   of   Croatian    Department     of    Immigration recommended 
United  Youth  of  the  World),  which,  despite   Marincic's deportation.  In weighing up all the 
its innocent sounding  name,  is  under  thc considerations,  including  Marincic's  probable 
effective control of Srecko Rover and  is  fate  if returned  to  Yugoslavia,  the  Assistantÿ 
suspected    by   the   Commonwealth    Police  of    Director said: 
being  an  extremist   front  organisation   (see   letÿ        I  believe   the   strong   doubts   which   exist   about    his 
ter from J. Davis to  the  AttorneyÿGeneral's  past  and  future  involvement  in  potentially  violent 
Department,   dated    8th   June   1972).   He  first    Balkan   politics should  be   exercised    in  favour  of Ausÿ tralia   and   therefore   recommend    that   Zdenko Marinÿ 
attracted   police   attention   on   29th   November  cic   be   deported.   Such   action,   I  suggest   will  have   a 
1970  when  he  removed   a  Yugoslav  flag from   salutary   effect  unon   those   Croatians   u/ho    u«e   Ausÿ 
the balcony of the Southern Cross Hotel in  tralia  as  a  base  for  pursuit of  their  ideals  and  will  
Melbourne    during    Yugoslav     National    Day     also   provide   the   Yugoslav   authorities   with  a positive indication   that    Australia   neither    supports    nor  ronÿ 
celebrations  and  burned  it. For this offence he    dones  extremism. 
was  convicted  on  9th   February   1972   and   I  venture   to  suggest   that   they are   sentiments fined. with    which    the    overwhelming  major'ty  ot 
On    19th   May   1972    Marincic  hastily   left    Australians    would    agree.    These   sentiments, 
Australia.  This  was  shortly  before  the  'Bosÿ   however,   did  not   find  favour  with   the   then 
nian  incident'  which  has   already   been  referred    AttorneyÿGeneral. 
to. Marincic  turned  up  in  Frankfurt,  Gerÿ   In  a  long  and  carefully argued  submission 
many,  but   the   German   authorities   refused   to  the  Minister  for  Immigration dated   12th 
him entry. He had  not  obtained  a  reÿentry  November  1972,  Senator  Greenwood  reversed 
permit before leaving Australia, so he has no the  priorities as  between  the  interests  of Ausÿ 
right  at all  to  be here.  Nonetheless  he   tralia  and   those  of  an   obvious  Croatian   terÿ 
returned to Australia on  24th  May  1972  and  rorist  in favour of the latter. His letter, which 
was  immediately  arrested   and   charged   the   is  among   the   documents   tabled,   should   be 
ne t da  ith ha ing a firearm in his possesÿ l l   t di d  b    h   i   i t t d 
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regard   for  men  whose   preferred methods  of matters,   we  can   only   reach  one  conclusion 
asserting their political beliefs  are  the  bomb  about  his  conduct  in  this  matter:  In order to and 
the gun. Let me quote  just  one passage protect  a  terrorist from deportation, he misinÿ from 
this extraordinary letter: formed   the Minister  responsible for   the 
1 appreciate  your  concern  that  Marincic is  a perÿ issuance  of  a  deportation   order   about   the son   
whom  we  could  not  safely  allow  to remain in legal  consequences  for the  terrorist  of  such an 
Australia.  I understand   your  apprehension   is that he  order. is a man  with  a propensity  to  violence  and  that, >n view  of recent  happenings  involving violence  to perÿ 
sons   and   property,  we  have   a paramount obligation  This is a serious  charge  but  is supported by 
to  the  Australian  community  to  remove him from  an  earlier   example   of Senator   Greenwood's the 
country. benign   view  of  the  rights  of terrorists. This 
Naturally I  share  your  apprehension  that  we   case   involved   none   other   than Jure  Marie, should  
knowingly  allow  a person  of violent procliviÿ   about  whom I have  already  said  a great deal. ties  to  remain  in this  country  if he  is an  immigrant 
whom  we can  deport.  But  this  is  a matter   of balancÿ  On   4th    July    1972   the    AttorneyÿGeneral's 
ing the  likely  harm to  Australia  against (he  conseÿ Department  put  a  submission  to  him that  he 
quences  of  deportation.  It  is  relevant   in  each   case   to   should   recommend    that  Marie's   application 
note the country to which a person  will be  deported.  for  a  passport   be   refused.  The   officer of  the 
I  have     indicated     the    traditional   and    accepted Department    who   made    this   recommendation rule7applicabl  e not only in the past in this  country 
but  also  in the USA and  the UK7tha  t deportation    pointed  out  that  ASIO's latest  report  and  the 
or extradition does not take  place  where  a person  is most  recent  Commonwealth Police  report  on 
likely to be dealt  with  for his political  opinions  by  Marie  indicated  that  he  was  deeply  involved 
thc country to which he is sent. I believe that this in Croatian nationalist activities and was preÿ 
outweighs  all other considerations in this case. pared    to   support    acts    of   violence  against 
In the event, Marincic is still among us. Howÿ Yugoslavia, that  there  was  a  real possibility  
ever misguided one might consider an Attorÿ that he would, if granted a passport,  be  a 
neyÿGeneral who placed the interests of an participant  in acts  of  violence directed  against 
obvious terrorisi ahead of the interests of the Yugoslavia and that, if this occurred, it would 
Australian people, there might  be  some  who  be  an  embarrassment  to  Australia's  relations 
would be impressed by the countervailing with Yugoslavia. Senator  Greenwood  rejected 
libertarian considerations on which his subÿ this advice from his  Department  and  was  not 
mission is  apparently  based.  There  is, howÿ  in  favour of  refusing the  passport  to  Marie. 
ever, a fatal flaw in this argument, which Fortunately,  the  Minister  for Immigration did 
assumes    that    the    deportation    of  Marincic    not  grant  Marie's application. 
would  inevitably  place  him  at  the  mercy of 
the Yugoslav police. The chief law officer of In a previous debate  on this subject Senator 
Australia must have been familiar with the Greenwood  indignantly repudiated  the  charge 
decision of  the  High  Court  in  the  case  of  that he  was   'soft'   on   Croatian   terrorists. Znaty 
v. The Minister of State  for  Immigraÿ  Surely  that  was a  mild  charge  to  lay  at  the tion  and  
Another  (1972  Argus  Law  Reports    door  of a  man  whom the  documents  prove to 
page  545).  Judgment  in  this  case  was  delivÿ  have  been the  active  protector of  terrorists! 
ered  on  25th  February   1972,  that  is, some  9    On  21st    September 1972,   2 highÿranking 
months prior to the letter to the Minister for officers of the AttorneyÿGeneral's Departÿ Immigration urging    him    not to    deport    ment,  alarmed  by  recent  events, especially the 
Marincic.   bombings   in  the  streets  of  Sydney,  called on 
The judgment of the  Court  in  that  case  him  and  drew  to  his  attention  certain  Croaÿ 
clearly  established  the  right  of  the  Governÿ  tian   publications   and   discussed   the   various 
ment to deport a person to anywhere.  Counsel  Croatian  organisations. Their  submissions to 
briefed   by   the   AttorneyÿGeneral  submitted the   AttorneyÿGeneral   are   among  the  docuÿ 
that  the  law  was   and   had   been  since   1903   ments   produced   today   to  the  Senate.  One  of 
that the Government is not bound to send the these officers, who had  been  specially  assigned 
deportee  back  to  the  place   from  which   he   6  years   earlier   to  Croatian   affairs  and   was 
came  and  the  Court  approved   that  submisÿ   considered  in the  Department  to be  the  expert 
sion.  If  we  assume  that  he  was  familiar  with  on  this  subject,  expressed   the  view  that  2 of 
this decision and surely  he  would  not  underÿ these  organisations,  HOP and  HNO,  'were  not 
take  to  advise   the  Minister  for Immigration primarily cultural but political and militarist'. 
without familiarising himself with  the  upÿtoÿ  A f  k   l t   thi  ffi    li d f 
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The tone of the last Government's attitude The Minister  recommended that  the  Governÿ 
towards  Croatian  terrorism  was   set   as   long   ment   should   make   a   strong   statement   that 
ago as  27th  August  1964 by  Sir  Robert  outrages  'of  this  kind  will  not  be   tolerated'. 
Menzies. His statement was  precipitated  by  a  That  was  Mr Lynch  in  government. Mr 
complaint  by the Yugoslav Government  followÿ   Lynch   out   of    government    speaks    in   a 
ing 2 incidents: different  tone.   Last  week   he   condemned the 
(1)  The  1963 guerrilla  incursion  into  precautions taken to   protect   the   visiting  
Yugoslavia  by  6  Croatians  previously  resident    Yugoslav Prime Minister as 'hysterical'. 
in Australia. Sir    Garfield    Barwick,    then    Minister for 
(2)  The  discovery  of  a  militaryÿstyle  trainÿ  External  Affairs,  also  expressed  his  concern 
ing    camp     for    Croatian    extremists     near     shortly  after  the   1963   incursion  into Yugoÿ slavia.  In  a  letter  addressed   to  the  Attorneyÿ 
Wodonga,  Victoria. General    and    the    Minister    for  Immigration 
M r   Menzies  gave   a  little  lecture  on  Balkan    dated  6th January   1964,  he  wrote, in part: 
history  and   stated   that   police  'had  found  no        In essence,  thc  problem  is  one  of  'keeping  an eye' 
evidence whatever to support allegations of  on  immigrant  extremists,  while  operating  within  the 
Ustashi violence towards  individuals  of  framework  of  existing  law  and  practice.  We should 
Yugoslav  nationality'. Mr  Menzies  went  on  to    
not    abandon      our    democratic     principles    of tree 
speech,  belief  and  association   but  I  would  hope  that 
say: migrants    are    left   with   no   misunderstanding  of  the 
It   is  understandable     that   some   Yugoslav   migrants      disfavour    with   which    the  Government     would   view 
of  Croatian   origin  should  continue  to  hope   for the     any   activities  which   might   reasonably    give   rise to establishment   of an  independent   Croatia  and  within a    objections    by    the    present     governments     of  their 
democracy like Australia they have a Tight to advocate countries of 
origin.  With  this  end  in  mind,  I should 
their   views   so   long   as    they   do   so   by  legitimate     like  to  suggest    that   the   Australian   Security Intelÿ 
means. 
ligence    Organisation    should    maintain   some  superÿ vision over migrant groups  (making no attempt  to disÿ 
That  is  a  reasonable  proposition but  I  leave  it   guise  its surveillance)  and  bring  lo your  attention any 
to  honourable  senators  to  judge  whether   the    activities   which   might   be   considered    to  have  conÿ travened  sections  30 (A) or  30 (C)  of  the  Crimes Act. 
'means'  1 have  disclosed  today  are  'legitimate'.   In  appropriate  circumstances,   it  may,  be  necessary   to 
The  long  list  of  unsolved   crimes  of  violence   consider   the   desirability  of   prosecutions   under   the 
tells an eloquent story of the indifference of Act as a further deterrent to uncontrolled extremism, 
governments    of   23    years    duration   to   the     although  this measure  need   not  be  adopted   except   in thc  last resort. 
'means'   used   by  Croatian  extremists   to attain 
the  goals Mr Menzies  smiled  on  so  benignly.  The  story  which  I  have  unfolded  today   and 
The police  have  done  their  best  with  inadeÿ  the  documents  which  I  have  tabled  show  how 
quate  resources  and  no  encouragement.  They  little  heed  was paid  to  the   warnings   of  Mr 
could hardly fail to draw the conclusion that Lynch and Sir Garfield Barwick.  Indeed  one 
successive   Liberal   governments   could   not    can   only  agree  with  the   comments   made  by 
have  cared  less  whether  they  succeeded  or  not   one  prominent  politician  in  a  letter  which  he 
in crushing  Croatian  terrorism.  To  be  sure, wrote  to  the then  AttorneyÿGeneral  on  16th 
there were sporadic cries of alarm  from  indiÿ  December  1969.  His  comments  included  the 
vidual    Ministers.    For    example     on     3rd   following: 
December   1969,   the    Honourable    Philip    The  extremists   themselves   may  by  now  have  come 
Lynch,  then  Minister  for  Immigration,  wrote   to  believe   that  they  can  act  with  impunity  and  that 
to  the  then  AttorneyÿGeneral Hughes  expressÿ    they  can   therefore,  without   risk  to  themselves,   step up  the  level  and  frequency of violence. ing: 
He went  on  to express some concern that: 
.    .    .   concern    al  the   likely   serious  consequences               On   the   only  occasion    when   an   offender  (who  was 
if  Croat  nationals in  Australia  are  permitted  to  conÿ  arrested   at  the  time  of  committing   the  offence in  the tinue 
unchecked  their   terrorist  activities  and   outraaes   course  of  a  public  demonstration)   was   brought  before against     
representatives     of   the    Yugoslav   Government     a  court,  he   was   fined  an  amount    which   might  have and   
authority  generally   in  this  country.  1 have  reason        left    an     impression      with     the     Yugoslav      missions to   
believe  that  the   terrorists  are    endeavouring    to    here    .   .    .   that   tbe  Australian  authorities   did  not create    
the    impression    amongst     Yugoslav    migrants  in       take  the  matter seriously. Australia  that  the   Croatian  extremists   have   the supÿ 
port  of  significant sections  of  Australian  society  and  For  the  benefit  of  honourable   senators   who 
even  the  government.  1 am  moreover  concerned  with   are  interested,  those  comments  came  from  the 
the likely, effect upon our relations with Yugoslavia, Rt  Hon.  William  McMahon,  when he  was 
especially    in  terms   of   our   migration  arrangements      Minister  for External AfTairs   Even  after these              
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one which ASIO described to me as that of dinating Committee of  Croatian  Associations 
'indifference' to the problem of Croatian terÿ  in  Australia).  Affiliated  with  the Committee 
rorism.  In  the   view  of  ASIO  the  organisation   are    such    important    organisations    as    HOP 
was   not  given   proper   ministerial  directives  in   (Croatian    Liberation    Movement),    HNO 
regard  to Croatian terrorism. (Croation     National    Resistance)     and    UHNj 
Passing  reference  has  been  made  to  Srecko     (United Croats of West Germany). 
Rover.  He  is  a leader  of  the  Croatian  Liberaÿ    Now   that  it  is  clear   that   the  new  Governÿ 
tion   Movement   in  this   country   and,   indeed,    ment    intends    to   cope    vigorously   with    the 
he  is  a  world  figure  of  considerable  imporÿ   problem   of   Croatian   terrorism   we  hope   and 
tance   among   emigrant   Croats.   He   is    the    believe  that  it will  be  possible   to  gain  the  coÿ 
leader of  HNO   (Croatian   National   Resisÿ  operation   of   that   vast   majority  of   peaceful 
tance),   based   in   Melbourne   and   linked  with   Croatian   citizens   who  are   the   first  victims of 
the  Spanish headquarters  of  the  organisation.  the fanatical   minority   of   their   countrymen 
Among  the  documents  tabled   today   is  a  copy     who    engage     in    terrorism.    The    documents 
of  an  interview   between   a   Commonwealth   tabled   show   that  Croatians   have  been  intimiÿ 
Police   officer  and   Rover.   The   latter   admits   dated   to   contribute   money   to   the    terrorists. 
that  he  will  use   any  means  possible   to  achieve      The   measures   which  we  propose   will  put   an 
an  independent   Croatia;   claims   to  know  that   end   to  this.  What  I  have  said   about   Croatian 
one of the Andric brothers  (since  killed  in the  terrorism  applies  to  all  terrorism.  I  point  to  
Bosnia  incursion)  made  the  pen  bomb  which  the  case  of  the  Bulgarian   terrorists, Daskaloff 
exploded in  Richmond  Town Hall  on  2nd  and  Petroff,  who  were  convicted  of throwing 
September  1967,   gravely   injuring   a   young   a   bomb    into   the    grounds    of   the    Russian 
man;  advocates the  violent  overthrow  of  the  Embassy in  Canberra  and were   sentenced   to 
Yugoslav    Government.    Documents    seized  in    terms    of    imprisonment.    Despite    that   these 
the  raid  on Rover's home  in  August   1972,   men   were   clearly   liable   for  deportation,   the 
copies  of  which  are  tabled  today  including  a  previous   Goernment   did  not  deport   them  and 
map  of the  route  to  be  followed  by  the  incurÿ    they are still in our midst. sionists,      prove      conclusively      his     personal 
involvement    with   the    Bosnia     incursion  of 
June 1972. Also seized was a seal  bearing  the  d  
The  present  Government's policy  will  be  to 
insignia   of  the   Supreme   Headquarters   of   the     a
eport   aliens   associated   with  terrorist organisÿ 
Croatian    National   Resistance    and    the   Croaÿ   tions   who  have   been  convicted   of  crimes  of 
tian   Armed   Forces,    ammunition    and    docuÿ     violence,    and    become    liable   to deportation. 
ments   relating  to  the   instigation of guerrilla Recommendations    have   been  made  that  cerÿ 
activity in Yugoslavia. tain  persons   be   deported,   not necessarily  to the    country    from   which   they    came. AH 
Senator    Rae7No  t    in   Australia   but   in  proper   procedures   and   safeguards   of   civil 
Yugoslavia. liberties   will  be   observed.    The  Minister for Immigration   makes    the   necessary   orders.  The 
Senator    MURPHY7I   s   the     honourable    new  policy is to  cut  out  the  cancer  of  terrorÿ 
senator  implying  that because  the  guerrilla  ism   from  our  body  politic.  This  should  apply 
activity took place in Yugoslavia and not in to  all who  are  liable  to  deportation  and  from 
Australia this should be of no account to the whom violence can be  apprehended.  The  law 
Government of Australia? A most significant will  be  used to  deal  with  terrorism  and  vioÿ 
document     seized     was     a    report     from   the   lence. 
Supreme  Advisory Council of the  troika dated 
15th   July   1972,   indicating  that   an   organisaÿ    Important  changes  will  also  be  macle  in our 
tion  has   been  set   up  in  Australia  on  the  basis       police   and   security  arrangements.   Pending   the 
of  small  cells  or   troikas.   The   manner   in   full  report  on  the  operations   of  ASIO  and  its 
which  these  troikas  operate  is  set   out  in detail     relations   with  the  executive   government  which 
in a report from  the  Commonwealth Police  1  intend  to  present  to  Parliament  during  this 
prepared   on   6th   March   1968   which   was    session,    the   DirectorÿGeneral    of   ASIO   will 
always   available   to  the   former  AttorneyÿGenÿ   operate   mainly   from   Canberra.    This    will 
eral   and   which   is   among   the   documents   ensure  closer   liaison  with  the  Australian Govÿ 
tabled   today.   In  a  move   to  establish  himself     ernment    and    the   Commonwealth    Police   in 
as  the  leader  of  Croatian  nationalism  in Ausÿ   combating   terrorism    In   the   past   there   has 
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their   operations    overlapped.   Tliis   is  a  problem  1  should   like  to  add   a  word  about   events of to  
which  1  have   given   much   attention   in   the   last  week.   I  am   advised   that   terrorists came  to past   
few weeks.  Canberra    last   week   with   the   intention of  killÿ 
Another   problem   is   that   matters  of  national ing   the    Yugoslav    Prime    Minister.   The Comÿ 
security  often involve  breaches  of  State  crimiÿ missioner of  Commonwealth   Police, Mr  J. 
nal  law. This  has  often meant  that  ASIO  has  Davis,  advised   me   that,   frustrated  in  that not  
been  supplied  with  information  which  ambition  by  security   precautions, the  terrorÿ bears on 
matters of national security. The ists might make an alternative  attempt  on the conclusion  I  have  
drawn  from this  is that we life  of   the   Australian  Prime  Minister  (Mr 
need federal laws to cover crimes which may  Whitlam)  or  other  Ministers  of the  Governÿ 
affect national security. ment.  The  unanimous  opinion  of  the  Federal 
law  enforcement  authorities  was   that  it was 
Senator   Rae7On  e   political  police  force?  Is    unsafe   for  the   Australian  Prime   Minister   to 
that  what you intend? walk  through  the   Port  Kembla Steelworks of 
Senator   Webster7Wit   h Senator   Murphy   as    Broken   Hill  Pty  Co.  Ltd  on  Wednesday   last. 
head  of the police.  In  this  situation,  I  make   no  apology for any 
Senator MURPHY7Befor e honourable   steps   which  I  took   last   week   to  ensure  that 
senators  opposite  continue  with  interjections I the intentions   of violent terrorists were 
think  they would  be better advised   to  wait   thwarted. Those  who  take  the  view that those and    
see    what   recommendations   have   been precautions    were   unnecessary  because  nothing 
made  in the  past  and  from  what distinguished happened   are  indulging  in  a  twisted form of 
quarters,  which  1 am  not  in  a  position to put logic.  Toleration  of  terrorism  in this country 
now before the Senate but which I assure is over. Whatever we import  from the rest of honourable 
senators  I will put later. the  world  we  do  not  need  that.  This Governÿ 
ment   is  determined   that   terrorism in Australia 
I intend to recommend to Cabinet  that  legÿ will  be  resolutely  stamped  out. A  list of  the islation  be   
introduced  for  new or  strengthened documents   has   already   been    tabled along  with 
Federal    criminal   laws    to   deal  with  offences the   other   documents.   1  ask    for  leave to  have 
such    as    the   use    of   telephones    or postal  serÿ it  and   a  summary   of  the   documents incorporÿ 
vices  to  convey  threats  to persons  or property;     ated  in Hansard. committing    an    act    of    violence    against  a 
foreign  guest   of  the   Australian  Government;  The  PRESIDENT7i   s leave  granted?  There 
against    diplomatic  or   consular  personnel   or being no objection, leave  is granted. 
premises or    against persons      or premises (The    list  and  summary   read as  follows)7 
engaged     in   or   used    for  overseas   or  interstate 
trade     ancl     commerce;     acts     of  violence   or LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO 
threats   of   violence   against  Australian  Minisÿ 
CROATIAN  TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
 IN AUSTRALIA 
ters  or  officials of  the  Australian Government  APPENDIX A 
and   others;   acts   or   threats   of   violence   or  Document   A.17Th  e  Menzies  Statement   of  27th 
extortion   by  aliens;  inciting  in Australia acts August 1964. 
of  violence  against  a  person   or  property  in  a  Document   A.27Lette  r  from   Dr   Hefer   to  Mr 
foreign state with which  Australia has friendly Menzies   received   2nd  September   1964. 
relations  or  to  collect  nioney  or  to  train   perÿ        Document  A.37Lette  r by  Sir  Garfield  Barwick  as Minister for External Affairs to the AttornevÿGeneral 
sons   in   the   use    of   weapons,  explosives  or of 6th January 1964. 
poisons   in  Auslralia   for  this   purpose.   I   will       Document   A.47Notatio  n   by   Mr  Snedden   when 
also    propose    legislation    to    supplement    the    AttorneyÿGeneral,    on    a    departmental    submission 
powers already possessed  hy  the  Australian dated 25th  September  1964  relating  to  prosecution  of Government   
to   prevent    the    entry   into   Ausÿ     
certain Croatians.
 Document  A.S7ASI  O  Position  Paper  of  1st May 
tralia   of   terrorists  or  persons   associated    with    1967. 
organised   crime.  The   Commonwealth  Police  Document    A.67ASI  O    Position   Paper    of    1st 
will  be  strengthened,  especially  in its criminal October  1967. 
investigation    unit.    The    Commissioner    had     B
Document  A.77Repor  t  of  the  Crime Intelligence ureau  of    the    Commonwealth    Police    dated  6th 
requested the previous Government to  be  supÿ  March  1968  on  the  Croatian  Revolutionary Brotherÿ 
plied  with  extra  staff  and  additional  translaÿ   hood  (HRB). 
tors  but  this  request   fell  on  deaf  ears.  These        Document  A.87Lette  r by  Mr Lynch,  when Minisÿ 
requests have now been examined by my ter  for  Immigration to the  then  AttorneyÿGeneral Department,    
found   to    be    reasonable    and     dated  3rd December 1969. 
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Document   A. 107Commonwealt  h   Police   comments  Document   B. 117Lette  r   by   Srecko   Rover   to   the 
upon  the  two preceding Ministerial letters. GovernorÿGeneral     dated     20th    October,    1972    comÿ 
Document   A.ll7ASI   O  comments   on  the   two  preÿ     plaining    about    Her    Majesty    the    Queen's    visit  to 
ceding  Ministerial letters. Yugoslavia. 
Document    A.127Repor  t    of    conference    between Y
Document  
.
B.127Aim  s and  objects  of  the  Croatian 
Commonwealth   Police   and   ASIO  held   on  17th   Febÿ outh  (H.M ). 
ruary   1970  in  respect  of  the  Rolovic  Note  deh%ered th
Document   B.137Th  e
r 







to  the Australian Government.  e World League  of C oatian  Youth (S H.U M.S. . 



















R.O    and the anscr pt    o committal   procee ing in  Victoria 
( H Do°ument   A. 147Memorandu  m  from  thc  Attorneyÿ against   its  leaders. 
General's  Department   dated    10th  June   1972   to   the         Document    B.l57Lette   r   by   Joint    Committee   of 
AttorneyÿGeneral advising of the Croatian Illegal Croatian  Organisations  in  New  South  Wales to  Prime 
Revolutionary  Organisation   'HIRO). Minister   McMahon  dated   3Ist  August, 1972. 
Document   A.l 57Recor  d   of  interview  prepared   by Document   B. 15A7Cop  y   of   police   reports   on   the 
Senator    Greenwood    when    AttorneyÿGeneral,   of   his      United  Croats   of  West   Germany (U.H.Nj.). 
interview   with   the   Yugoslav   Ambassador    on   19th Document    B.l67Oal   h   of   the    Croatian   Revoluÿ 
July 1972. . _ ,  .    tionary  Brotherhood (H.R.B.). 
Document A.167Pres  s Statement     by    Senator Document  B. 177Th  e  papers of  Adolf  Andric. 









pen   bomb, 
1972  
ichmond  T  wn  Hall.  2nd  Sep ember    19 7. 
Document A. 177Pres  s    Statement     by    Senator Document   B.187Th  e  Jure   Marie  papers  of  May, 1 9 6 7 ÿ Greenwood,      when      AttorneyÿGeneral,     dated l l t h 
August   1972   relating   to   the   armed   incursion   into  Document     B. 197Recor  d     of    interview   by    Sgt. 
Yugoslavia. .  .  . . « George  of  the  Commonwealth  Police  with Jure Marie D cument    A. 187Cop  y   of   a   submission    by   the     of  5th  June,  1968. u 
 
 
AttorneyÿGeneral's     Department     to    the    Attorney.  Document B.207Th  e    Jure     Marie    papers    of 
General    relating   to   a   passport   application by  Jure August. 1972. 
Marie. Document     B.217Recor  d    of    interview    by    Sgt. 
Document    A. 197Lette  r    by   Senator    Greenwood,     Brown    of    the    Commonwealth    Police    with    Blaz 
when   AttorneyÿGeneral,   to   the   Foreign Minister, Mr Kraljevic  on  8th  August. 1972. 
Bowen, dated  27lh November  1972. Document B.227Ma  p     of part of Germany 
Document    A.207Letter  s   by   Senator   Greenwood, obtained    at    the    premises    of    Pericic    in    August, 
when  AttorneyÿGeneral,  to  the  Minister for Immigraÿ  1972. 
tion    Dr   Forbes,    dated    29th   June  1972    (passport Document     B.237 A   news    sheet   entitled   'Report 
application  by  Josip  Bogut)  and  12th  November  1972     from  Revolutionary Front'. 
(deportation  of  Marincic). Document    B.247Lette  r   from   H.R.B.   Europe    to 
APPENDIX B A.S.I.O.   and    letter    relating   thereto    by    A.S.I.O. to Document  B.l7Constitutio   n of  the  Croatian  Liberÿ     
Department  of Immigration.
 Document   B.257Cop  y  of  a  CommonweaUh  Police 
ation Movement (HOP). report   upon   $300   being  forwarded  to Sweden  from 
Document   B.27Constitutio  n  of   the   official   Croaÿ    Mount  Gambier.  South  Australia. 
tian   Ustashi  Movement'  and  the  seventeen  principles  Document   B.267Cop  y   of   a   memorandum    from 
of the Ustashi.   . the   Australian  Embassy,  Washington,  to  the  Departÿ 
Document B.37Correspondenc  e between Josip     ment  of  Foreign  Affairs  about   the   American  governÿ 
Kovac  of  Canberra   and  Srecko  Rover  of  Melbourne    ment's  attitude  on Yugoslavia. 
dated  14th and  21st  July 1972. Document   B.277Photograph  s   of  bomb   incident  in 
Document  B.47Cop  y  of  a  letter  to  Prime Minister     Sydney  on   16th  September,  1972. 
McMahon   by   the   Croatian Coÿordinative  Committee APPENDIX C 
of  Victoria  dated   25th  May  1972  complaining  about  Document   C.l7Publicatio   n  entitled  'Ustasa',  1941ÿ 
the  cancellation  of Srecko Rover's passport. 1971. Document     B.57Lette  r    to    the    AttorneyÿGeneral 
from  Ljubomir Vuina dated  23rd September, 1972. Document C.27Publicatio  n entitled 'Pregled', Document    B.6 (a)7Cop  y   of   a   record   of   A.B.C.     March,  1972. 
television  interview  with  Tomislav  Lesic  on  19th Sepÿ  Document    C.2A7Lette   r   by   A.S.I.O.   dated   24th 
tember,   1972. April.  1972   to  the   then AttorneyÿGeneral. 
Document   B.6 (b)7Cop  y  of   a  record   of  interview  Document    C.37Publicatio  n    entitled     'Spremnost', 
on  A.B.C. television  wilh  Fabian  Lovokovic on 20th August,  1972. . 
September,  1972. Document  C.47Publicatio  n  entitled  'Uzdamca . 
Document   B.77 A  series  of  photographs   taken   at  Document  C.57Publicatio  n  entitled 'Vjesnik'. 
the  Wodonga  Training Camp  in 1963.  Document C.67Publicatio  n entitled 'Hrvatska 
Document     B.87Constitutio  n    of    the    Australian Drzava',  February,  1973. 
Croatian  National  Resistance7Oceani   a  (H.N.O.). Document   C.77Publicatio  n   entitled  'Obrana',  Janÿ Document B.97Recor  d of     interview     between 
Superintendent    Milte  and Srecko  Rover. uary,   1973. 
Document   B. 107Intelligenc  e   report   by   a   troika Document C.87Publicatio  n entitled 'Hrvatska 
terrorist  group  and   a  copy   of  a  map of Yugoslavia Borba'. 
which  marks  the   route  into  Yugoslavia  taken  by  the  Document   C.97Publicatio  n  entitled  'Osvif,  Februÿ 
terrorist  raiding  party  of  June,   1972. Rover's  papers ary, 1973. 
(1972). Document  CIO7Publicatio   n  entitled 'Kletva*. 
Document C ll7Publicatio  n  entitled  'Instructions 
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SUMMARY  OF THE DOCUMENTS  tian  Youth   (H.M.),  which  has  had  Jure Marie, at 
The   documents   constitute   evidence   that  Croatian one  time  the  Australian leader   of  the Croatian Revoÿ 
terrorist  organisations   exist  in  Australia  and have  so  lutionary  Brotherhood,  associated  with  it. The  second 
existed  for many years.  of  the  youth groups  is the World  League  of Croatian 
Youth  (S.H.U.M.S.),  which  is  one   of  the  organisaÿ 
(i) Background to the Documents tions contained  within  the  general  body  of  the Croaÿ 
2.  These   documents    come   out   of   a   background     tian   Liberation Movement  (H.O.P.). These  two youth 
that    effectively  commences    in   Australia   in   1956,      organisations   have  been    used    as    recruiting grounds although  Croatian  organisations   commenced   in Ausÿ     
for  the smaller  terrorist organisations.
 
tralia   as   far  back  as   1950   with  the   arrival  of  the   (ii)   Documents,    Ministerial    Statenient,    Correÿ 
early  Croatian  migrants from  the  refugee  camps  of  spondence   and   Special   Reports   by   Commonwealth 
Europe. Police and ASIO 
In  1956  General   Luburic,  who  had   his  headquarÿ       6.  Document  A l  is a  copy  of  a  statement   made  by 
ters  in  Spain,  split  away  from  the  general  organisaÿ   Mr  Menzies  the  then  Prime  Minister  in the  House of 
tion  that was  continued  after  1945  by the   Ustashi  Representatives   on   27  August   1964   which   had  been 
leader, Dr Ante  Pavelic.  General  Luburic was  interÿ precipitated  by  a  complaint by  the  Yugoslav Governÿ  
ested  in  a  more   militant   revolutionary  organisation.    ment   to   the   Australian   Government   following  the 
Dr  Pavelic   was   advancing  in  age   and  died  in  1959.    1963  armed   terrorist  raid   into  Yugoslavia  and   the 
Dr Pavelic, in 1956,  created  the  ÿCroatian  Liberation  holding of  a  military  style training  camp near 
Movement' (H.O.P.) with  its  headquarters  in  Buenos Wodonga,  Victoria  in  1963.  Mr  Menzies  stated  that 
Aires,  Argentina,  as  a  general   world  organisation  to     the  Commonwealth investigations: 
incorporate and  coÿordinate  the various other  orgaÿ   'so   far  have  not   produced   any   evidence   which 
nisations and  movements within it. would  warrant legal proceedings'. 
One  of  these  organisations,   controlled  by   the   miliÿ   The   emphasis   of  this  statement  seems   to  have   been 
tary office of the  H.O.P.,  is  the  official  'Croatian  that  investigations  would  be  made  of various  organisÿ 
Ustashi   Movement'.   General    Luburic  on   the   other      ations and  where evidence: hand,    created     the    Croatian     National  Resistance 
(H.N.O.)  with  its headquarters  in Madrid,  Spain. This  'which  would  be receivable   in   a   court   of 
organisation   has   proved   to  be  a  marked   inciter  of         law'   .   .  ., 
militant   revolution  against    the   State  of Yugoslavia was obtained an 
throughout the world.  'appeal  to the law' 
Here  in  Australia,  the  split  between   the   two  Ustaÿ   would  be  made.   In  addition details  of  security  invesÿ 
shi   world  leaders  was  reflected  by  the   establishment      tigations  would not be  made  public. 
of  the   Croatian   Liberation  Movement (H.O.P.) Ausÿ   7.   Document    A2   consists    of   a   letter to  Prims 
tralian   Branch.  It  has  been   led  since its foundation  Minister  Menzies  from  Dr  Hefer,  the World Presiÿ 
in 1956 by Fabian Lovokovic.  dent   of  the   Croatian   Liberation Movement (H.O.P.) 
In    Victoria,   Srecko     Rover    followed   General dated    24  August    1964    in   Madrid and   apparently 
Luburic   and   formed   an    Australian   Branch of  the  received  on  2  September    1964.  Dr  Hefer  is the curÿ 
Croatian   National  Resistance   (H.N.O.).  The  H.O.P.  rent  World  President  of  H.O.P.  and  in Document C l 
in   Sydney    is  linked   directly  to   the Buenos   Aires  of  the  publication 'Ustasa' there  is a picture of him on 
headquarters  of the  world  organisation  of  H.O.P.  The     page   15   speaking  from  a  podium  with  the  Ustashi 
Melbourne   Croatian   National  Resistance   (H.N.O.)  is      symbol of the ' U'  with the  bomb  inside  it. 
linked   to   the   Spanish   headquarters   of   that   organisaÿ      8.   Document   A3   is   a   letter   by   Sir   Garfield  Barÿ 
tion  which produces  'Obrana'. wick  as   Minister  for  External  Affairs  to  the Attorney 
3. Upon  the death  of  Dr  Pavelic the World   General.   In  this  letter  Sir  Garfield  Barwick  expressed 
Presidency of the  H.O.P.  was  taken  by  Dr  Stjepan  his  concern at  the  foreign policy  implications of  terÿ  
Hefer   who   remains    the   current   World   President.      rorist  activities which: 
Although the official 'Croatian Ustashi Movement' is 'may embarrass our relations with  other  Governÿ 
incorporated   within  the   Croatian   Liberation  Moveÿ     ments'. 
ment  (H.O.P.)  which,  as   we  have  seen,  was   the creÿ 
ation   of   the   warÿtime  Ustashi   leader,    Dr  Pavelic,      He  also  stated   in  the letter: 
there   are  a  number   of  other  groups  which claim to ' I should  like  to suggest  that  ASIO should mainÿ 
be the true descendants,  in  revolutionary spirit,  of  the tain  some  supervision  over  migrant  groups  (making 
terrorist   military   Ustashi   of   Ante   Pavelic.   These   no  attempt  to  disguise  its surveillance)  and  bring to 
groups  include  the Croatian   Revolutionary   Brothÿ   your  attention  any   activities  which   might  be  conÿ 
erhood (H.R.B.); the Croatian Illegal  Revolutionary  sidered  by them  to  contravene Sections  30A  or 
Organisation   (H.I.R.O.)   and   the   United   Croats   of        30C of the Crimes Act.' 
West   Germany.  (U.H.Nj.)  All of  these   organisations    9.  Document   A4  is  a  copy   of  a  memorandum  by 
exist  in  Australia  and  evidence  of  this  fact  is  conÿ  the  AttorneyÿGeneral's Department  dated 25th  Sepÿ 
tained  in the annexed  documents. tember  1964.  The  submission  dealt  with  the question 
4. The secret terrorist organisation, the Croatian of prosecutions of  a  number  of  Croatians including 
Revolutionary   Brotherhood  (H.R.B.)   has  been   the  late  Father   Romac  of  Sydney  for offences  against 
involved with  the two  armed terrorist raids  into  the Passports  Act  and  the  Aliens  Act.  Mr  Snedden Yugoslavia 
in 1963 and 1972. The documents contain who was  AttorneyÿGeneral at  that  time made  the  folÿ evidence  that  
members   of  the  H.R.B.  were  associated      lowing notation on the submission: 
with  the  Croatian  National  Resistance  (H.N.O.)  and  ÿThere   is  a  period   of  public  quiescence  al  preÿ 
its Victorian leader, Srecko Rover, sent.   I   would  not   want   to  see    the   whole  issu» 
5.  There   are   two  militant  youth  groups  to  which      revived   by   prosecutions   which   are   not   in  themÿ 
the  documents   annexed   relate.  The  first  is  the  Croaÿ        selves   of  great   proportion . .  . signed  BMS'. 
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10.  Documents   AS   and   A6   are   Position   Papers   June   1972   to    the   AttorneyÿGeneral    then    Senatoi 
produced  by  ASIO  in  relation  to  Croatian   organisaÿ  Greenwood.   The   memorandum   informs the  Attorneyÿ 
tions on  lst  May 1967  and  lst  October  1967.  These  General   that   a  new   terrorist  organisation  calling  itself 
Position   Papers   were   available   and   indeed   were   forÿ   the   Croatian  Illegal   Revolutionary    Organisation 
warded  to  all  appropriate   ministers   of  the   Governÿ  (H.I.R.O.)  has   been   discovered   in  Victoria.  The  memÿ 
ment   including the AttorneyÿGeneral. orandum   had    a   report   of   the   Commonwealth Police 
11. Document A7 is a report on the Croatian Revÿ attached to it  as  well  as translations  of  the  docuÿ 
olutionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.) by the Crime Intelÿ  ments  of  the organisation.  These  documents  include 
ligence Bureau  of  the  Commonwealth Police force  the   constitution  of   this   terrorist  organisation   fully 
dated  6th March  1968. This document  sets out in clear    set  out  in Document B.H. 
terms  the  full  structure  of  this   Croatian   terrorist   19.   Document   A15   is   a  record   of  interview  preÿ 
organisation  including  the   Oath   and   the   manner   in   pared   by   the   then   AttorneyÿGeneral   of  his  interview 
which  it  is taken  as  well  as  the  troika  and  stozher  with  the   Yugoslav   Ambassador   on  19th  July   1972.  In 
militarist  structure. the   last   paragraph    of  that   record   of   interview Senaÿ 
12.   Document   A8  is  a   letter   dated   3rd   December       tor  Greenwood  records  the following; 
1969    from  Mr  Lynch,   when   Minister for Immigraÿ  ' I  said    that    it   was    very   difficult  to have   this 
tion,  addressed   to  the   AttorneyÿGeneral.  In  this  letter         knowledge   of   a  person's   intent   before  he   left  Ausÿ 
Mr  Lynch  expressed his concern: tralia. 
'at     the     likely    serious     consequences   if   Croat Where  there   was   some   reason   for believing  that 
nationals   rn   Australia   are    permitted   to   continue   a   person  because   of  his  statements,  activities  and 
their terrorist activities and outrages against repÿ  associates  could  be  presumed  to  bc  fostering terrorÿ 
resentatives    of    the    Yugoslav     Government     and          ist   activities   the    Government    could    act    and  I 
authority, generally in this country'. instanced     the    refusal   of   a   passport    to  Srecko 
Mr  Lynch  further stated that: Rover'. 
' I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the terrorists  are 20. Document  A16 is   a   copy   of   the   press   stateÿ 
endeavouring   to   create   the   impression   amongst  ment   issued   by  the   then   AttorneyÿGeneral   dated   20th 
Yugoslav   migrants   in   Australia  that    the   Croatian      July  1972. 
extremists    have   the   support    of   significant  sections           21.  Document    A17  is  a   copy   of  a  press  statement 
of  Australian society  and  even the  government'. issued     by    the    then    AttorneyÿGeneral    dated      l l t h 
13.    Document    A9   is   a   letter   addressed    to   the     August 1972. 
AttorneyÿGeneral  by  Mr  McMahon  when Minister for   22.  Document   A18  is  a  copy   of  a memorandum  by 
Foreign   Affairs,  pointing  out   that   over   the  last  few  the    AttorneyÿGeneral's     Department     dated   4th   July 
years   there  have  been  a  number   of  incidents or attacks  1972   to   the   then    AttorneyÿGeneral. That   memoranÿ 
by    extremist     groups,     especially    against     Yugoslav  dum   dealt    with   the    application   for   a passport   by 
official  missions    in   Australia.   Mr  McMahon  stated  Jure   Marie. Jure   Marie  is  covered   at   length in Docuÿ 
that:  ments   B18,   B19   and    B20.  The   memorandum   of  4th 
'the   extremists   themselves   may   by   now have  come July   1972   recommended    to  the   then AttorneyÿGeneral 
to  believe  that  they  can  act  with  impunity and  that   that: 
they  can  therefore,  without  risk  to themselves,  step  'On   balance  our   view  is  that   this   is  a case  in 
up the  level and  frequency of violence'. which   the   issue   of  a  passport  might   properly be 
14.   Document   A10  is  a  report  by  the  Commonÿ         again  refused.' 
wealth Police  commenting  upon  the  two  above  menÿ  Both  ASIO   and   the   Commonwealth   Police had   recÿ tioned  
ministerial   letters.   The   conclusions   to   this  ommended   to  the   Department   of Immigration against report  
contain  the following statement:  the   issue   of  a  passport   to  Marie.  Despite these  recomÿ 
' f t   is   quite    clear     that    Australian Croats    are mendations    the    AttorneyÿGeneral   was   not   in favour 
f  involved   in   an    international    conspiracy     directed      of    refusing   a   passport     to   Marie.   Nonetheless  the 
, against the Tito Government  of  Yugoslavia  and  it Minister  for  Immigration did  not  grant  the  applicaÿ 
seems  that  members  of  the   Croatian  Revolutionary,    tion. 
Brotherhood  will  persist  in  their  attempts  to  attack    23.   Document   A19  is   a  copy   of  a   letter   by   the people    and   premises   of  the   Yugoslav   Government      then   AttorneyÿGeneral   dated   27th  November    1972   to 
in Australia'. the   Minister  for  Foreign   Affairs  Mr  Bowen expressÿ 
15.  Document   A U  is  a  memorandum   by   ASIO  to   ing  disagreement    with  a  proposed   course  of  action  by 
the  AttorneyÿGeneral's  Department  dated   12th  Februÿ   the   Minister  for  Foreign   Affairs  in  relation  to  Croaÿ 
ary  1970.  This  memorandum  contains   ASIO's  comÿ   tians   who  had   gone   from  Australia  to  visit  Yugoslaÿ 
ments  upon   the   two  above  mentioned   ministerial  letÿ  via  and   had   been   detained   by  the   Yugoslav  authoriÿ 
ters. ties. 
16.   Document   A12  is  a  report  dated   20th   February      23.   Document   A20  consists  of  2  letters   by  Senator 
1970   by   the   Commonwealth   Police   at   a   conference   Greenwood,   when    AttorneyÿGeneral    to   the   Minister 
held  on 17th  February 1970   between   Commonwealth   for  Immigration  dated   29th   June   1972   relating  to  a 
Police  and   ASIO  in  respect   of  the   Note  delivered  by   passport  application  by   Josip   Bogut   and   12th 
Ambassador Rolovic of Yugoslavia to the Australian November 1972 relating  to  the  deportation  of  Marinÿ 
Government. cic. 
17.   Document  A13  consists  of  a  background brief 
circulated   by  ASIO  and   dated   2nd   April  1971.  The      Croatian  Liberation  Movement    ÿHOP) and  the Croaÿ 
brief   is   entitled   'The   Croatian   National  Resistance       tian  Ustashi  Movement ÿUHRO) 
(H.N.O.)7Recen  t  Developments'. 24.   The   Consutution   of   the   Croatian  Liberation 
18.  Document   A14  is   a   copy   of   a   memorandum   Movement,   as   revised   and   issued   by   Dr   Hefer  in 
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at   the   Mintis  Press,   117   Burwood  Road   Beln ore   with  Fabian  Lovokovic, the  leader  of  HOP  in Sydney 
New   Soulh   Wales.   It  is  contained,   together   with  «    
and   the   man   referred  to  in  the   correspondence in
 
translation,  in  document   B l .  This  document   refers    
document   B3.  In  that   interview  Lovokovic  did  not 
In  Art cle  1 u> the  'Croatian  Ustashi  Movement'  and     
deny  or  refute that  the  Constitution of  the Croatian 
Liberation    Movement     (HOP)    contained     a   orovision 
i ÿ   Article   14   provides    in   Item    5,    for a   'M.l.tary providing for a  'Military Office'. Office'. 30   Document  B7  is  a  series  of  photographs  taken 
25  The  Constitution of the  official 'Croatian  Ustaÿ   at  Wodonga,  Victoria, during a  training camp  organÿ shi Movementÿ  within  the  HOP  is  set  out  m  docuÿ  ised  by  the  Croatian  Liberation Movement  (HOP.) in 
ment  B2.  It  is  taken  from  the  book  ent.tled,   Croaÿ     1963    A  Unit  of  the   Citizen  MiUtary  Forces  assoÿ « \      Libe>.     »n    Movement    1929ÿ59'    issued     by   the      ciated   itself   for  reasons   of  public  relations,  with  tno n 
HOP on lhe occasion of 30  years  existence o f ÿ  training  by these  men  of the  Croatian  Ustashi  Moveÿ 
USTASA  Croatian  Revolution  Organisation  (UHRO)  ment  within  the HOP.  The  photographs  show  the 
1959'   The  document   is  a  translation  that  was  done     heavy  black  ' U ' of  the  Ustashi  under  the chessÿboard by Constable First Class M . Russell of the Commonÿ  shield  of  Croatia  with  the  letters  'HOP' over  ihe  top. 
wealth  Police  Force  in  1964.  Attached  withi  that  docÿ     These      photographs       corroborate      the  statements 
r e n t   is  a statement  of the  17  articles of the  Ustash,    attributed   to   Lovokovic  in  the   Kovac/Rover correÿ embodied   in  a document   issued   in  Oermany  in  1970    spondence    in   document     B3    for   he    was    at    the 
by T'Ustashi  Satnik'   (i.e.  'Ustashi  CaptainVÿAnte     Wodonga  training camp. Vukic,  who  is  the  current  President  of  the European 
Branch of the  United Croats  of West Germany. Croatian  National Resistance  (HNO) 
16 Documents B l and B2 need to be related to 31 The Constitution of the Australian Croatian document     B3,   
containing    correspondence     between     National  Resistance7Oceania  ,   is  set  out  in  document J r f p   towc   of  
Canberra  and  Srecko  Rover  of  Melÿ    B8. That document states that: 
bourne    dated     14th    and    21st    July    1972,   in  wh>ch 'We    regard    Yugoslavia    and    Yugoslavianism   as 
Kovac  writes  that   Mr  Les  Shaw   stated   to  a  group  o j          thc   greatest    and   lhe  only   evil   that   has   caused   the 
n    people    that   Lovokovic   'admits   that   Ustash.   cx.s             existing    calamity     .    7 7 Therefore    we    consider 
in   Auslralia  and   that   he   is   their   leader'.    Copies  of    any   direct  or  indirect  help  to   Yugoslavia.  Croatian 
these    letters    were    obtained    by    the    Commonwealth            national treason.ÿ 
Police   from  originals  found  in   Rover's  prem.ses  m Also  included  in  this  document   is  a  report upon  the 
the   searches   made   under    search   warrant  in  August General   Assembly   of  the   Croatian  National  Resisÿ 
972 The letter of 21st July 1972 further reads 'He  tance  in  Auslralia of  18th  October 1969.  This  Report 
(Lovokovic) admits that  people  are  bemg  trained and refers  to   a  world   tour  of  Croatian  Associations  by 
says  that  he  is  not  responsible  for i f . Mr  Shaw  said  Mr  Srecko  Rover  including  a  visit  to  Spam   'on  a 
that   everyone,   mcluding   Mr  Rover    had   stated   on  matter  of  importance'.  Reference  is  also  made to fraÿ 
television  that   'there   are    no   Ustashi ̂    Australia  ternal  greetings   and  'thoughts'  of  officials and  memÿ 
Lovokovic  claims  that  there   are .  The  first lette  of  bers    of   Croatian    National   Resistance   in   Europe, 
Hth  July   197'  refers  to  certam persons  reÿestablishÿ Stressing  the   special   importance   and   significance  ot 
ing  an  organisation  with 'only those  who will join as our  Associations  in Sweden   and  Germany,  as well as 
Ustashi'. That  letter also reads,  of  members   in  Argentina   and   South  America. This 
'He  (Ante  Kovac)  says   that  our politicians have greeting  also extends  to the  United States members. degraded    the  letter   ÿ U ÿ  and   thai  he   will have  it ÿ  32     A  significant   record   of   interview   is  contained 
rectified'. in   document    B9.  This   is   a   record   of   an interview 
27 The reference in  these  letters  to  'pohticians  held  on 16th  February 1970  between  Superintendent degrading    
the    letter    ÿU»,   relates   to   document  Milte   when   a   Commonwealth   Police  Officer,  with B4   
This  document   contains   a  copy   of  a  letter  to  Srecko  Blaz   Rover.   In  this   interview.  Rover al  the 
Prime Minister McMahon by the Croatian Coÿordmaÿ outset  attempted  to  forestall the  interview by seeking tive  
Committee   of  Victoria,  dated   25th  May  1972,  Superintendent     Milte   to   inquire   of  ASIO  about 
complaining  about  the  cancellation  of  Srecko Rover s  Rover    Rover's   words  were,   'Why  don't you   phone 
passport    and    that    the    Australian  Governmem   .s  ASIO  first  before  you  talk   to  me.'   The  record  of 
tampering AustralianÿCroatian politicians in exile.  interview  shows   where  Rover  stands  on  the question ÿ>8.   
Document    B5   contains    a   copy   of  a  letter of   terrorism   and    ihe   overthrow   of Yugoslavia  by 
addressed    to    the     AttorneyÿGeneral  (then   Senator  force  and   violence.   When  asked   by   Superintendent 
Greenwood),     dated    23rd    September 1972 rom  Milte  how   he   and   his   people   proposed   to  achieve 
Cjubomir  Vuina.  Vuina  in  referring  to the  Ustash.  their   alms   of  a  recognised   state  for  Croatia.  Rover 
said: , replied: 
7In      fact   it   is   or   was    a   body    of people   who 'We   will do  it by any  means possible.' 
resisted   the  Communist  Government  in Yugoslavia   When  Superintendent   Milte asked  him which organisÿ 
during  the  War  and  of  course  became  an  unpopuÿ  ation  he  belonged to  in   Auslralia,   Rover staled, lar   
body   with   its   Government.   Violence is  tar  None,   Sir.  I   wts  a  member   of  the   HOP but  they 
removed from its concepts  in tbis country'. expe««d   me   because    of   my    radical views.   When 
The  writer  of that  letter  is a  former Colonel in what   asked   did  he  know  Jure  Marie,  the  Andric hrothers, 
was  the   elite   Black   Legion   of   the   Ustashi m  the Ivica Kokic and Josip Senic,  Rover replied: 
Hitler   puppet    regime    of   Croatia   during the   Second  ' I  know  all  these   people.   Andric  was the  person 
World War. who   made   the   pen bomb.' 
(The   Black  Legion  was  an  elite  pari  of the  Ustashi The   pen   bomb   referred  to  is  the   one   that exploded Army  similar  to Ihe  German  SS  and  had the concenÿ at    the    Richmond   Town    Hall   on   2nd  September tration camps under  its control.) 1967    when  a  youth   suffered  grievous   bodily harm. 
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When  Superintendent  Milte  put  to  Rover  that  Father   and   his  successor   was   considered  by  ASIO  to  be 
Kasic  advocates  violence  to  free  Croatia  from Yugosÿ       Josip  Bicsic.  The  organisation  publishes   a  paper  in 
lav  tyranny, Rover made the following statement: Argentina  entitled  'Hrvatska Gruda'.j 
'But   this  is  alright  because   it  is  just, like  Vicÿ Srecko    Rover    has,    in   a   past  police  interview, 
toria  wanting to govern  in  its  own  right from New supplied the following information about himself: 
South  Wales.'  He  was   born,  Sarajevo,   on  3rd  February 1920 
The  most  significant statement  by  Rover  in this interÿ  where  he  was  educated  to  Matriculation standard 
view,  which  is  a clear  admission  by  him that  he  supÿ and   later  attended   the  University  of Zagreb,  the 
ports  violence  and  terrorism  is  shown  bv the followÿ capital  of  Croatia.   He  siudied  Electronic  Engiÿ 
ing: neering.   However,   he   left  University  in  1943, 
'Milte  said:   How  do   you  propose  to  overcome having   been   called   up   to   serve   in  the  Second 
the  present Yugoslav Government Bojna   Ustaske   Vojnice  (i.e.   Second   Battalion, Ustashi Armed Forces). He  joined  as a Private 
He  said:   Bv  similar  means  to  that   being used in and   in  June   1944   was   promoted to  commission 
Vietnam  today.  rank    of   Lieutenant.    He    served    in Armoured 
Milte said: What do you mean? Units  in Sarajevo  in the  First  Ustaski  Zdrug (i.e. 
He   said:   Your   Government  is   trying to  overÿ Brigade),  ready  to  repel  any  Allied  landing  that 
throw   the   North   Vietnam  Government  by  means might  take   place   on  the  Adriatic  Coast by  the 
of  force  and  we  intend  to  do  the  same  in Yugoÿ Western  Allies.  In  1945,  on  the  downfall of 
the slavia.  I will do  anything in my power  to assist them Axis   powers,  Rover   went   to   refugee  camps  in 
in achieving this aim.' Italy  and  Austria  and  in  the  next  few  years was 
33.  Document   BIO contains  irrefutable evidence of involved   in  several  guerrilla  terrorist raids  into 
Srecko  Rover's  close  personal   involvement with terÿ Yugoslavia.   In   1950    he    migrated  to  Australia 
rorism   including  the  armed   terrorist   raid made  into and  has   ceaselessly  pursued   the   aims of organisÿ 
Yugoslavia   in  June   1972.  The  evidence contained  in ing   the   overthrow   by   force   and   violence   the 
these    documents     fully   corroborates    the   statements State  of Yugoslavia. 
made  by  Rover in  the  record  of  interview   with   34.   Document   B i i   is   a   letter   signed   by   Srecko 
Superintendent    Milte   on    16th   February    1970.   as   set   Rover    to   the   GovernorÿGeneral    dated    20th   October 
out   in   document    B9.   The   papers    in   document   BIO     1972,   with   a  covering   letter   to   Senator    Greenwood, 
are    translations    and    copies    made    from   documents     the     then    AttorneyÿGeneral,    complaining   about     the 
that   were  obtained   by    the    Commonwealth    Police    visit   of   Her   Majesty  the   Queen    to   Yugoslavia.  This 
under   search   warrant   in   August   1972.   Other   docuÿ   document    needs   to   be   seen   in  the   light  of   document 
ments and   articles   were   obtained   from  Rover   at   the   B4   which   refers   to  Srecko   Rover   as   being   an   'Ausÿ 
same  time. These  included  the  following: tralianÿCroatian  politicianÿinÿexile'. 
(i)   A   Seal    bearing    the    insignia    of  the  Supreme Croatian  Youth <H.M.) 
Headquarters   of  the   Croatian  National Resisÿ  35.  Document   B12   contains   an   extract  from  the 
tance  and  the  Croatian  Armed Forces (HOS); Croatian   Youth  Journal,  'UZDAN1CA'  of  the May 
(ii)  Ammunition  for  a  fireÿarm  of  a  calibre the  1965  edition.  A  translation  is  attached.   It  sets  out   the 
possession  of  which  is illegal in Victoria: aims    and    objects    of    Croatian     Youth    (H.M.) as 
(iii)   A   list   of   names   and   addresses,  overseas    as    embodied  in  a  Resolution   carried   at   the   Foundation 
well as local, of persons involved in Croatian Meeting of lhe organisation on 28th March 1965. In 
organisations; Article  1 i l states: 
(iv)   Documents     relating    to    the Conference   ot 'We   do   not   recognise    any Yugoslavia,  Monarÿ 
Croatian   National  Resistance   held   in  Toronto   chist  or  Communist,  and   we  will  fight  against   her 
early   1972.   which   indicate   that   Rover    was     by    the    use    of    all   means    of    total    destructÿ 
elected    ai   thai  Conference   to  the   position  of         ion.   .   .  .' 
Deputy  World  Leader of HNO. Article  3 states: 
[lt was  while  Rover  was  attending that Conferÿ  'We   remain   loyal   lo   lhe   ideas   and   principles 
ence  rhat  his passport was cancelled.] underlying the Croatian Right of State 
(v)   Documents  relating  to  the   instigation  of  guerÿ    Parly    .   .   as  well   as   to   the  principles   of   the 
rilla activity in Yugoslavia. Croatian   Ustashi    Movement   of   Dr  Ante Pavelic, 
All  original  documents    and   articles   that   had   been           the Poglavnik.'. 
obtained  under  search  warrants  in  August  1972  from    World League  of Croatian Youth (S.H.U.M.S.) Rover  and   olher  persons  were   returned   to  Rover and 
those   persons  in  November   1972   as   required   by  the    pr 
36.
i 
Document  B13 contains  the  text  setting  out 
t 
the 
then   AttorneyÿGeneral.  Paper   (a)   of  document    BIO is         inc ples  upon   which   the   World  League   of  Croa ian 
an Intelligence Report  (translation   attached)   from  a   Youth   (S.H.U.M.S.)   is   based.   Translations   are 
'Troika'  lerrorisi   group   operating   secretly   in   Ausÿ   attached.   The   document   also   contains   application 
tralia.  Paper  (b)  of  document  BIO  is  a  copy   of  a   forms  and  the  form  of  Oath  required  to  be  taken  by 
map of Yugoslavia  which  marks  a  route  into Yugoÿ  its  members.  T h :  originals  of  these  documents  were 
slavia  to  an  area  where  the  armed  terrorist  raiders  of  obtained  by  the  Victoria  Police  Force,  together   with 
June  1972  were   crushed   in  an  armed  skirmish  with   the  documents  relating  to  the  Croatian  Illegal  Revoÿ 
lhe military and security forces of Yugoslavia. lutionary   Organisation   (H.I.R.O.)   that   were  found with  the  cache of  arms  and  ammunition in the  Warÿ 
[The Croatian Armed Forces  (HOS),  the  seal of burton  Mountains  in Victoria  in MayÿJune  1972. This 
which is  in  the possession  of  Srecko Rover  and organisation is  referred  to  in  document  Bl  as  it is  a referred  
io  above,  was  formed, according  to ASIO,  youth organisation  within  the   Croatian  Liberation after  194S  
and  was  the successor  to   the  Ustasha   Movement  (H O P )  and  there  is  an  express provision Army   General   
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Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) hood,   I   pledge    myself   to   obey    and carry  out 
ind Croatian Revolutionary Army (H.R.V.) without  demur   any  orders   and   instructions, given 
37.  Document  B14 contains  the Constitution of the me  and  to serve  loyally  the Brotherhood's Revoluÿ 
Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation tionary Principles. 
(H.I.R.O.)  which  claims   to  have  been   made at  the I pledge  myself  to  keep  any  secrets entrusted  to 
Ustashi  Supreme  Headquarters  in  1972.  A translation         me  and  not  to disclose  anything  that  might damage 
is  attached.   It also  contains  stationery  headed  'Croaÿ  the  interest   of  the  Brotherhood  and  of  the  Croaÿ 
tian  Revolutionary  Army'  (H.R.V.).  The  originals of    tian People. 
these    papers    were    obtained    by  the   Victoria  Police  If  I  offend  against    this   Oath   and the  Brotherÿ 
Force    as    the    result    of   searches    in the  Warburton hoods       Revolutionary       Principles, my     penalty 
Mountains   of   Victoria   where    a  cache   of arms  and under  the  organisation's   laws, shall be death. 
ammunition    was     found   in   a   training   area in  the  So  help me God.' bush.   The  leaders  involved  in  this  organisation have 
been    prosecuted     by   the   Victoria   Pohce   and    the     w 
40.  Document  B17 contains  a series  of papers that 
transcript  of  the  committal proceedings   against  them     s 
ere   obtained
t 
by  the  Commonwealth
o 
Police under 
is  attached   to  document    B14.  The   Constitution  of      earch  warran   at  the  premises  of  Ad lf  Andric, in 
H.I.R.O. provides:  'A Chemical  Branch for bomb and     1966,  in Geelong,  Victoria.  Translations  for each of 
explosion  production  is  to  be  formed'.  It  also  proÿ     the  papers are  attached,   together  with a record of an 
vides: interview  by  Sergeant   E.  H. George   of  the  Commonÿ 
'A  militia  is  to  be  formed  in  any  case;  they  are      
wealth   Police   with  Adolf  Andric  on  21st   June 1966. 
to  be  given  military  training and preparations for 
Adolf  Andric  is  very  important  in  that  he  was an
 active  terrorist  member   of  this  terrorist organisation 
their  arming are  to be made: while he  was  in Australia. After returning to Europe 
Further: in  1969   he   carried   on   his   terrorist activities and 
'The  Supreme   Stozer   will  open   special  training    maintained   his   association    with  other   Croatians in 
schools   for  terrorism  and   for  all 'activist' activities Australia.  Adolf  Andric was  a leader  with  his brother 
on   assassinations,    raids,  sabotage, arson,   etc' Ambroz,   of  the  armed    terrorist   raiding  party which entered  Yugoslavia  in June  1972.  Many  of the memÿ 
Joint Committee of  Croatian  Organisation in New  bers  of that  raiding party  had  been  recruited  in Ausÿ 
South Wales tralia. Adolf Andric was  an industrial chemist having 
38. Document  BIS  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  by  the  had  technical  training  in  this  trade in Yugoslavia 
Joint  Committee   of  Croatian   Organisations  in New before migrating to  Australia. Many  of  the papers in 
South Wales to Prime Minister McMahon dated 31st document B17 indicate considerable experimentation 
August   1972,   complaining   about   searches  made  on in  relation  to  poisons,   explosives   and bombs. These 
the premises  of  certain  Croatians.  The  letter  conÿ  documents  portray  a  picture   of terrorist  planning tained 
a printed sidenote with the names of the folÿ that  is almost  beyond  comprehension.  Several of the lowing 
organisations: papers  set   out  the   fundamental  principles  of HRB. They    also   evidence     a   close    association    of other 
(a)   The  Croatian  Liberation Movement  (HOP); important  members  of   the   Croatian   community  with 
<b)   The  Croatian   National Resistance  (HNO); Adolf   Andric.   This  is  especially  so   in  the  case of 
(c)   The Croatian  Country Club; and Tomislav  Lesic  and  Jure  Marie. 
(d)   The United Croats (UHNJ) 
Tbe document is clear evidence  of  the  unification  of 
41. Document  B17A  consists  of  four  photographs 
which  had  been  achieved  in  1972  of  all  the  militant  wh
the  pen  bombs   and  the  scene  of  the  washroom 
and extremist Croatian  organisations. The  United  2nd
ere  it exploded
6
in  the  Richmond  Town
r
Hall  on 
Croats (UHNJ) has its associations overseas,  as  with  Milt 
September 
t
19 7.  Rover  informed  Supe intendent 
HOP and HNO, and is a terrorist organisation. The  Am
e in  the  in erview recorded in document
c
9,  that 
United Croats is an organisation based directly on the 
broz  Andric,  the  brother  of  Adolf  Andri , made 
Ustashi  principles  and  methods   of  operation.  This is          pen bomb. 
shown   in document   B2. Press  reports  on State Police  42.  Document   B18  consists   of  a  series of papers 
proceedings   in New  South  Wales and Commonwealth that   were   obtained    by   the  Commonwealth   Police 
Police reports on this terrorist organisation  are  conÿ  under  search  warrant  at  the  premises  of Jure Marie tained  
in  document  B15A.  That  document  contains   in  May   1967   in  Wollongong,  New South   Wales. the  
criminal  record  of  the  Australian  leader  of  the  These papers  are  a  few  of the  many  that  were United 
Croats of West Germany as well as a full obtained from Jure Marie's premises at that time and statement  of  tbe   
structure   of  this terrorist  organisa they   are   all  of  a  similar  nature.   Translations   are 
tion. attached    to  each   of  the   papers  contained in docuÿ 
ment  B18. They  portray  a picture  of  a tightlyÿknit, 
Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood  (HRB) wellÿdisciplined  secret  militarist  structure.  One  of  the 
39.  Document  B16  contains  the  Oath  of  the  Croaÿ  series  (000290)  of papers  in document  B18  is headed 
tian   Revolutionary   Brotherhood.   A  translation   is    as follows: 
attached.  The  oath  is  taken  at  a  ceremony before a 'Croatian   National  Resistance   'SUD'  Armed  Forces 
black  draped  table on which  is placed  a rifle, dagger,  Headquarters crucifix and  two  candles. The rifle and  dagger  are in 
a   crossed    position.  The   oath   is   in   the   following     25lh March 1964 
form: Top  Secret Operation   area  8 
' I swear   by  Almighty  God   and   things   that   are      To  gentlemen  Croatian Officers,  NCOs and Soldiers. 
                     T  S * 
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already  stated, possesses the  seal  of   the   Croatian   had  no  marking on  it, airline tickets  and  other  docuÿ 
Armed  Forces (HOS).   Another   document   in   the   ments  evidence  that  he   had   travelled  in  Europe  in 
series  in document B18  contains a  copy  of  the  print  May/June  1972.  The  terrorist raid  into  Yugoslavia in 
from the seal containing the insignia of the Croatian June 1972 was mounted from Germany and Austria. 
Revolutionary Brotherhood. Bound in a red folder This can  be  related  to the  document  that  contained  a 
contained in  document B18  is  the Croatian text,  record  of  an  interview  between  Superintendent   Milte 
together  with  a  translation, of a  Handbook  or Manual   and  Rover  in  which  Rover  stated  that  persons  would 
of Croatian Revolution. be  sent  through  Germany  to  fight in Yugoslavia. The 
43. Document B19 is a record of an  interview by evidence  contained  in Document  20  of  Marie sending 
Sergeant  E.  H.  George  of  the  Commonwealth  Police  money  to Vegar in  Europe   can   be   related   to   the with  
Jure   Marie  on   Sth   June  1968.   The  interview   statements  made  by, Tomislav  Lesic  on  the  ABC teleÿ was  
based on  the   papers  that   had   been   obtained  vision  on  19th September   1972, and contained  in docuÿ under 
search warrant in 1967, some of which are  conÿ  ment  6(a).  In  that  interview Lesic  stated  that  funds tained  in  
document   B18.  Jure  Marie  was   the   leader      were sent  to guerrilla fighters in Europe and Croatia. 
at  that time  of  the   Croatian  Revolutionary Brotherÿ  48.  Document  B23  is  a  newsÿsheet   entitled  'Report hood in Australia. from Revolutionary  Front'. A translation  is attached. 
'  44.  Document   B20   contains   papers   that   were   This   report   indicates   that    it   is   produced    by    the 
obtained by  the  Commonwealth Police from  the  H.R.B.  It relates  to  the  terrorist  raid  into Yugoslavia 
premises   of Jure  Marie in  August   1972.  These docuÿ     in June   1972. ments   show   that  Jure  Marie was  still  involved with 
terrorist  activities  in  1972.  The  original  with  translaÿ 49.  Document  B24  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  the 
tions  and  clear  diagrams  of the  organisation  structure    Deputy   for  External   Affairs,  Headquarters    of   the 
of   a   terrorist   group   with   its  associated   Troikas  is    Croatian   Revolutionary    Brotherhood,   Europe, 
clearly seen  in  these  documents.  This series  of papers  addressed to  the  Regional  Director  for  Victoria  of 
contain copies of bank and receipt  documents  eviÿ A.S.I.O. There  is  also  a  copy  of  a  letter by A.S.I.O. 
dencing  the  fact  that  Jure  Marie had  sent money  to  to  the   Department   of   Immigration   relating   to   an 
Paul Vegar in Europe. Paul  Vegar  was  one  of  the H.R.B.  proposal to  allow  a  group  of  15  of  their Australian  
naturalised  Croatians  who took  part  in the    members  to leave Australia. 
armed  terrorist  raid  into Yugoslavia under  the  Andric    Funds  to Sweden 
brothers  in June 1972. 50.  Document   B25  Is  a  copy  of  a   report   by  the 
45.  These papers contained closeÿup   maps   of   a   Commonwealth   Police   dated   7  March  1972,  relating 
special  area  of  Yugoslavia  and  an  accompanying  letÿ  to  $300  forwarded  from Mount Gambier,  South  Ausÿ 
ter  referring  to  the   maps   and   events   that   were   tralia,  by   bank   draft  to   Goteborg,   Sweden,   to  aid 
planned   to  lake  place  in  a  town  called  Severin   that     Croatian extremists  in Sweden. 
is   detailed   on   the   maps.    These    maps   and   correÿ     Attitude of the  United States Governnient 
spondence are associated  with  the  armed  raid  into  51.  Document   B26  is   a  copy   of  a   memorandum 
Yugoslavia  in  June  1972.  One  of  the  letters  refers  to    No.  2205/72   dated   31  July   1972,  to  the   Secretary, 
the  fact  that  the  'financial resources  of  the   organisaÿ  Department   of  Foreign  Affairs,  from  the  Counsellor 
tion which  we  took  with  us  from  Victoria  as  well  as of  the  Australian  Embassy,  Washington,  D.C.  That 
those  received  later, have  now   been   used   up'.  The   memorandum  states   that   the   attitude  of  the   United 
letter   goes   on   lo  speak   of   the   organisation   bearing   States   Government   is   that   the   United  States  would 
the  burden from  Australia and  also  refers  to  the  gain nothing  and lose  much  if  Yugoslavia  were   to 
Australian  organisation.  That  letter  also  refers  to  the  breakÿup  or be  weakened  by  internal  divisions  and. 
HRB.  There  is   a   sheet   in   Marie's   papers   accomÿ   separatism,   particularly  if  such   developments  were 
panied by a  translation  with  the  number  '1382'  on it,  encouraged  or  promoted from  abroad.  It  also  states 
which  is  a  statement of  a   constitution   for  units   that  in  recent   years  the  United  States   Administration 
within the HRB. The  diagram  is an  illustration  of an  had  been  concerned to  chip away  at  the  roots of  the 
HRB unit. Croatian extremist  strength  in the United States. 
46. Document B21 is a record of an  interview by  Photographs  of  bomb  incident, Sydney,  16 September 
Sergeant    Brown   of   the  Commonwealth   Police   with  1972 
Blaz  Kraljevic  on  8th  August   1972.  Kraljevic relates   52.  Document   B27  consists  of  photographs   of  the 
how  he  was   recruited  to  take  part  in  the  armed  terÿ     bomb incident in Sydney  on 16 September 1971. 
rorist   raid   into   Yugoslavia   of   June    1972,    and   how    PUBLICATIONS Lovric  and  Glavas  were  also   recruited  for  that raid. 
Lovric  and  Glavas  took  part  in  the  raid.  Kraljevic  53.  A  range  of  Croatian  extremist  publications  is missed  
joining  the  group  in  GermanyÿAustria,  due  to  produced   in  Australia  and  overseas   with distribution his   
arrest   for  liquor  offences   in  Victoria.  Another     in Australia. 
Croatian  named   Zdenko  Marincic who  was  associated     54.  All these   publications  are   a  source  of  inciteÿ 
with Kraljevic.  left  Australia  at that  time,  but  was ment  to  and  encouragement  of  violence  and terrorÿ turned    
back    by    German    police   at  Frankfurtÿonÿ   ism. 
Main.   Upon   his   return   to   Mascot   Airport he   was 'USTASA',  (JUBILEE),  10  April, 1941ÿ1971  ediÿ 
arrested,  charged   and   convicted   of   having  unlawful   tion.   Page   38   carries   a   poem   by   Venco,   AUSÿ 
possession   of  an   unlicensed   firearm7 a  rifle  and  four         TRALIA,  titled  'TO CROATIA'. 
silencers  secreted   in  a  toy  koala   bear.  He  was  senÿ         'Oh  my  beloved  Homeland, turned  into a dungeon, tenced  to nine  (9)  months  imprisonment.  Although  an         Thy children's innocent blood continues  to flow alien  he  was not deported. Because of their Croatian name. < 
47.  Document  B22  is  a  copy  of  a  map   of part of Today thou enjoyest neither  freedom nor justice, 
Germany    that   was   obtained   by  the  Commonwealth With the  symbols  of thine old fame defaced, 
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The  creators of another  Tenth of April will rise,   'OBRANA'    (DEFENCE),   January,    1973.    The 
And   a   dawn    of   freedom   shall   yet   be  born  for  paper frontÿpages a picture of GENERAL 
Croatia. LUBURIC   in   a  dress   uniform,  complete   with the 
Au revoir, oh my ancestors' cradle,  Nazi  decoration   of  a  Knight's  Cross.  Pages 4 and 
My  brothers   and   sisters,  my   sea,   my clefts dales  5  carry   Swedish   press   comment   on the  September 
and my hills, 1972   airliner  hijacking. The  Swedish  papers quoted 
Au revoir, for the hour is nigh.   from   are    picked    in   a   manner    presenting    the 
A   new  generation   has  arisen   from  the graves of  hijackers  in  a  most  favourable light, behaving  like 
thy martyrs,  perfect    gentlemen     throughout    the  episode.    The 
Woven  from  the  fibres  of  sacrifice and   permeated  article's  purpose  of  praising  the  hijackers  is  transÿ 
with love  parent.  Page  9  carries   extracts   from  the   text of a 
For thee, oh my Homeland of knights.  leaflet    received     by    the    paper  from   Cleveland, 
Ustasi  Private  Soldier.  C l U.S.A.,   titled  'A  PROCLAMATION  TO  THE SERBIAN   PEOPLE'   and   signed    by   the 'UNION 
'PREGLED'   (REVIEW),   March,  1972,  Page   17 OF  SERBIANS  AT  HOME   AND ABROAD'. The 
carries   a  picture  titled  'ON THE EVE  OF  CROAÿ     extracts   call   ON  THE  SERBIAN   FIGHTERS  TO 
TIA N   REVOLUTION'  and   showing  perched   in  a     FOLLOW   THE   CROATIAN   PATRIOTS'  EXÿ 
tree  a  sniper   with  his  rifle  at   the  ready.   The   capÿ    AMPLE OF MURDERING  YUGOSLAV AGENTS 
tion  says,  'HAVE  A  LOOK  AT  THE  ABOVE  AND HIJACKING AND   BRINGING   DOWN 
PICTURE*.    'SPRINGTIDE   IS  APPROACHING         AIRCRAFT.    WITH   CHRISTMAS  APPROACHÿ 
I N  PRENJ  AND PAPUK MOUNTAINS  (Translaÿ         ING,   'LET  US   BARE  OUR   TEETH   AT THE 
tor's  note7tw  o  mountain  ranges  suitable   for  guerÿ   YUGOSLAVS!    WRECK    TITO'S   EMBASSIES 
rilla  operations).  LONG  LIVE THE YOUTHFUL  AND   CONSULATES!'  The   text   purports  lo  use 
SPIRIT OF CROATIAN REVOLUTION'.  the    Serbian    variant   of   the   SerboÿCroat     language. 
The   DirectorÿGeneral   of   A.S.I.O.   wrote  on  24 But  its  grammar,   style  and   terminology  are   such  as 
April    1972     to     the     AttorneyÿGeneral      (Senator           could   never   have   been   used   even   by  a  simple Serÿ 
Greenwood)   enclosing  copies  of  translated   articles   bian.   The   'PROCLAMATION'   is   a  transparent and   
commented    that   the   Attorney  may   'wish  to       plant,  most  probably  composed   by  a  Croatian born 
examine'   (the  articles)  'in  the  light  of  the   Crimes         
or  at  least  educated  in ZAGREB.
 
Act'. 'HRVATSKA     BORBAÿ     (CROATIAN  STRUGÿ 
'SPREMNOST     (READINESS),  August,    1972, GLE).   It  has   a  routine  Croatian  extremist  inflamÿ 
front   page.    Under    the    title   of  ÿTHEY   HAVE matory  approach. 
DIED  FOR   CROATIA',  the   paper   lists the  nineÿ 'OSV1T'  (DAWN)  CROATIAN WEEKLY, No. 
teen   participants   in   the    incursion   into  Yugoslavia   69,   14.2.1973,   front  pages   under   the   title  of  'THE saying    that    'WE   MUST   ALL  AGREEÿ   THAT       TRUTH  ABOUT  THE ANDRIC  BROTHERS', its THEY    HAVE    GIVEN    THEIR     LIVES    FOR          reporter's   interview of  'a  person   who  does  not wish CROATIA. to   disclose     his    name    for   personal     reasons'.  The 
'UZDANICA'  (MAINSTAY), No. 1, 1972 Page paper  goes   on  to  say   ihat   it  does   not   'belong to 
1.  It  carries  an  article  signed  by  'T.  S.'  and  titled   any  political  party  and,  as  such',  does  not  'engage 
'OUR    ANGLE  ON  BUGOJNO',  which  identifies        in  polities'.  Its  only  desire   is  to  'write  for  and 
its  readers   with  the   terrorists   taking  part   in  the   inform  the   Croatian   people  of  developments  both 
June,  1972  raid in BOSNIA,  YUGOSLAVIA. Page          inside  the  country  and  outside'.  Stating  that  it will 
13 carries an article  by  'STEF'  and  titled  'A follow  its  regular practice  of  not  commenting  on 
CROATIAN  DEATH  MORE  HONOURABLE   any  political  articles,  the  paper  adds  that  what  it 
THAN  LIFE'  dealing  with  Dr  Jelic's   death  copied  wishes   to  serve   is   'the   interest   of  the   Croatian 
from  the   'CROATIAN  STRUGGLE'.  It  contains        people  and  their  freedom'. 
another         article       headed         ÿTHE      REVOLUÿ 
TIONARIES'      BREAD      IS      COVERED   I N The   interview  itself   is   most strongly proÿAndricÿ 
BLOOD',   signed     by    'BUCO',   which   praises    the         brothers. 
June,  1972  raiders.  The  end  of  the  interview  makes  it  clear that  the 
'VJESNIK'   (CHRONICLE)   OF THE CROAÿ paper   has   the   interviewed  person's  full  name and 
T I A N    LIBERATION    MOVEMENT   H.O.P.,   in    address. 
Canberra,   July,   1972.   Page  7  carries  an   anonymous 'KLETVA'  (CURSE),  a  roneoed booklet circulatÿ 7article  headed   'WE  HAVE  FOUND  THE  ANTIÿ         ing  in  the  Croatian  community.  It  is  a  manual  for 
VENOM    TO    SERBOÿCOMMUNIST   VENOM'.     revolutionary    armed      forces     and     irregulars.     It 
The   article   praises   the   Ustashi   movement    and   its     includes     chapters     on    the      general      REVOLUÿ 
aims.   Its  conclusion   calls   on   Croatians   to  answer        TIONARY       ORGANIZATION.       SABOTAGE, 
the   call  of  duty,  their   motto  being   'A  PAINFUL        INTELLIGENCE    SERVICE,    SECURITY SERÿ WOUND  CAN  BE  TREATED   ONLY   WITH A N VICE,     PROPAGANDA    SERVICE,     REVOLUÿ 
EVEN  MORE PAINFUL  MEDICINE*. TIONARY    COURTS,    GUERRILLA    WARFARE 
'HRVATSKA    DRZAVA'  (CROATIAN  STATE) and    on    REGULAR    ARMED    FORCES,   complete 
February,    1973.   Page   8  carries   an   article  by  Ivan         with    diagrams      on    basic  army    units. ' I N ÿ 
JELIC   headed     'SPEAKING    FRANKLY',   which         STRUCTIONS     FOR      CROATIANS OUTSIDE 
calls  for  the establishment  of  a  Croatian  governÿ   THEIR   HOMELAND'  an   openly   H.R.B.  leaflet 
ment in  exile, to  include  the  best,  most  able  and  signed  by  the  CROATIA'S  NATIONAL  LIBERAÿ 
most resolute exiled Croatians who will  'COÿ  TION  FRONT and  circulating of  late  in the  Croaÿ 
ORDINATE OUR STRUGGLE' AND LEAD IT tian community. It opens  by  calling  on  the  Croaÿ 
ALONG   THE   MOST   EFFECTIVE   LINE   SO   tians   abroad   to   wreck   Yugoslav   embassies  and 
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Senator   MURPHY7 I  move:  Security   Intelligence  Organisation?  Why did 
That    the   Senate    take   note   of the   statement. he  run  away  from  speaking  about  the subject 
Senator   WITHERS   (Western   Australiaÿ    today?   That   is   why   we   thought   it   would   be 
Leader    of    the     Opposition)    (4.3)7A    t     this     
far    better    to    wait    and    see     what    this   great 
stage    I  shall   speak    briefly   to   the    motion   that    statement     was   all   about    before   proceeding   to 
the   Senate   take   note    of    the    statement.    The    
question   time.   Question   time  will  be   called  on 
Senate    will   appreciate     that     a    paper     which     shortly   and    we   will  then    be   in  a   position   to 
has    taken    about    an    hour    to   put   down   and       ask     questions    in   order   to   try   to    fill   in the 
which  has   been   supported  by  a  large  number     
gaps,   because   gaps   do   exist   and   they  ought 
of documents cannot  be  considered  immediÿ  not  to exist.  Rather  than  spend  some  60  minÿ 
ately   by   the   Opposition.  Therefore  we   will   
utes  in  this place  trying  to  destroy  his predeÿ 
seek    to   adjourn  the   debate   on   the   motion    cessor   in  office as   AttorneyÿGeneral it would 
which   has   been   moved   by  Senator   Murphy.    have  been   far  better   for  Senator   Murphy to 
Before  we  do  so   I  think   that   a   few  comÿ    
justify his  own  actions  over  the  last   12 days, 
ments    may    be    in   order.   Today   we    have     which   have   put   the    total   security   of this 
listened     to    Senator      Murphy's    statement,     
nation  at   risk.  As  1 said   earlier,  I  think the 
which,   as    1  have   said,   occupied   almost   an     Senate  ought  to  come  back   to  the  paper   at a 
hour.    It   has    been    delivered   in   an    almost      later  stage   and   therefore  I ask   for  leave   to 
theatrical   atmosphere.   I  suppose   the   honourÿ    
continue my remarks.
 
able    senator    ought    to   be    pleased  that   he Leave  granted; debate adjourned. 
had   a   full  house.   I   am   only   pleased that 
people    have    not    paid   to   come   otherwise PERSONAL EXPLANATION 
they  would  be   asking   for  their  money back 
because   they   must    have   been   disappointed     Pr 
Senator   
I 





at   whai   the   statement   contained.  I  thought    m 
esident, 
nte 
claim  to   have 




that  after  the  raid on  Friday, 16th March st 
isreprese    d   and   I  seek      ave    o   make   a atement. 
Senator  Wilkinson7Visit  .  The   PRESIDENT7I   s  leave  granted?  There 
being no objection, leave  is granted. 
Senator  WITHERS7 I  used  the word  'raid . 
One   would   have   thought   that   that    would     Senator    GREENWOOD7 I    have    listened 
have been adverted to  somewhere  in  the for   the   greater   Part   of  an   hour   to   what   I 
statement.  But  the  most  that  can  be  said  is   regard  as   not  an  exposure,   not  an  identificaÿ   
that  it  was  dismissed   in   2   minor   paraÿ   tion  of  terrorist  individuals or  organisations in 
graphs on  page   28  of  a   30ÿpage   document.   this  countrv  but  what  I  have  interpreted  as  a 
All  we  have listened   to   this   afternoon   has   challenge  to  my  integrity,  a  challenge   to  my 
been   a  reiteration of  statements   about  a  reign     
honesty    and   a   challenge   to   the   bona fides
 with which I    discharged the office  of 
of  terror7mos   t of  which  we  have  heard  time     AttorneyÿGeneral   last   year.   It   accords   with 
and time  again.  One  would  have  thought  that what  was forecast  in  Press   statements.   I  proÿ Senator    
Murphy   would    have     at     least     pose  to  reply  not  today  but  in  due  course  and attempted   to  
justify  his  actions  of  the   last   12  in   detail,   chapter   and   verse,   in  the   course  of days   and   not   
make   the   statement   wbich   he    the   debate,    because   I   have   been   subjected   to made  this  
afternoon. One  is left  with the a   monstrous   vilification   in   which   truth   has impression   that   all  
that   Senator    Murphy   has      played  virtually  no part.  1 have  sat here 
attempted  to achieve  is  a  state  of  tension, and 
it  is  a  state  of  tension   which  is  often  brought          Government  senators interjecting. 
about  by  the  continual presence  of  police. We         The   PRESIDENT7Order   ! I  will  not  have 
have heard of threats of  death,  threats of  this  Senate  governed  by  a  claque  on  the  back 
bombings,  threats  of  bombs  in  the  Senate  and     bench either on  my right or on my left. 
of   bullet   proof   g'ass.   What   happened  here 
today? We  heard   nothing  at  all  about   those   Senator   GREENWOOD7 J   have   sat   here 
things.  All I  can  say,  Mr  President,   is  that   and   1   have   listened   to   and   I   have   read 
Senator Murphy   has   deliberately   not   excerpts  of things I  have  said  taken completely 
attempted  to  ans er  the  q estion before  the out  of  context  and not  put   in  the   balance 
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Senator   Withers  be   entitled   to  speak in the  ignored   what   is  relevant,   concealed  what  is 
debate,   in  effect,  as   though  he   had not yet  inconvenient  and  refused to table  all the docÿ 
spoken.  uments which would enable  people to find out 
Senator   Withers1 I  would  be agreeable  to where  the  truth  lies. The  truth  has  not been 
that   course   if  all  other honourable  senators told  and   the  reason   that   the   truth has  not 
agree. been    told   has    been    because    the Attorneyÿ General  has  chosen  not  to do so. 
The PRESIDENT1Wha  t   does    Senator 
DrakeÿBrockman say on the matter?  He  stated   that  there  are terrorist organisaÿ 
Senator DrakeÿBrockman1 I  am  glad  that tions  in  Australia.  He  has   named certain we  
have  been   brought  into  it. On behalf of organisations.    But   who   are  their  members, 
the Australian Country Party, I agree. what   are    their   activities,   what   have   they done?    What   is   there   to  justify  his claim? 
Senator   MURPHY1Woul  d   Senator   Gair Where is the  substantiation?  Where indeed, is 
indicate whether  he concurs with the proposal?    the credible evidence? What does  the Attorneyÿ 
Senator Gair1 I would hate to disturb the General say? He  says  that  the evidence  is 
harmony that appears to exist. I have no in the documents that he piles on the table of objection to 
that procedure. the  Senate1som  e  2,000   or   more  pages of documents.   For  what  purpose?  Is  it to allow Senator  Negus1O  n  behalf  of  myself  and the assumption to be made: 'Well, if there  are 
the  independent  senators,  I  state that   we   2,000 pages  there  must  be  something'?  But he agree.
  does  not  identify  what  he  relies  on as  eviÿ 
Senator  MURPHY1Ma  y  it  be  taken  that dence.  Above all else,  he  has  refused to prosÿ by  
general  concurrence  this will be  the  course  ecute  anybody  or  any  organisation  for any of  the 
proceedings?  criminal activity of any kind. Nor has he said 
The   PRESIDENT1I  s  there  any objection?    that  he  will  prosecute1i  f  indeed, in the preÿ 
There being no objection, leave is granted for  judiced  atmosphere  he  has  created,  any  perÿ 
this course to be followed. son  he  has   named  could  expect   a  fair trial before a jury. 
Motion1b  y  leave1withdrawn  . 
Senator Murphy claims that there is overÿ 
CROATIAN TERRORISM  whelming  evidence,   incontestable evidence, of 
Ministerial Statenient his  allegation of  terrorist organisations  in this country.  There   are   laws1i  n   the  Commonÿ 
Debate  resumed  from 27 March  (vide page    wealth   Crimes   Act1unde  r   which   he   can 
547), on motion by Senator Murphy:  prosecute   persons   and  apply  to  the courts to 
That  the  Senate  take  note  of the statement. declare    such    organisations    to be  unlawful. 
Senator   GREENWOOD  (Victoria)  (3.7)1 Persons  who cause  death,  injury  and terror by 
The AttorneyÿGeneral (Senator  Murphy) said exploding  bombs  are  terrorists  and liable to last
 week that he would inform   the    the  full rigours of our criminal  law. It is not 
Senate and the people of Australia of the only persons who commit the crimes but perÿ facts1th  
e  facts  of  organised  Croatian terrorÿ   sons  who conspire  to  commit  crimes  or who ism  in  
Australia.  He  has  not  done so. What  attempt  to  commit  crimes  who can be proseÿ 
he has  done  has  been  to  choose his  target,  cuted.  The  laws  exist,  the  offences exist, the 
select his facts and give those chosen by him determination to stamp out political terrorism and   
those   only   to  the   Senate  and   to   the    is  asserted1an  d   yet  there  are  no applications 
nation. What he has done in the name of the to  the  courts. It is  inconceivable that if there 
truth  has  been  to accuse some,  to judge some,     is   evidence     of    organised     terrorism  there 
to  vilify  some,  and  to  deceive  all  the  people    should   be   no   prosecutions.   And, naturally 
of  Australia.  He  has  done  this  by concealing  what  we  are  concerned  about  are  not  proseÿ 
the truth; not  by exposing it. If the  facts did  cutions  of  individuals  following  police  raids 
not  support  his  beliefs, then  he  ignored and and   arrests  since   the AttorneyÿGeneral made 
suppressed those facts. What he has done has his statement last week. We are  concerned  to 
disgraced   his  office. As  the AttorneyÿGeneral   challenge    and   deny    the   AttorneyÿGeneral's 
of  the  Commonwealth he  claimed  to  be  givÿ   assertions   that   last   year   the   evidence   was 
ing  the  facts  on  a  serious  matter of whether available   in  abundance    to  support  prosecuÿ 
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given.  The  fact  is1i  t  must  be1tha  t  there  is  This   statement, which   Senator    Murphy 
no evidence which would enable  prosecutions.  describes  in effect as  a lie, I  made  as  Attorÿ 
There is no credible evidence to support the neyÿGeneral. I made it responsibly. It is not a 
allegations. This is what the Commonwealth lie, in fact or in effect.  I made  it after considÿ 
Police, the Australian Security Intelligence eration of the recommendations, the  factual 
Organisation and the AttorneyÿGeneral's    material,  the  reports  and  the  relevant  inforÿ 
Department  of  the  Commonwealth   confirmed  mation  which  had  been   supplied  to  me.  The 
to me and what the documents  the Attorneyÿ responsibility  for  the  statenient  naturally  is 
General concealed and the facts  he  withheld  and  must  be  mine, but it was  made  as  a conÿ 
plainly disclose.   sidered  statement   of  the  position as  I and the 
The  AttorneyÿGeneral had  an  abundance  of   agencies  of  the  Commonwealth  for  whom  I 
material  available  to  him. What  he  chose not    was  responsible  knew it. 
to reveal is revealing.  I  have a  document,  A  further document  from  ASIO,  undated, 
received from ASIO last year and dated 13th which  Senator  Murphy  did not  table,  was  an 
April 1972, which Senator Murphy has availÿ initial  assessment  after  tbe  bomb  explosions  
able to him and which he has not tabled. And which occurred  in  Melbourne  in  April  1972 
what does it say?  It expressed,  in  11 closely  and which  I  received about  that time.  The 
argued  pages,  that  it is  difficult not  to believe     document stated:. that  the   majority  of  violent   incidents involvÿ 
ing  Yugoslavs in Australia: C 
However,  even  if it  can  be  shown  that  within the roatian    nationalist    organisations     there    are  some 
1i t Ihey are indeed the work of Croatian nationalÿ individuals with a propensity to violence this would ists1mus  t  
also  be  the  result  of  activity  by isolated     provide insufficient grounds  for general condemnation individuals  
or  very  small  groups.  Certainly  the  inciÿ  of  the organisations  when . there  is  no  evidence  to dents 
themselves have been of a type not requiring indicate that bomb attacks are other than  the  violent organisational   
support,  but  rather,   limited ingenuity    expressions  of individual extremists. on  the  behalf   of  an  individual  to  obtain explosives 
ancl  construct   a simple detonating mechanism. If requested  I  shall table  the document. These 
Did  Senator   Murphy  refer  to  this  statement?     assessments  are   entirely  consistent    with  the 
Did he table this document? He did not. The view that is to be found  in the  documents, 
document concluded: which  Senator  Murphy was  prepared  to table, 
that  while  there  were  grounds  for presuming  that the    
of what was said in 1971. 
Croatian     nationalist    organisations     as     entities     are      I  note,  for example,  from  those  tabled  docÿ 
unlikely  to  be  involved   in  such   violence  in  Australia,    uments,     that    on   2nd    February,    1971    the 
a  more   probable   explanation   lies   in  the  activities    of    DirectorÿGeneral  of Security stated: 
individuals   and   small   groups    acting   independently          It  should  be   understood   that,  so  far,  evidence  is without  organisational  support. lacking  that   any   of   the  bomb  attacks   on Yugoslav I shall table the document and I challenge the establishments have been planned by specific organisÿ AttorneyÿGeneral.   Why   did   he   not   table it? 
Why  did he  make  no  reference  to  its concluÿ   ations,   rather   than   by   individual   extremists.  The 
sions? detection  of  individuals,  or  small  isolated groups, is obviously a more diflicult matter  than  the penetration 
Senator  Murphy  denied  that  there was basis of  established organisations. 
for my assessment that there was no credible I note also  that  at  the  conference  attended  on 
evidence    of   the   existence    in   Australia  of    20th  February  1971 to deal  with coÿoperation 
Croatian revolutionary terrorist  organisations. between  the  Commonwealth Police and  ASIO 
He said that at  the  time  I  made  those  stateÿ  the  Commissioner  of  Commonwealth  Police 
ments  they  were  untrue.  But  what  are  the  reported  to  the Secretary   of   the  Attorneyÿ 
facts?  What  was  the  statement  I  had  made?  I  General's   Department  that  the  recent  acts of 
had said on 20th July 1972: violence were discussed  and that: .   .   .   the    indications   were    that    Croatians   were 
Investigations by the Commonwealth Police so far involved  but  whether  this was  as  the  result  of activity 
have   not   revealed    any   credible   evidence    that   any      and control by Croat organisations  was not clear. Croatian   revolutionary  terrorist  organisation  exists in 
Australia.   The  Government   cannot   positively  reject     It was also said that: 
assertions  that  individuals  or groups   of individuals   .   .   .   evidence   is  lacking  that   bombings   etc.  have 
may  be  engaging  in  terrorist activities  directed  in   been  the  work  of  organisations  but  may  be  the work 
some  way  to achieving Croatian  independence. of small groups  which are  not integrated. Allegations  of such  activities and  other  matters are 
frequently brought  to  the  notice  of  the  police  and It is obvious  that the ASIO  and  the Commonÿ 
these  are  subject  to  continuous  investigation. If  invesÿ  wealth   Police   assessments   of   1971   still 
tigations    disclose     such     activities,   the    persons    so     remained   the   same   in   1972    Why   did the d    ill  b   t d   if th i   ti iti    i  
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received   in  1972?  They  do  not support  his  be    kept    informed.   But    the final  report 
elaborate   thesis  but  why  should  they  not be  apparently was    not    available  until  23rd 
revealed?   November1b  y  which   time,  because  of   the 
Senator  Murphy  claimed  that  there was an dissolution   of   Parliament,   I   had   ceased to 
irresponsible indifference to information availÿ receive any reports or  submissions  from  the 
able, but he makes  this  charge  only  on  the  Commonwealth  Police.  One  of the  last Comÿ 
basis of that information which he regards as monwealth Police documents I received was a 
relevant for the Senate and the people  of  submission  from  the  Commissioner  of Comÿ 
Australia to have.  It may be clever politics but    monwealth  Police  dated   19th  October   1972. 
it is unworthy of the  principal  law officer  of   It said: 
the  Commonwealth. I was  consistently  receivÿ    From  time  to  time, allegations  have  been  made by 
ing submissions from the  Police,  from ASIO both the Yugoslav Government  and  various groups in 
and  from  the  AttorneyÿGeneral's  Department  Australia  that  clandestine  training is  being  given  to 
on  the  whole  question   of  terrorism. Senator     Croatian   'terrorists'   in  this   country   prior   to their returning   to   Europe    to   carry   out   guerilla  activity 
Murphy  referred  to  the  aideÿmemoire  from  against   the  Socialist  Federal  Republic  of Yugoslavia 
the Yugoslav Government and the  allegations  (SFRY).  All such  allegations  have  been  scrupulously 
about the Croatian  Revolutionary  Brothÿ  investigated  but  to  date no  viable evidence  at  all has 
erhood.   But,  again,   what   are   the   facts?   I   been  uncovered  to  support  the  contention  that Croaÿ tian terrorists have been  trained in Australia. 
received   a  departmental   submission   on 18th 
August  1972 which stated: I  shall   table    this   document.    Surely   this  is 
highly   relevant.   It  was    the   day    before  the The   reports    by   ASIO    to    the  Department  of reply  was  given to the  Yugoslav Government. Foreign   Affairs  dated   24th   March   1970   and   to this 
Department dated 15th  August   1972   both   indicate   Why did not  Senator  Murphy choose  to make 
that, in ASIO's view and that of 'the relevant law this  information  available?  The Commonÿ 
enforcement  agencies'  no  evidence  has  been  found to    wealth    Police    had     reported     to     the 
support   the   Yugoslav   contention   of   1970   that   the     AttorneyÿGeneral's      Department      on  17th groups   gathered    round   the   Croatian Revolutionary 
Brotherhood  were  still  in  existence  in  this  country,  August  1972.  At that  stage  they  had  before 
and were operating  on  a  scale  comparable  with preÿ  them  the  aideÿmemoire  which  had  been  preÿ 
1963 activities. sented  by  the  Yugoslav  Ambassador   on 16th 
If  requested  I   shall   table   this   document.   Will   August.   Senator   Murphy   has placed   reliance the    
AttorneyÿGeneral   say    why   he  declined  to upon     this     aideÿmemoire      and   drawn   certain 
put    this   material    before    the    Senate and    the conclusions    from   it.  But   his  conclusions    are 
people   of  Australia?   based   on  the   same   tactic,  of  selecting    what  he 
The aideÿmemoire contained numerous        wants   and   ignoring   what  is  to  the   contrary or 
allegations.  Persistent  among  the  allegations in    is   inconvenient,   as    characterises   his whole 
the  document   were  the  assertions  that  terrorÿ   statement. 
ist   training  by   terrorist   groups was  taking What  are  the  facts?  What  are  the  matters 
place   in  Australia.  Senator Murphy claimed  Senator   Murphy   withholds?   First he  refers 
that  what he called  a bland interim reply was  extensively    to   the    police    report  of  23rd 
given on 20th October to the Yugoslav Govÿ November which he has  tabled and  which 
ernment   which   maintained   that  the  matter  represented,   apparently,  the final conclusions 
was    still   being   investigated    but made  no  of  the   Commonwealth  Police.  It  is a docuÿ 
admission of the presence of terrorist organisÿ ment never produced to  me  and he  would ations 
in our midst. It was this which, subseÿ know this. And yet he  attempts to build  a quently, the 
Prime Minister (Mr Whitlam) has case on the assumption that it was material stigmatised  as a lie.
  known   to  and  in  the  hands  of the  previous 
But  how  could  the  reply  say anything else Government.  Second,  he  tables  the Commonÿ 
in  the  light  of  the   facts?  Senator   Murphy    wealth  Police report dated  17th  August   1972 
chose to withhold  the  facts.  What  are  the  which,  of course,  was  stated  by  the  police to 
facts? All the detailed aideÿmemoire allegaÿ be a preliminary study. He refers to one senÿ tions   
were   being   investigated.   Searches  of    tence only1tha  t it, namely the  aideÿmemoire, homes 
had taken place. I was constantly does contain a core of almost irrebuttable being   informed  that   
documents   seized1an  d    fact. 
nothing other  than  documents  had been  found    But  what was  the  core  of irrebuttable fact?  
by the Commonwealth Police in these The Commonwealth police did not expressly searches1wer  e  
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sisted  of.  Nor  does  Senator  Murphy. I  shall either the movement'1Croatia  n National 
refer  to  what  it  might  be  at  a  later  stage.    Resistance1'o   r Rover'.  It also states: 'We  are 
Third, what the report did say was: not  yet  in possession  of  evidence',  to support 
For the first time we  have  been  given  clear eviÿ  alleged  assessments  of individuals. Further the dence  
that the  Yugoslav  authorities  have   been  makÿ  report  says:  'The  names  and   premises  .   .   . ing  a  
detailed  study  of  leading  Croatian  nationalist    are  the  subject  of current  investigation'.  Then 
figures in  Australia  and   that   they   may   well  be  in   it says: 'We  are  unable  to obtain  any credible possession    of   credible   evidence    which   would  support 
their  allegations.  Whilst  we would  disagree  at  this evidence  to  support  these  allegations'.  They 
juncture with some specific aspects of their claims, related to training and  terrorist  groups.  The 
particularly in relation to the links between HRB and report also states: 'Police  have  been  unable  to 
HIRO,  basically  they  seem  to  have  evidence  pointing    obtain  formal complaints  from witnesses who towards  the  existence   of  a Croatian  terrorist organisÿ 
ation in Australia. would  testify in Court'. That  was referring to 
The  evidence  referred  to  consisted  of  what   allegations   of  apparent   extortion.  Finally,  it 
was  alleged  by  the  Yugoslav  Government.  It  states:  'Our  investigations   failed  to   produce 
had    to   be   tested   by   investigation.   As   the    credible   evidence    to   support    such claims'. 
report said, they may well be in possession of That was relating to claims of blackmail with 
credible  evidence   which  would  support   their    respect  to  the  purchase  of  soÿcalled Croatian 
allegations.  The   report  expressed   serious  conÿ   passports. 
cern    on   what    the    material   in the   aideÿ  These   are,   as   I  have   indicated, the  stateÿ 
memoire  contained  about the  possible  exisÿ  ments  to  be  found  in  the  police  report  of tence  
of  a clandestine   terrorist organisation in 17th  August.  These  statements  are highly relÿ 
Australia. evant    but   were    not    even    referred  to  by 
It  is  proper  and  only  fair  to  consider  what  Senator  Murphy. They  represent  the state of the   
5  pages    of   the   police   report of  17th police   investigation   and    their assessment  of 
August indicated. What was the core of irreÿ the position before they proceeded  to  make 
buttable  fact?  Surely  it was,  as  a study  of the    the  detailed   inquiry  into  the  Yugoslav Govÿ 
report  discloses,   that  there  had  been   a raid,    ernment's  allegations  in the  aideÿmemoire. 
an   unlawful  incursion,  by persons  intending  They  represent  the  considered  police viewÿ 
violence, into Yugoslavia. Some of these perÿ point  at  about  the  same  time  as  I made  the sons 
came  from  Australia.  They  had  links statement  which  Senator Murphy categorised with 
Australia. The report stated: as  a lie. I  had  said  that  investigations by the 
Attacks have taken place on  Yugoslav  missions  Commonwealth  police so  far had not revealed without 
detection  of the culprits. credible   evidence   that   any   Croatian revoluÿ 
That   is   fact1irrebuttabl  e   fact1bu  t  in   the    tionary  terrorist  organisation  existed  in  Ausÿ 
light of the many reservations  and qualificaÿ  tralia.  But  there  was  no  denial. There  was  a 
tions the report contains it is difficult to  see  willingness  and  preparedness  to investigate all  
what other  irrebuttable  fact,  relating  to Ausÿ  allegations.  And  this,  as the police  report 
tralia, is referred to. As I  have  indicated,  indicates,  as  the  departmental submission  supÿ 
Senator  Murphy  did  not specify   what   it   ports   and   as   the   various   ASIO   reports 
referred to. confirm, was the position at that time. 
But  the   balance   of  the   report,   which  was   And  I  reiterate  again: Why, if the Attorneyÿ 
tabled   in  the  Senate,   on  a  day   subsequent  to     General     was      concerned     to     prescnt      the 
the  making  of  Senator   Murphy's   statement,   facts,   was   no   mention   whatsoever   made  of 
indicates   that,   until  investigations   were  made,    these   specific   matters?   The   AttorneyÿGeneral 
the   claims   of   the   Yugoslav    Government    also  revealed   his  partisanship   and  limited  preÿ 
could not  be  the  subject  of  more than  initial  sentation  of  the material  available to  him comment. 
For   example,   the   report   says:  'We   when   he   chose   to  quote   part,   and   part  only, are  not  in  
a  position  to  comment  on   the   of   the   initial  ASIO  assessment  of   thc   aideÿ veracity   of  all  
the   claims'.  That   was  relating     memoire.   I   refer  to  the   ASIO   document   of to  allegations  
of  Australian  involvement  in  7th  September 1972  which he  has   tabled. organisation   and   
training  of  terrorist   groups.     What  he  did  not  refer  to  was   the  part  of  the It  says:  'Until  
detailed   substantiating   evidence      ASIO   report   immediately   preceding    the  pasÿ is  provided'.  
That  was  relating  to individuals' sage which  he  quoted.  What  he  omitted  was alleged    
involvement    in  particular   acts.   The     as  follows: report  states:  'This  Force  has  been  unable  to                     
                             
 
 
802 Croatian  Terrorism SENATE Croatian  Terrorism 
useful  assessment    of  tbe   aide   memoire.   In  general      which  Senator  Murphy  did  not  refer.  It is a terms,   it  would   appear   that   none   of  the   material     significant omission. The Commissioner  of the provided  would  be of any  great  value  as  evidence in 
a  legal sense, but  rather  that  it consists  of a series   of    Commonwealth   Police  in  his  report   of 17th 
allegations requiring  investigation. August   19721tha  t   was   one   of   the   tabled 
He  committed the cardinal sin of quoting out    documents1describe  d   it  as  one  of  a  number 
of   context.   The   police   report   concluded   by   of   disturbing   aspects.   Maybe   the   susceptiÿ 
stating  that  a  detailed  list  of specific questions bilities  of  the  AttorneyÿGeneral were  offended 
was being prepared for  clarification  by the when  he  learned  that  there  was  a police suspiÿ 
Yugoslav authorities. And  the  ASIO  report cion  of  one  or  more  Yugoslav  agents  provoÿ 
indicated   that   inquiries  had  been  instituted in     cateurs.   What  was  omitted from  his   statement 
an   effort  to   establish    the   international  links,    was   the  police  comment   on  the  aideÿmemoire 
the  nature of  organisational   support,   the   oriÿ   assertions  of  the  existence   of  a  secret  terrorist 
gins of the  initiation  and  planning of the  Bosÿ  organisation  HIRO.  In respect  of this  a  proseÿ 
nian   raid   and    the   location   of any   possible cution   for  possession   of  explosives   was and  is 
military   training.   Yet   when   all   the   police    still to be  heard  in Victoria. I  quote  from fhe 
searches,   the   investigations,   the   interrogations      report  of  17th August: 
and the inquiries and translations of seized There  are  a  number  of  disturbing aspects, particuÿ 
documents had been completed what did the larly in relation to one of the 4 allied conspirators, police  
report?  They  reported1an  d  as  I  have    Ivan  Mudrinic.  This  force  has  received  information said,  
because of  the  dissolution of Parliament,    from  a  number  of  sources  that  Mudrinic  was  in the pay   of  the  Yugoslav  ConsulateÿGeneral,  Melbourne. 
it  was  not  a  report  which  came to  me1tha  t    This  gives  rise  to  the  suspicion  that  he  played  the 
the allegations of  a  secret  terrorist  organisaÿ role  of  agent  provocateur  in the  matter  of  the  Warÿ 
tion  must  be  continued  to be  taken  seriously.    burton explosives  cache  and,  in fact, possibly in relaÿ tion  to the  constitutional documents  of HIRO. These 
And  this, of course,  was  no  more  and  no less     documents   appear  to  be  almost  a  text book example 
than what they had said in August. of  prima  facie evidence  of  illegal  associations under 
section 30 of the Commonwealth Crimes Act. 
All   allegations    of   terrorism   and terrorist 
organisations   must   be   taken   seriously.  And   re
It
o
is  diflicult  at  this  juncture' 
t
to  see any  viable 
they were  taken  seriously. What was  avaihble    c 
as n  why  the  Bosnian  inciden  
i 
group  would  b
 arrying   such   documents,   which    n  view   of their 
was the allegation. But to say that X or the X apparent lack of relevance to anywhere except Ausÿ 
organisation is terrorist is not proof that he tralia, would be an unnecessary burden. It is possible or  it  
is1an  y  more  than  to  say  that  X  is a    that   the   Yugoslav   authorities  .may   have  obtained 
murderer  is  to establish  that  he  is. And what    copies  through  Mudrinic or possible  other informants in   Australia.    In   view    of    the    pending     trial of 
I have  said  is  a  fundamental  aspect  of  our Mudrinic  et  al,  any   enquiries   which   might  overtly 
civil liberties. We value  certain  rights  as  part   suggest    an   agent   provocateur    would   prejudice  the 
of our free society. And one of them is that a Crown case. The matter  is  therefore  the  subject of 
person   accused   of  a  crime  is  obliged  to  be     discreet inquiry. 
and  is  entitled  to  be  tried  in  a  court,  under   I repeat  that  Senator  Murphy did not  refer to 
due process of law, and not to  be  judged  this  allegation.  Why?  Surely  it  is  relevant  in 
criminal simply  on  the  assertion  of  a policeÿ  any  assessment  of  whether  the  aUegations  of 
man, a foreign government or an Attorneyÿ Croatian nationalist organisations being  terÿ 
General.  Arising  out  of the  many  allegations   rorist   organisations    are   justified.  Surely   it 
in the  aideÿmemoire  the  final police  report of  raises  questions  as  to  whether   the  sweeping 
23rd November  recommended  only  that  one condemnation of  the  Croatian  migrant  comÿ 
Jure Marie  was  implicated  with  an  munity  is  justified. The  real  point  about  this 
unidentified Croatian nationalist organisation matter is  whether  the  organisation  known  as 
which  the  report  stated  'apparently  existed in    HIRO  exists.  If it  does,  has   any  part  been 
Australia and which has been engaged in an played by the  Yugoslav  authorities  themselves 
attempt  to overthrow  the  recognised  Governÿ   in   respect   of   its   creation   or   existence? 
ment of  Yugoslavia'.  There  was   no  credible   Obviously the police have their suspicion. 
evidence    of   the   other   allegations,    and  no 
prosecutions  eventuated.  The  suspicion   to   which   the police  report 
gave  expression   is  certainly  a view  held  by a 
The  police  reports  taken  together   reveal  the   number   of   Croatians.   These    allegations    of 
facts  and  they present  a  vastly   different   picÿ  agents   provocateurs,  of   which   I  readily  conÿ 
ture from that which was presented by the cede there was no credible evidence to enable 
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passed on  their  views  to  me  last  year. Cerÿ ment.  Is  it  because  it supports  the  allegation 
tainly there are Croatians who regard their  of  an  agent  provocateur  to  which  the  Comÿ 
troubles  in Australia as  having been fomented  monwealth  Police  referred  in  their  report  of 
by  Yugoslav  secret   police  in  Australia.  The    17th August? 
AttorneyÿGeneral    would    be    aware    of   these             I  consider     it   my    duty,    as     the  Attorneyÿ allegations. He would also be aware  of  the  General  has  not done,  to raise  the  question  as 
ASIO appreciations, of  worldwide assessment to  the  extent  to  which  Croatian nationalists 
made    
by   other    nations'   agencies,    and    the    are  properly  to  be  regarded   as  suspects  in a 
information  possessed  and   suspicions    held  by     number   of  unresolved   incidents.   I   say, withÿ the  Commonwealth  Police.  And  yet  he  has  out  making  any   conclusion  on  the   matter,  
not  referred  to  any  part  of  this  in  his stateÿ  that  these allegations  ought  to  have  been ment. He ought to have been frank with the  placed  alongside  all the  other  allegations  and 
Senate and the Australian people. assertions  which  Senator  Murphy made  in his 
The  AttorneyÿGeneral  has   not   tabled   a   statement.  If he  says  he  is  proposing   to  give  
number of  documents  which   raise,   as   they   the  facts  he  should  give  all  the  facts  and   not 
ought to raise in the mind of any scrupulous only some of them. What the Australian 
AttorneyÿGeneral,  the  questions  of  whether  or   people   are   looking  for  is  not   only  the  truth 
not  there  are  agents  provocateurs in Australia   but  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth, 
and   whether   they   have  been   involved  in  any    and   an  AttorneyÿGeneral  should  aid  them  and 
of  the   incidents  attributed  to  Croatian  terrorÿ     not hinder  and  mislead them in that quest. 
ists.  I  received  an  ASIO appreciation shortly I turn  now  to  the  claim  that the  Sydney 
after  29tb  August  1972  in  which reference  bombings  of 16th September  1972 highlighted 
was made to the activity of the Yugoslav the question of Croatian  terrorism.  Why?  It 
intelligence service in Australia in an effort to may be that these bombings were the work of 
penetrate and  fragment  emigre organisations politically motivated Croatians.  It may  be  that 
and to sow  distrust  so  that the Croatian  they were the work of Croatians not politically 
emigres  would  be  unable  or  unwilling  to  act  motivated.  They   may  have  been   the  work 
as a cohesive  antiÿregime  body. Reference was  of  any  Australian,  immigrant  or  otherwise, 
also made to the beliefs held in  emigre  and  who  had  some  criminal  objective  to  pursue 
security  intelligence  circles  as to  the techÿ  or,  they  may  have  been  the   action   of   an 
niques  which  bave  been  used  by  the  Yugoslav     agent  provocateur.  We do not know. 
authorities   and   the   anticipation   as   to   the 
.actions     which    might    be    expected   in   this  That  it  was   terrorist  in  character is unquesÿ 
country by     Yugoslav     authorities.     It    was     tioned.   But   noÿone     has    been  charged    and 
stressed  that  no  hard  evidence  was  held  to supÿ  police  investigations  have   still not   revealed port  
these  beliefs.  This  is  a  document availÿ  material  upon   which   a   prosecution  may   be able to 
the AttorneyÿGeneral. It would be made. The ASIO  in an  assessment dated  19th unreasonable  to   
suppose  he   has   not   seen   it.   September   1972   expressed   the   view that  there He did not table it. 
Again I challenge the was nothing to link the 2 bomb explosions AttorneyÿGeneral  to  say  why  he  
chose to   and   a   hijacking  of   a   Swedish plane   which ignore  its  implications. occurred   on   
the   previous   day    to any   invesÿ tigations   of  Croatian   terrorist   activities. They 
Another document not tabled deals more expressly left open the possibility  that  some 
specifically  with  the  alleged  implication  of   form of organisation  may  yet prove to exist. I 
the  Yugoslav  Consulate with   the   as   yet   shall   table   the  assessment   I   received   from 
unheard trial  relating  to  the  cache  of  exploÿ   ASIO1 a   document   available   to   Senator 
sives and documents discovered in the Warÿ Murphy  which  again  he did not table. I chalÿ 
burton Ranges. I specify the  document as  a  lenge  him  to  say  why  this  document  was  not 
letter    to   the    Secretary     of   the   Attorneyÿ  tabled. General's Department  dated  29th August 1972. 
1 do  not say  anything more about  the  contents       The  distortions  I have pointed  to in Senator 
of the document because it purports to relate Murphy's statement are founded on a comÿ 
conversations   with  named   persons   employed   parison  of what  Senator  Murphy said  and  the 
by the Yugoslav Government. But Senator material he had  available  to him and  to which 
Murphy  knows  the  gravity and  the  relevance  he  either  gave no weight or which he declined 
of the information it contains.  Yet he  did not  to disc.'ose in any  way. His statements and  the 
take  it  into  account   in any  way  in his  stateÿ    allegations   he   founds  upon those  statements 
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are  not  only improperly  based,  they  are   held  a  Press  conference   when  questions  could 
dishonestly  presented.  It is  a  biased  and  selecÿ  be  asked   of  me  and  answered.   I  said,   in  full 
tive  presentation   of  facts.  The AttorneyÿGenÿ     and frank detail: 
eral  has  misled  the  Senate  and  the  people of 
Australia  by making a statement,  tabling docÿ    re 
Commonwealth   Police  have  investigated allegations 
uments  and  ignoring and  concealing material    c 
ported  by  the  Australian  Broadcasting  Commission oncerning  the  use  of premises   at  the  rear  of  a shop 
which may  exculpate  those  whom  he traÿ  in Shannon  Avenue,  Geelong  and  that  Croatian  men 
duces.  This  is  injustice and  when  the  weight    and    youths    met    in   Geelong    and    proceeded    to 
of  parliamentary  privilege  is  also  placed  on    different parts  of the  You Yang mountains  for trainÿ 
the  scales  against   the  persons  who  are   traÿ    ing.  There  is  no  evidence   to  support  the  claim that groups   of  more   than   30  men   met   in  the   shop or 
duced  the  justification on  him who  does  it is slept  in the  shed   in the  backyard  of  a house behind 
so much the greater. But what  injustice is  the  shop.  Both the  Victoria  Police  and  the Commonÿ 
caused if the persons who  are  vilified  and  wealth  Police  are  satisfied  these allegations are  not 
convicted  by parliamentary  accusation  are  not    true.   Other    allegations    reported    have   been  invesÿ tigated   and  no  evidence   to  support   them   has been 
even   aware1le  t   alone   able   to  have  access    found. 
to1documents  ,     information    and    material 
which,  if  it  may  not  declare   them  innocent,  Specifically1 
raises  that  reasonable  doubt  which is  the  corÿ      'Press  reports   that   a  woman   said   that Yugoslavs 
nerstone of our criminal law.  often spent   weekends    at  a  You Yangs  farmhouse have not been  borne  out  by investigation. 
Is it too weak  to describe   Senator Murphy's ar
Reports   of 
i




gunfire  in the 
conduct as  inexcusable?  It is, surely, the more      r 
e  are  expla nable  by the fac 
r
tha , there  is a  rifle ange  in the  area  used  by  the   eputable  Australian 
reprehensible    when,   in  addition  to  tabling       Sporting  Shooters Association. 
documents   containing  rumour,  suspicion  and           The  local  President   of  the  Shooters  Association 
unverified   allegation,   he    permits    a   roving .
has  stated  that  the  presence  of  40  or  more  men on 
expedition   to   the   media    and   the   public  to         the  You Yang  rifle  range  was  common  and  had  no connection  with  political matters.  The Association 
print  and say  what they  please1wit  h  absolute       has  conducted  both  day  and  night  firing exercises 
privilege concerning  the  individuals named  in      for the last 14 years. 
the  parliamentary  documents.  It is a denial of Local  police  in  the   area   have  reported that  no 
fundamental human values which this country complaints relating to 'groups of armed migrants' has   
long  cherished1an  d   for  which,  I  hope,       have ever been received by  them. 
the  lack  of  challenge  over  so  many  years  has   tr 
Local   inquiries
p




military aining  of  the  ty  e  alleged  in  a new pap r report 
not weakened our firm desire to sustain. could  have   possibly  been   carried   out  in  the You 
Yangs area without it becoming a matter of public 
Senator  Murphy's statement   is a monumenÿ knowledge.  The  You Yangs  are  a  highly popular tal  
misrepresentation.   He  accuses  the former  recreation   area   used    by  sporting  bodies  and  the 
Government1an  d  its  predecessors1o  f   defeaÿ  general   public.  It  is  also  used  for  motor  sports 
tism  and  lack of initiative. Nothing is  further     including  car  trials  and  rallies, some  of  which are conducted   after dark.' 
from  the   truth.  And  Senator   Murphy knows 
from the records  available  to  him  what  the 
C 
It  is  apparent 
o 
that  inquiries  conducted
li 
by  the 
truth is. Yet he denies it by his refusal to p
ommonwealth p lice and the 
r
Victoria po ce have 
acknowledge   what   occurred.   He  conceals   it    s
roduced
t 
the   same   result.  The e  is  no  evidence to 
ubstantia e   reports   and   allegations'  of  Croatian miliÿ 
by  withholding  from the Senate  documents of    tary  training activities in the  You Yang area. 
undoubted  relevance.  He  knows1bu  t  he  did        This is not the mark of irresponsible indifferÿ 
not  acknowledge it1tha   t the pattern  of police    ence. It is the mark of concern and willingness 
investigations,  of  ASIO   intelligence  assessÿ   to  test  every  allegation  that  is  made.  Senator 
ments  and  an  active  pursuing of all leads  and     Murphy  must  know,  because  the  material is information was maintained at all times. available to him, of the  detailed investigations 
Everything the police heard was investigated. which occurred. And yet he chose to ignore 
Everything   I  heard   or   received   was   invesÿ     them. I had stressed many times in many places 
tigated.  Newspaper   stories   were  investigated,    in 1972  the strongest  denunciation of terrorism journalists were interviewed and, from the of any description. Violence of any kind is to 
information obtained, what was able to be be deplored. And I knew that, in what I said, 
investigated was investigated. I  detail,  for I had  the  full  support  of  my  colleagues  in 
example,  what  I  said  on  20th  July  1972  in  government.  I  had  constantly   reiterated   the 
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or   subversive   activities1t  o   be   carried   out  gent  as  practicable.  He  should  know,  if  he 
either  in this country or overseas1the  y would    has  inquired, that  this was  a matter  on  which 
not   be   tolerated.   As  far  as   the   Government  I  had requested the AttorneyÿGeneral's 
was   able   it  would  put   a  stop   to them. And Department    to  prepare   a   submission  for my 
numerous      steps    were     taken, apart     from    consideration  as  a  uniform  laws  project to be 
requiring and ensuring that police and  other  presented  to  the Standing  Committee  of investigations  
were  maintained.  AttorneysÿGeneral.   Naturally,  this  is a  matter 
Senator Murphy  must  know,  for  the  docuÿ  falling  within  State  responsibilities.  Senator ments  
he  tabled  reveal  it, that  the  earlier  surÿ     Murphy   should   know   of   the    work   of the 
veillance and other lawful activities of the Central Crime Intelligence Bureau and its 
Commonwealth police and  other  police forces   special   interest   in  criminal  activities within 
were  effective1s  o effective that  the  organisaÿ    migrant   communities.  He   knows   or  should 
tion known as the Croatian Revolutionary know of steps initiated to review the effecÿ 
Brotherhood   virtually   disbanded    and  ceased    tiveness  of  the  Commonwealth  Police  Force. 
to exist by 1967. One organisation reasonably He should know of  steps  taken  to  improve 
suspected  in those  days  of possible complicity     liaison between  police forces. 
in  or  preparedness  to  assist  acts  of  violence     I  have    mentioned    these   matters   because 
against the Yugoslav Government therefore  they refute the  portrayal of apathy  and disinÿ  
ceased  to  be  a cause  for concern.  And  this  is  terest  which  Senator   Murphy  so   selectively 
what all the subsequent assessments of the sought to create. Senator Murphy has claimed 
Commonwealth agencies confirm. Whether, as that ASIO described the attitude of my predeÿ 
police    reports    of    23rd    November     1972     cessor  Mr Hughes   and,  thereafter,  Mr N. H . 
received by Senator Murphy after he became Bowen and myself, as indifferent to the probÿ 
AttorneyÿGeneral suggest,  the  body  has been  lem  of  Croatian  terrorism.  This,  for  my  part 
revived  is   for  Senator   Murphy  to  determine.   and   on  the  part  of  my  predecessors  I  entirely 
But  if  he  has  evidence  he  has   an  obligation to     repudiate.     The    statement     emanating  from take action. ASIO,  which Senator  Murphy declared subseÿ 
Senator Murphy knows,  or  ought  to know,   quently   by   an  answer   to  a  question   to  have 
that   in  conjunction  with  the   Department  of come  from  the  DirectorÿGeneral  himself, is a 
Foreign  Affairs an   interdepartmental  commitÿ   curious   selfÿserving  statement.   Its significance 
tee  to consider   existing  legislation  and   pracÿ   would   not  be   lost   on  the  AttorneyÿGeneral. 
tice  in  Australia  in  the  detection  and  counterÿ   Yet   it   was   not   associated    with   the   same  
ing  of terrorist   activities   was   established.   It   strength,   priority  or  vehemence   of  expression 
was   to  consider,   as   I  indicated   to Mr Bowen which  has   characterised    the  other   condemnaÿ 
as  Foreign  Minister  in   a   letter   of   16th   tions  in his  statement.  Are  we  to  believe   that 
October  1972,.  a  conspectus   of   Commonÿ   a  man   who  has   never   previously  complained, 
wealth and State and territorial laws having a now, in the extraordinary atmosphere which bearing  on  
terrorist  activities1no  t  only  with    the   AttorneyÿGeneral  by  his   raid  on  ASIO a  view  to  
ascertaining   whether   Australian law    has created, suddenly discovers an was   adequate  
to  deal   with  terrorism, but  also indifference  in the former AttorneysÿGeneral? to   
ascertain    what   changes   would   be required 
to  give  effect  to  any  new  international  treaties        For   my  part,   I  had   numerous   conferences 
and   obligations.  Senator   Murphy  must  know,      and   discussions    with  the   DirectorÿGeneral of 
because    it   was   public   knowledge    and    the    Security. Senator  Murphy should have known, 
material is available  to  him,  of  the  efforts  for the  information  must  be  available to him, 
which the Government made  to  persuade  the  that  on  27th  September I  summoned  a  conÿ United   
Nations   General   Assembly   to  take  a ference   of   the   DirectorÿGeneral  of  Security, 
strong    and    positive   stand    against   terrorism the    Commissioner    of  Commonwealth   Police 
throughout  the world. and   senior   officers  of  the   AttorneyÿGeneral's 
Department   to  consider    amongst    other  things 
Senator Murphy must know because the more effective means of liaison, investigation 
AttorneyÿGeneral's   Department   has   the   mateÿ   and   dissemination    of   intelligence   relating   to 
rial  which  I  asked to  be  prepared,  of  the   allegations   and   counterÿallegations   of  Yugosÿ 
summary   of  laws   throughout   Australia  relatÿ   lav   terrorism.  The   document   which   I   shall 
ing  to  the  storing  and   acquisition  of gelignite.     table    indicates    not   a  picture   of  indifference 
I   i     f   d  i  h    b                         
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best   possible   position  to  provide  the  Prime Senator     Murphy,   which   I mention   only 
Minister   and    Cabinet    with  assessments   of because   they   were   specific  and   ought  to  be 
intelligence relating to terrorist activities in answered. They also are the  results  of slanted 
Australia.  The  document,  which  is  a submisÿ  and  selective  presentation   of   material.  He 
sion by the  Secretary  of  the  AttorneyÿGenÿ  states,  for example,  that,  on  19th  September,  
eral's  Department  approved  by  me  on  6th  I had claimed  in  the  Senate  that  the  allegaÿ 
October  1972, states: tions of  the  President   and  Prime Minister of 
The  purpose   of  this  minute  is  to  seek  your formal    Yugoslavia   had   been   proved   as allegations 
approval  to  the  arrangements   agreed   on  at  the  disÿ     without basis.  He contends   that  this was  conÿ 
cussion you  had  with  Mr  Barbour  and  myself on trary  to  the  'core  of  almost  irrebuttable fact' 
27th September last for a group to be established to which  was  an  expression  contained in  the 
coÿordinate intelligence and investigations relating to preliminary assessment by the Commonwealth 
politically motivated acts of violence. Police   of   the   Yugoslav   Government's aideÿ The  coÿordination  group   is  to  consist   of  a senior 
officer of  this  Department  who  will be  in charge  of  memoire.   But  what  he   omits  and   it  is  the 
the  group,  a  senior  oflicer  of  the  Commonwealth   fact,  is   that   the   debate   in  the   Senate   was 
Police Force and a senior officer of ASIO. about   statements   which   had   been    made  by 
After setting  out  the  functions of  the  group  President and   Prime   Minister   prior   to   the 
the document records: aideÿmemoire     being    received.    These   stateÿ 
In  accordance  with  your  requirements   the  group   
ments   were   part   of   the   subject matter  of 
will make frequent and regular reports on  at  least  a  Senator  Murphy's  motion  which  was  being daily 
basis to yourself. debated. And   the Commonwealth   Police 
report of 17th August had confirmed that If    
the     DirectorÿGeneral    of    Security    is   these broad  allegations  were without basis1a  s 
accurately  reported  by  the  AttorneyÿGeneral,   subsequently   the    allegations    in   the   aideÿ 
he  has  a  curious  idea of  'indifference'. The  memoire about   specific   bases   and  training 
group   was   established    for  one   reason,  and     camps  were  said  to lack viable  evidence. 
that   reason   was   that   as   a  Government we 
were not prepared to  tolerate  violence  or  terÿ   But  the  quotations  and  imputations  which 
rorism and any step to further our determiÿ  Senator  Murphy  chose  to  make  are contrived 
nation was worth while. I shall also table, an to create a different impression  from what  the 
earlier document,  being   a  memorandum   to   record  shows.  And this, of  course,  appears  to 
me by the Secretary of the AttorneyÿGeneral's be the  quite deliberate  pattern  of  what 
Department  headed   'Yugoslav  Migrant  Probÿ   Senator    Murphy    said.    Senator    Murphy 
lems and Related  Matters'  dated  29th August  accused  me  of  being  an active  protector  of 
1972, concerning the need for a thorough terrorists.  It is  a  charge  unsupported  by  eviÿ 
appraisal to  be  made of  troubles  in  the dence  and  absolutely  unwarranted.  It  derives 
Yugoslav community in Australia and for from the letter I forwarded to  the  Minister 
improving liaison between the various Comÿ for Immigration which last week was incorÿ 
monwealth  agencies.  The   memorandum   I   porated  in Hansard.  To that  letter I then  and 
table  was  in response  to  initiatives  which  I  now   fully  adhere.  Zdenko   Marincic  was   a 
had  taken  and  I refer  to  them only  to estabÿ    convicted  person.  That  he  was  a  person who 
lish that, if Senator  Murphy had  wished to do  must be taken  either to have been  prepared to so, 
he could  have  acknowledged  them  himÿ  engage  in violence overseas  or  to support  the self. It 
was from this appraisal  and  subseÿ violent acts  of others  I  plainly acknowledged. quent 
consideration that the  coÿordinating  But  he  had  committed no  act  of violence in group on 
politically motivated acts of vioÿ Australia  and  in my opinion, to deport a perÿ lence was 
eventually established in the Attorÿ son to such a country where he will be perÿ neyÿGeneral's  
Department. secuted    for  his   political   opposition to  the 
Government  of  that  country  is  not  my conÿ 
But these are all matters to which Senator cept of how an Australian Government Murphy  
makes  no  reference.  The  documents    should  act1o  r  of  how  the  Australian people were  
available  to  him  but  were excluded.  would  expect  it  to  act.  I  do  not  know how They 
demonstrate, as  almost  all  of  what  I  any  AttorneyÿGeneral  with  a sense  of justice have said  
today demonstrates,  that  the  and  a  respect  for  human   values   could  have vilification  in  
which  Senator   Murphy  has   taken a different view. 
engaged  was  derived  from  a  highly selective, 
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AttorneyÿGeneral's  Department  to  be relieved   questions   the  statement  does  not  answer.  It is 
of  his  duties because  of some  supposed refusal    a  statement   for  which   the AttorneyÿGeneral 
to   accept   bis   advice.   If  he   was   relieved,   must    carry   the   shame    of   the    Australian 
and   1 do  not  know  that  he  was,  it  was  an    nation that it was ever made. 
internal  decision  of  the  Department.  It  was The   PRESIDENT1Order  !  Senator  Greenÿ 
not mine. In any event the officer whom I wood, you indicated to me that you wished to 
identify as the one allegedly relieved was table some documents. Do you seek leave to 
communicating with my office, as my records table the documents? reveal,   on   Croatian  matters   at   the   end of 
October.   Senator   Murphy   must   know   the       Senator  GREENWOOD1Yes  .  I  seek leave 
facts1bu   t  he  has  chosen  again,  not  to state    to  table  the  documents  which  I  said  in  the 
them  but to leave  the  matter  open  for innuÿ   course of my statement I would table. 
endo  and  assumption.  I  also  say,  to illustrate The  PRESIDENT1I  s leave  granted?  There 
the  character  of the  case  sought  to be  made,     being no objection, leave is granted. 
that the opinion I expressed as 
AttorneyÿGeneral  on  the  question  of  the  grant    d 
Senator GREENWOOD1 I table those 
of   a  passport    to  Jure   Marie,   which was  in ocuments  which are  as follows: 
any  event  refused, by  the  responsible  Minisÿ 1. ' 
13th April 19721ASI  O Appreciation headed: 
ated
 
ter,  namely  the  Minister  for Immigration, was V 
Croatian    Nationalism  and    Politically Motiv 
not    included   in   the   tabled documents.   I 2. 
iolence in Australia'.   
emorandu   m by  the Secreÿ retained  my  copy  of  my  notation  on  fhe 3ÿ    tary  
29th  August  19721M 
l's Department headed: of the AttorneyÿGenera 
page    submission   dated   6th  July,  wherein  I  'Yugoslav Migrant Problems and related matters'. 
expressed  my  views  and  acknowledged comÿ  3.  19th September  19721ASI  O note headed:  
pletely  that  the  decision was  for the Minister is 
'Recent  Events  in the field of Croatian Nationalÿ 
for    Immigration.    Why  the   departmentally m and Politically Motivated Violence'. 
noted  copy of  a 2ÿpage submission dated 4th    of 
4.  4th
t





July  and  never  presented   to  me  was tabled I the A torneyÿGeneral's Departmen headed 
am  unable to say. A 
'Coÿordinating 
'. 
Group  on   Politically  Motivated 
cts  of Violence 
In   conclusion  I  say   that  Senator  Murphy's (approved  by  AttorneyÿGeneral,  6th October  1972) 
statement   should  never  have  been  made.  It    m
5.  19th  October
e
19721Commonwealt  h Police Subÿ ission   to   the   S cretary    of  the AttorneyÿGeneral's 
was  made  in a  highly  charged atmosphere of Department  headed: 
unprecedented acts1o  f    raids    on   security 'Parliamentary Question1Croatia  n   Nationalist 
headquarters     by   Commonwealth  Police,  of Activities'. 
intensive   house   searches,  of massive  security  Senator JAMES  McCLELLAND (New 
precautions.  In  this atmosphere,  charges  have    South   Wales)  (4.1)1I  t  is  a  great   pity  that 
been made  contrary  to  the  usual  processes  to  Senator  Greenwood  did  not  wait until  after 
which  we  are  accustomed   and   a   whole   last   weekÿend   to  compose  his   speech,   or  at 
migrant   community  is   virtually accused  of least  he  was  not  adroit enough  to  make a  few 
guilt1becaus  e    every    Croatianÿborn   citizen    amendments   to  it   after  the   events   of  last 
tends   to  be  regarded   as  a  potential  criminal.    weekÿend.  Otherwise,  presumably,   he   would 
It   is    alien   to   our traditions   and    the    not  have brought himself to say: 
AttorneyÿGeneral's statement has done Above  all  else,  he11 
nothing   to   allay   the   widespread fears  and referring   to    the   present   AttorneyÿGeneral 
concern to which expression has been given. (Senator Murphy)1 
The   statement   accuses   organisations   of   has  refused  to prosecute   anybody  or  any  organisation 
being  terrorists,  of  being  recruiting  grounds,   for any criminal activity of any kind. 
of  being umbrella organisations  for terrorists.    I am  perfectly aware1an  d   I  will  keep  well 
But  is there  credible evidence  to sustain  those    within  your  ruling,  Mr  President1tha  t  these 
accusations?  If  there   is   none   he   has   monÿ   charges  against   these   particular  people   are  sub 
strously  maligned  and  condemned  a  group of  judice  and  I  will  make  no comment  at all 
Australian   citizens   who   have    no   redress   and    upon  their  guilt  or  otherwise.  But surely,  I am 
who    will  long   bear   the   scars   of  his  action.    permitted    to   say    that   Senator     Greenwood's 
But   if  he   has   the   evidence   why  has   he   not   statement    is  already   out  of  date,   because  we, 
used  the  courts? Why  has  he  chosen  the  Parÿ  as a  government, have  done  within  4  months 
liament  to  present  a  slanted and  highly  prejuÿ  what  his  Government  and its  predecessors  did 
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new  incentive  scheme  to encourage and assist year.  The  task  force has  reported  back to the 
exports.  That scheme  has  been under exarrunÿ IDC which is composed  of interested departÿ 
ation. Industry people have been consulted and ments. The task force was charged with the reÿ 
have made comments.  There  has  also been an sponsibility  of  investigating the  allegations, 
Industries Assistance Commission repon looking keeping firmly in mind the traditional rights and 
into  the   expon   market development   grants traditional  movements  of people from Papua 
scheme as well as other expon incentives. All New Guinea in the Torres Strait area. The interÿ 
these  matters   are   being   considered  by  the departmental  committee  is at  the present  time 
Government and until they are resolved I am not  considering the report of the task  force.  The 
in a position to make any funher comment. As response to that report has not yet come to  me, 
soon  as  the  matter  has  beenfinalisedby the but the initial investigations show that the moveÿ 
Government, an announcement will be made in ments referred to by the honourable member are 
this House. not considerable. 
INTEREST RATES TRANSPORT PLANNING AND 
Mr  BARRY  JONESÿI direct my question  to RESEARCH 
the Treasurer. Is it a fact that the Reserve Bank Mr NIXON (GippslandÿMinister for has 
been pushing down forward margins on the   Transport),Fo  r the information of honourable 
United States dollar below the relative differenÿ members I present a report prepared by the Deÿ 
tial between interest rates in Australia  and  partment  of Transport  entitled 'The Transport 
interest rates in the United States? Is the present (Planning and Research) Act 1974 Report of 
margin unrealistically low and is it intended to Progress to 30 June  1977'.  The  report  was 
reduce it funher? Is the Reserve Bank pushing produced at the request of State authorities and 
down forward margins in order to bring the Ausÿ provides an example of the coÿoperation beÿ 
tralian dollar to parity with the United States tween State and Commonwealth which is being 
dollar? If so, does this indicate that the Governÿ achieved under the Act. 
ment   wishes   to  establish   an  open foreign 
exchange   market  in Austraha? COMPENSATION: COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT    EMPLOYEES 
Mr HOWARD,O  n a number of occasions, in  Mr  HUNT (GwydirÿMinister for Health)ÿ 
response  to  questions  and  also through stateÿ Pursuant   to section  122  of the Compensation ment, I have provided to this House and to the (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act community generally, a description and explaÿ 1971 I present the  annual  report of the Comÿ nation of the current management of the Ausÿ missioner for Employees Compensation for the 
tralian exchange rate. Frankly, I have nothing to yearended 30 June 1977. add  to those descriptions. 
ENVIRONMENT 
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION  Mr   GROOM  (BraddonÿMinister for 
Mr SHIPTONÿI direct a question to the Minÿ Environment, Housing and Community ister 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs concernÿ  Development),Fo  r the information of honourÿ ing 
illegal immigration to Nonhern Austraha. Is  able  members  I present  the  summary report  of the 
Minister aware  that numbers  of Papua New the sixth meeting of the Council  of Nature Conÿ 
Guinea citizens are overÿstaying their traditional, servation Ministers, Cairns, 29  July  1977,  and 
normal and usual  visits  to  Australia  and have  the summary  record of proceedings  of the  ninth 
settled permanently in northern Australia, parÿ meeting of the Australian Environment Council, 
ticularly in Queensland?   Has the Minister's  Deÿ    Canbena, 11  August  1977. 
partment investigated  this matter?  Does  the Minÿ 
ister have an estimate of how many such people DCROATIAN EMBASSY' 
are overÿstaying in Australia?  Have  they come  to Ministerial  Statement 
Australia under any special anangements? Mr  PEACOCK  (KooyongÿMinister for 
Mr MacKELLARÿThis matter was brought  Foreign Affairs),b  y leave, I wish to make clear 
to  my attention last year. Following that, I conÿ  the  Government's  position  with  respect  to  the 
sulted  Ministers  of other interested depanments creation  of establishments,  institutions or organÿ 
and  an interdepartmental  committee  was set up isations which can,  because  of the diplomatic terÿ 
to look at the impUcations ofthe question. A task minology used, result in substantial difficulties in 
force   was    established     and    that task  force AustraUa's   relations   with  other  countries  and 
journeyed to Thursday Island in the Torres Strait    impede  the operations of Australia's foreign polÿ 
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wellÿbeing of the nation. This is particularly so destruction of a state in friendly relations with 
when such an establishment is referred to as an Australia but which also arrogates to itself an unÿ 
'embassy'. Australia is a party to the Vienna acceptable title and status which could in turn 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. That conÿ disrupt the orderly conduct of Australia's relaÿ 
vention, in article 22,whic  h has the force of law  tions  with  another  universally  recognised 
in AustraUa,impose  s on Australia a special duty   member  of the international community. This  
to prevent  any impairment of the dignity of a could clearly have a substantial adverse effect on 
diplomatic mission accredited to this country. It   our  international  standing,  the  conduct of 
is not a matter  which can  be dealt  with in any Australia's   foreign  policy   and  our  national 
sense   of compromise.  It is a matter  of our interÿ   interest, thus affecting all AustraUans. national obligations and  the domestic  law which 
gives  effect to  these  obligations.  I need hardly u 
It can  scarcely  be  maintained  that the setting 
add  that  this would not apply to such  estabUshÿ   i 
p of  a  soÿcalled   Croatian  Embassy  is  not  an 
ments  as  the  soÿcalled  Aboriginal Embassy as it  mpairment   of  the   dignity  of the  diplomatic 
did not  affect  the standing  of any other nation mission   which  in  law,  and   in fact, represents 
with which Australia has diplomatic relations. Yugoslavia in this country. It is of no less concern that  the  unauthorised   establishment    of this soÿ 
It has  not  been  necessary   in the  past to treat called  Embassy  interferes  with  the exercise ofthe 
this  matter  as  one  for legislative  action.  Howÿ executive  power  of the  Commonwealth  to  conÿ 
ever,  this  has  now  become   necessary   because  of   duct    Australia's    international    relations.   The 
the establishment   in Canberra  late  last year of a Government  is thus  deeply  concerned   lest other 
soÿcalled Croatian Embassy. It is because the esÿ minority groups may be inspired by the conÿ 
tablishment   of the  soÿcalled   Embassy has  had tinued  existence   of the selfÿstyled Croatian Emÿ 
important ramifications for Australia,ramifica  ÿ  bassy to  believe  that  they,  too, may similarly 
tions   with  respect   to  the Vienna Convention, interfere in and  jeopardise   Australia's relations 
Australia's responsibilities under it, the effective with sovereign states. Furthermore, it has been a 
operation  of Australia's foreign policy, and our longstanding   poUcy  of AustraUan   governments 
longÿstanding relations with a universally recogÿ to oppose the importation into Australia of alien 
nised   nation,  namely  Yugoslavia,tha  t  the political  and  racial feuds. The Government  is 
Government   now  feels  it necessary to consider also  concerned   about  the  aggravation of tension 
legislation to put an end  to this anomaly and to between  certain  ethnic groups. 
guard against any recurrence.  At this stage  let me  make  it quite clear that it is 
I therefore  wish to set  out the  Government's not  in any  way the  Government's   wish to disÿ 
position with regard to this matter. The soÿcalled criminate against the Croatian commumty or to 
Croatian  Embassy  has  been  set  up in Canberra stop,   or  hinder,   members   of that community 
by certain persons who may or may not be fully forming their own groups  and  clubs where  these 
aware  of the serious  impUcations  of their actions,  are  not  aimed  at  a state  and  government  with 
which impede the correct and orderly conduct of which AustraUa has normal diplomatic relations. 
Australia's  international  relations,   for which I The   overwhelming  majority  of the  Croatian 
am directly responsible.  It is therefore necessary community in Australia has shown,  by its contriÿ 
that I now make clear to this House beyond any bution to the development of Australian society 
possibility of doubt the Government's views and and culture, a strong loyalty and commitment to 
intentions  on this matter. These   are in short that its new homeland.  It is an affront to this loyalty 
an establishment   such  as  the soÿcalled Croatian and  commitment  that  a soÿcalled Croatian Emÿ 
Embassy  is  damaging  to the  national  interest  and   bassy   should    purport   to  represent   them.  The 
that  such  an  estabUshment  cannot therefore  be proper    international    representative   of  the 
tolerated. interest  of AustraUans  of Croatian,  as  of other, 
Yugoslavia  acceded  to independence  in the origins is the AustraUan Government and no one 
context of the postÿWorld War I settlement, to else. 
which Australia was a party.  AustraUa has longÿ  The  only course  of action  for the  authors  of 
standing and friendly relations  with that country.  this enterprise is for them  to abandon it forthwith 
By   mutual   agreement    many  people   from and  revert to  the means   by which  dissent may be 
Yugoslavia  have  settled  in AustraUa. This has peacefully  asserted  within  the  law as it prevails 
strengthened   our  ties.  We respect  Yugoslavia's in our society. In order  to leave no doubt of the 
sovereignty.   The  Government cannot  therefore seriousness    with   which   this   matter   is  being 
view  with  indifference an  attempt to establish regarded,  and  consistent   with  the provisions  of 
and  maintain on AustraUan territory any organÿ article  22  of the  Vienna  Convention  I wish to 
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introduce legislation specifically prohibiting Cabinet since then. I leave the matter there. The 
institutions  or  bodies  falsely  representing   themÿ      point,  I believe,  has  been  adequately  made. 
selves  as  diplomatic, consular   or other official However,  I  will  relate   a few  simple  facts missions of another country or part of another associated with this  matter.  The  'Croatian Emÿ 
country.   Such   action  is  essential   not  only  to      bassy',    as    it  is   called,   was    opened    on 29 remove the anomaly which  has  already  been  November  last year.  It has  taken  something like 
created, but lest the  practice  of establishing  soÿ  four months  to obtain  this  firmness  of attitude called  embassies  be extended   thus  jeopardising      from the  Minister.  In that  intervening period it Australia's  foreign  relations and   national   has  become   quite clear  to those  about Canberra 
interest.  The  Government  does  not  believe  that   who  have  contacts  and who  are concerned  about the Australian community  would support  the esÿ     these   matters  that  relations  between Yugoslavia tablishment  of organisations  so obviously to the       and Australia have  become  increasingly strained detriment of this nation. I present the following and were  reaching  the  point  of jeopardy  as  a 
paper: result  of the  absence  of appropriate firm action 
'Croatian Embassy',Ministeria  l Statement, 5 April 1978.    by the Government. 
Motion (by  Mr Fife) proposed: I remind the  House   that  on  29  November last 
That the  House  take note of the paper. year  when  the  'Croatian  Embassy'   was opened, the  opening was  graced  with official Government 
Mr HAYDEN (OxleyÿLeader of the Oppoÿ presence.  Senator   Knight,  formerly  of the Deÿ 
sition) (3.13),I  t is appropriate that the Governÿ   partment of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Haslem, of 
ment  should  take  firm action  on this  matter, this House,  were  present.   I think  it is reasonable 
although   it  must   be  conceded   that the action to ask, in view of the provocative statements that 
comes  belatedly  and   grudgingly.   The   Minister    the    Minister   for  Foreign   Affairs  has  made, 
for  Foreign  Affairs (Mr Peacock)  has given a whether  their presence  at the opening  of the emÿ 
firm  undertaking   that   legislation will be bassy  was  with  the  knowledge  of the Governÿ 
introduced to give effect to the sentiments he has ment and of the Minister and to what extent they 
expressed  in his statement.  I would  wish that he  were  encouraged  or  discouraged.   But  there  are 
might  have  more  success in the  introduction  of   more  important  questions  to  be  asked. It is sigÿ 
that legislation than  he  has  enjoyed  so  far  in  nificant that  although  the  embassy  was  opened 
seeking   to introduce  legislation  to prohibit the well before  the last general  election, the Minister 
operation of the Rhodesian Information Office in did not find his way clear to make a statement on 
this  country.  Honourable   members  will recall the  matter  until  well  after the election, nearly 
that   Security    Council  resolution  409/77   coÿ four  weeks  later.   Presumably    he was waiting 
sponsored    by   the   United  States   of America, until the Croatian vote had  been safely counted. 
proposed   among  other  things  that  member  Mr Hodgman,Ho  w debased you are. nations   should   take  action   to  close down 
Rhodesian Information Offices. This Governÿ Mr HAYDENÿThe Minister for Foreign ment 
gave a firm undertaking to the Australian   Affairs, 
people  last year that  that  would be  done. The  Mr SPEAKERÿOrder! The  Leader ofthe Opÿ 
right wing rump of the  Government,  which  is  position  will  resume  his  seat.  The  honourable 
large and even greater in its influence on the member for Denison will withdraw that remark. 
Government, 
Mr Hodgman, I withdraw it, Mr Speaker. 
Mr SPEAKERÿOrder! The motion is to take Mr  HAYDEN,Th  e Minister  for  Foreign note of a paper about legislation in relation to orÿ Affairs has attracted no stature to his presence by 
ganisations   declaring  themselves   to  be embassies   the  way   in  which  he  has  handled   this  matter.  He when  that is not  the fact.  The   honourable  gentleÿ     has     been    tardy    and    unimpressive.     His final man    can    make    statements    relevant  to  that action, the statement  to  the  House   today,  comes, 
motion but not to an entirely different subject. as I said before,  grudgingly  and belatedly  and is 
Mr HAYDENÿMr Speaker, I submit that a clear indication that action was finally what I 
am proposing is that on the Minister's    extracted, I stress extracted,fro  m the Governÿ record 
so far we have no reason to feel reassured ment, not because it felt it should act as a matter that he 
will be successful in introducing the sort of principle or because it felt the burden of its 
oflegislation that is required here. In the case of responsibilities internationally under the Vienna 
the Rodesia Information Office he has been conÿ Convention which the Minister has quoted, but 
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government  they adopt another.  Then they try to  indicating to him  that  he is engaging in conduct  
lay  the  blame  on the  shoulders  of the  Federal   considered   by  me  to  be  contrary  to  the  Act. I 
Labor  Party,  which  Senator   Webster  said  was   have told him  that unless  that conduct, which inÿ 
not concerned  with the interests of people in priÿ   cludes   the   display  of  the   sign 'Croatian Emÿ 
mary industry. I think that our  record stands  secÿ      bassy', a flag and  a shield, is discontinued within 
ond   to  none   and  shows  that  we are  concerned   14 days  after today  and  undertakings are given 
with the problems of primary industry. When we    that it will not reÿoccur,  an application will be      
get into government  again at the end of next year   made  to  the  Federal   Court  of Australia for inÿ 
the people  out in the country areas  will throw  up  junctions preventing that  conduct  from  continuÿ 
their  hats  and  say:  'Three  cheers  for the Labor   ing.   There    have    been    indications  that  Mr 
Party'.   Despoja   does   not   wish   to  engage  in activities 
Senator   CAVANAGH  (South  Australia) which  are  contrary  to the  Act and  is seeking to 
(5.43)1 I want to  take  only a few  minutes in this        make representations   on them.  If this is so,   I shall 
third reading debate. In view of the way that the be  willing  to  examine these  representations 
debate is going, I hope that we do not  have within the next  14 days. Needless to say,  i f Mr 
another  turmoil similar to that  which  we have      Despoja ceases to engage in activities contrary to 
had in the past on such occasions.  I think  it is  the  Act and  undertakes  not to engage in them 
very unfortunate that the  Minister for Science further,  no  injunction  proceedings  will  be 
and   the   Environment  (Senator   Webster)   has    necessary. 
adopted the  attitude  he  has.  One  of the  first   The  Government's  decision  to  pursue this 
things to learn on joining the  Ministry is  that,     matter  should not in any way be interpreted as whilst  it  might  be  nice   to  answer   statements  an   act   of  discrimination  against   the  Croatian 
made by the Opposition, one's duty as a Minister     community. The  Government has  no  wish to stop is  to get  Bills through the  Parliament. Although      or  hinder  members   of the  Croatian community Senator Webster might gain some satisfaction  forming their own  clubs, groups or  associations. 
from adopting the attitude he has adopted, in The Croatian community has, and  continues  to doing that  he is not carrying out his duty as a    demonstrate it by its contribution to the developÿ 
Minister of getting his  Bills through  the  Parliaÿ      ment  of Australian society  and  culture, a strong ment.  Those   Bills  would  have  been   passed  by    loyalty  and   commitment  to  its  new   homeland 
now had he not made his aggressive  attack. That  and  the Government welcomes  this  contribution. 
could lead to  the  irritation of senators,  the calling     I hope   Mr Despoja  and  those  associated   with 
of quorums, and senators being thrown out ofthe     him  take advantage of  the  next  14 days to make chamber.  All that  could happen  simply because the  institution  of such proceedings unnecessary. we have a Minister who is not carrying out what I 
believe  is  the  duty of a Minister,  namely to get   Senator   M U L V I H I L L   (New  South 
legislation through this place.  Wales)1b  y leave1O  n  behalf of the  Leader of 
Question resolved in the affirmative. the   Opposition  (Senator   Wriedt)  I  simply say that  the  Opposition  regards  this  situation that 
Bills read a third time. besets  the  Government   as  one  in  which  a very 
'CROATIAN EMBASSY' fine  decision has  to be made  between  liberty and licence. The AttorneyÿGeneral (Senator Durack) 
Ministerial Statement  and  I had some experience  of this situation in a 
Senator   DURACK (Western Australiaÿ committee  context. Although  we may perhaps 
AttorneyÿGeneral)1b  y  leave1Becaus  e  of  the   differ on emphasis I am sure that  we both apÿ 
interest shown in the Senate in the activities  of  preciate the deepÿseated  antagonisms  that exists the 
so called 'Croatian Embassy' in Forrest, I inÿ  in the Yugoslav community. The point at issue is 
form the  Senate  that  the  Government has deÿ  how far certain elements can go in a community. 
cided  to  take  action in relation to it under the  Any  government  has  to have a foreign policy 
Diplomatic and Consular Missions Act. that at least observes  certain conventions. 
Senator Georges1Wha  t  are you going to do,  It could be said that the cultural aspirations of 
storm it? an ethnic community are  under  siege,  but I do 
Senator  DURACKÿWould  the  honourable  not  know  of  any  part  of  Australia  in  which 
senator   like  to  hear  the  rest  of the  statement?  Croatian  clubs  have not proliferated. They  have  
This  afternoon  I  sent  a  letter  to Mr  Mario  been  approved  by  councils  and  State  governÿ 
Despoja, the self styled 'Charge D'Affairs' of the ments of different political colour. But, that is not 
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plain fact is that Yugoslavia is in a unique situÿ important role in that movement for  a new interÿ 
ation. It is a country which is more or less in beÿ national economic order and  for  raising the  livÿ 
tween the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty ing standards of all of the people in what can be 
Organisation power blocs.  I will not elaborate  on    generally described  as Third World nations. 
that  point.  I  commend   to honourable  senators  I think it is a matter of regret that small groups 
the statement made some years ago by a  former  in our community should seek  to establish  a posÿ 
senator,    Senator    Wright,   when    he  was   the ition  independent    from  that   of  the  State  of 
Foreign Affairs spokesman  in the  Senate for the Yugoslavia which, after all, suffered greatly durÿ 
Liberal Government in which he spelt out in deÿ ing World War II. In the intervening years it has 
tail the situation if there were a fragmentation of endeavoured, quite successfully I believe, to raise 
Yugoslavia.   Unfortunately  some  people   have the   living  standards   of  its people. Yugoslavia 
sought such an event. also occupies a very important role in the divided 
It is not  my purpose,  or the Opposition's purÿ Europe that arose at the end of World War  II. 
pose, to score any  political points on this matter. I  We   have  been  aware   of the development of 
think  we are encouraged   by the fact that people terrorist  movements   that  claim  to  speak  on beÿ 
who are to the Right have to observe the law in half of the Croatian community. We are aware, 
the same way as people who are deemed to be to of course, that these groups do not speak on beÿ 
the far Left. On behalf of the Opposition I say half of that  community; that  in fact the overÿ 
that a democrat does not have any satisfaction in whelming majority of Croatians and Yugoslav 
having to curb selfÿexpression. However, there is migrants   who  have   come   to  Australia have 
a dividing line. I do not want to stifle debate so I settled and have proved themselves to be good 
will conclude my remarks with that point. citizens  willing to  accept  the  democratic and 
Senator GIETZELT (New South Wales)ÿby open  way  in  which  Australian community life 
leave1 I move: develops.  They  do not want  to  be  caught  up in the web of international intrigue which unfortuÿ 
That the Senate  take  note ofthe statement. nately has  been  part of the movement  around the 
I wish  to endorse  the  remarks  made by Senator 'Croatian  Embassy'. 
Mulvihill. We allrecognisethat he has played a  We  do  not,  of course,   want  to  go over  the 
signincant    part   in   resolving the   problems difficult days of 1973 when the Prime Minister of 
associated with some of the groups that have ocÿ Yugoslavia came to this country  as  a guest  of the 
cupied  a more  than  unusual  role in recent years Government following an invitation extended by 
in  endeavouring   to  divide  the Yugoslav comÿ the   previous   Government   during 1971ÿ72.  We 
munities in our country. I think I can say that the know  of the  endeavours  of a  small minority of 
Opposition would support the Government's inÿ malcontents who  tried  to  create  social  tension 
tentions in this matter. Legislation on this matter within the Yugoslav communities and within the 
was   passed   some  time  ago   and   we have been Australian   community  generally,   and  all that 
awaiting   the    second    stage   of the  legislative flowed  from that.  I think  we  have waited long 
process1tha  t is, for the Government to make a  enough  for steps  to  be  taken  by  the  Federal 
decision to apply the Act,  and  to call upon those Government  to put  an end  to selfÿstyled embassÿ 
who  designate  themselves  as  the  'Croatian  Emÿ  ies  that  seek  to abrogate  the  right of the official 
bassy' to cease activities which relate to our reÿ embassies of governments with  which  we  enjoy 
lationship with other countries. close and friendly relations. 
I think it is a matter  of great  regret that some  I think there has  been a very good relationship 
of these people have been able to create the  imÿ  between  the  Government  of Yugoslavia  and  the 
pression   in the  Australian community that they Australian    Government    regardless  of  the 
represent   a  strong  view  in  the Yugoslav comÿ changes    in   composition   of  the  Australian 
munity.  In fact they  represent  a small minority Government,  and  that  is the  way  it should be. I 
view   that   is  associated   with  an expression  of think   the   Opposition   would  commend   the 
nationalism  which  in itself  contradicts the very Government  for the steps  it has  taken in accordÿ 
strong trends  of federalism that exist in  the state ance  with the  legislation. The AttorneyÿGeneral 
of Yugoslavia. Of course,  their view ignores the (Senator  Durack) indicated in  his statement  that 
very important role that Yugoslavia is playing in some negotiations will take place with those 
developing    the    bridges    between  the  major people   who  style   themselves    as  the  'Croatian 
powers  of the  world   I refer particularly to the Embassy'    As  a  result  of those negotiations  the 
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embarrassment to the Australian Government. I  gains accruing to the production of oil from lowÿ 
seek leave to continue my remarks later.  cost Australian fields, principally those of Bass 
Leave granted; debate adjourned. Strait, would go to the Australian oil producers, principally EssoÿBHP.  The  Government  has deÿ 
EXCISE  AMENDMENT  BILL ÿNo.  2)  1979       cided to take a larger share of the revenue  itself. 
Second Reading    To  that  extent  the  Opposition approves of 
Debate  resumed  from 4 June, on motion by what  the  Government  has  done, although, for 
Senator Chaney:   reasons that I will outline, it would prefer a reÿ 
That the Bill be now read a second time.  source tax to apply. The Opposition also has resÿ ervations  in that  clearly  this  measure,  like so 
Senator WALSH (Western Australia) many of the measures in the 1978 Budget and (5.55)1Thi  s 
Bill is also a product of the Fraserÿ    the  1979 autumn  horror miniÿBudget, will sigÿ Howard 
horror miniÿBudget of 24 May. The purÿ  nificantly increase the consumer  price index and pose of the 
Bill is to ensure that any further inÿ  ensure  that  the  rate of inflation will continue to creases     by    
the    Organisation    of   Petroleum    rise. Exporting Countries  in oil prices  will be passed 
on in the prices paid by Australian refiners for It is perhaps nice for Mr Newman that he 
domesticallyÿproduced crude oil, but that the adÿ should have managed to score a small victory in 
ditional revenue flowing from OPEC  price inÿ  this matter, given not only his troubles of the last 
creases after  1 January   1979 will accrue  entirely     couple of weeks  but also the way   in which he  has 
to the Government instead of, as  under  the preÿ stumbled  along in the  shadow  of the  Australian 
vious arrangements, being shared between the Labor Party's shadow Minister in this area, Paul 
Government and  the Australian  crude  oil  Keating.  Mr Newman  has  been  trying desperÿ 
producers. The Government estimates that,  as a  ately to be  noticed, while stumbling along in Mr 
result  of the  OPEC 1 April  increase  of 9.5  per  Keating's shadow.  Mr Newman has been able to 
cent, this measure  will raise $ 166m   in a full year.     point  out,  apparently,  to  the  Government   the 
It is widely expected,  indeed  almost certain, that      error in the  original  legislation.  He has certainly 
on 1 July there will be a further OPEC price  inÿ  been noticed now, not so  much for pointing out 
crease of 10 per cent or thereabouts,  so it is probÿ  this error but for not being able to hear,  or so  he 
able  that  over  the  entire  year  this  measure  will  tells  us,  in  the  House  of  Representatives.   We 
yield  government   revenue   of  some  $320m  or     have a Ministry in which the Prime Minister (Mr 
$330m. Malcolm  Fraser)   cannot   remember   and Mr Newman cannot hear. 
The   history   of  this  measure has 
demonstratedÿif further demonstration were This measure represents a movement away needed1ho  
w  the  Government  has  lost control     from  the  Government's  import  parity  pricing both of the 
process of government and of parliaÿ policy, but it is an inferior type of tax to the reÿ mentary 
business. The blunder which the source tax which the Australian Labor Party has Government 
made was summed up succinctly in  long advocated. A resource tax seeks to tax away the current 
issue of the Laurie Oakes Report as the pure economic rent component  of mineral follows:
 and oil deposits. By economic rent I mean any reÿ turn over and above  that necessary to call forth 
.   .    .    The National Development Minister, Mr Newman,       the  factors of production  which  would produce insisted on the  amendments1 the desired or existing level of output. 
The  reference  is  to  amendments   which were 
made   after   the   Bill   had  been   originally Sitting suspended from 6 to 8 p.m. 
introduced in the House ofRepresentatives1 Senator WALSH1Prio  r to the suspension of 
after studying the legislation on his return from an overseas  the sitting I was saying that in one sense the Opÿ 
trip, in an extraordinary blunder, the original legislation proÿ position welcomes this  measure  insofar  as  it 
vided for all oil fields to be treated in the same way, even      ensures that the additional windfall gains which though the Treasurer, Mr Howard, had said in his expendiÿ 
ture and  taxation statement  to Parliament: 'The implications       accrue  to crude oil producers  from low  cost Ausÿ 
of these new levy arrangements on  small producers  and  marÿ  tralian  fields do so entirely for the public revenue 
ginal fields will be kept under reveiw.' rather  than  being divided, as  was  the  case under 
To some extent the Government, in introducing  the  previous  arrangements, between the  Ausÿ 
this legislation, has recognised  its past errors. It  tralian producers  and the public revenue;  on the 
has implicitly recognised the foolish decision1 other hand we  have  a  reservation.  That,  of 
although it fails to acknowledge it, of courseÿ  course,  is that  this measure, like so  many other 
th t it d  i  th  1978 B d t h  it d id d measures which were announced  a fortnight ago 
                          
 
